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Abstract
What explains variation in institution-building under foreign occupations? Why do some
state-building missions produce effective and durable state institutions, while others leave a
legacy of weak or dysfunctional ones? I explored these questions through a comparative study of
the Japanese colonization of Taiwan (1895-1945) and the American colonization of the
Philippines (1898-1941), which produced contrasting institutional legacies despite the presence
of similar initial conditions. While a strong bureaucratic Taiwanese state arose in the aftermath
of Japanese colonization, the legacy of the American occupation of the Philippines was a weak
postcolonial state penetrated by parochial interests.
I explain variation in institution-building outcomes through two causal variables: (i) the
degree of discretionary power afforded to the occupational administration by the home
government; and (ii) the ability of native elites to effectively resist the institution-building effort.
Discretionary power allows reform agents to abandon any pre-formulated (and likely ill-
conceived) plans, and instead flexibly integrate native laws, norms, and customs with their new
institutional designs. Additionally, and contrary to conventional wisdom, more effective
institutions emerge when native elites possess the willingness and capacity to resist (even
violently) the institution-building effort of foreign agents. The reformist state-building agenda of
occupiers is likely to be in direct opposition to the distributional interests of native elites, who
seek to maintain their advantageous position within the existing order. It is, therefore, only under
the threat of effective resistance that foreign agents will accommodate the interests of native
elites to forge institutions with local ownership.
The main empirical chapters of the dissertation draw on more than two years of original
archival research in fourteen libraries and depositories across Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States. In both cases, my analysis focused on the similarities and differences in the process
through which education and police institutions were developed over time; these two areas were
chosen due their importance for a country's political stability and socioeconomic development.
The applicability of conclusions drawn from the historical cases to contemporary state-building
missions was assessed through an examination of recent U.S. efforts at building a police
institution in Afghanistan.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Chapter 1: A Theory of State-building
1. Introduction
Within the past two decades, international actors have again begun to play an
increasingly prominent and direct role in the reconstruction of war-torn and failing states. Prior
to 1991, United Nations peacekeeping operations did little more than enforce agreed-upon peace
accords between inter- and intra-state actors. Yet, starting with the creation of the 1992 United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the UN began to take responsibility for the actual
governing of post-conflict states, as well as the development of their economic and political
institutions. It is not just the UN that is now actively engaging in the building of nation-states out
of failed states. Although the United States aborted its first post-Cold War state-building mission
in Somalia after eighteen American deaths in 1993, since then, both Democratic and Republican
administrations have committed considerable amounts of troops, money, and political capital to
the rebuilding of Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The recent record of international actors in establishing Western institutions through
occupation, however, has been disappointing, and shows little sign of progress.' Given the long-
lasting strategic and humanitarian consequences of foreign intervention and state-building, a
better understanding of what allows foreign reformers to build successful institutions in occupied
territories is urgently needed. The aim of this dissertation is to examine past state-building
efforts, in particular within the context of colonialism, to draw lessons for today. It is under
colonialism that some of the most ambitious institution-building schemes were undertaken, and it
For a summary and assessment of these state-building missions, see Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The
United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); James
Dobbins, et al., America's Role in State-building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003);
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar
Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009).
is therefore in its context that we find stunning successes and catastrophic failures in
reconstructing entire societies in the image of Western modernity.
The Japanese occupation of Taiwan (1895 to 1945) was an outstanding example of state-
building success under colonization. Prior to Japanese occupation, Taiwan was an economically
underdeveloped and disease-ridden frontier province of the Qing empire. In addition, since the
annexation of Taiwan was an unexpected result of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese were
without a concrete plan for governing the island, which immediately plunged into a state of war
upon Japanese arrival. Therefore, it was little surprise that after receiving conflicting guidance
from French and British advisors, the Japanese failed miserably in building governance
institutions during the early years of colonial administration. In fact, with the financial burden of
the occupation so severe, and prospects for successful colonial development so grim, some even
advocated selling Taiwan to a European power. Yet, after overcoming initial difficulties, the
Japanese constructed a highly effective set of administrative and extractive institutions in
Taiwan. Within a decade, colonial reformers had eradicated the bubonic plague, modernized the
antiquated and inefficient system of land ownership, and developed a dense network of roads and
rail that allowed Taiwan to become a highly profitable colonial possession.
During the same moment that the Japanese were establishing modern state institutions in
Taiwan, American colonial officials in the Philippines were coming to terms with the fact that
their "civilizing" mission, which began with the American conquest of the Philippines in 1898
(and eventually terminated in 1946), was going terribly wrong. The American colonial state
never lacked the coercive capacity to impose new institutional designs on the Filipino people, as
evidenced by the U.S. military's ability to crush a widely supported independence movement.
Yet, a little over a decade into their state-building effort, U.S. colonial officials were frustrated
with their failure to improve health and sanitary conditions throughout the archipelago, as well as
their inability to keep Filipino schoolchildren enrolled in the new and secular public school
system. Local governments, designed to train Filipinos in democratic behavior, were hopelessly
corrupt. Various land reform measures that were intended to increase landownership among
peasants were instead contributing to the growth of large plantations. In short, while American
dominance in the Philippines allowed the United States to reform the institutional makeup of the
Philippine Islands on paper, many of the newly established institutions were failing.
Hence, during the first half of the twentieth century, two imperial powers-Japan and the
United States-similarly sought to impose their way of life on peoples resisting occupation and
demanding independence. Yet, only in one of these two cases were the institutional objectives of
the colonizers met. Why? This variation in the successful establishment of modern state
institutions in colonial Taiwan and Philippines lies at the heart of this comparative-historical
study, but the goal of this dissertation goes beyond understanding these two historic cases; rather,
it is to draw lessons from our colonial past to infer how we may improve upon more recent
attempts at state-building.
The significance of the Taiwan and Philippines cases to contemporary state-building
missions also comes from their exceptional position within the history of colonization, as being
among the first instances where colonizers aimed, from the very beginning, to transform a
foreign and traditional society into a modern bureaucratic (rational-legal) state.2 Consequently,
2 A modern state is characterized by a cohesive central government with the capacity to monopolize or regulate
various coercive, extractive, and distributive functions within the confines of its (internationally recognized)
territorial boundary. For a detailed discussion of the difference between modern and pre-modem states, see Thomas
Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 6-10; Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political
Sociology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1988), pp. 7-14; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European
States, AD 990-1992 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), pp. 1-5; Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press,
1946): 77-128.
from an institutional perspective, they have more in common with recent state-building missions
than with older European colonial undertakings in Asia and Africa, especially when compared to
colonies that were governed indirectly through local intermediaries. 3 Meanwhile, because these
occupations took place during a period where draconian methods of social engineering were
normatively permissible, they display far greater variation in institution-building strategies (both
within and across the two cases) than is found in contemporary state-building efforts. These two
cases are therefore uniquely situated to offer both positive and negative lessons (and warnings)
for today's policymakers.
This dissertation takes an explicitly institutional approach to explain variation in state-
building outcomes. In contrast to previous work in post-conflict studies that debates the merits of
specific institutional designs, I focus on the conditions under which foreign occupiers are likely
to establish strong institutions. I argue that two key factors jointly determine the likelihood that
war-torn or traditional societies will be transformed into modern states through strong
institutions: (i) the extent of discretionary authority granted to the occupational administration by
its home government; and (ii) the ability of native elites to resist the institution-building effort.
The greater freedom foreign occupiers have to engage in on-the-ground experimentation, the
more likely they are to successfully integrate new institutions into the native social order. Agent
discretion is thus a necessary structural condition for state-building success. Additionally, and
contrary to conventional wisdom, more effective institutions emerge when native elites possess
the willingness and capacity to resist (even violently) the institution-building effort of foreign
agents. The reformist state-building agenda of occupiers is likely to be in direct opposition to the
3 Eventually, state-building would became an important goal of various European colonies in the years preceding
World War II, but these efforts were cut short by various independence movements following the war, or in the case
of many African colonies, were pursued with far less intensity than they were in Taiwan and the Philippines. For
more on colonial state-building in Africa, see Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
distributional interests of native elites, who seek to maintain their advantageous position within
the existing order. It is, therefore, only under the threat of effective resistance that foreign agents
will accommodate the interests of native elites to forge institutions with local ownership.
Very few scholars have examined colonial occupations for the purpose of understanding
state-building. 4 To a large extent, this is due to the belief that contemporary state-building efforts
are fundamentally different from their colonial predecessors. This may be true in terms of the
larger objectives of the occupiers, but when the actual process of building institutions is
examined, there is very little difference between occupations then and now, especially when late
colonial cases (such as Taiwan and the Philippines) are the objects of comparison. By ignoring
the colonial cases, a large segment of the relevant population of cases is therefore discarded. This
has been particularly damaging to our understanding of state-building, since some of the most
prominent successes and failures in building institutions abroad took place under colonialism.
Without studying the entire range of variation in outcomes, there is little hope for improvement
in our dismal record in bringing peace, stability, and economic prosperity to post-conflict states.
2. State of the Literature
The topic of this dissertation is state-building. It is a study of a small subset of colonial
and contemporary occupations where the institutional objective is the establishment of a modem
state infrastructure in a target territory. Although much has been written on state-building in
recent years, existing works tend to cluster around three main competing explanations of state-
building success and failure. First, background conditions (such as the ethnic composition of a
target territory, its previous experience with democratic governance, and level of economic
development) are often seen as instrumental in determining the difficulty of transferring Western
4 Jason Brownlee, "Review Article: Can America Nation-build?" World Politics 59.2 (2007): 314-40.
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institutions to traditional or war-torn societies. Others have argued that the greater the intensity
of the institution-building effort (in terms of time, money, and manpower), the more likely the
occupation will have a lasting legacy. While it is certainly possible to leave behind a negative
institutional legacy, this perspective tends to associate intensive occupations with positive
outcomes, be it the establishment of bureaucratic capacity, economic growth, or democratization.
Finally, scholars have emphasized institutional design: The key to state-building success is to
uncover the ideal set of formal rules and organizational innovations that effectively suppress
corruption, encourage political openness, and/or mitigate inter-ethnic tension in a typical post-
conflict environment.5
In the following pages, I review these perspectives, and argue that they share a common
shortcoming: Despite the fact that any effort to establish new institutions takes place over a
number of years and through various twists and turns, these theories tend to treat state-building
as a single event, rather than a process. Furthermore, although a foreign occupation is necessarily
a moment of "critical juncture," with a "substantially heightened probability that agents' choices
6will affect the outcome of interest," the role of agency is underspecified. If the background and
intensity approaches ignore the agency of foreign agents and the consequence of their actions on
state-building outcomes, those that focus on design treat agents as unconstrained actors who are
able to freely choose the best model conceivable. What I suggest instead is an account of why
5 In addition to these approaches, there also exists an older literature on state formation. The focus of this literature,
however, is not how states are built through foreign occupation, but rather, the issue of how traditional societies
modernize into nation-states through the "natural" process of economic development and war, or by the actions of
modernizing elites. See Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental
Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East
(Glencoe, I: Free Press, 1958); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Lucian W. Pye, Aspects ofPolitical
Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation ofNational States
in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
6 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," World Politics 59.3 (2007), p. 348.
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some foreign reformers are able to overcome adverse background conditions, make use of
limited resources, and forge workable institutional designs, while others fail in these attempts.
The theoretical focus is therefore squarely on the process through which foreign agents endeavor
to transform war-torn or traditional societies into modem states, and the factors that constrain the
actions of these agents.
2.1. Existing Approaches to the Study of State-building
In the months preceding America's 2003 invasion of Iraq, scholars and pundits debated
whether past military occupations could provide valuable lessons for U.S. policymakers. In
particular, the successful post-World War II reconstruction of Japan was mentioned as a possible
model for Iraq. Questioning this analogy, however, was John Dower (the Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian of Japan), who noted the incomparability in background conditions between postwar
Japan and Iraq in terms of the legitimacy enjoyed by the occupying forces (in the eyes of the
occupied) and the homogeneity of the target population.7 Others, such as Francis Fukuyama,
have stressed the importance of preexisting state capacity and infrastructural development as key
determinants of state-building outcomes: U.S. success in rebuilding postwar Germany and Japan
can largely be explained by the fact that these two countries were already nation-states with a
highly effective civilian bureaucracy, an advanced (albeit broken) industrial system, and a
developed (albeit repressed) structure of interest aggregation.8 In contrast, America's record in
7 John W. Dower, "Lessons from Japan about War's Aftermath," New York Times 27 October 2002: A13. Edelstein
argues that the primary reason why occupiers are able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the occupied is the existence
of a common third party threat. If the occupied territory is threatened by a common enemy of the occupier, then its
population is more likely to accept the intervention as a means of achieving security from external threat.
Meanwhile, the existence of a common threat increases the probability that the occupier will commit the necessary
time, manpower, and resources to the state-building effort. David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and
Failure in Military Occupation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
8 Francis Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2004), pp. 38-39. State-building in Japan and Germany, Fukuyama argues, therefore progressed more along
the lines of "reconstruction" than institutional "development," where reconstruction refers to "the restoration of war-
12
territories without a preexisting modern state structure has been poor, as witnessed by failed
interventions in Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and South Vietnam.
Consequently, Jason Brownlee concludes that state-building is more likely to succeed in
territories where the occupiers are required to do the least-that is, where modernizing
(democratizing, liberalizing) reforms can build upon existing local institutions and traditions.
True state-building missions, from this perspective, are a fool's errand.9
Meanwhile, intensity of colonization, scholars have argued, is among the most significant
determinants of whether European occupiers, despite their self-serving intentions, had positive
effects (if any) on a colonized territory's postcolonial development. Mirroring these findings on
colonial institution-building, James Dobbins and his collaborators argue that the most important
factor differentiating successful state-building cases (such as Japan and Germany) from failed
ones (such as Somalia and Haiti) are "not their levels of economic development, Western culture,
or national homogeneity. Rather, what distinguishes these two groups is the level of effort the
torn or damaged societies to their preconflict situation" and development to "the creation of new institutions and the
promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has
not been previously." Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-building and the Failure of Institutional Memory," in Nation-
building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006),
pp. 4-5.
9 Brownlee, "Review Article: Can America Nation-build."
1 For representative arguments, see Atul Kohli, State-directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization
in the Global Periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Matthew Lange, Lineages ofDespotism
and Development: British Colonialism and State Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); James
Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010). Lange argues that directness of colonial rule correlates positively with
postcolonial GDP growth and various democracy indicators. Mahoney, on the other hand, writes that although
intensity of colonization is a key variable in predicting postcolonial outcomes, its effect is not always positive:
While intensive colonization by liberal states did indeed result in higher postcolonial economic growth, that by
mercantilistic countries had negative long-term developmental outcomes. Recent interest in colonial legacies can be
traced to works written by economists and economic historians in the early 2000s. See, in particular, Daron
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review 91.5 (2001): 1369-1401; Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise
and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessonsfor Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Kenneth
L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman, "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of
Development in the New World," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14.3 (2000): 217-32. For a rejection of the
notion that colonization had any positive effects on post-colonial economic development, see Jonathan Krieckhaus,
Dictating Development: How Europe Shaped the Global Periphery (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2006).
international community has put into their democratic transformation."" Intensity of the
institution-building effort is also a key factor in Doyle and Sambanis' model, where three
variables jointly determine the probability of peace-building success: international capacity, local
capacity, and residual animosity between (previously) warring factions. Finally, scholars such
as Stephen Krasner have led the intensity argument to its natural conclusion by suggesting that
"de facto trusteeships" should be reintroduced to the list of policy options for state-builders. By
directly administering war-torn territories for an extended period, foreign reformers can
undertake broader and deeper state-building campaigns.' 3
If the background and intensity approaches seek to explain the conditions under which
institution-building is more likely to succeed, the design approach focuses on the actual content
of the reforms that foreign occupiers should undertake. Virginia Page Fortna, for example, writes
that compliance to cease-fire agreements may be increased by designing institutions that
accomplish the following: raising the cost of renewed aggression, providing credible information
regarding the actions and intentions of formally warring groups, and instituting mechanisms for
preventing accidental abrogation of agreements.' 4 With his focus on the issue of democratic
stability, Donald Horowitz examines how electoral rules can be devised to lessen ethnic conflict.
He proposes an electoral system of alternative voting, whereby voters rank several candidates on
" Dobbins, et al., America's Role in Nation-building, p. 161.
12 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
"3 Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International
Security 29.2 (2004): 85-120. For a critical discussion of "neotrusteeship," see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,
"Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,"International Security 28.4 (2004): 5-43; Pierre Englebert and
Denis M. Tull, "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States," International Security
32.4 (2008): 106-39.
1 Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
a single ballot to encourage moderation in campaign rhetoric.15 Meanwhile, Roland Paris argues
that democratic (as well as free-market) institutions are inherently divisive, and should not be
immediately introduced in post-conflict societies.' 6 Finally, Roeder and Rothchild suggest that
institutions in post-conflict societies be designed so that they are "power-dividing"-that is, rival
groups achieve security by the moderating effects of a checks and balances system (as in the
United States) rather than through formal ethnic representation in political and economic
institutions.17
2.11. A Way Forward
The primary limitation of existing approaches is that they have little to say on the process
through which institutions are established. Indeed, state-building will undoubtedly proceed more
smoothly if the target society is already a modem bureaucratic state. More resources are always
better than less. However, as the Taiwan case illustrates, it is possible to build a modem
bureaucratic state out of a traditional society. Despite the fact that both background conditions
and state-building intensity operate at the level of the occupation as a whole, foreign reform
efforts typically produce uneven results across various institutional areas. Meanwhile, although
the design approach acknowledges that we must go beyond background conditions and intensity,
it fails to address why foreign occupiers come to adopt a particular institutional design over
*5 Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991); idem, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000). The opposing view is taken by Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative
Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Lijphart argues that a proportional representation electoral
system is the most suitable method to represent the views of all minority groups within a country, and therefore, to
alleviate their grievances. See also, Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
16 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
A similar argument is found in Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," International Security 30.4 (2006):
87-112.
"7 Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild, "Dilemmas of State-building in Divided Societies," in Sustainable
Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2005): 1-25.
another. In fact, it is often the case that foreign reformers select institutional models that are
thoroughly unworkable within the society they seek to transform. Existing theories, because they
are largely unconcerned with the actual process of building and reforming institutions, have had
little to say on why the misapplication of models occurs so frequently.' 8
Also left undifferentiated are the various ways by which new institutions stand to fail in
regulating behavior. In part, this is a consequence of how state-building success and failure have
typically been measured: "Performance indicators" (such as GDP change, number of battle
deaths, and freedom and democracy scores) are popularly used to measure state-building
outcomes, but they do not give us any information regarding why an institution was or was not
able to elicit a change in the behavior of the target population. Specifically, it is unclear as to
whether negative scores on these indicators were a result of individuals ignoring new rules, or
because compliance to new rules inadvertently produced undesirable behavior. Moreover, while
performance indicators may provide an assessment of present institutional effectiveness, they say
little about how an institution may evolve and perform in the future. By understanding why an
institution is able (or unable) to produce the anticipated behavioral results within a target
population, it is possible not only to understand the reasons for success or failure in the present,
but also to predict future institutional performance. Overall, curiously lacking in many works
that examine institution-building under foreign occupations is a clear argument on how
institutions function and the ways in which they can be changed.' 9 What I therefore offer is an
explicitly institutional approach to the study of state-building.
18 An important exception is Lise Morjd Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008). Here, Howard examines the conditions under which international actors are able to learn
from their mistakes and adjust their institution-building strategy.
19 A notable exception is Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development.
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An institutional approach to the study of state-building also allows us to separate our
value judgments regarding the effects of institutional reform from the issue of whether or not
new institutions were successfully established. In the Philippines, for example, U.S. intervention
led to an expansion of the Philippine economy, but the consequence of this development was the
growth of large plantations at the expense of small-scale farming. Whether one perceives this
outcome to have been good for the Philippine Islands depends on whose perspective one takes,
as well as on one's normative beliefs concerning the issue of economic development and
equality. On the other hand, the evaluation of whether various laws promoting economic growth
and regulating land tenure were successfully established-that is, whether the target population
complied to new laws in the manner anticipated by the reformers-is less value-laden. This is
certainly not to suggest that ethical questions should not be taken into account in state-building.
Yet, in order for us to effectively engage the question of whether we should intervene in other
countries and what kind of institutions we should try to construct, we must first know why it is
that some reform efforts produce effective and durable institutions, while others fail.
3. Causes of State-building Success and Failure
My argument proceeds in two parts. The first, and conceptual, portion of my argument
examines the question of how best to measure outcomes of institution-building efforts. I argue
that it is possible to categorize institutions built under foreign occupations by two indicators: (i)
hybridity, or the degree to which newly introduced institutions are integrated into the existing
institutional order; and (ii) local ownership, or the extent to which a plurality within a subject
population (or more accurately, their representatives) regards the operation of a particular
institution to be in their best interest. These two relational measures are useful not only for their
ability to compare and contrast institution-building outcomes across a wide range of cases (both
colonial and contemporary), but also because they are each associated with distinct predictions
regarding short-term performance of institutions, as well as their longer-term evolutionary
trajectory. The more hybridic and locally owned new institutions are, the more transformative
they are likely to be.
Second, I explain variation in institution-building outcomes (in terms of their hybridity
and local ownership) through two causal variables: (i) the degree of discretionary power afforded
to the occupational administration by the home government; and (ii) the capacity of native elites
to oppose effectively specific reform proposals by foreign agents. Discretionary power allows
reform agents to abandon any pre-formulated (and likely ill-conceived) plans, and instead
flexibly integrate native laws, norms, and customs with new institutional designs. Effective
resistance to an occupation by local elites, on the other hand, leads to the establishment of new
institutions with robust ownership, as it compels foreigners to meet the distributional interests of
local actors in the process of institutional reform.
3.1. Typology of Institution-building under Foreign Occupation
Territories that become targets of state-building missions are typically characterized by
an ineffective central government-that is, failing or failed states. Statelessness, however, does
not imply a lack of institutions, as the absence of state institutions encourages the development
of alternative forms of political order, such as warlordism or tribal rule.20 Even societies
devastated by war are intricately interwoven by both formal institutions (written rules and
supporting administrative organizations) and informal institutions (norms and beliefs), which
'0 Ken Menkhaus, "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of
Coping," International Security 31.3 (2006): 74-106.
regulate everything from social behavior to political and economic interactions. As Joel Migdal
and others have argued, the problem of governance found in weak states is not that a system of
societal control is missing entirely, but rather, the reality that various such competing systems are
dispersed among a heterogeneous set of actors.22 For this reason, state-building missions, even
those undertaken in territories devastated by war, do not take place on a tabula rasa, but within a
situation of existing institutional complexity.
Thus, the success of state-building missions is determined by the extent to which imposed
institutional elements are integrated into the existing (and often informal) institutions of the
23target territory. If this interaction between foreign and native institutions produces conflicting
behavioral signals or causes them to undermine one another, then the institution-building effort is
likely to ultimately end in failure. On the other hand, if the foreign and the native are integrated
into a coherent whole, the result will be the establishment of effective institutions-effective in
the sense that they have clear and consistent behavioral implications on the target population.
While the specific relational structure between the newly introduced foreign institutions and
native institutions can take a number of forms, they lie within a spectrum between a hybridic
structure on one hand and a dualistic structure on the other. As diagramed in Figure 1, the
contrast is between institutions where the foreign and the native are thoroughly integrated into a
coherent whole, and those where the foreign and the native co-exist side-by-side to
independently affect the behavior of the local population.
2 Borrowing from Avner Greif, this dissertation conceptualizes an institution as "a system of rules, beliefs, norms,
and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior." Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to
Modern Economy: Lessonsfrom Medieval Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 30.
22 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Change
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2003), pp. 11-42; Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States:
State-Society Relations and State Capability in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.
10-41.
23 Claus Offe, "Designing Institutions in East European Transitions," in The Theory ofInstitutional Design, ed.
Robert E. Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 217.
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Figure 1: Typology of Institution-building Outcomes Under Foreign Occupation
Hybridic & Locally Owned Hybridic & Locally Disowned
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Furthermore, both hybridic and dualistic institutions may or may not attain local
ownership. The significance of local ownership lies in its direct relationship to the issue of
institutional durability: Without local ownership, an institution is unlikely to survive in the
occupation's aftermath. However, since institutions are inherently distributional instruments (i.e.,
they allocate scare resources within a population),2 it is unlikely that a particular institution will
obtain universal support within a target territory, especially in a war-torn and/or ethnically
divided society. Hence, local ownership is seen here as achieved when an institution is supported
by a plurality of the native population. Moreover, the focus will be on the elites representing this
plurality, as they play a mediating function between the occupational administration and the
24 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining Institutional
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p. 8. As Mahoney and Thelen note, this view of institutions is characteristic of the historical
institutional perspective on institutions, but can also be found in the more rationalist or sociological schools on
institutions. An alternative perspective of institutions is one that sees them as tools for enhancing cooperation. For a
summary of the different approaches to the study of institutions, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor,
"Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44.5 (1996): 936-57.
wider population. In short, the term "local" in local ownership is used as a shorthand for elites
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commanding a significant following within the target territory.
Each of the four possible ideal-typical outcomes has distinct implications on an
institution's effectiveness, durability, and transformativeness. An institution that is both hybridic
and locally owned is likely to be highly effective. In the first place, with foreign and traditional
institutions thoroughly integrated, the target population will be subjected to a coherent set of
formal and informal rules within an institutional area. The effectiveness of a hybridic and locally
owned institution is also a function of the fact that native elites will assist the occupational
administration in the enforcement of its rules. In the long run (that is, even in the aftermath of the
occupation), a hybridic institution with local ownership is durable and will continue to generate
the intended behavioral outcome of the institution's designers. This institutional arrangement is
also transformative in that it leads to a behavioral change in the subject population-a change
that is buttressed by the new institution's durability.
An institution that is hybridic but without local ownership is effective, but only so long as
the foreign occupation continues. It is possible, however, for a hybridic institution initially
lacking in native elite support to eventually acquire local ownership under a long-lasting foreign
occupation. This results when existing powerholders adapt to the new institutional arrangement
and begin to acquire distributional benefits from the institution's operation. Alternatively, new
institutions may disrupt power relations within the target society and empower, or give rise to, an
alternative elite stratum. Precisely because a hybridic institution, even without local ownership,
is highly effective (if directly enforced by foreign administrators), either one of these outcomes
25 For further discussion of the term "local ownership," see Timothy Donais, "Understanding Local Ownership in
Security Sector Reform," in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais (Berlin: Lit Verlag,
2008): 3-18; Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding
Operations," Journal ofIntervention and Statebuilding 1.1 (2007): 3-26.
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is quite possible, as long as foreign interveners are willing to allocate considerable time and
manpower to the occupation. Consequently, the combination of hybridic institutions and lack of
local ownership is potentially transformative, but only in instances where the problem of the
institution's initial fragility is addressed.
Thirdly, an institution can be locally owned but dualistic in its structure. Such an
institution will be durable, but its effectiveness will be erratic, and at the mercy of native elites.
Under a dualistic institutional structure, new rules, regulations, and bureaucratic structures exist
separately alongside a native institution within a single functional area. Unsupported by the
existing institutional order, new institutions are likely to lack some of the necessary tools for
enforcement, in particular, norms and beliefs (i.e., informal institutions) that compel individuals
to comply with a set of formal rules and regulations. Moreover, as new institutions are created
alongside old ones, the two will interact to produce some unpredictable (and typically
undesirable) behavioral outcome. For example, if an elaborate bureaucratic structure
characterized by meritocratic appointment and promotion rules is created in a society where
interpersonal relations are governed by clientelistic relations, then it is difficult to anticipate (at
least from the institutional structure alone) what the resulting behavioral outcome will be. It is
for this reason that the performance, and ultimately the transformativeness, of a dualistic
institution is highly dependent upon the whims of its local elite supporters. The likelihood that a
dualistic institution produces some undesirable behavioral outcome is even greater in the post-
occupation period: Once foreign "supervision" is removed from the equation, the new
institution's local owners are free to selectively choose what rules and regulations to enforce and
what to ignore in their quest to maximize their distributional benefits.
Figure 2: Institutional Ideal-types and Their Observable Outcomes
Transformative Effective Potentially
Transforamtive
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Finally, institutions built under foreign occupations may be both dualistic and lack local
ownership. Predictably, such an institution is ineffective and unlikely to survive the occupation.
As such, the new institution itself will not generate much short term behavioral change or a
longer-term transformation of the social order. This does not mean, however, that the target
territory will be unaffected by the failed institution-building effort. Just as war, revolution, and
catastrophic natural disasters can disrupt and fundamentally alter the distribution of power within
a society, so too could a disastrously conceived state-building mission. The colonial period is
indeed littered with examples of highly ambitious modernization projects gone tragically awry.26
Yet, the specific outcome of a destructive transformation is not something that foreign agents
have much control over. It is up to the territory's post-colonial rulers to rebuild from the disorder
that colonial officials left behind. However, because their starting point is hardly a tabula rasa,
26 See, for example, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 225-29.
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but rather, a dysfunctional state of institutional incoherence (containing both modem and
traditional elements), the odds are against a successful post-occupational reform effort.
3.11. The Causal importance of Agent Discretion and Local Elite Accommodation
With institutional hybridity and local ownership identified as key characteristics of
institutions built under foreign occupations, the question of causality arises. Why are institutions
established by foreign actors more or less hybridic and why are they more or less supported by
native elites? As shown in Figure 3, I argue that two factors play a critical role: (i) degree of
discretionary authority afforded to reform agents by the home government; and (ii) the level of
effective resistance by the local population against the foreign occupation. In other words, the
outcome of state-building missions is determined by the specific way in which the occupational
administration is constrained from above and from below.
Figure 3: Summary of the Causal Argument
Local
Agent Resistance Effective Ineffective
Discretion
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Starting with the relationship between agent discretion and institutional hybridity, it can
be observed that a hybrid institution is neither foreign nor native, but is a fusion of the two. A
fusion of two separate institutions-each undergirded by a different internal logic-does not
occur simply by placing them side-by-side or on top of one another: Both foreign and native
institutions must be changed so that the two can combine into a coherent whole. However, how
foreign models can or should be modified, and local institutions reformed in this process, is hard,
if not impossible, to determine in advance. State-building is typically undertaken in territories
with weak or failing governmental and economic institutions, where a myriad of informal
structures (such as kinship and clientelistic networks) play a central role in regulating the
behavior of individuals. These types of institutions are not only inherently difficult to identify
and conceptualize (especially for foreigners), but information regarding their internal workings is
tightly guarded in post-conflict societies, as such knowledge is an important source of power for
local elites. Foreign actors are therefore likely to initially face a situation of acute uncertainty in
regards to the native institutional order.
Hence, efforts at reforming and building institutions must be characterized by flexibility
and pragmatism if they are to have any chance of success. 2 7 To the extent that hybridic designs
cannot be formulated in advance, reform agents must be able to experiment with various
institutional arrangements, and flexibly adapt their initial designs as more information becomes
available through the course of interacting with native institutional structures. Consequently, a
necessary condition for the establishment of hybrid institutions is that the occupational
administration be afforded considerable discretionary authority by its home government.
Discretionary power allows foreign reform agents to abandon any pre-conceived plans that they
may have had (or been assigned) upon entering the occupation, and instead, adopt alternative
models and approaches to institution-building through a process of trial and error.2 8
27 On this point, see Scott, Seeing Like a State; Wade Jacoby, Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western
Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
28 For an alternative (cognitive) approach in explaining the cause of institution-building rigidity, see S6verine
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However, the home government will likely eschew granting too much discretion to its
agents, given the possibility of conflict in agenda.29 From the perspective of the occupational
administration, state-building is a top priority. On the other hand, state-building is merely one of
many conflicting policy and political goals of the home government. Doing everything possible
to succeed in state-building may not be a viable option for the home government, which must
take into account the financial and human costs of the intervention, the reaction of its citizens to
a prolonged and seemingly imperialistic occupation, and how the presence of foreign troops in
the target territory will be perceived by other countries (both partners and adversaries) in the
region. Furthermore, state-building is an issue that provokes intense normative debate: It is not
only costly to the intervening country in terms of men and money, but it could also affect the
wellbeing of the target population for generations to come. It is therefore unavoidable that state-
building becomes a politically contentious issue requiring careful management and oversight by
the home government. Hence, even if the home government has complete confidence in the
capability of its agents, to grant them substantial discretion is not without risks. Although state-
building is too complex to succeed without discretion on the part of reform agents, it is also an
issue that is politically too sensitive to leave solely in the hands of technocrats.
There are two primary methods through which the home government may control the
level of discretion bestowed to its agents. First, executive orders or legislation governing the
conduct of agents can vary in specificity. While some mandates outline only the ultimate goals of
the occupation, leaving agents the freedom to shape the institution-building strategy, others may
detail the types of institutions that should be built, as well as how agents should go about
Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
29 John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic
Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 17-43.
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building these institutions. Second, discretionary power can be limited by the nature of the
contract that governs the agent's employment. Political appointees, especially those that serve
without set terms, are inevitably more sensitive to the demands of the home government, as well
as less likely to make consequential decisions without first consulting their superiors. In contrast,
bureaucratic agents will have greater freedom to deviate from any pre-conceived plans, as
membership in a bureaucratic organization provides a certain degree of security in employment.
As such, the issue of discretion becomes entangled with that of autonomy: Autonomous agents
are more likely to exercise discretion regardless of the flexibility built into their state-building
mandate.30 In sum, the likelihood that institution-building will be pursued with flexibility and
pragmatism, and therefore result in the creation of hybrid institutions, is a function of both the
nature of mandate (with varying degrees of discretionary authority) assigned to agents, as well as
their propensity to faithfully follow this mandate (that is, their autonomy).
If the degree of agent autonomy determines whether an institution established by foreign
occupiers will be more or less hybridic, what then determines the degree to which a new
institution is locally owned? To answer this question, it is necessary to begin with the notion that
institutions are, above all, distributional instruments. In some instances, the sole purpose of an
institution (such as welfare systems, forestry and mining laws, and trade regimes) is to allocate
scarce resources among various societal groups and individuals. Meanwhile, other institutions
(such as electoral rules and norms concerning political legitimacy) determine who has control
over the way resources are allocated. In other words, institutions exist within society because
they serve as effective tools for dominant groups to satisfy the demands of their members, to buy
30 In this way, the issue of agent discretion becomes entangled with that of autonomy. Autonomous agents are more
likely to exercise discretion regardless of the assigned mandate. On the issue of bureaucratic autonomy, see Daniel
P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive
Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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off or coerce potential challengers into submission, and to redistribute a portion of the spoils to
subordinated individuals so that their grievances do not destabilize the social order.31
Therefore, native elites are likely to be interested in reform insofar as it helps buttress (or,
at minimum, preserve) those institutions that already distribute scarce resources to their
advantage. In other words, existing elites are status quo oriented. This sharply contrasts with the
interests of foreign occupiers, who would not have invested time, money, and manpower into a
foreign occupation, if they felt that the continuation of status quo was acceptable. Therefore,
although foreign occupiers often pay lip service to the concept of "local ownership," if
institutions are actually designed to attain local support, they are likely to be far less
transformative than sought by foreign reformers. It may be that the inhabitants of a target society
will ultimately gain from reforms favored by foreign occupiers. A world free of political
violence, ethnic hatred, and poverty is likely to be a place of greater security, prosperity, and
wellbeing for all. On the other hand, what Western reformers tend to condemn as corruption and
misrule are often rational systems of resource allocation and inter-elite accommodation in
polities with weak or traditional governance structures and economic systems. Consequently,
only when native elites have the capacity, and exhibit the willingness, to resist a state-building
mission-so that their interests are truly reflected in the design of new institutions-is local
ownership actually obtained.33
3' G. John Ikengerry, After Victory: Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton:
Princeton UniversitTress, 1992); Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe
and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 79-88.
32 Englebert and Tull, "Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States."
3 The conventional wisdom in the post-conflict literature, however, is that institutional reform is more likely to
succeed when native elites are weak, as seen in Stedman's piece on "spoilers" and Barnett and ZUrcher's work on
strategic interactions between state-builders and native elites. In both of these works, the interests of local
powerholders are (rightly) seen as obstacles to the unfettered implementation of the occupier's agenda. However,
when the issue of institutional compliance and enforcement are taken into account, it becomes apparent that foreign
reformers may be better served by the existence of powerful native elites. See Michael Barnett and Christoph
Not all native elites, however, are equally instrumental to the effectiveness and durability
of institutions created under foreign occupations. Of particular importance are elites (such as
tribal chiefs and grass roots religious leaders) with intimate ties to their communities, who are
therefore critically situated to help enforce new and foreign rules and regulations. However, in
territories that typically become targets of state-building missions, local elites with deep roots
and a strong following are more likely to be "traditional" in their outlook (because their source of
power rests in clientelistic ties) and oppose the "enlightened" (be it democratizing or
liberalizing) reforms, compared to the urban and intellectual (and often Western educated) elite.
The former is therefore shunned by foreign reformers, while the latter is embraced as a worthy
collaborator. Yet, the very characteristics that make "traditional" elites difficult partners also
positions them as potent allies of the occupational regime in the enforcement of new institutions,
and in ensuring that these institutions survive in the aftermath of the occupation's conclusion.
The elite's capacity to resist an institution-building effort is to a great extent derived from
the pre-occupation social structure of the target territory. Religious elites, landlords, and tribal
leaders are all consequential powerholders because they possess the ability to mobilize the local
population through their respective ideational, economic, or customary authority. Nonetheless,
the way in which a foreign administration is established in the target territory also plays a crucial
role in translating powerful local elites into effective resisters in the process of institutional
reform. In particular, when foreign rule is forged through violent means, pre-occupation systems
of authority can be greatly disrupted, leading some local notables to lose power, and allowing
new centers of authority to arise. The ability of native elites to shape the outcome of a state-
Zfircher, "The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood," in The Dilemmas
of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D.
Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009): 23-52; Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,"
International Security 22.2 (1997): 5-53.
building mission also depends on the coercive and financial capacity of the foreign agents
themselves. If occupiers are willing to commit enough military power to an occupation, they may
be able to suppress all local opposition and implement their desired reforms.
Finally, the willingness of native elites to resist a reform effort is unlikely to be uniform
across different institutional areas within a single society, as institutions are not all equal in their
distributional impact. Access to educational opportunities, for example, will undoubtedly play a
central role in determining the composition of the elite stratum in the long run. However,
educational reform will not have an immediate effect on the distributional interests of native
elites in the way that land reform would. As such, displacement of an existing system of property
rights could elicit greater opposition from native elites compared to far reaching reforms in
education. Furthermore, the same institutional area may not induce similar levels of opposition
across different polities. Secularization of education, for example, will face greater hurdles in
societies where church and state are united under a single religious-political elite, as well as in
places where religious leaders are powerful political figures. Resistance is something that must
be triggered, and whether the reformist agenda of foreign occupiers generates excitement among
native elites will correspond to the distributional impact of the reforms. To oppose the designs of
foreign agents is costly; elites are likely to pick their battles, and challenge occupiers only in
matters that are central to their survival and economic wellbeing.
4. Explaining Divergent Outcomes of Institutional Reform
Varying degrees of agent discretion and effective resistance lead to one of four possible
state-building outcomes, characterized by different combinations of hybridity and local
ownership. In this section, I will briefly illustrate my argument with an overview of my case
studies (summarized in Figure 4), which consist of inter- and intra-case comparison of Japanese
and American institution-building in the areas of policing and education.
Figure 4: Variation in Institution-building Outcomes, Taiwan versus the Philippines
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4.1. Taiwan and Hybridic Institution-building
One of the most distinctive features of the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT), for its
first twenty-five years of existence, was its near absolute autonomy from both the executive and
legislative branches of the government in Tokyo. When the Japanese occupational army faced an
unexpectedly aggressive resistance in 1895, the initial plan to make the Governor-Generalship a
civilian office was abandoned in favor of a military government. In Meiji-period Japan, where
the military escaped civilian control, this decision was highly consequential. The fact that the
Governor-General would come from the highest ranks of the army establishment (as general or
lieutenant general) ensured that his political standing would be equal to that of the Prime
Minister. Furthermore, it was determined that the Govemor-General would possess de facto
lawmaking authority within Taiwan. He possessed the power to issue ordinances that had the
effect of law, as well as to decide which Japanese laws were applicable in Taiwan. Therefore,
even as politicians in Tokyo voiced complaints over the GGT's various policies, there was little
they could do to compel their agents to change direction.
The primary consequence of the GGT's autonomy was to neutralize pressure within
metropolitan Japan for the pursuit of assimilation in Taiwan. The perspective that Taiwan should
become an integral component of the Japanese state, and that the Taiwanese should be culturally
assimilated into the Japanese nation, dominated the Imperial Diet (the national parliament) when
the Taiwan issue was first debated in 1896, and was repeatedly affirmed by the government
whenever parliamentary debates turned to Taiwan. However, the notion that the Taiwanese could
be assimilated seemed absurd to top colonial officials, who could observe conditions in Taiwan
firsthand. Ignoring Tokyo's preferred policy of assimilation, the GGT instead made extensive
use of local knowledge in designing new institutions; anything that mimicked Japanese precedent
was carefully adapted to native conditions. In this way, an institutional order that creatively
combined Japanese laws and organizational innovations with Taiwanese customs was forged
through the initiative of the colonial agents themselves.
Nonetheless, there was variation across different policy areas in how the institution-
building process unfolded. The organization of the police institution in colonial Taiwan was first
of all hybridic: It combined a modern police organization with traditional Taiwanese collective-
responsibility and local surveillance structure comprised of one-hundred households known as
hoko (baojia).34 The integration of hok5 within the formal colonial administrative system was
3 Note on transliteration: Throughout this dissertation, I have generally used pinyin to transliterate Chinese words,
except for proper nouns that are more commonly known by the Wade-Giles transliteration, such as Taipei (Taibei in
pinyin), Taichung (Taizhong in pinyin), Hsinchu (Xinzhu in pinyin), and Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi in pinyin). If
a proper noun is mentioned within a direct quotation, then the original transliteration is preserved. As for author
names in bibliographical citations, I have used the transliteration that the author himself/herself used. If an author
wrote in English, I have listed his or her name in the order of given then family names, in the Western convention. If
his or her work was written in Japanese, I have listed his or her family name first, followed by the given name.
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also seamless: Local hoko units were typically headquartered within police stations, while
elected hokd officials simultaneously served as chiefs of administrative zones-the lowest level
of local government. Through the hokd system, the colonial police not only recruited local
Taiwanese to provide assistance during the pacification campaign, but could also collect
information on households and monitor population movements. The building and repairing of
roads and bridges and the eradication of infectious diseases was also undertaken through the
local hok6 office.
The effectiveness of colonial policing was also a function of the fact that the hoko system
achieved local ownership. In the first place, each hok& unit was headed by an elected official
with the title of hosei, thus providing opportunities for Taiwanese elites to obtain political
prestige within their local community. Since Japanese colonial officials undertook their various
development programs, such as land reform, introduction of scientific farming, and creation of
agricultural coops through the hosei, hok6 also served to advance collaborate ties between the
colonial state and local powerholders. The economic benefits of serving as a hosei official was
substantial, as they were rewarded for their assistance to the colonial state through the provision
of lucrative tobacco and opium sale permits. In short, the hoko system advanced the interests of
both the colonial state and the landed Taiwanese elites, thus ensuring that the Japanese
governance structure was founded upon a stable foundation.
In the area of education, pragmatic reformers were well aware that in order for the new
colonial schools to function effectively within Taiwan, they had to be integrated into the native
institutional structure. Hence, while Japanese educators saw their primary mission as that of
spreading Japanese language literacy in Taiwan, they made extensive use of Chinese texts in the
classroom to ease the transition from "traditional" to "modern" education. In addition, existing
Chinese schools received oversight by the GGT's Bureau of Education, so that their curricula
could be gradually conformed to that of the new schools. Unlike in the case of the police
institution, however, local ownership of the new education system varied considerably over time,
reflecting the rise and fall (and rise again) of the intelligentsia's role in maintaining colonial
governance. During the initial years of Japanese rule, the colonial administration relied heavily
on the assistance of gentry elites in the counter-insurgency campaign. Not only were they highly
regarded within Taiwanese society for their mastery of Confucian classics, but as large and
wealthy landlords, they were also the island's economic elite. Members of the gentry were thus
well positioned to negotiate with insurgent leaders for their surrender and integration into the
colonial order. In turn, Japanese colonial officials were careful to design the public school
curriculum in a way that accommodated the pedagogical interests of the gentry-in particular,
their desire that Taiwanese children be provided a sound grounding in Confucian learning.
The gentry's usefulness to the colonial administration ended when the insurgents were
defeated and order was restored. Moreover, witi the establishment of the hoko system, and the
appointment of village notables and other commoner elites as hoko leaders, Japanese officials no
longer needed the gentry to serve as intermediaries between the colonial state and Taiwanese
society. Correspondingly, the ability of the gentry to influence the public school curriculum
diminished. Confucian texts were abolished from the colonial schools in 1904, and the newly
instituted courses focused more on vocational training (such as farming, handicraft, and sewing),
rather than on academic topics favored by the gentry elite. Yet, the fortunes of the intelligentsia
improved again in the aftermath of the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the rise of nationalist
movements across the colonized world. Thereafter, colonial administrators could no longer
expect to maintain control over Taiwan through coercion and bribery alone; if Taiwan was to
forever be a part of Japan, the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese had to be won. The intellectual
elite would inevitably play a pivotal role in the new ideological and normative campaign of the
colonial government. Opportunities for post-primary education for the Taiwanese were
expanded, and racial segregation of schools between Taiwanese and Japanese children came to
an end (at least officially). De facto discrimination against the native inhabitants in school
admission continued, but the formal educational system was now one that satisfied the
aspirations of the Taiwanese intellectual elite.
4.11. The Philippines and Dualistic Institution-building
In stark contrast to the relationship between Tokyo and the GGT, that between the Insular
Government (as the colonial administration in the Philippines was known) and Washington was
one of clear subordination of the former to the latter. The most important source of constraint
was the U.S. Congress's authority to directly legislate over Philippine matters and to place
limitations on the type of laws that colonial authorities could draft for the islands. In turn, this
empowered the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) to monitor the activities of
the Insular Government. Whenever U.S. colonial officials sought Congressional authorization for
a particular policy, it had to depend on the BIA for support. Conversely, whenever Congress
debated laws for the islands, it relied on the BIA for information and expertise. The U.S. colonial
administration's lack of autonomy and discretional authority was also a result of its weakness as
a bureaucratic organization. The Governor-General and secretaries of executive departments in
the Insular Government were all political appointees without set terms, whose careers depended
entirely on the continued support of the War Secretary and the U.S. President. Moreover,
Philippine colonial officials-even those appointed to the post of Governor-General-tended to
be plucked out of obscurity and possessed little political leverage back home.
As faithful agents of the administration in Washington, the Insular Government's primary
goal became one of rapidly transferring American democratic and economic institutions to the
archipelago in order to maintain U.S. domestic support for the occupation. President William
McKinley's 1899 decision to annex the Philippine Islands was highly controversial. The
American public was strongly anti-imperialist, and moreover, the Philippines fell into American
hands as the consequence of a war fought to liberate Cuba from Spanish despotism. It took every
rhetorical weapon in the McKinley administration's arsenal to pass the Philippine annexation
treaty in the Senate, and even with this victory, Republicans still faced the possibility of an angry
American electorate in the 1900 presidential election. Republicans argued that the Filipinos were
incapable of self-government, and that the alternative to U.S. occupation was anarchy in the
Philippine Islands. American intentions were claimed to be benevolent. Through its occupation,
the United States would teach the Filipinos how to govern themselves so that they could become
an independent and democratic nation. If U.S. domestic support for the continued occupation of
the Philippines was to be maintained, it was critical that the actions of the colonial government
supported this rhetoric of "benevolent assimilation." To have a democratizing and liberalizing
agenda in the Philippine Islands was arguably more important to policymakers in Washington
than to actually succeed in building a viable Filipino state.
Given their subordination, America's reform agents were not in a position to challenge
this fact, especially when a particular policy area had clear implications for U.S. domestic
politics. Colonial policing was one such area. When it was established in 1901, the primary task
assigned to the Philippine Constabulary was that of replacing the U.S. Army in regions deemed
officially pacified so that the fagade of benevolent rule could be upheld. However, in many of
these officially "pacified" regions, armed resistance continued. Consequently, the Constabulary
increasingly took on a paramilitary structure, operating in units comprised of hundreds of men.
The tactics it used to suppress Filipino resistance also borrowed from the U.S. Army counter-
insurgency playbook. Such heavy-handed tactics backfired, and by 1905, even staunch Filipino
collaborators began to openly criticize the U.S. regime.
At this critical juncture, the colonial leadership turned to Capt. Harry H. Bandholtz, a
Constabulary division commander, to take charge of reforms. His first objective was to obtain
Filipino support for the Constabulary. To this end, the Constabulary helped "friendly" elites win
local elections and obtain lucrative government contracts in exchange for their support in the
counter-insurgency campaign. Under Bandholtz's leadership, the Constabulary was thoroughly
transformed into an instrument of collaboration between the colonial state and landed elites.
However, constrained by Washington's policy of "benevolence," Bandholtz was unable to
undergird colonial policing with a strong (hybridic) institutional foundation. In particular, despite
the police chief's desire to create a unified police structure in the archipelago, the all-Filipino
municipal police forces, as well as militias headed by provincial governors and large hacienda
owners, were left outside the Constabulary's effective control. The carefully constructed myth of
the United States as a benevolent occupier was in part based on the notion that Filipinos enjoyed
self-rule at the local (that is, provincial and municipal) level. The absorption of the municipal
police into the national police structure-one that was dominated by U.S. military officers no
less-threatened to undermine this myth.
Finally, education reform in the Philippine Islands resulted in what one colonial official
described as "the most typically American institution which our government here established."35
The new American public schools were strictly secular, following the liberal tenet that individual
3 David Prescott Barrows, "Report of the General Superintendent of Education," in U.S. Department of War,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1903, pt. 3
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), p. 64.
freedom was only secure insofar as the separation of church and state was absolute. Meanwhile,
the language of instruction was English. Not only was English the language of diplomacy and
commerce in East Asia, but also the language in which many of liberalism and democracy's most
important texts were written. From the perspective of the colonizers, English was therefore the
most appropriate language upon which to found a new liberal and democratic Filipino nation-
state. However, in seeking to recreate the Filipinos in their own image, President McKinley and
his advisors woefully ignored the fact that the Filipinos already possessed a highly developed
and well regarded education institution that was nothing like the new system imagined by U.S.
officials. Organized by the Catholic church, the existing system placed religion at the center of
education, and employed Spanish as the language of instruction.
Constrained by Washington, the American colonial agents had little leeway to resolve the
acute discrepancy between America's preferred "modern" education system and the existing
"traditional" one. Given that the language of instruction was English, new teachers were brought
in from the United States and other English speaking countries. Yet, due to reasons of cost, most
public schools continued to be staffed by native teachers, who (because they were not English
speakers) hardly understood the materials they were teaching. The quality of education suffered.
Moreover, the secular orientation of the new schools offended the pious Filipinos; those who
could afford private education-i.e., the elites-thus sent their children to Catholic schools, as
they had always done. In this way, a new school system that was designed to create a liberal-
democratic citizenry in the Philippines further contributed to the hardening of class barriers. By
attempting to educate the islands' inhabitants in a foreign language, colonial officials ensured
that the vast majority of them (who spoke Tagalog, Bisaya, and Ilocano, among other languages)
would remain illiterate. The "most typically American institution" created in the Philippines was
also its most dysfunctional.
5. Case Selection and Research Methodology
At the heart of this dissertation lies an empirical puzzle: How and why did the Japanese
succeed in implanting a set of modem bureaucratic institutions in the island colony of Taiwan,
while other more established colonial powers seemingly failed in this endeavor? 36 Success,
however, is not all that makes the Japanese colonization of Taiwan a critical case for
understanding state-building more broadly. What makes the investigation of the Japanese
colonial effort in Taiwan so uniquely informative is that a failed institution-building effort by the
United States in the Philippines unfolded during the exact same historical moment. Taiwan and
the Philippines cases are comparable not only in terms of background conditions, but also in the
type of institutions targeted by Japanese and American colonial agents, the intensity through
which their reforms were carried out, and the duration of the occupation. In short, together these
two cases present an ideal context for the pursuit of a comparative-historical analysis.
Even by itself, the Taiwan case has the potential to offer important lessons in state-
building. First and foremost, while there is some variation across institutional areas, the Japanese
colonization of Taiwan is among the clearest examples of state-building success. Second, the
Japanese institution-building effort was comprehensive. The Japanese intervened in every aspect
of Taiwanese life by implementing regulations on sanitation, creating cooperatives for small-
scale farmers, establishing a national police structure, and much else. Third, and most
importantly, various background conditions in Taiwan made it a difficult case for success. When
36 For a comparative overview of Japanese institution-building efforts in Taiwan and Korea (vis-i-vis other colonial
occupations), see Bruce Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations: Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam," in
Parallax Visions: Making Sense ofAmerican-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century, ed. Bruce Cumings
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999): 69-94; Kohli, State-directed Development, pp. 367-425.
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the Japanese first arrived, Taiwan was an ethnically heterogeneous and agrarian frontier region
that had barely been touched by modernity. Although a representative of the Chinese imperial
government nominally exerted control over the island, the real wielders of power were the
landed elites. Taiwan was therefore a highly fragmented society with little island-wide political
unity or national consciousness. Moreover, the Japanese attempt to build new institutions directly
followed a bloody war of conquest, and their success hinged on the generation of local support
for institutions that native elites initially had no interest in adopting. In short, Japanese colonial
officials were tasked to do the impossible: undertake a comprehensive transformation of a
traditional society into a modern state, while thoroughly lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the
local population.
For these reasons, Taiwan stands out among other successful examples of state-building
under foreign occupation. The Allied occupations of Japan and Germany are often discussed in
the scholarship as prominent instances of success. Yet, as Fukuyama and Brownlee rightly point
out, the United States did very little state-building in these territories. Japan and Germany were
already modern nation-states prior to occupation, and what the Allied interventions did was
largely to restore the more democratic and liberal traditions that had characterized these nations
prior to the rise of fascism in the early 1930s. 37 Consequently, these cases offer very little insight
for contemporary policymakers, who (like Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan) are tasked with
forging modern states out of traditional societies, or piecing together ethnically fractured
societies into a single national state.
The significance of Taiwan to the history of state-building notwithstanding, its primary
analytical importance to the question of state-building comes from the colonization of Taiwan's
37 Brownlee, "Can America Nation-build," pp. 323-27; Fukuyama, "Nation-building and the Failure of Institutional
Memory," pp. 4-8.
comparability to an oft-mentioned case of state-building failure: the U.S. occupation of the
Philippines.38 In the first place, not only did both occupations take place during the same historic
moment (roughly the first half of the twentieth century), but moreover, they proceeded in similar
stages, as shown in Figure 5. Japanese and American occupiers were met with similarly
substantial resistance from the native populations, and pacification efforts lasted for nearly a
decade after their initial conquests. The major institutions that came to characterize colonial
Taiwan and the Philippines were also established during a fairly compact period, lasting from
1898 to 1906 in Taiwan (under the leadership of Kodama Gentara and Got6 Shimpei) and from
1900 to 1907 in the Philippines (under William Howard Taft and Luke Wright).
Figure 5: Timeline of Events, Taiwan versus the Philippines
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A second burst of institution-building took place in Taiwan between 1919 and 1923
under Governor-General Den Kenjir6i, when Japanese colonial policy shifted in the direction of
assimilation (after Prime Minister Hara Takashi succeeded in placing the new Governor-General
38 In the historical literature on colonialism, it is often the case that Taiwan is compared to Korea and the Philippines
to Puerto Rico. However, for reasons described in this section, t found that a comparison of Taiwan and the
Philippines to be much more analytically rewarding.
under his direct supervision). Meanwhile, as lawmaking authority in the Philippines was fully
transferred to Filipino politicians in 1916, Filipino leaders made various alterations to institutions
established during the Taft era. This second period of institutional reform ended in 1921, when
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood arrived in the islands to put an end to "irresponsible" Filipino
experimentations. The third and final stage of colonial institution-building took place between
1936 and 1945 in Taiwan and between 1935 and 1941 in the Philippines. In Taiwan, the
Government-General inaugurated the policy of kominka (imperialization), where the policy of
gradual Taiwanese assimilation was abandoned in favor of forceful Japanization. During this
same moment, the Philippine Islands was made into a self-governing U.S. Commonwealth.
Having assumed control over all three branches of government, President Manuel Quezon and
Vice President Sergio Osmefia obtained the power to build their nation in the Filipino, rather
than American, image.
In addition to this uncanny parallel in the progress of state-building between Taiwan and
the Philippines, the two colonial territories also shared various similarities in key background
conditions. Both the Japanese and U.S. colonizers were seen as illegitimate intruders by a large
portion of the native elite, and a decade-long pacification campaign was needed for the two
colonial powers to firmly establish control over their respective island colonies. Institution-
building therefore progressed under conditions of violence and instability. Yet, despite their
complex ethnic composition, both territories were largely free of inter-ethnic violence during the
occupation period. 39 Finally, both Taiwan and the Philippines were traditional societies where
political authority was highly fragmented. In sum, while Taiwan and the Philippines were similar
in key background conditions, and while Japanese and American colonial occupations
39 In part, this was due to similar efforts by Japanese and U.S. forces to segregate the "civilized" populations (i.e.,
the Han Chinese in Taiwan and the Christianized inhabitants in the Philippines) from other ethnic and religious
groups.
progressed simultaneously with comparable pace and intensity, the outcome of these two state-
building missions could not have been more different. 40
The Taiwan and the Philippine occupations also possess the potential to offer important
insights for contemporary policymakers precisely because they are historic cases. Most post-
World War 1I cases of state-building are ongoing and, with their ultimate institutional reform
outcome uncertain, are hardly fitting for a dissertation aimed at theory-building. Even Cambodia,
while no longer under direct UN administration, is still a recipient of significant foreign
development assistance, and international actors there continue to be heavily involved in
domestic institutional reform. Furthermore, compared to other colonial cases, Taiwan and the
Philippines have less institutional "baggage" and thus allow for a "cleaner" comparison. State-
building was the goal of Japanese and American colonizers from the very beginning. This
contrasts to other cases of colonialism, where colonizers undertook the development of modern
political and economic institutions after decades of governing colonized peoples through indirect
rule. Cases such as India, Nigeria, and French Indochina, along with other African and Asian
territories colonized by European powers, produced more complex institutional arrangements,
involving elements of both indirect and direct rule, making them less suitable for a theoretical
study of state-building.41
At the broadest level, this project draws theoretical insights through a comparison of the
Japanese colonization of Taiwan and the U.S. colonization of the Philippines. Nonetheless, as the
40 This research design follows Mill's method of difference, where two cases with similar background conditions
and contrasting outcomes are chosen for comparative study. See John Stuart Mill, "Two Methods of Comparison,"
in Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods, ed. Amitai Etzioni and Frederic L. Du Bow (Boston: Little,
Brown: 1969 [1848]): 205-13; Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New
York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).
4 As scholars have argued, this contradiction between the earlier governance method of indirect rule with later
attempts at developmental colonialism explains much of the political dynamics of post-independence African states.
See Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996).
subject of this study is institutions and the process through which they are modified, empirical
observations are conducted at this level. Specifically, two institutional areas were targeted for
qualitative study: policing and education. First, these areas were chosen for their importance to a
country's political stability and economic development, so that the results of the empirical
investigation are of interest to policymakers as well as scholars. Furthermore, police and
education were reform areas recognized by the occupiers themselves as holding the key to state-
building success. In the short-term, a functional police institution was what allowed colonial
authorities to pursue all of their other goals vis-i-vis these territories. In the long run, effective
education was what ensured the fulfillment of the respective colonizer's ultimate goal: the
absorption of the Taiwanese into the Japanese state, and the creation of a liberal-democratic (and
pro-American) citizenry in the Philippines.
In developing my argument, I conducted original archival research in fourteen libraries
and depositories across Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, where I reviewed documents
related to several dozen Japanese and American colonial officials, in addition to government
reports, newspaper articles, memoirs, and other published primary documents.4 In particular, I
relied most extensively on collections left behind by the following individuals: William Howard
Taft (Civil Governor of the Philippines, 1901-1904; U.S. Secretary of War, 1904-1908; U.S.
President, 1909-1913); W. Cameron Forbes (Philippine Secretary of Finance and Police, 1904-
1909; Governor-General, 1909-1913); Harry H. Bandholtz (Governor of Tayabas province,
1902-1903; Chief of Constabulary, 1907-1913); and Goto Shimpei (Chief Civil Administrator of
Taiwan, 1898-1906). Documentary evidence was triangulated as much as possible through the
examination of official reports, correspondences, journal entries, and newspaper articles in order
to mitigate my own interpretive biases when analyzing primary sources. Since there was usually
42 A list of manuscript collections examined is presented in the bibliography.
more than one individual who left behind documents pertaining to some event, the same episode
was studied several times as experienced from different perspectives, and by members of
opposing political camps.4 3
Finally, the portability of my argument to contemporary instances of state-building was
explored by analyzing the ongoing U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. Here, I focused my
investigation on the institution of policing, for without peace and stability, all other reform
efforts have little chance of success. This case was selected not only for its policy relevance, but
also because it exhibits important differences in background conditions vis-A-vis the historic
cases. The intervention in Afghanistan, unlike those in the Philippines or Taiwan, is multilateral.
As such, there is no single occupational administration in charge of directing the state-building
mission. Furthermore, in contrast to the Taiwan and Philippine cases, Afghanistan is
characterized by intense inter-ethnic conflict that has complicated the state-building effort. By
demonstrating my theory's applicability to a dissimilar (and contemporary) case, it is possible to
ascertain that agent discretion and effective resistance are indeed key drivers of variation in state-
building outcomes.
6. In Lieu of a Conclusion: Outline of Chapters
In chapter two, I overview the colonial Taiwan case and argue that a defining
characteristic of the Japanese colonial administration was the considerable autonomy it enjoyed
from Tokyo. When Taiwan fell into Japanese possession in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese
War, decision-makers in Tokyo were united in their stance that a policy of institutional
43 For a discussion of case-oriented research methods, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies
and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2004); James Mahoney,
"After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research," World Politics 62.1 (2010): 120-47; Gerardo L.
Munck, "Tools for Qualitative Research," in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry
E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2004): 105-2 1; Charles C. Ragin, The
Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University California
Press, 1987), pp. 34-52.
assimilation should be pursued. It quickly became clear to Japanese colonial agents, however,
that the unqualified imposition of Japanese institutions in Taiwan was a failing strategy; as a
result, they constructed hybrid institutions by carefully integrating Japanese organizational
innovations with traditional Taiwanese rules and norms. This radical policy shift was opposed by
Tokyo. Yet, the fact that the Japanese Governor-General was a high-ranking army official (from
a country where civilian control over the military was weak), combined with the colonial
government's autonomous law-making powers, meant that colonial reformers could undertake
institutional reforms with flexibility and innovativeness.
Chapter three contrasts the institution-building dynamics observed in Taiwan with those
of the Philippine effort. Unlike their Japanese counterparts, top American colonial officials were
closely tied to political parties and their leaders in Washington. Furthermore, while the U.S.
colonial administration possessed the authority to draft new laws for the Philippine Islands in
partnership with local elites, all consequential policy decisions were subject to review by the
Department of War. The U.S. Congress also exercised control over key policy issues in the
archipelago, especially in the areas of finance, business law, and resource development. Thus
constrained, American colonial agents were compelled to rigidly pursue Washington's
institution-building agenda, despite its incongruence with conditions found in the archipelago.
The causal relationship between agent discretion and institutional hybridity is analyzed in
chapter four by comparing the development of policing in colonial Taiwan and the Philippines.
In both territories, the newly established police organization succeeded in suppressing armed
opposition within a decade after annexation. Yet, the postcolonial legacies of policing in these
two territories were markedly different. I argue that police institutions in Taiwan and the
Philippines were similarly supported by local powerholders (thus leading to their effectiveness
under colonial conditions), but variation in the internal structure of the institutions placed them
on diverging evolutionary trajectories. The colonial police institution in Taiwan was hybridic;
that of the Philippines was dualistic. As a result, while Taiwan's postcolonial rulers inherited a
strong state with coercive capacity concentrated in the hands of a central bureaucracy, coercion
in independent Philippines was decentralized and in the hands of provincial elites.
In chapter five, I compare the development of education institutions in the two cases.
Here, the analytical focus shifts to the process by which new institutions obtain local ownership
under foreign occupation. Counter-intuitively, successful institutions are forged when native
elites possess both the capacity and the willingness to resist the reform effort of foreign
occupiers. In Taiwan, the spread of revolutionary activity from mainland China to Taiwan in the
early 191 Os strengthened the hand of Taiwanese elites, allowing them to compel the colonial
administration to accommodate their demands on education. In the Philippines, however, internal
conflict pitted peasant and labor groups against Filipino elites, leading the latter to forge close
ties with the colonial authorities. Filipino resistance toward U.S. education policy was also
subdued compared to Taiwan. This, however, did not signify Filipino elites' support for the new
education system, but rather reflected the fact that elites could bypass the public school system
altogether by sending their children to private Catholic schools. Failing to attain the robust
support of native elites, the U.S.-sponsored education system suffered in quality.
In the concluding chapter, I apply my findings from the Taiwan and Philippine cases to
contemporary state-building missions, with a focus on police reform in Afghanistan. Afghan
police reform was initially placed under the auspices of the German government, but given the
lack of progress, the U.S. military soon introduced its own police-training program. Moreover,
while Germany centered its reform efforts at the national level, the U.S. military aimed to build
police institutions from the bottom up. The Afghan case thus provides a unique opportunity to
examine parallel institution-building programs within the same policy area by two very different
types of reform agents. Following this analysis are six general lessons (from the colonial cases)
for contemporary state-building missions. Finally, I end by reflecting upon the normative
implications of my findings. If the most effective institution that can be established under a
foreign occupation is also morally defensible, then state-building (while difficult) is
straightforward. However, what if this is not the case? In the final analysis, normative issues
must also be addressed in policy debates conceming state-building, for at stake are some of our
most cherished beliefs on good government, social justice, and economic fairness.
Chapter 2: The Success of "No Policy" in Colonial Taiwan
Agent Discretion and Institutional Reform by Trial and Error
1. Introduction
An account of Taiwan's rapid post-WWII economic development cannot be told without
considering the critical role played by the state. It was due to the strength of the postcolonial
Taiwanese state that taxes were collected efficiently in order to help build the infrastructural
foundation of an industrial economy. A strong state also made sure that Taiwanese children
received universal primary and intermediate education,'and that ample opportunities existed for
higher learning. Most critically, a comprehensive and redistributive land reform was possible
because of the state's monopoly on coercion within Taiwanese society.I The strong postcolonial
Taiwanese state, however, did not arise out of an institutional vacuum, but was a legacy of
Japanese colonialism.
Under Japanese occupation, Taiwanese farmers and business owners had been organized
into credit unions and business associations, which provided multiple channels for coordination
between the state and the private sector. In addition, the Japanese colonial government excelled
in counting and measuring various aspects of Taiwanese life, enhancing the state's regulatory
capacity over the local population. Moreover, the colonial state had thoroughly penetrated
Taiwanese society by hierarchically organizing local administration from the prefectural
government down to the village level, and by integrating local Taiwanese notables into this
administrative structure. Hence, even as Japanese colonization caused great harm and suffering
for the Taiwanese people, its legacy was to provide Chiang Kai-shek and other postwar leaders
'For a discussion of Taiwan's postwar economic development, see Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of "The Rest":
Challenges to the Westfrom Late-industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Joseph E.
Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf, Rethinking the East Asian Miracle (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001); Robert
Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and
Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993).
the necessary tools for transforming Taiwan into one of Asia's most dynamic and
technologically advanced economies.
The causal significance of colonialism's institutional legacy on post-independence
economic development is not unique to Taiwan, but is observed systematically across all former
2
colonial territories. What is nonetheless unique-or, perhaps more accurately, rare-about the
Taiwan case is that the legacy of colonialism there was the establishment of a strong state with
the capacity to implement a comprehensive economic development strategy.3 In territories
colonized after 1885 (that is, when whole-sale European colonization of Africa and Asia began),
the colonial state was typically a rudimentary structure that governed indirectly through local
elites. The colonial state shared the use of legitimate coercive power with societal actors to lower
administrative costs, knew little about the local population, and chiefly occupied itself with
resource extraction (as opposed to economic development).4 Yet, the uniqueness of Taiwan's
colonial legacy does not emerge merely in comparison to European colonial states in Africa and
Asia characterized by "indirect rule,"5 but is also found in relation to a territory such as the
2 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): Matthew Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Development: British
Colonialism and State Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); James Mahoney, Colonialism and
Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010). These works by political scientists also find support in recent findings by economists. In particular, see Daron
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation," The American Economic Review 91.5 (2001): 1369-1401; William Easterly and Ross Levine,
"Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development," Journal ofMonetary
Economics 50.1 (2003): 3-39; Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal ofEconomic Growth
9.2 (2004): 131-65.
3 Korea, another Japanese colony, is the other prominent example where a strong state emerged from a colonial
occupation. See Bruce Cumings, "Colonial Formations and Deformations: Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam," in
Parallax Visions: Making Sense ofAmerican-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century, ed. Bruce Cumings
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999): 69-94. Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and
Industrialization in the Global Periphery.
4 Jonathan Krieckhaus, Dictating Development: How Europe Shaped the Global Periphery (Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).
s Matthew Lange defines indirect rule as the "domination via collaborative relations between a dominant colonial
center and several regionally based indigenous institutions." Meanwhile, direct rule is defined as "the construction
of a complete system of colonial domination which both local and central institutions are well integrated and
Philippines, where the United States sought-for nearly fifty years-to create the foundation of a
strong state.
Given that European powers were generally uninterested in establishing the structures of
a strong state in their African and Asian colonies, it is unsurprising that most African and Asian
postcolonial states turned out to be weak upon independence. However, what explains variation
across colonial institution-building efforts in Taiwan and the Philippines, when the goals of
Japan and the United States (in terms of institutional development) were so similar? Indeed, it
was not just the goal of creating a strong colonial state (and their reliance on "direct rule" to
achieve this end) that the respective Japanese and American colonial administrations in Taiwan
and the Philippines had in common. The two colonized territories were also characterized by a
plethora of similarities in background conditions: both were ethnically heterogeneous and
agrarian frontier regions that, outside of a small group of urban elites, had barely been touched
by Western modernity. With similar climates, they were both producers of rice and sugar, and
plagued by the same infectious diseases, such as cholera and malaria. The local populations in
Taiwan and the Philippines were similarly hostile toward the colonial occupiers, and as a result
of barbarous pacification campaigns by the colonizers, tens of thousands of deaths were recorded
in both territories. Yet, despite these similarities, only in Taiwan did colonial reformers succeed
in establishing effective governance institutions, which then served as the foundation of a strong
postcolonial state.
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to explain this overall variation in institution-
building outcome across colonial Taiwan and the Philippines, leaving the analysis of variation
within the two colonial territories for chapters four and five. To this end, this chapter proceeds in
governed by the same authority and organizational principles." Lange, Lineages ofDespotism and Development, p.
28.
three parts. First, I review the debate over colonial policy that took place in Tokyo immediately
following the annexation of Taiwan in 1895, where assimilation ultimately emerged as the
favored institution-building approach of the Japanese government. I then rewind the story back
to 1895 to discuss the establishment of the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT) as Japan's
colonial administration in the newly annexed island, and the factors that led the GGT to acquire
considerable discretion in colonial policymaking. Finally, these two parallel discussions come
together as I demonstrate the key consequence of GGT's discretionary authority: It allowed
Japanese colonial agents to abandon the ill-conceived assimilation agenda of Tokyo and, instead,
flexibly integrate local Taiwanese laws, norms, and customs with new institutional designs. The
result, in other words, was the forging of hybridic institutions. As I will display in the following
chapter, this contrasted with the outcome of America's Philippine occupation, where the lack of
agent discretion led to the emergence of a dualistic order, whereby native Filipino institutions
were left outside the formal structures of the U.S. colonial state.
2. Assimilation versus Association: Policy Debates Over Taiwan in Tokyo
The annexation of Taiwan was not within the Japanese government's strategic plan when
it went to war against the Qing Empire over Korea in July 1894. Rather, it resulted from
opportunism, when the complete collapse of Chinese defenses in Manchuria allowed the
Japanese Army and Navy to expand its field of operations from the Liaodong Peninsula (with its
strategically placed Port Arthur) to Weihaiwei (the Qing Empire's second most important naval
base), and finally to the Pescadores (the small island group located near Taiwan). A war that was
started by Japan to secure Korean "autonomy" (by installing a pro-Japanese government in
Korea) led to Japan's annexation of Taiwan, after the island was included within Japan's
territorial demands in the April 17, 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Qing Empire.
Meanwhile, as a result of the so-called Triple Intervention by France, Russia, and Germany
following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan was forced to cede its control over Port Arthur
(Japan's most desired concession) and Weihaiwei, which eventually came under the control of
Russia and Great Britain, respectively. 6 In this way, Japanese geostrategic ambitions in Korea
and Manchuria were temporarily stifled. Nonetheless, with the annexation of Taiwan, Japan
found itself in control of an important base for naval operations and international trade to its
south, and was determined to make the most out of this opportunity.7
Due to the fact that Taiwan was a late addition to Japan's strategic planning, Japan was ill
prepared for administering an island inhabited by foreign and (unexpectedly) hostile peoples.
Indeed, when Prime Minister It6 Hirobumi organized the Taiwan Affairs Bureau (Taiwan
Jimukyoku) in June 13, 1895, as the supreme decision-making body in Tokyo concerning the
newly annexed territory, Japanese policymakers had not even decided whether Taiwan was to
become a special province of the Japanese Empire, like Hokkaido and Okinawa, or would be
treated as Japan's first foreign territorial possession.8 Asked by the Taiwan Affairs Bureau to
6 For details on the Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the Triple Intervention, see S. C. M. Paine,
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
7 The importance of Taiwan to Japanese geostrategic interests is articulated most clearly by Katsura Tar6 in "Taiwan
T6chi Hoshin [Taiwan Governing Policy]," July 1896, Reel 9, No. 84.1, Katsura Taro kankei monjo [Documents
related to Katsura Taro], National Diet Library, Tokyo. In a particularly notable passage, Katsura writes, "Taiwan
looks over the Pescadores [Penghu Islands] to the China coast and is linked, through Amoy, to all of southern China.
It leads onto the South Sea islands and offers potential for controlling the distant South Seas in the same way that
Tsushima joins Kyushu to Pusan and helps us control Korea. ... We must make the south China-Fujian zone ours.
To do this, we must open close contacts with Amoy and protect our opportunities in Fujian." (Translation by Stewart
Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan: The Three Careers of General Katsura Taro (London: Macmillan
Press, 2000), p. 46). A complete reproduction of Katsura's policy paper can be found in Tokutomi Soh6, K5shaku
Katsura Tard den [Biography of Prince Katsura Tar6], vol. 1 (Hara Shob6: Tokyo, 1967[1917]), pp. 705-33. In this
document, written during his brief tenure as Governor-General of Taiwan during summer of 1896, Katsura argues
that Taiwan should be used as a base for expanding Japanese influence (in particular economic) in southern China.
The significance of this document comes from the fact that he was among the most influential generals of the
Imperial Japanese Army, becoming Army Minister in 1898 and then Prime Minister in 1901. For a discussion of
Katsura's Taiwan policy, see Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan, pp. 45-49.
8 The Bureau was composed of eight members (in addition to Prime Minister It6 Hirobumi) who represented key
ministries and agencies: Ito Miyoji (Chief Cabinet Clerk), Kawakami Saroku (Vice Chief of Staff), Kodama Gentaro
(Vice Army Minister), Yamamoto Gonnohy6e (Vice Navy Minister), Hara Kei (Vice Foreign Minister), Suematsu
submit their view on this fundamental question were foreign advisors Montague Kirkwood and
Michel Revon, whose opinions (reflecting the established practices of Great Britain and France,
their respective home countries) represented two polar choices on this matter: "association" 9
versus "assimilation."'
Kirkwood argued that Japan should treat Taiwan as a "foreign" territory and govern
Taiwan according to proven methods of colonial administration." Using the British crown
colonies of India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Jamaica, among others, as examples, Kirkwood
recommended the Japanese government adopt a governance structure for Taiwan with the
following features: First, the appointment of a civilian official as Taiwan's administrator, and his
placement under the authority of a new ministry with the duty of administering colonial affairs.
Second, the establishment of an independent bureaucratic structure in Taiwan that was
responsible for the various administrative duties normally undertaken by government
bureaucracies of mainland Japan (such as military, foreign, and financial affairs). Third, the
Kench6 (Chief of Legislation Bureau), Tajiri Inajiro (Vice Finance Minister), and Den Kenjir6 (Chief of
Communications Bureau of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation). See Edward I-te Chen, "The
Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H.
Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 240-74.
9 The term "association" was not used by Kirkwood to describe his policy, but it was a word later used by French
colonial officials to describe their rejection of assimilation and adoption of British-style colonial policy of treating
colonies as politically and culturally distinct from the empire's core territories. Therefore, while it is not historically
accurate to describe Japan's policy option in 1895 to have been between assimilation and "association," this latter
term is nonetheless conceptually useful when contrasting French and British colonial models. For a discussion of the
evolution of French colonial policy, see Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial
Theory, 1890-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
10 When the term "assimilation" (doka in Japanese) was invoked in Japan, it differed from its use within the context
of French colonial thought. In France, assimilation occurred when an individual accepted and obeyed French laws
and social customs in the public sphere. In Japan, assimilation demanded nothing less than a complete spiritual
transformation and the total abandonment of all other ethnic identities. For further discussion on this difference, see
Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), pp. 98-103; Yanaihara Tadao, "Gunji-teki to doka-teki: Nichi Futsu
shokuminchi seisaku hikaku no ichiron [Militaristic and assimilationistic: On the comparison between Japanese and
French colonial policies]," in Yanaihara Tadao zenshai [Collected works of Yanaihara Tadao], vol. 4 (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1963): 276-306.
" Montague Kirkwood, "Taiwan seido, Tenno no taiken, oyobi Teikoku Gikai ni kansuru ikensho [Opinion paper on
the issue of the Taiwan system, the authority of the Emperor, and the Imperial Diet]," in Taiwan shiry6 [Taiwan
documents], ed. Kaneko KentarO (Tokyo: Hara Shob6, 1970[1895]): 78-107.
creation of a Taiwanese legislative body that would formulate laws specific to, and therefore
appropriate for, Taiwan. Fourth, and finally, the preservation of existing laws and customs of the
Taiwanese people to the extent possible, and their use as the basis of Taiwan's own unique legal
code. In short, Kirkwood's plan entailed the complete and permanent institutional separation of
Taiwan from mainland Japan. As was the case between Britain and its crown colonies, what
would unite Taiwan with mainland Japan was the fact that they shared a common head of state-
i.e., the Emperor. 12
If Kirkwood's argument assumed that racial differences between the Japanese and the
Taiwanese prevented the integration of Taiwan as a province of Japan, Revon took the position
that the Taiwanese people could be assimilated into the Japanese national community. In a policy
paper presented on April 22, 1895, Revon argued that Japan "should assimilate [Formosa and the
Pescadores] as fully as possible, and therefore, [Japan] must plan on making the islands a
prefecture of the empire in the future, if not now." 3 His recommendation was premised on the
notion (which was also held by Japanese policymakers at the time) that Japanese people will
move and settle in Taiwan in large numbers, thus helping to advance the assimilation of the
Taiwanese into Japan. In order to facilitate the process of assimilation, Japanese criminal law
should be transferred to Taiwan as soon as possible, Revon argued, and the Taiwanese judicial
system incorporated into that of Japan proper. Japanese civil law could be introduced gradually
(in order to prevent disruption in the daily lives of the Taiwanese), but every effort should be
made to prepare Taiwan for complete judicial integration in the future. Finally, although the
colonial administration must be given considerable autonomy in governing over Taiwan during
12 Montague Kirkwood, "Shokuminchi seido [Colonial systems]," in Taiwan shiry5 [Taiwan documents], ed.
Kaneko Kentaro (Tokyo: Hara Shob6, 1970[18951): 108-48.
"3 Michel Revon, "Ryoto oyobi Taiwan tochi ni kansuru togi [Response to the question of governing Liaodong and
Taiwan]," in Taiwan shiry6 [Taiwan documents], ed. Kaneko Kentaro (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970[1895]), p. 407.
the initial pacification period, the ultimate goal was to incorporate Taiwan into Japan as a
province. Therefore the island should be placed under the direct authority of the central
government and its bureaucracies. 14
Here, it is important to note that Revon did not argue that all Japanese laws or the various
constitutional rights and duties of the Japanese should be transferred immediately to Taiwan.
Instead, what he had in mind was to put into place a framework through which Japanese
institutions would be gradually and completely transferred to Taiwan over time.1 5 This
institution-building strategy had precedent. Such a dualistic institutional structure was found
within French Algeria (as well as within German Alsace-Lorraine), but more importantly, it was
also the prevailing system within Hokkaido and Okinawa in 1895. Since Hokkaido was
considered to be a frontier territory inhabited by the "barbaric" Ainu people, it was not until
1901 that prefectural level elections were introduced, and Hokkaido was not represented by
elected officials in the Imperial Diet (the national legislature) until 1902. In Okinawa, the
granting of the franchise was delayed even further: It was in 1909 that the first prefectural level
elections took place, and Okinawans had to wait until 1912-that is, exactly forty years after the
1 Revon's entire opinion paper is found in ibid., pp. 399-409.
is The notion that clauses of the Meiji Constitution could be separated into sections that applied unconditionally to
newly annexed territories (such as the clauses regarding the authority of the Emperor) and sections that only applied
when certain pre-conditions were met (such as the clauses regarding voting rights and military duty) was widely
supported by prominent constitutional theorists of the era, such as Hozumi Yatsuka and Ume KenjirO. For a
discussion of their constitutional theories, as they applied to the question of Taiwan annexation, see Asano Toyomi,
Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei: h6iki togo to teikoku chitsujo [Imperial Japan and colonial legal system:
unification of legal jurisdiction and imperial order] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppan, 2008), pp. 100-11; Oguma
Eiji, "Nihonjin" no ky6kai: Okinawa, A inu, Taiwan, Chbsen shokuminchi shihai karafukki und6 made [The
Boundaries of "Japanese": Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Korea from colonial domination to recovery movement]
(Tokyo: Shiny6sha, 1998), pp. 126-31. It was not until 1944 that the right to vote in national elections was extended
to Taiwan (as well as Korea) in an attempt to fully incorporate Japan's colonial subjects within the total war effort.
See Okamoto Makiko, "Senjika no Ch6sen jin, Taiwan jin sansei mondai [The problem of wartime Korean and
Taiwanese franchise]," Waseda Daigaku Gakuin Bungaku Kenkyfika kiyo 42 (1996): 73-84; Tanaka Hiroshi, "Nihon
shokuminchi shihaika ni okeru kokuseki kankei no ikisatsu: Taiwan, Chosen ni kansuru sanseiken to heiekigimu wo
megutte [The development of the issue of citizenship in colonies under Japanese rule: concerning franchise and
conscription in Taiwan and Korea]," Aichi Kenritsu Daigaku Kokugo Gakubu kiy6 9 (1974): 61-96.
Rytikyni kingdom was formally annexed by Japan in 1872-to finally send their first set of
elected officials to the Imperial Diet.16
For this reason, the implications of the policy advocated by Revon on the lives of the
Taiwanese were not too different from the approach proposed by Kirkwood in the short term. In
either case, the Taiwanese initially would experience little change in the governing laws.
However, the two contrasting governing schemes had radically different implications on the
institution-building process within Taiwan, as well as Taiwan's long-term development. The
assimilation strategy treated existing Taiwanese laws and customs as impediments to the
introduction of modern institutions. Therefore, the Taiwanese would be governed by familiar
laws and customs in the immediate term to avoid confusion and unrest, but the goal was to
completely rid Taiwan of its "backward" institutions. Kirkwood's approach also started from the
notion that existing Taiwanese institutions were backward, but he assumed that they could form
the foundation upon which new and modem institutions could be built.17 In other words,
assimilation implied an institution-building strategy of displacement, while the approach
suggested by Kirkwood would have entailed some combination of institutional conversion
(where existing institutions were reformed to accomplish new tasks) and the layering of new
laws and organizational structures onto the old.'8
In this debate between Kirkwood and Revon, the issue of race and ethnicity-that is, the
question of the "assimilability" of the Taiwanese-played only a minor role. Rather, the causal
16 Richard Siddle, "Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945," Japanese Studies 18.2 (1998), p. 122.
"7 The preference of Hara and most of the political leadership in Tokyo for naichi encho shugi, and their criticism of
the approach suggested by Kirkwood, was ironic because the latter institution-building strategy was precisely what
led to successful institutional modernization in Meiji Japan. See D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The
Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to MeUi Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
'8 A discussion of these alternative institution-building strategies of displacement, conversion, and layering can be
found in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010): 1-37.
arrow flowed in the reverse direction, as Kirkwood and Revon, as well as Japanese
policymakers, conveniently adopted whatever theory of Japanese national identity that justified
their policy agenda.19 This was indeed the case in Vice-Foreign Minister Hara Kei's (Takashi)
February 2, 1896 opinion paper, which became the Taiwan Affairs Bureau's preferred policy vis-
a-vis Taiwan, at least in its general principal of advocating assimilation. After summarizing the
two contrasting policy options offered by Kirkwood and Revon, Hara wrote that the policy
where "Taiwan may have a system slightly different from the main lands, but will not be
considered to belong to the colonial type" was "without a doubt" the superior option.2 0 All
appropriate Japanese laws should therefore be gradually implemented in Taiwan, and various
administrative offices (such as army, navy, post, telegraph, railway, taxation, and the judiciary)
made directly responsible to the appropriate central bureaucracies in Tokyo, rather than leaving
their supervision in the sole hands of the Taiwan Governor-General. Meanwhile, despite Hara's
advocacy of assimilation, the seemingly key question of whether the Taiwanese could be
assimilated received only a cursory discussion in the text.
9 For discussion of the evolution of Japanese national identity in the context of colonial expansion, see Ishida
Takeshi, "'D6ka' seisaku to tsukurareta kannen toshite no 'Nippon' ['Assimilation' policy and 'Japan' as an
invented idea]," Shiso 892, 893 (1998): 47-75, 141-74; Oguma Eiji, A Genealogy of 'Japanese'Self-images, trans.
David Askew (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002), pp. 16-92; Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes toward
Colonialism, 1895-1945," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 80-127; Michael Weiner, Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in
Pre-1945 Japan (London: Routledge, 1995).
20 Hara Takashi, "Taiwan mondai nian [Two proposals for the Taiwan problem]," in Taiwan shiry5 [Taiwan
documents], ed. Kaneko Kentar6 (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970[1895]), p. 32.
2! Ibid., pp. 33-34. It was in this point of whether various administrative duties (such as customs, post, and
communications) should be placed under the direct jurisdiction of relevant bureaucracies in Tokyo or under the
jurisdiction of the Governor-General where many of the bureau members disagreed with Hara, despite their overall
agreement that assimilation should be pursued. Those who agreed with Hara were Den Kenjiro (Chief of
Communications Bureau of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation), Yamamoto Gonnohy6e (Vice
Navy Minister), and It6 Miyoji (Chief Cabinet Clerk). Disagreeing with Hara were Kawakami Soroku (Vice Chief
of Staff), Kodama Gentar6 (Vice Army Minister), Suematsu Kencho (Chief of Cabinet Legislation Bureau), and
Tajiri Inajir6 (Vice Finance Minister). Oe Shinobu, "Shokuminchi sens6 to Sotokufu no seiritsu [Colonial war and
the establishment of the Government-General]," in iwanami koza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami series on
modern Japan and its colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 20-21.
The rationale provided by Hara for assimilation-which he referred to as naichi enche
shugi (doctrine of homeland extension)-was as follows: In the first place, the geographic
proximity of Japan and Taiwan allows the Japanese and the Taiwanese to interact with one
another easily. The situation the Japanese faced vis-A-vis Taiwan was thus akin to one between
Germany and Alsace-Lorraine as well as France and Algeria, where assimilation was being
pursued. Moreover, given the racial similarity of the Japanese and the Taiwanese, a governance
system that assumed racial difference between the ruler and the ruled was inappropriate.
These reasons of geographic proximity and racial similarity nonetheless paled in
comparison to Hara's most pressing (and likely his only real) reason for advocating assimilation:
The policy's effect on Japanese grand strategy. As a result of its decisive victory against China in
the Sino-Japanese War, Japan proved that it was now the most powerful Asian country in the
region. However, Japan was not yet among the ranks of the great powers, and its position in
Northeast Asia was still relatively weak, as evidenced by Japan's quick capitulation in light of
the Triple Intervention by France, Germany, and Russia. Hence, Japan's Taiwan policy could not
simply be about Taiwan, or about Japanese domestic politics for that matter. It was
unambiguously apparent to Hara that Japan's colonial policy had first to support Japan's
immediate foreign policy concerns, while strengthening Japan's long-term strategic position vis-
A-vis the Western powers.23
In particular, Hara was deeply troubled with the possible effects of Japan's Taiwan policy
on the new Commerce and Navigation Treaty that Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu had just
concluded with Great Britain in July 1894. This treaty was of great diplomatic, commercial, as
well as ideological importance to Japan, as it replaced the humiliating unequal trade treaties and
22 Hara, "Taiwan mondai nian," pp. 32-33.
23 Oguna, "Nihonjin " no kyokai, pp. 86-93.
extraterritorial agreements that Japan was forced into signing with Western powers in 1858, and
paved the way for similarly updated commerce and navigation agreements between Japan and
24fourteen other countries. However, the treaty did not come into immediate effect when it was
signed in 1894, for a key requirement of the treaty was for Japan to adopt a new law code in
accordance to Western legal standards and practices. As stipulated by the treaty, Japan had until
July 16, 1898-that is, one year before the new treaty was to come into effect-to revise its law
code and promulgate it throughout its territory. In light of this provision, Japan's Taiwan policy
had the potential of derailing the treaty; with annexation, Taiwan was formally a part of the
territory where a new Western legal code was to be adopted.2 s Accordingly, Hara's justifications
for the pursuit of assimilation in Taiwan ends with the following plea:
We have already informed Great Britain that we are viewing the various ports in Taiwan
the same way we view the open ports in the Japanese home islands; also, we have told the
United States that after pacification [of Taiwan], we will apply our current tax rates to
Taiwanese ports; furthermore, we have declared to each of the treaty countries that we
will extend the treaty [to Taiwan] as much as possible. Therefore, if we were to adopt the
proposal where Taiwan is treated as a colonial territory, we would create a contradiction
in our domestic and foreign policy. 26
Indeed, Hara was hardly alone in fearing the impact of Japan's colonial policy on the new
Commerce and Navigation Treaty. Henry Denison, an American who served as legal advisor to
successive Japanese foreign ministers (and was the author of the clause concerning Taiwan in the
Treaty of Shimonoseki), was another influential figure within the diplomatic establishment who
interpreted the new treaty as requiring the extension of the Japanese law code to Taiwan.
Nonetheless, according to Denison, it was not necessary that Japan's law code be equally applied
24 For a discussion of this treaty and other diplomatic achievements of Mutsu Munemitsu, see Louis G. Perez, Japan
Comes ofAge: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of Unequal Treaties (London: Associated University Presses,
1999).
2' Asano, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei, pp. 24-25; Oguma, "Nihonjin" no ky6kai, p. 120.
26 Hara, "Taiwan mondai nian," pp. 32-33.
to all residents of Taiwan. Invoking the Algerian precedent, he argued that a modem law code
could be applied just to those of Japanese ethnic origin and citizens of Western countries residing
in Taiwan. As for the local Taiwanese population, they could continue to be governed by
traditional laws and customs for the time being. In this way, Denison provided the legal
argument for a discriminatory and dualistic institutional system where a different set of laws
were applied to an individual depending on his or her nationality or ethnicity. 2 7
An alternative interpretation of the Commerce and Navigation Treaty was offered by
Kirkwood, who argued that the treaty allowed for Taiwan to have its own distinct law code as
long as Japanese and foreign nationals (and, by implication, the Taiwanese as well) were treated
equally by law. This was because Japan, as a sovereign state, possessed the right to write its own
laws. In addition, the treaty itself explicitly allowed Japan to revise its law code as necessary. By
implication, according to Kirkwood, an entirely new law code can, and should, be written for
Taiwan. By this time, Kirkwood had spent a year traveling in Taiwan, and was now convinced
that his original 1895 recommendation to treat Taiwan as administratively and legally separate
from Japan was the best course of action. He observed firsthand that the island's inhabitants
possessed laws and customs that were clearly different from those found in Japan, and could
foresee the immense problems that Japan would face if it attempted to impose its institutions
onto the Taiwanese people.28
In March 1898, Prime Minister It6 held a series of meetings with Ume Kenjiro (his most
trusted legal advisor), Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujiroi, and Got6 Shimpei (who was expected to
depart for Taiwan shortly, as the colonial government's new Chief Civil Administrator) to
discuss these alternative interpretations of the Commerce and Navigation Treaty. Meanwhile,
27 Asano, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei, pp. 66-72. See pp. 100-11, for a similar interpretation to the law
code issue by Ume Kenjiro.
28 Ibid., pp. 72-76; Oguma, "Nihonjin " no ky6kai, pp. 120-21.
although a representative of the Japanese colonial administration-known as the Government-
General of Taiwan (GGT)-was not present at these meetings, its opinion was made known to
the committee through letters written by Governor-General Nogi Maresuke and by the GGT's
Foreign Affairs Bureau. The GGT's position, like that of Kirkwood, was that the 1894 Treaty
should not be extended to Taiwan, at least for the time being. First, the GGT noted that given
stark differences in the laws and customs between the Japanese and the Taiwanese, trying to
impose Japanese institutions would further destabilize the already precarious security situation.
The GGT also feared that with Taiwanese industry in its infancy, American and European
capitalistic interests would come to dominate the Taiwanese economy if they were not contained
within treaty ports. Paradoxically, the end of extraterritoriality in Taiwan could mean the
economic colonization of Taiwan by the West.29
It and his advisors could certainly see the merits of Kirkwood's interpretation, but they
found his recommendations to involve too much risk; consequently, GGT's counsel was also
rejected. To It and his advisors, it was clear that Kirkwood's overriding concern was not the
Commerce and Navigation Treaty itself, but the issue of Taiwanese governance. Denison, on the
other hand, focused on the 1894 Treaty, and in particular, preventing Japanese colonial policy
from derailing the It cabinet's primary foreign policy objective. On June 23, 1898, the GGT,
under Tokyo's direction, issued an ordinance stipulating that Japanese civil, commercial, and
criminal codes, as well as Japanese codes of civil and criminal procedures would govern the
relations among Japanese and between Japanese and Western nationals, while ethnic Taiwanese
and Chinese would be governed (for the time being) by their traditional laws and customs.3 0 In
29 Asano, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei, pp. 76-79.
'
0 Ibid., pp. 85-99. For an English translation of this 1898 ordinance (Ritsurei No. 8), see Tay-sheng Wang, Legal
Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: The Reception of Western Law (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2000), p. 195.
this way, naichi ench5 shugi, at least in principle, was adopted as Tokyo's official stance toward
its new territorial possession.
The link between the new treaty and Japan's Taiwan policy, however, was not the only
factor behind Ito's, as well as Hara's, preference for naichi encho shugi. Seasoned realists, they
both recognized that fundamental geopolitical interests were also at stake. From their perspective,
a thoroughly Japanized Taiwan (assuming that this was possible) was far better for Japanese
long-term military strategy than a Taiwan with its own distinct national identity, or one that saw
itself within a larger Chinese community. Furthermore, the policy to make Taiwan a separate
political entity, with an autonomous administrative structure and a local assembly (as advocated
by Kirkwood), would inadvertently create the preconditions for Taiwan's eventual independence.
Only when the Taiwanese were culturally, administratively, legally, and politically assimilated
into the Japanese nation-state was Taiwan's future as an integral component of the Japanese
empire secure.3 "I am a believer in the strategy of applying the doctrine of assimilation (doka
shugi) to Taiwan," Hara wrote in a Yomiuri Shimbun editorial on January 2, 1899. "The doctrine
of appeasement (kaijya shugi) buys peace in the short term," he continued, "but may brew
calamity in the future, and lead to our nation's demise."32
Ito and Hara were hardly the only individuals who advocated naichi ench5 shugi out of
national security interests, nor was Taiwan the only (or first) territory within the Japanese
31 Throughout his political career, Hara was unwavering in this opinion. For example, when Lin Xiantang, who led
the conservative wing of the Taiwanese nationalist movement, visited Hara on January 21, 1921 with a petition for
the creation of a Taiwanese legislative body, Hara rejected this by stating, "Lawmaking powers assume a condition
of independence or semi-independence, and therefore I am absolutely against the pursuit of such proposal." Hara
Takashi, Hara Takashi nikki [Journal of Hara Takashi], vol. 5, ed. Hara Keiichiro (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan,
1965), p. 340. For further discussion, see Oguma, "Nihonjin " no ky6kai, pp. 86-93.
32 Quotation found in Oguma, "Nihonjin " no kyokai, p. 86. It is notable that Hara refers to the policy of association
as one of "appeasement." Hara may have had in mind that in many British colonies, the policy of association had
given birth to demands for a native assembly in preparation for eventual self-rule. Also note that here, he calls his
policy one of dka shugi (assimilationism), rather than his preferred term of naichi enche shugi (doctrine of
homeland extension).
Empire where assimilation was pursued for geostrategic reasons. 33 In fact, assimilation had been
Japan's dominant approach toward its outlying territories at least since the 1868 Meiji
Restoration (and arguably since the early nineteenth century), as a result of increased geopolitical
rivalry in the Far East.34 For most of the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), the policy of the
Matsumae domain (which governed the southern portions of Hokkaido) toward the people of
Ainu was one of prohibiting their Japanization, neither by the transfer of Japanese customs nor
through the teaching of the Japanese language. However, as Russian explorers began to appear
around Hokkaido in the late eighteen century, Edo (Tokyo) government officials began to voice
concerns of possible Russian advancement in Hokkaido. As a result, in 1799, the Bakufu (as the
central government was known) placed the Ainu lands (ezochi) under its direct jurisdiction and
ordered their Japanization. Settlement of Japanese subjects throughout the island of Hokkaido
(particularly in the northern portion) was also actively promoted.
Similarly, the policy of the Satsuma domain (in current-day Kagoshima prefecture)
during the Tokugawa period was to treat the Rynkyii kingdom (Okinawa)-which was a
3 Izawa Shiiji, who served as the GGT Education Bureau Chief from 1895-1897, argued (before his departure for
Taiwan) that assimilation was necessary for geostrategic reasons: "In order to maintain order in a new territory, in
addition to conquering it externally through force, it is necessary to conquer its spirit, dispel its old national dreams,
and realize a new national spirit. In other words, it is necessary to pursue Japanization. We must rebuild their
intellect and assimilate it into the Japanese way of thinking, and make them one and the same as a Japanese citizen.
Therefore, the objective of education is to conquer their spirit." Quotation found in Oguma, "Nihonjin " no kyokai,
p. 94. General Akashi Motojiro, who became Governor-General of Taiwan in 1918 also advocated the pursuit of
assimilation policy form the perspective of national security and Japan's southern strategy, which (according to his
biographer) was his utmost concern. See Komori Tokuji, Akashi Motojiro (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968), pp. 190-200.
For a discussion of Akashi's policy, as well as a reproduction of his various policy pronouncements, see ibid., pp.
51-66. As it will be shown in the ensuing discussion, Akashi's agenda was a departure from the existing approach of
the GGT, which explicitly rejected assimilation as being unviable. Given that most of his staff, including Chief Civil
Administrator Shimomura Hiroshi (his second in command, and the individual placed in charge of formulating
policy), were veterans of previous colonial administrations, it is likely that his call for assimilation was met with
resistance within the GGT. Indeed, very little changed during Akashi's tenure, except for the adoption of a new
Taiwan Education Order, as discussed in Ch. 5. See ibid., pp. 131-34.
3 As Mark E. Caprio argues, security concerns were also an important factor that led countries such as Great Britain
and France pursue a policy of assimilation toward territories close to home. Mark E. Caprio, Japanese Assimilation
Policies in Colonial Korea: 1910-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 19-48.
3 Ishida Takeshi, "'D6ka' seisaku to tsukurareta kannen toshite no 'Nippon', pp. 56-59; Oguma, "Nihonjin " no
kyokai, pp. 50-69; Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance, and the A inu ofJapan (London: Routledge, 1996).
tributary state to both the Qing dynasty and the Satsuma domain-as a foreign country inhabited
by those ethically distinct from the Japanese. This changed in 1871, however, when Okinawan
sailors were slaughtered in Taiwan after their vessel was shipwrecked off the island's northern
coast, and the Japanese government sent a retaliatory expedition to Taiwan to avenge the death
of "Japanese nationals." At the time, the Rytikyti kingdom was divided between pro-Japan and
pro-Qing factions. Hence, the 1871 Taiwan incident was seen by Japanese policymakers as an
opportunity to consolidate Japan's claim over these strategically important islands. Thereafter,
the Rytikyi kingdom was annexed in 1872 and made into a Japanese prefecture in 1879. In order
to ease its absorption into the Japanese administrative and legal structure, existing laws and
customs were temporarily retained, but the assimilation of the Okinawan people into Japan was
actively pursued through the imposition of Japanese education.36
The Japanese government's policy toward Taiwan in fact borrowed heavily from
precedents in Hokkaido and Okinawa. First, as was the case in Hokkaido, Japanese emigration to
Taiwan was actively promoted. In order to facilitate the policy of turning Taiwan into a Japanese
settler colony, the Japanese government provided two years (after annexation in 1895) for the
ethnic-Han inhabitants of Taiwan to decide whether they would remain on the island and become
Japanese subjects or would sell their property and migrate "back" to mainland China. The hope
was that a large number of Taiwanese would leave, creating an opportunity for Japanese settlers
to become farmers and landowners in Taiwan. 37 Second, as seen in Vice Foreign Minister Hara's
January 1896 proposal, the initial plan was to treat Taiwan as a special Japanese province
36 Gabe Masao, "Nihon no kindaika to Okinawa [Modernization of Japan and Okinawa]," in Iwanami koza kindai
Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami series on modem Japan and its colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten, 1992), pp. 101-19; Ishida Takeshi, "'D6ka' seisaku to tsukurareta kannen toshite no 'Nippon', pp. 65-66;
Oguma, "Nihonjin " no ky6kai, pp. 18-49; Ryiikyn Seifu, Okinawa ken shi [History of the Okinawa prefecture], vol.
2 (Naha: Kokusho Kankokai, 1970).
3 This policy was modeled after the German approach to determining citizenship in Alsace-Lorraine when this
territory was annexed from France in 1871. For a discussion of this policy and the resulting problem of determining
nationality and citizenship in Taiwan, see Asano, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei, pp. 30-50.
administered directly by Tokyo, where Taiwan would be gradually and completely incorporated
into the Japanese administrative, legal, and political structure. Third, as was the case in both
Hokkaido and Okinawa, education would be the primary method through which to advance the
Japanization of the Taiwanese people. 38
By 1898, naichi encho shugi had thus become Tokyo's official policy toward Taiwan.
Not only was this institution-building approach already being pursued in Hokkaido and Okinawa,
but it also seemed to best serve Japan's short-term diplomatic objectives as well as its long-term
geostrategic interests. Ironically, however, this was precisely the year in which the Taiwan
Government-General abandoned naichi ench6 shugi, and adopted a colonial policy that closely
resembled the one that had been advocated by Kirkwood. The reasons for this paradoxical turn of
events (to be elaborated in the following sections of this chapter) were two-fold: First because of
fierce Taiwanese resistance against Japanese forces, policymakers in Tokyo decided to grant the
Governor-General of Taiwan considerable autonomy, and in particular, the right to implement
law-like ordinances without prior permission from Tokyo. In this way, the GGT obtained the
ability to pursue its own policy agenda and ignore Tokyo's preference for assimilation.
The second reason was that with the appointment of Got6 Shimpei as the new Chief Civil
Administrator of Taiwan (along with Governor-General Kodama Gentaro) in 1898, the GGT was
now led, for the first time, by an individual who had extensively studied European (particularly
British) colonial methods, and was single-mindedly focused on making Taiwan into a profitable
colonial possession. Unlike past GGT officials, who saw their appointments in Taiwan to be
temporary assignments before resuming their careers back in Tokyo, Got6 saw his life's calling
38 Oguma, "Nihonjin " no kyokai, pp. 93-100.
as a colonial administrator and empire builder. He had no desire to look to home for guidance,
but was determined to chart his own course in Taiwan to become Japan's Lord Cromer. 39
3. The War in Taiwan and the Establishment of an Autonomous Government-General
In May 1895, when Admiral Kabayama Sukenori was appointed commander of the
Taiwan forces, Prime Minister Ito instructed the man who was to become the first Governor-
General of Taiwan that while the coercive power of the military was necessary to initially subdue
foreign peoples, military rule was inappropriate for peacetime colonial administration. Under
It's original plan, drafted on May 21, the GGT was to be divided into three separate branches:
civil, army, and navy affairs. Moreover, the Government-General was to be placed under the
direct control of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau, and consequently under the jurisdiction of the
Cabinet (in Tokyo). At this point, the appropriate credentials of the Governor-General had not
yet been decided (most importantly whether or not he must be an active duty military officer),
but the proposed system was clearly designed under the principle of civilian control of the GGT.
This plan, however, was not to be implemented.40
Instead, the GGT acquired near absolute autonomy from Tokyo in 1896, and by
administrative regulation, the Governor-General was to be an active duty general or lieutenant
general (or admiral or vice admiral) of the Imperial Army (or Navy), and therefore equal in rank
(within the Japanese bureaucratic hierarchy) to the Prime Minister himself. The immediate cause
of this drastic and highly consequential change in the administrative structure of the GGT was
39 Earl of Cromer (Evelyn Baring) was the British Consul-General of Egypt from 1883 to 1907. His official title,
"Consul-General," masks the reality that he was in fact the autocratic ruler of Egypt for twenty-four years. He was at
the time (and continues to be) widely regarded as among Britain's most successful colonial administrators. For
Cromer's representative writings on colonial administration, see Modern Egypt (New York: Macmillan, 1908);
Ancient and Modern Imperialism (London: J. Murray, 1909). For an authoritative biography of Cromer, see Roger
Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
40 Prime Minister Ito's instructions, as well as other documents pertaining to initial plans regarding the GGT, can be
found in It6 Hirobumi, Taiwan shiry6 [Taiwan documents] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970[1936]).
the ferocity of Taiwanese resistance against Japanese occupation, which seemed to suggest the
"necessity" of a military governor-general, at least in the short-term. Yet, lurking in the
background was the attempt by the military and other conservative elements within the Meiji
state to fend off challenges by political parties and liberal activists wherever they could within
the process of Japan's slow development into a democratic state.41
Having defeated the Qing army and navy in Korea and Manchuria, and having acquired
Taiwan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese government had initially expected little
organized resistance-at least from regular military forces-on the island. Indeed, that the
Taiwan campaign was assigned to an admiral of the Imperial Navy, rather than an army general,
attests to early Japanese expectations. However, soon after the treaty with China was signed, the
situation in Taiwan took a negative turn for Japan. On May 25, 1895, the Qing governor of
Taiwan, Tang Jingsong, defied Beijing and declared independence from Chinese rule and
became the first (and only) President of the Republic of Formosa.4 2 Although Chinese forces in
the northern part of Taiwan largely followed Beijing's orders and abandoned Tang by retreating
to the mainland, units in the south, led by Liu Yongfu, declared their loyalty to the new Republic,
ensuring that Japanese forces would face stiff resistance, as they commenced their southern
advance through the island.
Moreover, it was not just the defectors of the regular Qing army who fought against
Japanese aggression; an important source of local resistance was prominent landlord families,
who recruited their tenants to form private militias to repel the invaders.4 3 Consequently, within a
4' Oe, "Shokuminchi senso to Sotokufu no seiritsu," pp. 18-19.
42 For an account of the establishment of the Republic of Formosa, see K6 Shod6, Taiwan Minshukoku no kenkyai:
Taiwan dokuritsu undo5 shi no ichi dansh5 [A study on the Republic of Formosa: a chapter in the history of the
Taiwan independence movement] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1970).
4 Harry J. Lamley, "Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in Taiwan: A New
History, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 206-208. On the militias, see Steven Harrell,
month of the start of the campaign, Kabayama was compelled to ask for reinforcements twice.
The military command of the GGT was also expanded to a full wartime footing and Lt. Gen.
Takashima Tomonosuke (who previously served as Army Minister, and would do so again after
this campaign) was assigned to command the Imperial Army in Taiwan on behalf of the
embattled Admiral Kabayama.44
In all, the Japanese employed a fighting force of 40,983 men (plus an additional 20,621
men in non-combat units) to defeat the forces of the Formosan Republic. This was to constitute
nearly one-third of all Japanese soldiers deployed during the entire Sino-Japanese War. 45 Yet, the
pacification campaign was hardly over with the capture of the city of Tainan (the last remaining
stronghold of the Formosan Republic) and the fleeing of Liu Yongfu (who took over as de facto
leader of the resistance when Tang Jingsong abandoned his Republic on June 4) in October 1895.
Until 1902, Japanese forces continued to be embroiled in guerrilla warfare against local notables
and their private militias, whose determination to resist the Japanese invaders had strengthened
as a result of the brutality of the Japanese army (who burned entire villages and indiscriminately
killed civilians) during the 1895-96 campaign.46 When the western plains region was finally
pacified in 1902, the GGT turned its attention to the mountainous (and resource rich) areas of
eastern Taiwan, which had previously been separated from the populous plains area by a long
fortified line that ran the length of the island. The intensity of this last phase of the armed
"From Xiedou to Yijun, the Decline of Ethnicity in Northern Taiwan, 1885-1895," Late Imperial China 11.1 (1990):
99-127.
44 Muk6yama Hiroo, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku und6 shi [A history of the national movement in
Taiwan under the Japanese rule] (Tokyo: Chiio Keizai Kenkyfijo, 1987), pp. 59-119; Oe, "Shokuminchi sens6 to
S6tokufu no seiritsu," pp. 5-6. In particular, Mukoyama provides a day-by-day account of the war's progress.
4s Oe, "Shokuminchi sens6 to Sotokufu no seiritsu," p. 6.
46 It is estimated that approximately 32,000 Taiwanese, which was more than one percent of the total population
were killed between 1895 and 1902. Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, p. 111. For a
detailed description of Taiwanese resistance and the Japanese pacification campaign, see K6 Sekai, Nihon tochika
no Taiwan: teikoto danatsu [Taiwan under the Japanese rule: resistance and suppression] (Tokyo: University of
Tokyo Press, 1972), pp. 9-159; Muk6yama, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku und6 shi, pp. 164-308.
conflict was much lower compared to the preceding campaigns, but it was not until 1915 that the
Japanese were finally able to subdue the last of the indigenous Taiwanese tribes inhabiting the
47mountainous region.
It was within this context of ongoing combat between the Japanese Imperial Army and
various Taiwanese military units that the debate concerning the structure of the GGT took place
among members of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. The Bureau's first draft (whose author is unclear)
was written sometime in late 1895 (likely in November or December), and contained within it
the following notable features: First, the qualification of the Governor-General was to be that of
an active duty general, lieutenant general, admiral, or vice admiral. Second, the Governor-
General was to follow the direction of the Minister of Colonization ("takushokumu daijin no
kunrei ni shitagai"), but was nonetheless placed nominally under direct authority of the Emperor
("sotoku wa tenno ni chokkatsu shi"). Third, the Governor-General was to be granted the power
to appoint and dismiss higher civil servants (k&to kan) at the sonin rank, given that he first
submit these requests to the Emperor for approval through the Prime Minister.4 8 This pertained
to all officials of the GGT in managerial positions at the divisional (ka) level or below. As for
bureaucrats who were not in managerial positions, and were outside the higher civil service
hierarchy, they were to be appointed upon the sole discretion of the Governor-General. 49 Fourth,
47 Kondo Masami, "Taiwan Satokufu no 'riban' taisei to Musha Jiken [Taiwan Government-General's 'riban'
system and the Wushe Incident]," in Iwanami koza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami series on modem Japan
and its colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992): 35-60; Oe, "Shokuminchi senso to
Sotokufu no seiritsu," pp. 8-10.
48 Higher civil servants in Japan were divided into the following three categories: shinnin kan, chokunin kan, and
sonin kan. Shinnin kan was the highest bureaucratic rank, and was held by the Prime Minister, Army General and
Navy Admiral, cabinet ministers, and Taiwan and Korea Governor-Generals. Meanwhile, vice ministers and bureau
chiefs were given one of two chokunin ranks, depending on the importance of their position. Next came the seven
levels of the sonin rank. For a brief description of the Japanese bureaucratic structure, see Okamoto Makiko,
Shokuminchi kanry6 no seiji shi: Chosen, Taiwan Sotokufu to teikoku Nihon [The political history of the colonial
bureaucracy: Korean and Taiwanese Government-Generals and the Japanese empire] (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008), pp.
41-44.
49 In other words, the only positions the government in Tokyo had any authority over were the top leadership
positions of Governor-General (setoku), Chief Civil Administrator (minsei chokan), director-generals of GGT
the draft proposal created various bureaus within the GGT, and assigned to these bureaus duties
that were normally under the jurisdiction of government agencies and ministries in Tokyo. 0
Fifth, and finally, a separate document proposed the creation of a GGT legislative assembly
(rippo gikai).'
This draft was a departure from Prime Minister Ito's initial plan for the Taiwan
Government-General. As Vice Foreign Minister (and Taiwan Affairs Bureau member) Hara
pointed out in his notes concerning this Nov-Dec 1895 proposal, that by placing the Governor-
General directly under the authority of the Emperor, his power was made greater than that of the
proposed Minister of Colonization. Under such conditions, supervision by the Colonial Minister,
and therefore the Cabinet, would have been in name only. (Allowing the Governor-General such
freedom in bureaucratic appointment also made certain that the Colonial Minister would have
little supervisory power over the GGT.) Furthermore, Hara was alarmed by the fact that the draft
proposal designated that policy areas he felt should be properly placed under the jurisdiction of
ministries and agencies in Tokyo-such as post and communication, legal affairs, and customs-
would instead be administered by GGT bureaus. Meanwhile, the creation of a legislative
assembly within the GGT was a direct challenge to the lawmaking authority of the Imperial Diet,
and contradicted the government's official policy of assimilation. Finally, Hara was opposed to
limiting the governor-generalship to active duty military officials. Given the near absolute
bureaus (kyokucho), and provincial governors (shiichiji). Yet, even here, Tokyo would not have been in the position
to make appointments freely. It was up to the armed forces to decide which active duty officer were to serve as
Governor-General. Also, all bureaucratic appointments were ultimately made by the Emperor (upon consultation
with his advisors), and it was unlikely that approval for the appointment of the Chief Civil Administrator, bureau
chiefs, and provincial governors would be granted unless they first had the Governor-General's support.
50 For the text of this proposal, as well as comments made in the margins by Hara, see Hara Takashi, Hara Takashi
kankei monjo [Documents related to Hara Takashi], ed. Hara Takeshi Monjo Kenkyfikai vol. 6 (Tokyo: Nihon HCs6
Shuppan Kyokai, 1984[1970]), pp. 220-23.
s" Ibid., pp. 223-25.
autonomy of the armed forces in Meiji Japan, this clause, more than anything else, made certain
that the government in Tokyo would have little control over the actions of the GGT.
Hara's counter proposal was presented to the Taiwan Affairs Bureau on February 2, 1896,
as a part of his opinion paper favoring assimilation (discussed above). His most notable
recommendations were as follows: (i) the jurisdiction of the central bureaucracies should be
extended to Taiwan; (ii) a lawmaking body that might challenge the authority of the Imperial
Diet should not be created in Taiwan; (iii) the supervisory power of the Minister of Colonization
over the GGT should be strengthened; and (iv) the governor-generalship should be opened to
civilians. On most of these points, he obtained the support of his fellow bureau members. As
seen from the GGT bureaucratic system established by the Taiwan Affairs Bureau on March 31,
1896, there is no mention of creating a legislative body in Taiwan. The clause stating that the
Governor-General was to be placed under the direct authority of the Emperor was deleted, while
the supervisory power of the Minister of Colonization over the Governor-General was clarified
and strengthened ("s6toku wa ... takushokumu daijin no kantoku wo uke shohan no seimu wo
t6ri su"). 5 3 It was only in the issue of making central bureaucracies in Tokyo directly responsible
for policy matters in Taiwan that Hara met opposition from many bureau members, who likely
found Hara's proposal to be highly impractical.
Meanwhile, Hara's position that capable civilians should be allowed to serve as
Governor-Generals of Taiwan met the strong objection of Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami Soroku.
52 For Hara's comments on the draft Taiwan Government-General proposals, see ibid., pp. 220-28.
5 The text of the 1896 imperial decree (chokurei) establishing the GGT can be found in Yamazaki Tansho, Gaichi
tochi kiko no kenkyfi [A study of the governing institutions of the outer lands] (Tokyo: Takayama Shoin, 1943), pp.
185-86. A year later, minor changes were made to the bureaucratic system in Taiwan-changes which largely
concerned its internal composition rather than its relationship to Tokyo. This 1897 GGT bureaucratic structure lasted
until 1919, when Prime Minister Hara succeeded in revising the decree to allow for the appointment of civilians to
the post of Governor-General. The 1897 GGT decree can be found on pp. 187-88. The 1919 revisions to the 1897
decree, which will be discussed in later pages, can be found on p. 190.
1 For a discussion of this meeting see Hara's February 2, 1896 journal entry in Hara Takashi nikki, vol. 1, p. 230.
On this point, see also footnote 21.
In part, a military governor-general was likely seen as necessary (or at least highly desirable) by
the Army in order to have complete freedom of action in suppressing Taiwanese resistance.55
Yet, underlying the Army's position regarding the civilian governor-general proposal was the
decision of Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (who rivaled Prince Ito Hirobumi in influence and
prestige within the Meiji state) to adopt a policy of "northern defense and southern advance
(hokushu nanshin)" in light of Japan's territorial gains (or the lack thereof) following the Sino-
Japanese War. With Japanese ambitions (temporarily) stifled in Korea and Manchuria, Yamagata
determined that Japan could satisfy its geostrategic and economic interests by carving out a
sphere of influence centered on Taiwan and China's Fujian province (which was directly to the
west of Taiwan). Given Yamagata's supremacy within the military, he could ensure that the
administration in Taiwan would be in the hands of individuals sympathetic to his southern
56
expansionary policy as long as the Governor-General was a military officer.
According to Hara, a majority of the members of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau agreed with
him in the desirability of opening the Governor-General's post to a civilian.57 Yet, the opinion of
the Army (or perhaps more precisely that of Field Marshal Yamagata) could not be dismissed,
for the Army (as well as the Navy) possessed the power to bring down the Government by
orchestrating the resignation of the Army (or Navy) Minister, who-by law-had to come from
the ranks of active duty officers. In fact, the belief in the necessity of a military governor-general
ss Nakamura Akira, Shokuminchi tochi h5 no kihon mondai [The fundamental problem of the colonial governance
laws] (Tokyo: Nihon Hy6ronsha, 1943), pp. 49-50.
56 Oe Shinobu, "Yamagata-kei to shokuminchi bundan t6chi [The Yamagata clique and military rule in the
colonies]," in iwanami koza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami series on modem Japan and its colonies], ed. Oe
Shinobu, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 3-15. Indeed, the first "peacetime" Governor-General Katsura
Tar6 colonial policy in Taiwan was premised on the importance of Taiwan to Japan's southern advance strategy. See
Tokutomi, Koshaku Katsura Tard Den, pp. 705-33. It was also hardly a coincidence that from 1896 to 1915, the
individuals appointed as Governor-General were all key Yamagata prot6g6s hailing from the Field Marshal's home
province of Yamaguchi (formally the Choshfi domain).
5 Hara, Hara Takashi nikki, vol. 1, p. 230.
was so strongly held by the Army that Kawakami even defied the Meiji Emperor's strong desire
58(expressed a year later in August 1897) for a civilian governor-general.
Table 1: Governor-Generals of Taiwan, 1895-1919
Tenure as Taiwan Position held prior to that Positions held concurrently as Governor-
Governor-General of Governor-General General and later appointments
Kabayama Sukenori: May Member of Privy Council Member of Privy Council (1896, 1904-1922)
10, 1895 to June 2, 1896 (1892-1894) Home Minister (1896-1898)
Chief of Naval General Staff Education Minister (1898-1900)
(1894-1895)
Katsura Tar6: June 2, 1896 Commander of 3rd Division Army Minister (1898-1900)
to October 14, 1896 (1891-1896) Prime Minister (1901-1906, 1908-1911, 1912-1913)
Genro [Elder Statesman] (1912-1913)
Nogi Maresuke: October 14, Commander of 2nd Division Commander of 11th Division (1899-1901)
1896 to February 26, 1898 (1895-1896) Commander of 3rd Army (1904-1906)
President of Gakushfiin University (1907-1912)
Kodama Gentar6: February Vice Army Minister (1892- Army Minister (1900-1902)
26, 1898 to April 11, 1906 1898) Home Minister/Education Minister (1903)
Vice Chief of the General Staff, Japanese Imperial
Army (1903-1906)
Chief of the General Staff, Manchurian Army
(1904-1905)
Chief of the General Staff, Japanese Imperial Army
(1906)
Sakuma Samata: April 11, Commander of the Tokyo none (becomes gravely ill while in office and dies
1906 to April 30, 1915 Garrison (1904-1906) soon after his resignation)
And6 Teibi: April 30, 1915 Commander of Ch6sen none (becomes an army reservist upon leaving
to June 6, 1918 (Korea) Army (1912-1915) office)
Akashi Motojiro: June 6, Commander of 6th Division none (dies in office)
1918 to October 26, 1919 (1915-1918)
Source: Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea
Control," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 30, p. 130.
and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political
58 For a detailed account of this episode, see Hiyama Yukio, "Taiwan tochi no kiko kaikaku to kanki shinshuku
mondai: Meiji 30-nen no Taiwan tochi [Reform of the Taiwan colonial administration and the problem of
bureaucratic discipline: colonial rule of Taiwan in 1897]," in Taiwan Sotokufu monjo mokuroku [Index to documents
related to the Taiwan Government-General], ed. Chiiky6 Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyijo, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yumani
Shob6, 1995), pp. 348-51.
Consequently, it was little matter that the Colonial Minister (and later the Prime Minister
or Home Minister, when the Colonial Ministry was abolished) was given authority to supervise
the actions of the GGT. In a country where the military was the most powerful organ of the state,
as long as the Governor-General was a high ranking officer of the Imperial Army or Navy, he
was immune to any and all pressures from politicians in Tokyo.59 Also, the fact that the
governor-generalship was restricted to the highest military ranks meant that he was likely to be a
peer of members of the General Staff as well as Army and Navy Ministers. 60 Indeed, as Table 1
displays, those who became Taiwan Governor-General between 1895 and 1919 (when the
military governor-general system was abolished) were among the most accomplished military
officers of Imperial Japan.
The political immunity enjoyed by the Governor-General also spilled over onto the rest
of the GGT bureaucracy. For example, when high profile corruption charges against civilian
officials of the GGT rocked the administration of Governor-General Nogi Maresuke in 1897,
Nogi dismissed the Chief Justice of GGT Higher Court Takano Takenori (who was taking an
active role in this case) in order to protect his Chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau, Mizuno Jun,
from prosecution. This incident caused an uproar in Japan, especially among liberal politicians
and activists, who viewed it as a blatant infringement of judicial independence-a principle
protected by the Meiji Constitution. However, despite repeated complaints in the Imperial Diet
and elsewhere against the actions of Nogi, as well as protests among judicial officials in the
Taiwanese courts (which led to three judicial resignations in the GGT Higher Court), Nogi's
59 For example, in November 1901, Home Minister Utsumi Tadakatsu challenged the GGT proposal for
administrative reorganization, and in particular, the creation of the all-powerful Superintendent of Police-Inspectors
(keishi s6cho) as an independent organ within the Division of Civil Administration (minseibu). However, despite
Utsumi's objection, administrative reform was implemented as planned by the GGT. Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, Taiwan
in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 78.
60 When a lieutenant general was appointed to the post of Taiwan Governor-General, his bureaucratic rank was
increased from that of chokunin kan first rank to that of shinnin kan, which was normally held only by those with
the military rank of general in the Imperial Army.
decision stood. With the Army firmly behind Nogi-or, more precisely, firmly committed to
protecting the post of Taiwan Governor-General from political "meddling"-there was little that
the government in Tokyo could do.61
Finally, GGT's internal structure helped establish its "bureaucratic autonomy" 62 in two
ways: First, the GGT was incorporated into the larger Japanese bureaucratic organization-in the
aftermath of the 1897 corruption scandals-and as a result, it could provide its members the
same employment security enjoyed by Japanese civil servants in mainland Japan. 63 As shown in
Table 2, the GGT thus became the destination for ambitious and highly capable individuals who
passed the prestigious higher civil service exam and, starting in 1903, the GGT received an
average of eight to nine higher civil service exam qualifiers per year.64 Second, most
appointments to higher office within the GGT were internal promotions (especially between
1896 and 1919) and by the 191 Os, those serving as bureau and division chiefs tended to have
experience of ten years or more in Taiwan.65 Consequently, the Government-General came to
61 For a discussion of this case and its surrounding events, see Hiyama, "Taiwan tochi no kik6 kaikaku to kanki
shinshuku mondai," pp. 373-88; Muk6yama, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi, pp. 132-33; Wang,
Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 68-69.
62 Daniel Carpenter writes that bureaucratic autonomy prevails when "politically differentiated agencies take
sustained patterns of action consisted with their own wishes, patterns that will not be checked or reversed by elected
authorities, organized interests, or courts." Bureaucratic autonomy thus emerges when three conditions are met: (i)
political differentiation of bureaucratic actors from those who wish to control them; (ii) the development of unique
organizational capacities; and (iii) political legitimacy or strong organization reputations embedded in an
independent power base. Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and
Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 14.
63 The protection of the bureaucracy from political influences can be found in Article 10 of the 1889 Meiji
Constitution: "The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries
of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. ... " For the official English translation of the
Meiji Constitution, see It6 Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire ofJapan, trans. Ito Miyoji
(Tokyo: Igirisu H~ritsu Gakko, 1889). For a comprehensive examination of the Japanese pre-WWII bureaucratic
system, see Hata Ikuhiko, Kanryo no kenkyi: fumetsu no pawd, 1868-1983 [Study of civil servants: their
indestructible power, 1868-1983] (Tokyo: K6dansha, 1983).
64 This figure does not include those individuals who joined the GGT after more than a year of passing the exam-
that is, those transferring to the GGT from a different bureaucracy or agency. In total, 342 individuals joined the
GGT within a year of passing the exam during the entirety of the GGT's existence. Okamoto, Shokuminchi kanryd
no seji shi, pp. 234-42.
65 Ibid., pp. 328-35.
possess-or at least was claimed by its members to have possessed-a unique and cohesive
bureaucratic identity.66




Ministry of Foreign Affairs 267
Ministry of Home Affairs** 2154
Ministry of Finance 942
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 567
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 489
Ministry of Communications and Transportation 813
Ministry of Railways 687
Ministry of Education 90
Ministry of Justice 446
other central bureaucracies and agencies 598
Government-General of Taiwan 363
Government-General of Korea 577
other colonial III
other public sector 191
private sector 873
unknown 283
*This figure is for the number of individuals who found employment in the identified destination within five years
of passing the higher civil service exam.
** Within the Home Ministry figures are included those with appointments in the provincial governments, including
that of a provincial governor.
Source: Okamoto Makiko, Shokuminchi kanry6 no seiji shi:- Ch~sen, Taiwan S,5tokufu to ieikoku Nihon [The
political history of the colonial bureaucracy: Korean and Taiwanese Government-Generals and the Japanese empire]
(Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008), p. 238.
Bureaucratic autonomy, however, was not the only reason for the GGT's ability to
undertake institution-building with considerable discretion: as important was the Imperial Diet's
authorization for the GGT to issue "ordinances that have the same effect as the (Japanese) statute
within his governing jurisdiction"-which was the first, and ultimately defining, clause of Law
66 GGT officials called their unique identity "Taiwan-like spirit (Taiwan-teki seishin)." According to Taiwan Nichi
Nichi Shinp5 (which was the GGT's official newspaper), just like each family possessed its own unique traditions
(kafli), officials in the GGT were united in outlook by a common spirit (seishin). See "Taiwan-teki seishin," Taiwan
Nichi Nichi Shinpi5, editorial, 30 May 1908. For further discussion of this concept of "Taiwan-teki seishin," see
Okamoto, Shokuminchi kamy5 no se~i shi, pp. 335-3 8.
63, the controversial 1896 act concerning the authority of the GGT.67 (The entire law comprised
six short articles, the last of which simply designated a three-year time limit to the law. 68) In
addition to granting the Governor-General lawmaking powers, the most notable feature of Law
63 was that it created a legislative system that completely bypassed the Imperial Diet. Not only
were Taiwan-specific laws to be drafted by the GGT, but the application of Japanese laws was to
be done through an imperial ordinance (that is, via bureaucratic channels), rather than through
parliamentary procedure. From the Government's perspective, this concentration of legislative
and administrative powers in the hands of the Governor-General seemed necessary at the time,
given the unexpectedly strong resistance Japanese forces were facing in Taiwan. In this way, the
Governor-General would be able to freely implement various draconian measures to suppress the
insurgency without concerning himself with possible objections from liberal-minded
parliamentarians, and without delays in action resulting from such objections, or from routine
parliamentary procedure. 69
Yet, as legislators within the House of Representatives could see, not only was the
constitutionality of Law 63's lawmaking procedure highly suspect, but more importantly, the
67 In Japanese: "Taiwan s5toku wa sono kankatsu kuiki nai ni h6ritsu no koryoku wo y-Fsuru meirei wo hassuru koto
wo e." The entire text of Law 63 can be found in Gaimush6 Joyakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan no inin rippo seido [The
delegated legislation system in Taiwan] (Tokyo: Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku H6kika, 1959), pp. 14-15. An English
translation of the law can be found in Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 192-93.
For a discussion of Law 63 and its most notable features, see Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal
Perspectives"; Nakamura, Shokuminchi t5chi h5 no kihon mondai, pp. 62-71.
6 As for the five substantive articles, the first, as written above, granted the Governor-General the authority to issue
statute-like ordinances, or ritsurei. Article 2 then specified the process through which a ritsurei could be issued: first
a Consultative Council (hy5gikai) within the GGT gave approval to the proposed ordinance; second the ritsurei draft
was submitted to the responsible cabinet minister (which was typically the Home Minister), who then forwarded it
to the Emperor for final approval. Article 3 and 4 stipulated that in case of emergency, the process described in
Article 2 may be temporarily suspended. Finally, Article 5 stated that Japanese statutes may be enforced within
Taiwan through an imperial ordinance (chokurei).
69 For the Government's official explanation for Law 63, see GGT Chief Civil Administrator Mizuno Jun's
testimony in the Imperial Diet on March 17, 1896, which can be found in Gaimusho J6yakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan
ni shik6 subeki h6rei ni kansuru hdritsu (Rokujiisanpo, Sanjiichiho oyobi H6 Sango) no giiroku [Diet records on
acts concerning laws and regulations to be enforced in Taiwan (Law 63, Law 31, and Law 3)] (Tokyo: Gaimush5
Jbyakukyoku H6kika, 1966), pp. 3-4.
proposed law was a clear infringement on the powers and duties of the Imperial Diet. Leading
the charge against Law 63 was Takata Sanae of the liberal Rikken Kaishinto (Constitutional
Reform Party). Using rhetoric reminiscent of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement
(1874-1890), he stressed the unconstitutionality of granting the Governor-General the ability to
issue law-like ordinances, and to enforce Japanese statutes in Taiwan through imperial ordinance,
since the Constitution specifically identified certain matters (such as taxation) as requiring
parliamentary legislation. What was at stake, declared Takata, was the sanctity of the Meiji
Constitution and the various rights and duties that received protection in this document.7 0
Furthermore, as Ichijima Kenkichi (a fellow liberal and former editor-in-chief of Yomiuri
Shimbun) astutely observed, the proposed act did not specify how the Governor-General was to
receive supervision from the Colonial Minister. Hence, this law created a system whereby the
GGT was neither responsible to the Diet nor to the Government. 71 These objections led to the
attachment of a three-year limit to Law 63-an acknowledgement by the Government that Law
63 was an aberration to normal lawmaking methods-but otherwise, the original draft of the act
was adopted unchanged by both chambers of parliament.72
Here, it is important to note that while Law 63 detached Taiwan both administratively
and legislatively from mainland Japan, the Japanese government, or the GGT for that matter, was
hardly advocating a shift in colonial policy away from that of naichi encho or d5ka. For example,
when asked to explain the spirit of the controversial Article 1 of Law 63 during a hearing in the
70 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 18-20.
71 Ibid., pp. 13-15.
72 This outcome was a testament to the strength of conservative voices within a slowly democratizing Japan. For
further discussion and analysis of early parliamentary debate surrounding Law 63, see Haruyama Meitetsu, "Kindai
Nihon no shokuminchi tochi to Hara Takashi [Modem Japanese colonial rule and Hara Takashi], in Nihon
shokuminchi shugi no seiji-teki tenkai, 1895-1934: sono tochi taisei to Taiwan no minzoku und6 [Political
development of Japanese imperialism, 1895-1934: its governance structure and Taiwanese nationalist movement],
ed. Haruyama Meitetsu and Wakabayashi Masahiro (Tokyo: Ajia Seikei Gakkai, 1980), pp. 7-20; Nakamura,
Shokuminchi tochi ho no kihon mondai, pp. 73-116.
House of Representatives, Mizuno (GGT Chief of Civil Affairs) responded, "The spirit of the
proposed act is to Japanize Taiwan by enforcing [Japanese] statutes wherever possible, and to
rely only on the Governor-General's ordinances in those matters where we cannot do this ... "7
Furthermore, when questioned in the House of Peers whether the spirit of the proposed act was
to extend the Meiji Constitution as well as Japanese statutes to Taiwan, Mizuno reaffirmed
succinctly and without qualification that the act was "founded on the spirit to extend both." 74
Indeed, the reason why Japan's policy toward Taiwan was hardly debated in either
houses of the Diet in 1896 stemmed from the shared understanding of government officials, the
GGT, and parliamentarians that Japan's fundamental policy toward Taiwan was one of
assimilation. Hence, the only question at stake was one of legislative procedure-i.e., whether
Taiwan's unstable conditions necessitated the Governor-General to possess both executive and
legislative powers, or whether (as was the case in the provinces of Hokkaido and Okinawa)
lawmaking in Taiwan could be conducted within the chambers of the Imperial Diet.
Nonetheless, because Law 63 (along with the GGT bureaucratic system) guaranteed
colonial officials much freedom in action, it gave them room to craft their own independent
policy. Early GGT administrations were much too occupied in combating the insurgency to offer
any new ideas on how Taiwan should be governed. They could see (as did Hara and other
proponents of naichi encho shugi) that it was difficult to immediately displace Taiwanese laws
and customs in favor of Japanese ones, but Taiwan's complete assimilation would benefit Japan
in the long run.75 This was to change in 1898, however, with the arrival of Governor-General
Kodama Gentar6 and his pragmatic Chief Civil Administrator, Got6 Shimpei. As a proponent of
7 Gaimush5 J6yakukyoku H,kika, Taiwan ni shik6 subeki hdrei ni kansuru hdritsu, p. 5.
71 Ibid., p. 25.
7' For an overview of the policy of GGT administrations between 1895 to 1898, see Sugiyama Yasunori, Taiwan
rekidai S5toku no chiseki [The political accomplishments of successive Governor-Generals of Taiwan] (Tokyo:
Teikoku Chih Gy6sei Gakkai, 1922), pp. 1-82.
"biological colonialism"-that is, the notion that colonial policy should emerge from local socio-
environmental conditions-Got6 would spearhead institutional reform efforts that placed Taiwan
onto its own unique modernizing path.
4. The Government-General under Kodama and Gotou and Rejection ofAssimilation
By early 1898, it was clear to policymakers in Tokyo that Japan was failing to achieve its
goals in Taiwan. The insurgency continued unabated. Rather than proving to be a profitable
bounty of the Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan had become a considerable drain on the Japanese
treasury. In 1896, nearly seven million yen in subsidies were needed to maintain the functions of
the GGT and another six million in 1897. This appropriation, moreover, did not include the cost
of stationing and operating a large military presence in Taiwan. In comparison, the colonial
government's tax income amounted to a mere 2.7 million yen in 1896 and 5.3 million in 1897.76
Given this dismal state, some even advocated selling Taiwan to France for 100 million yen (or
50 million dollars).77
The incompetence of successive colonial administrations between 1895 and early 1898
was among the reasons for Japan's initial failure as a colonial power. Under Governor-General
Kabayama (1895-1896), the Japanese military galvanized grass-roots anti-Japanese movements
by its indiscriminate and brutal killing of civilians, as they marched southward to defeat the
nascent Formosan Republic. Governor-General Katsura Tar6 (1896) was a skilled politician and
administrator, and hopes were high that he would stabilize the situation. However, Katsura
relinquished his post a mere two months into his tenure when the Army leadership needed his
presence back in Tokyo to solve a political crisis. Nogi (1896-1898), who followed Katsura, was
76 For an overview of the financial situation of the GGT from 1896 to 1906, see Hirai Hirokazu, Nihon shokuminchi
zaisei shi kenkyfi [Study of the financial history of Japanese colonies] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo, 1997), pp. 26-53.
77 Tsurumi Yiisuke, Seiden Goto Shimpei [Official biography of Goto Shimpei], ed. Ikkai Tomoyoshi, vol. 2 (Tokyo:
Fujiwara Shoten, 2004), p. 647.
also a disappointment. Under his watch, corruption raged within the GGT, and several high
ranking officials were implicated. Among those compelled to resign was Mizuno Jun, who (as
Chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau) was the top civilian bureaucrat of the GGT since the beginning
of the Kabayama administration. His replacement, Sone Shizuo (a Finance Ministry bureaucrat),
proved even less competent. Under the guidance of Mizuno and Sone, the civilian bureaucracy of
the GGT ballooned in size (and in expense), but with no apparent improvement in
effectiveness.78
In January 1898, when It6 Hirobumi became Prime Minister for the third time, the
decision was immediately made to recall both Nogi and Sone. Chosen to replace Nogi was
Kodama Gentaro, who not only rivaled General Katsura (the new Army Minister) in political
savvy and prowess, but was also widely regarded as the leading intellect of the Imperial Army.
Kodama was unambiguously the best the Army had to offer to serve as Governor-General. (Later,
Kodama served as the Chief of General Staff of the Manchurian Army and masterminded
Japan's victory over Russia in 1906.) Yet, to the bewilderment of many, the man recommended
by Army Minister Katsura to lead Taiwan's civil administration was Goto Shimpei. 79 Although
he had prior experience with Taiwan-being the formulator of the GGT's opium policy and
having served as an advisor in sanitation affairs since 1896-he was a political novice with a thin
resume. A medical doctor by training, Goto was a graduate of a provincial medical school (that is,
78 Hiyama, "Taiwan tochi no kik6 kaikaku to kanki shinshuku mondai"; Mukoyama, Nihon Tochika ni okeru Taiwan
minzoku undo shi, pp. 120-63; E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Taiwan Under Kodama Gentar6 and Goto Shimpei," Papers on
Japan, Harvard University, East Asian Research Center 4 (1967), pp. 97-101; Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei,
vol. 2, pp. 647-48.
79 Katsura knew Got6 from their mutual participation in a group comprised of those having studied in Germany as
part of their official training, and had likely been plotting for some to have Got6 appointed to a prominent position
within the GGT. In fact, when Katsura became Governor-General in June 1896, he had Goto join him, along with
Prime Minister Ito and Navy Minister Saigo Tsugumichi, on a high profile tour of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Kodama was
also well acquainted with, and quite impressed of, Got6, due to Gotos work in establishing an immunization system
for Japanese soldiers at Ninoshima. Tsurumi Y., Seiden Gotd Shimpei, vol. 2, pp. 647-48.
he was not from the prestigious Law Faculty of the University of Tokyo), and was chief of the
Home Ministry's Sanitation Bureau prior to his appointment as Kodama's top aide.80
Among the most prominent skeptics of Gotb was Inoue Kaoru, the new Finance Minister,
who had Goto submit a plan for Taiwan as a test for his aptitude. Got's response, titled "Taiwan
Tochi Kytikyi An (Rehabilitation of the Taiwan Administration)," survives not only as an
example of a winning job application essay, but also as the clearest statement of the policy that
guided Japanese colonial officials from 1898 to 1915 (when the last of Got's prot6g6s left the
GGT leadership).8 First, Got6 argued that the biggest mistake of previous colonial
administrations was that they ignored existing Taiwanese institutions of "self-rule" (jichi),82 and
instead, attempted to rule Taiwan by structures of formal local government based on Japanese
precedent. As a result, the GGT was overextending itself. Traditional Taiwanese systems of
"self-rule" provided various societal functions, such as policing, intra- and inter-village dispute
adjudication, conscription, and tax collection, without any cost to the state. Hence, by reviving
these systems of "self-rule," the colonial government would not only greatly improve its ability
to maintain peace and collect taxes, but it could also decrease its financial reliance on Tokyo.
More broadly, Gotb argued that previous Japanese administrators had unwisely ignored the local
80 For Got's career prior to his appointment as Chief Civil Administration of Taiwan, see ibid., vols. I and 2.
Goto's Taiwan opium policy can be found in vol. 2, pp. 589-626.
81 See "Taiwan t~chi kyikyU an [Rehabilitation of the Taiwan administration]," in Got5 Shimpei monjo [Documents
related to Goto Shimpei], Reel 12, No. 4.33 (Tokyo: Yish6d5 Firumu Shuppan, 1979). The entire document can
also be found in Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 2, pp. 650-55.
82 The concept ofjichi was central to Goto thinking on governance, and plays a prominent role in Got6 treatise on
governance, Kokka eisei genri [The principles of national hygiene], which was originally self-published in 1889.
Here, Goto argues that systems of self-rule lies at the foundation of a nation-state, as it is what gives birth to the
public spirit and serves as a training ground for an individual's political life. In all societies, both state and society
must play a role in advancing governance, Goto argues, but the proportionate rule of each differs based on the
polity's civilizational level-that is, the role of society increases with a polity's evolutionary development. For
further discussion of Goto's arguments on "self-rule," see Kohara Takaharu, "Got6 Shimpei no jichi shis6 [Got6
Shimpei's thoughts on self-rule]," in GoI Shimpei, 1857-1929:jidai no senkakusha [Got6 Shimpei, 1857-1929: a
pioneer of the era], ed. Mikuriya Takashi (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2004): 115-24.
population's attachment to their customs and traditions, and blindly pursued a socially disruptive
policy of rapid modernization.
Second, Got6 argued that the colonial state should be made smaller and nimbler. In
addition to relying more on traditional Taiwanese institutions of "self-rule," the police should be
placed at the center of local administration. Under Got's proposal, their role went beyond the
maintenance of peace, and included promotion of scientific agriculture, inculcation of sanitary
habits, and adjudication of civil disputes. Third, and finally, Taiwan should be developed
through deficit financing by floating 100 to 150 million yen worth of GGT bonds. GGT bonds
(primarily to be sold to foreign investors) would then be used to finance the construction of
railroads, harbors, water ways, sewage systems, barracks, and batteries. A comprehensive tax
reform, as well as expected increase in revenue from the newly instituted opium monopoly,
would also help end GGT's reliance on Japanese subsidies, Goto noted.84
This proposal was outwardly a statement in pragmatism, and was interpreted by Finance
Minister Inoue and other members of the cabinet as such. 85 Heavy in detail (such as asking for
100 to 150 million in deficit financing), the document was notable for its silence on grand
strategy and ideology of colonialism. It was therefore in stark contrast to Hara Kei's 1896 policy
paper on Taiwan, where he largely defended the doctrine of assimilation (doka shugi) on
principle. Nonetheless, hidden but firmly undergirding Goto's proposal was a clear worldview
and long-term vision for Taiwan that implied a radical departure from the Japanese government's
83 For an examination of the GGT judicial system, see Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial
Rule, pp. 90-103. Under the 1904 Civil Disputes Mediation Law, local administrative officials-that is, the police-
were empowered to mediate civil disputes. Meanwhile, the 1904 Summary Judgment Law gave the local police
officer wide-ranging powers to pass judgment on petty crimes. Although it was rarely pursued in actuality, the law
provided a method for those convicted under the summary judgment procedure to apply for trial by court.
84 For further discussion of this policy proposal, see Kobayashi Michihiko, "Goto Shimpei to shokuminchi keiei:
Nihon shokuminchi seisaku no keisei to kokunai seiji [Goto Shimpei and Japanese colonial management: formation
of Japanese colonial policy and the influence of domestic politics]," Shirin 68.5 (1985): 1-32.
85 Asano, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei, p. 87.
goal of assimilating Taiwan into an integral component of mainland Japan. In the immediate
term, Goto's policy recommendations may have coincided with the perspective of the gradual
assimilationists surrounding Prime Minister It6, such as Denison, Ume, and Hara, all of whom
believed that Taiwan would go through a transition period (of relying on traditional laws and
customs) before the full set of Japanese institutions could be transferred.86 However, Got6's
dependence on traditional Taiwanese institutions was not simply a practical (and cost-saving)
stopgap measure until Taiwan was "ready" for the introduction of Japanese laws. Rather, native
institutions were to form the foundation upon which to construct Taiwan's distinct (and modem)
institutional order.87
Goto's worldview, shaped by his reading of Charles Darwin, Julian Huxley, Gustave Le
Bon, and Herbert Spencer, was grounded in the so-called "principles of biology" (seibutsugaku
no gensoku). As Goto explained to Gov-Gen Kodama, "We cannot suddenly change the eyes of a
halibut to look like those of a sea bream. Likewise, the fact that we need to respect customs
comes from the principles of biology."88 Gota, like many of his contemporaries, extended the
logic of evolutionary biology to cultures and civilizations. Envisioning himself as a "doctor
king," he saw his role as one of nursing the Taiwanese people back to health from a state of
societal disarray, prohibiting habits and beliefs that were harmful to the body politic, and
prescribing the appropriate medication to accelerate Taiwan's modernization. As such,
"seibutsugaku no gensoku" had a second meaning: the use of scientific methods to investigate
the customs and traditions of the Taiwanese, and the application of this knowledge to colonial
86 In particular, Ume's recommendations on Taiwan was particularly important, given his position as It6's most
trusted legal advisor. Ume's thoughts on Taiwan, dated 1897, can be found in "Taiwan ni kansuru kiken [Some
statements about Taiwan]," in Goto Shimpei monjo, Reel 23, No. 7.5.
87 Ibid., pp. 100-19.
88 In Japanese: "Sore wa kanshti wo omonzuru, zokuni ieba, s6 ya wake nanda. Tonikaku hirame no me wo
niwakani tai no y6 ni shiro to ittatte, dekiru mono jya nai. Kansha wo omonjya nakereba naran to yai no wa,
seibutsugaku no gensoku kara kiteiru." Quoted in Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 3, p. 39.
policymaking. Got6 was highly critical of Japanese higher civil servants (especially those trained
at University of Tokyo's Law Faculty) who, in his mind, relied far too often on legalistic
principles and theories to deduce rigid answers to real societal problems. Policymaking should be
characterized by flexibility and pragmatism, Goto insisted, and the specific solution most
appropriate for a particular time, place, and condition must be investigated through careful
empirical research.89
The geostrategic vision of Goto was also markedly different from that of Prime Minister
ltb and his prot6g6, Hara Kei. In contrast to It6 and Hara, who both saw Taiwan as constituting
the outer rim of the Japanese nation-state (along with Hokkaido and Okinawa), Gotb perceived
Taiwan as the inner most layer of Japan's (to be expanded) colonial empire. Upon arriving in
Taiwan on March 28, 1898, Gotb thus noted to himself, "In substance, Taiwan is a colonial
territory; it is indeed our nation's only colonial territory, and will be our training ground in
colonial policymaking."90 Finding truth in the logic of social Darwinism, Got6 believed that
strong states naturally "grew" as they defeated and absorbed weaker ones, and remained strong
only when they were able to retain control over newly annexed territories. Accordingly, Got6
saw Taiwan as a test for Japan's mettle as a great power (and colonizer), and prepared for further
89 Mark Driscoll, Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan's Imperialism 1895-
1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 30-36; Mizobe Hideaki, "Got6 Shimpei ron: tos6-teki sekaiz6 to
'risei no dokusai' [An essay on Goto Shimpei: a conflict-prone world and 'despotism of reason']," Hogaku ronso
100.2 (1976): 62-96; Nakamura Akira, "'Nihon shokuminchi seisaku ippan' kaidai [An examination of 'Nihon
shokuminchi seisaku ippan']," in Got6 Shimpei, Nihon shokuminchi seisaku ippan; Nihon boch6 ron [A thought on
Japanese colonial policy; Essay on Japanese expansion], ed. Nakamura Akira (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1944), pp.
8-10; Tsurumi Y., Seiden Got3 Shimpei, vol. 3, p. 52. For Goto's own explanation of his approach to colonial
policymaking, see Got6 Shimpei, Nihon shokuminchi ron [Essay on Japanese Colonialism] (Tokyo: K6min D6mei,
1915).
90 In Japanese: "Taiwan wa naiy6 ni oite wa shokuminchi, sono jitsu shikamo teikoku yuiitsu no shokuminchi, ina
shokumintochi no renshyiichi naru beshi." Goto's memo can be found in Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 3,
p. 45.
Japanese expansion by undertaking extensive research on Chinese coastal areas (especially those
opposite of Taiwan Straits) as well as on Southeast Asian territories. 91
Kodama and Got's administration in Taiwan, which lasted from 1898 to 1906, can be
roughly divided into two periods: (i) the emergency phase (1898-1902), and (ii) the
developmental phase (1902-1906).92 During the first period, the most pressing issue confronting
Goto was the grass-roots armed resistance. As argued by Goto in his "Kyilkyni An," the key to
winning the anti-insurgency campaigned was the restoration of traditional Taiwanese systems of
local "self-rule," and in particular, the village-level institution of self-policing and collective
responsibility known as hok5 (baojia).93 Within an ideal-typical hoko organization, ten
households comprised one k5, and ten k5 formed one ho, which was then headed by an "elected"
official with the title of hosei. It was in 1896 that Japanese officials first discovered the existence
of hok5, and by relying on hoko elders, organized village-level militias as an auxiliary force.
However, it was not until 1898, when Got6 took charge of the colonial administration, that
hok6's true potential as a local policing and surveillance institution was fully realized. 94
As reconstituted by Goto, hokoa units were designed to play instrumental roles in four
areas of local government: (i) household registration and monitoring of population movements;
(ii) sanitation and disease control; (iii) building and repairing of roads and bridges; and (iv) the
9' Got6 Shimpei, Nihon shokuminchi seisaku ippan; Nihon boch ron [A thought on Japanese colonial policy;
Essay on Japanese expansion], ed. Nakamura Akira (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1944); Mizobe, "Got6 Shimpei ron,"
pp. 91-94. In 1900, Goto and Kodama plotted the annexation of the strategically and economically important port-
city of Amoy in Fujian Province, by taking advantage of the confusion resulting from the Boxer War. For an account
of the "Amoy Incident," see Saitb Seiji, "Amoi Jiken saiko [A reexamination of the Amoy Incident]," Nihonshi
kenkyfi 305 (1988): 29-53; Takahashi Shigeo, "Meiji sanjyasannen Amoi Jiken no ichi kosatsu: Yamamoto Kaigun
Daijin no taido wo chfishin to shite [An examination of the Meiji 33 Amoy Incident: With a focus on the attitude of
Navy Minister Yamamoto]," Gunjishi gakkai 8.4 (1973): 33-44.
92 For an excellent English-language overview of the various reforms undertaken by Kodama and Goto, see E. P.
Tsurumi, "Taiwan Under Kodama Gentar6 and Goto Shimpei."
" The baojia system was originally established in Taiwan in the late seventeenth century, but had largely atrophied
by the time of the Japanese conquest in 1895. For a discussion of the Qing era system of governance in Taiwan, see
Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The Traditional Order," Journal of the Institute
of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 4.2 (1971): 495-522.
94 Ts'ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building, pp. 120-21.
maintenance of security. To this end, hoke officials were responsible for closely monitoring
fellow villagers, and deterring them from taking actions antithetical to the colonial regime. If a
hoko official failed to prevent "criminal" activity in the village, all members of that particular
hok5 were subject to collective punishment (renza). Meanwhile, when the police or army sought
local laborers to serve as porters or to repair roads and bridges, it was up to the hosei to recruit
the necessary manpower. In addition, hoko officials were tasked with organizing a village-level
security force known as the sdteidan (able-bodied corps). This force played a critical role in the
counter-insurgency campaign (especially in maintaining peace after military operations), and by
1902, armed resistance in the western plains region (where the majority of the Taiwanese lived)
had come to an end.95
Another early priority of Got6 was land reform. As Got6 learned through the work of his
new land investigation bureau (created in September 1898), traditional Taiwanese land relations
were characterized by a double-tier tenure system, where two types of landed elites claimed
"ownership" of a single parcel. On one hand were the patent (taiso/dazuhu) holders, who
theoretically possessed "ownership" rights to the land and were responsible for paying a land tax
to the Chinese imperial state. On the other were perpetual tenants (sheso/xiaozuhu holders), who
paid rent to dazuhu holders while also acting as landowners themselves by freely selling their
xiaozuhu rights (without the permission of a dazuhu holder) and subdividing the land to lease
smaller parcels to peasants. 96 Goto found this convoluted system to be highly inefficient (as it
95 Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in The Japanese Colonial Empire,
1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 216-17;
Muk6yama, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi, pp. 221-308; Ts'ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire
Building, pp. 98-1 17.
96 Chiukun Chen, "From Landlords to Local Strongmen: The Transformation of Local Elites in Mid-Ch'ing Taiwan
1780-1862," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubenstein (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 133-62; Chiang
Ping-k'un, Taiwan chiso kaisei no kenkyfi: Nihon ryoyfi shoki tochi chosa no honshitsu [Study of Taiwanese land-
tax reform: the true nature of Japan's early colonial land investigation] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974),
created multiple opportunities for tax evasion), and in the way of the development of Taiwanese
agro-business (as actual ownership to land was obscured). However, its outright abolishment was
sure to provoke backlash by those individuals the colonial state relied upon for its pacification
efforts, since hoko leaders were almost always wealthy landlords. Furthermore, since land was
the most important possession in Taiwan (as an agrarian society), radical reforms had the danger
of jeopardizing Taiwanese economic and social relations. A careful balancing act between
modernization and preservation of tradition was hence sought. 97
The solution devised by Goto and his land investigation bureau was to transform
xiaozuhu holders-the individuals who actually lived on the land and were recognized by the
peasants as local powerholders-into legal owners of agricultural lands by buying out the
absentee dazuhu holders. This was done through payment of interest-bearing bonds worth three
to five times the amount of dazuhu holders' annual rental income. Modernization of the land
ownership system also involved an island-wide land survey (from 1898 to 1903), which found
that there were more unreported agricultural lands than reported ones in the island. As a result,
land tax revenue doubled from 0.92 million yen in 1903 to 1.96 million in 1904, and with a hike
in the tax rate the following year, revenue from land reached 2.98 million in 1905. In turn, as
shown in Table 3, this played a key role in allowing the GGT to achieve financial independence
from Tokyo by ending Japanese government subsidies in 1904. Yet, despite initial protests from
landowners due to this sudden increase in land tax, Gotos land reform had the long-term effect
of fostering collaborative ties between the agrarian elite and the colonial state, as these reforms
pp. 7-68; Chih-ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 21-27.
97 Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 3, pp. 305-07. The official perspective of the GGT concerning land reform
can be found in Santar6 Okamatsu, Provisional Report on Investigations of laws and Customs in the Island of
Formosa (Kyoto: Commission for the Investigation of Old Laws and Customs in Formosa, 1902); Yosaburo
Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, trans. George Braithwaite (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907),
pp. 117-32.
made xiaozuhu holders the sole owners of valuable lands (with the GGT's backing). Moreover,
as the colonial state's revenue was appropriated to the promotion of scientific agriculture
(especially in sugar) and to the building of new irrigation systems, the resulting increase in crop
yields would more than compensate for this three-fold increase in land taxes. 98 Even the
ostensible losers in land reform-the dazuhu holders-had much to gain from the new order.
The compensation they received was invested in new business ventures in sugar, finance, and
mining just in time for them to ride the wave of rapid post-conflict economic expansion.99
Table 3: Sources of Revenue for the Taiwan Government-General, 1896-1906 (in million yen)
Tax Revenue Revenue Income from Subsidies Revenues Carryover
Year Net (Land tax, from Government from from Sale from OtherRevenue Excise and Government Property and Japanese of GGT Previous
Customs) Monopoly Public Utilities Treasury Bonds Year
1896 6.97 2.03 -1.81 -0.21 6.94 0.00 0.00 0.02
1897 8.34 2.63 0.42 -0.84 5.96 0.00 0.00 0.18
1898 8.08 2.91 1.47 -0.58 3.99 0.00 0.13 0.16
1899 9.18 3.51 0.75 -2.42 3.00 3.20 1.07 0.07
1900 10.55 3.27 2.63 -4.65 2.60 5.50 1.10 0.10
1901 10.28 3.52 1.83 -3.25 2.39 4.86 0.80 0.14
1902 10.65 3.81 2.64 -3.51 2.46 4.74 0.40 0.11
1903 10.52 5.67 1.85 -2.87 2.46 4.07 1.06 0.10
1904 12.37 7.65 3.00 -2.53 0.70 4.49 0.93 0.11
1905 13.92 8.34 3.54 -1.05 0.00 0.22 3.44 0.12
1906 17.08 8.54 5.16 -1.53 0.00 0.00 4.67 0.15
Source: Chih-ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 53.
Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945
Furthermore, the purpose of land reform was not simply to increase the colonial
government's tax revenue; it also sought to introduce modern land relations to Taiwan, even as
98 Han-yu Chang and Ramon H. Myers, "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of
Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship," The Journal ofAsian Studies 22.4 (1963): 433-49; Chiang, Taiwan chiso kaisei no
kenkyi, pp. 69-254; Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan, pp. 56, 58-62; Yanaihara Tadao, Teikokushugika no
Taiwan [Taiwan under colonial rule] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1934[1929]).
99 Harry J. Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915: A Study of Their Reactions to the
Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization, Diss., University of
Washington, 1964 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1965), pp. 420-29.
traditional land-related legal terms were retained to ease the transition. For example, according to
Taiwanese custom, a private individual could not acquire full ownership of land, as all land
hypothetically belonged to the sovereign. Hence, the most an individual could acquire was a
yezhu (proprietor) right. In the 1905 land law reform, the GGT retained the terminology ofyezhu
rights, but then imbued it with rights and obligations associated with complete land ownership in
the Western legal sense. Consequently, various changes resulted in the actual way that land was
possessed, transferred, and used as collateral. Before, a yezhu right could be passed from one
individual to another without official paperwork, but after 1905, transfer of land required a
financial transaction if it occurred outside of an inheritance. Also, while land was commonly
possessed without registration prior to 1905, after the reforms, all privately held land had to be
registered with the state or it would be considered as part of the public domain. Other land-
related terminologies, such as pugeng, dian, and tai (which roughly corresponded to lease,
pledge, and mortgage), were also retained by the colonial state, but the rights and obligations
associated with these transactions were conformed to Western notions of land ownership. As one
legal scholar put it, the Japanese had employed "old bottles" to accommodate "new wine." 00
This attempt to conform Taiwanese land relations to Western standards, nonetheless, was
to be the exception rather than the rule. In other areas of civil and criminal law, Goto sought to
"modernize" traditional Taiwanese institutions, rather than replace them with Western
institutions in substance (if not in name). Hence, during the developmental phase of the Kodama-
Goto administration (1902-1906), the investigation and codification of Qing-era laws and
Taiwanese customs became the GGT's most significant undertaking, along with infrastructural
development (such as the building of railroads, highways, and harbors). In turn, Goto's anti-
' Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 146-52. For a summary chart of the 1905 land
refonn, see p. 154.
assimilationist goal of establishing a distinct institutional sphere in Taiwan could no longer be
concealed, leading to intense questioning and objections by Diet members. 01
The initial stages of investigating Taiwanese laws and customs had already begun in
1898 through the work of the land investigation bureau (headed by Nakamura Zek6), but it was
not until April 1901 that the Commission for the Investigation of Old Laws and Customs
(Kyiikan Chosa Kai) was organized with law professor Okamatsu Santar6 as its chief. After its
formal incorporation as an organ of the GGT in October, the Committee came to be comprised of
a 15-member steering and editorial board and was supported by a staff of approximately one-
hundred field researchers and translators. Headquartered at the University of Kyoto (in Japan),
the Committee was divided into two divisions. The first concerned the study of Taiwan's legal
system and administrative procedures. Of particular interest were laws and customs concerning
land and kinship relations (such as family, lineage, marriage, succession, and inheritance). The
second division was on the traditional economy, with particular emphasis on movable
possessions (that is, possessions other than land), commerce, and credit. Eventually the two
divisions were combined into one, and a new third division, responsible for crafting draft
legislations, was established in 1909.102
The purpose of this commission was made explicit in an article written by Got6 in May
1901, where he publicly revealed (for the first time) his anti-assimilationist stance by criticizing
policymakers in Tokyo who maintained that Japanese laws could be transferred to Taiwan at
some future date. Instead, what Taiwan needed, Goto argued, was its own "permanent legal
10' Here it is instructive to compare the difference in content between the 1899 and 1902 Diet debates concerning
Law 63. In 1899, Diet members largely questioned to the constitutionality of Law 63 and did not touch upon the
issue of colonial policy. In 1902, however, Diet members voiced concern that the GGT seemed to be abandoning the
goal of assimilation. See Gaimush6 Joyakukyoku H~kika, Taiwan h5ritsu gjiroku, pp. 29-186.
102 Haruyama Meitetsu, "H6gaku Hakase Okamatsu Santaro [Law Professor Okamatsu Santar6]," Taiwan
kingendaishi kenkyii 6 (1988): 197-216; Timothy Y. Tsu, "Japanese Colonialism and the Investigation of the
Taiwanese," in Anthropology and Colonialism in Asia and Oceania, ed. Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu
(Surrey, UK: Cruzon, 1999), pp. 201-08.
system" (eikyi tochi no heritsu seido), based on scientific research on old laws and customs.'43
Goto, nonetheless, warned that this would take some time, as the GGT (or anyone else for that
matter) did not possess enough information on Taiwanese traditional institutions. While the
Japanese had a long history of studying the Qing legal system (kangaku), there was no previous
research on how abstract Chinese legal principles translated into actual practices within Taiwan.
Hence, not only did Okamatsu's researchers examine all available Chinese legal treatises as well
as standard Qing-era national and provincial statues and miscellaneous works (such as local
gazetteers and essay compilations), but they also undertook extensive interviews with Taiwanese
local notables and collected anything that could help illuminate legal practices, such as contracts,
ledgers, certifications, and inscriptions. The effort was monumental. Indeed, it was not until
August 1914 (long after both Kodama and Goto had left Taiwan) that the Kytikan Chosa Kai
completed its multi-volume report and produced a series of draft legislations to serve as the
foundation of a new Taiwanese law code.104
Ironically, however, obstructing the path toward the creation of a distinctly Taiwanese
institutional sphere was Law 63. Up to this point, it was precisely due to Law 63's "delegated
law-making system" (innin ripp& seido) that Got6 was able to implement a series of reforms that
led Taiwanese colonial policy away from Tokyo's assimilationist agenda. However, Law 63 was
103 Goto Shimpei, "Taiwan keieijyo kyfikan seido no chosa wo hitsuyo to suru iken [The need for the investigation
of the system of old customs from the perspective of Taiwan's administration]," Taiwan kanshfi kii 1.5 (1901): 24-
38. The journal Taiwan kanshia kii in fact became the primary platform through which both Goto and Okamatsu
advocated on multiple occasions their anti-assimilationist stance. For a particularly insightful analysis, see Okamatsu
Santaro, "Nihon Mimpo no ketten wo ronjite Taiwan ripp6 ni taisuru kibo ni oyobu [Hopes for Taiwanese
legislation through the recognition of the flaws of the Japanese Civil Code]," Taiwan kanshi kji 5.3 (1905): 13-26.
Here, Okamatsu flips the usual assimilationist position by arguing that precisely because Japan's law code is so
flawed (due to its awkward mixture of French and German laws) that Taiwan would be better off with a fresh start.
Just like India's civil code is an improvement on these customary laws of Britain, Taiwan's civil code would likely
be an improvement on Japan's.
104 Haruyama Meitetsu, "Taiwan kyikan ch6sa to ripp6 k6so: Okamatsu Santaro ni yoru chosa to ritsuan wo chfishin
ni [Investigation of Taiwanese Laws and Customs and the Legislative Framework: With a Focus on Okamatsu
Santar6's Research and Legislative Proposals]," Taiwan kingendaishi kenkyii 6 (1988): 81-114; Tsu, "Japanese
Colonialism and the Investigation of the Taiwanese," pp. 203-11.
a temporary law, which required Diet approval every three years. It was also a law grounded in
the assumption that Taiwan was under the Meiji Constitution-that is, a territory that was a part
of the Japanese nation-state, but (due to emergency conditions) temporarily placed under an
irregular legal structure (where the Diet's lawmaking powers were delegated to the Governor-
General). A new and permanent statute to replace Law 63, which would ensure Taiwan's
separation from Japan, was thus sought by Goto. As early as 1901, Goto had instructed
Okamatsu (who had come to play the role of Goto's chief legal advisor) to begin the process of
drafting a legislative proposal to replace Law 63. This was completed in 1904 as the "Taiwan
T6chi H6an" (Taiwan Governance Law), in time for the 21st Diet session.'0 5
The most prominent features of the "Taiwan Tochi Hoan" were as follows: First, unlike
Law 63, the new draft proposal assumed that the Constitution did not apply to Taiwan. Hence, it
not only prevented challenges to the legislative autonomy of the GGT on constitutional grounds,
but moreover, it implied Taiwan's permanent separation from the Japanese national community.
Second, it formalized Taiwan's de facto financial independence from Japan by designating the
GGT as a corporate entity. The GGT could therefore possess property, issue bonds, and devise
its own budget without intervention from the Imperial Diet. Fourth, the Governor-General would
become an equivalent of a cabinet minister. This would allow him to directly seek the
enforcement of existing Japanese laws and regulations in Taiwan via an imperial ordinance
(chokurei)-rather than through the government in Tokyo-for only a cabinet minister was
constitutionally permitted to initiate a chokurei request. Finally, it strengthened the role of the
05 In addition, Okamatsu boldly drafted an amendment to the revered text of the Meiji Constitution that would have
recognized the existence of colonial territories within the Japanese empire. For the role of Okamatsu in the writing
of Taiwan Tochi Hoan, see Haruyama, "Hogaku Hakase Okamatsu Santar6." Okamatsu's initial legislative proposal
can be found under the title, "Taiwan t6chi h6 [Taiwan governance law]," in Suzuki Saburo monjo [Documents
related to Suzuki SaburO], no. 10, National Diet Library, Tokyo. Okamatsu's explanation for his legislative proposal,
titled, "Taiwan no seido ni kansuru ikensho [Opinion paper concerning Taiwan's system]," is reproduced in Taiwan
kingendaishi kenkyfi 6 (1988): 217-32. The final draft of the Taiwan Governance Law, along with the GGT's official
reason for its need, is found in Goto Shimpei monjo, Reel 31, No. 77.
GGT Consultative Assembly by making it responsible for passing the GGT's budget, in addition
to its existing duty of drafting GGT ordinances. The Consultative Assembly was thus
transformed into a nascent legislative assembly under this proposal. In short, the "Taiwan Tochi
H6an" made Taiwan institutionally independent from Japan.106
Meanwhile, the consensus among policymakers in Tokyo that Taiwan was to eventually
be assimilated into Japan had also begun to crack. Kodama and Got's success in turning around
Japan's fortunes in Taiwan had much to do with this, but as important was the ascension of
Goto's long-time patron, Katsura Tar6, to the position of Prime Minister in 1901. Judging from
Katsura's 1896 policy statement (issued when he was Governor-General), his initial view of
Taiwan did not differ considerably from those of It6 and Hara; like them, he was a gradual
assimilationist.10 7 Yet, by the time Law 63 was due for its third review in February 1905,
Katsura's position had come to resemble that of his prot6g6 Goto. As such, in response to
dietman Oishi Masami's question during the 21st Diet session regarding Japan's basic policy in
Taiwan, Katsura answered (perhaps too honestly): "I will respond to the issue of whether
[Taiwan] should become a part of Japan or treated as a colonial territory. It is without doubt a
colonial territory. I believe that we cannot transform [Taiwan] to resemble the Japanese
mainland." 08
However, Katsura's backing alone was insufficient to pass the "Taiwan Tochi Hoan" in
the Imperial Diet, for the Prime Minister and his cabinet were unaffiliated with any of the
political parties that populated the lower legislative chamber. Hence, from the very beginning of
his administration in 1901, Katsura had little choice but to rely on a strategic partnership with
106 Haruyama, "Taiwan kyfikan ch6sa to ripp6 kos6."
107 Katsura Taro, "Taiwan tochi hoshin."
108 In Japanese: "Naichi d6yo ni suruka shokuminchi ni suruka to yti kotogara ni tsuite okotae itashimasu. Muron
shokuminchi de arimasu. Naichi doyo ni wa ikanu to kangae masu." Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan
horitsu gjiroku, p. 194.
Hara Kei, who was party secretary of Rikken Seiyflkai (then the largest political party) to pass
key legislations. 0 9 Yet, Hara was unwilling to compromise with Katsura over the Taiwan
legislation, due to his strong assimilationist views on this matter." 0 Goto's chances of passing
the "Taiwan T6chi H6an" during the 21st Diet session were further damaged by the absence of
Governor-General Kodama, who (as the Chief of the General Staff of the Manchurian Army)
was leading Japan's war against Russia. In past legislative struggles between the GGT and the
Diet, Kodama had proven to be an astute politician and effective negotiator. With his impeccable
military credentials (and now, as a successful Governor-General of Taiwan), he may therefore
have been able obtain enough votes for the "Taiwan Tochi H6an" even without Hara's
support.'" Confident that Kodama's return would make the necessary difference for the
legislation's passage, the Katsura government settled for a one year extension of Law 63, rather
than risking a vote on the new Taiwan legislation." 2
In February 1906, legislation to replace Law 63 was finally introduced, but it was no
longer Goto's proposal. In January, the Katsura cabinet had fallen due to the unpopularity of the
Treaty of Portsmouth (which ended the Russo-Japanese War), and Saionji Kimmochi, the leader
of Seiyiikai, became Prime Minister. In the new Saionji cabinet, Hara chose to serve as Home
Minister, and tasked himself (as the minister formally responsible for administering Japanese
109 Tetsuo Najita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905-1915 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
I967), pp. 12-31.
"0 For Hara's journal entry describing his meeting with Katsura, Goto, and Ichiki Kitokuro (Chief of the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau) during the 21st Diet session, see Hara, Hara Takashi nikki, vol. 2, pp. 122-24.
"1 For example, Kodama played an instrumental role in negotiating the passage of a bill in the Imperial Diet
approving deficit financing of Taiwan through the issuance of 35 million yen worth of GGT government bonds in
1899. See Kobayashi, "Goto Shimpei to shokuminchi keiei," pp. 16-21.
112 For the record of the debates surrounding Law 63 during the 21st Diet session, see Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku
H6kika, Taiwan horitsu gijiroku, pp. 187-220.
colonial policy) with the drafting of a counter-proposal to the "Taiwan Thchi H6an."13 The chief
characteristic of Hara's new draft law-which was a simple document comprised of three short
articles-was that it did away with the GGT ordinance (ritsurei) system, and instead, designated
that all laws and regulations in Taiwan were to take the form of imperial ordinance (chokurei).11 4
This proposal also faced resistance in the Diet, but this time, from the House of Peers. The
reason for controversy was that the law eliminated the Governor-General's lawmaking powers,
even if (as a practical matter) the GGT would likely continue to author chokurei drafts. Moreover,
a chokurei required the official sponsorship of a cabinet minister in a way that a ritsurei did not.
What was at stake, therefore, was the autonomy of the GGT from Tokyo, and in particular, the
political parties that had now come to play a dominant role in the formation of governments (as a
result of Japan's democratization). In the end, the 22nd Diet passed Law 31 (drafted by Tsuzuki
Keiroku, a close ally of Field Marshall Yamagata) to replace Law 63, but the two laws were
identical in substance. Only this time, it had a five-year limit.115
Although hardly apparent at the time, this status quo in the legal framework governing
the Taiwan Government-General was nonetheless to ultimately benefit Hara and fellow
proponents of assimilation. On April 11, 1906, Kodama resigned as Governor-General upon his
promotion to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, and he died
of a cerebral hemorrhage in July. Goto, satisfied with his accomplishments in Taiwan, decided to
"3 Since Goto remained the GGT Chief Civil Administrator, he was thus placed in the peculiar position of having to
defend the government's-that is Hara's-Taiwan proposal, which he personally opposed. For the entire 22nd Diet
session records pertaining to Taiwan, see Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan horitsu giiroku, pp. 221-92.
"4 For Hara's draft proposal (and its various drafts), see Hara Takashi kankei monjo, pp. 330-31.
's Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan h5ritsu gijiroku, pp. 229-44. See in particular statements by Tsuzuki
Keiroku and Hozumi Yatsuka. For an analysis of the 2 2"d Diet debates concerning Taiwan, see Haruyama Meitetsu,
"Meiji kenpo taisei to Taiwan tochi [The Meiji constitutional structure and Taiwanese colonialism]," in Iwanami
koza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [iwanami series on modem Japan and its colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu, vol. 4
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 43-45. Tsuzuki's draft legislation, the various amendments made to this
proposal, and the final text of Law 31 can be found in Hara Takashi kankei monjo, pp. 331-33. For an English
translation, see Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, p. 193.
pursue his ambition as an empire-builder in Japan's new continental frontier in China, and
accepted the post as the first President of the South Manchurian Railway in November. Many of
Kodama and Goto's allies continued to occupy top positions in Taiwan until 1915, but without
their leadership, little effort was made to place the autonomy of the GGT on a permanent
foundation. Legislative drafts by the Old Customs Investigation Committee were completed in
1914, and the pieces were finally in place for the establishment of a distinct legal structure in
Taiwan based on Taiwanese customs and traditions; however, complacent with the relative peace
and economic prosperity, and lacking in long-term vision, post-Got5 GGT officials allowed
Okamatsu's draft law codes to languish in bureaucratic muddle."16
The complacency of colonial administrators in Taiwan finally caught up with them in
1918, when Hara Kei became Prime Minister and immediately set his eyes on reining in the
autonomy of the GGT, as well as Japan's newer colonial governments in the Kwantung Leased
Territory, Karafuto, and Korea (all of which became a part of the Japanese Empire in the
aftermath of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War)." 7 The first phase of Hara's assault on the
GGT took place in 1919, when bureaucratic rules concerning colonial governments were
changed to allow for a civilian governor-general. "8 Later that year, Den Kenjir6 was appointed
by Hara as the first civilian to head the GGT with the specific instruction to advance Taiwan's
116 Haruyama, "Taiwan kytikan chosa to rippo kos6."
117 In fact, the abolishment of the military governor-general system was among Seiyikai's top priorities since the
early 1910s, given the (correct) perception that the Army-controlled colonial governments gave the military a
platform for pursuing its own agenda and weakened civilian control over the armed forces. On this point, see Imai
Seiichi, "Taish6ki ni okeru gunbu no seiji-teki ichi [Political position of the military during the Taisho period]," in
Taish6 demokurashii [Taish6 democracy], ed. Yui Masaomi (Tokyo: Yfnseido Shuppan, 1977): 116-49; Li Hung
Rang, "Dai ichiji kensei y6go und6 to Chosen no kansei kaikaku ron [The first movement for constitutional
government and the reformation of the government organization in Korea]," Nihon shokuminchi kenkya 3 (1990):
48-93; Ozaki Yukio, "Hanbatsu no Matsuro [The End of Clique Politics]," Seiyai 149 (1913): 32-39.
'18 For a comparison of the 1919 GGT bureaucratic reform to the original 1896 system, see Okamoto, Shokuminchi
kanry6 no seiji shi, pp. 83-96.
assimilation into Japan.'1 9 Thus ended the incredible autonomy that the GGT had enjoyed since
its establishment in 1896. Thereafter, until the restoration of the military governor-general
system in 1936, every time a change in government occurred between the two main political
parties-the Seiyaikai and the Keiseikai (later Minseit6)-a new Governor-General and Chief
Civil Administrator were sent to Taiwan as loyal agents of the government in Tokyo. 2
Finally, Law 3 replaced Law 31 in March 1921, this time as permanent law. Although the
GGT ordinance system was retained, the new law was written in such a way that designated the
extension of Japanese laws to Taiwan (via an imperial ordinance) as the norm, and the drafting
of Taiwan-specific ritsurei the exception. 2 1 Specifically, two characteristics of Law 3 led to the
extensive adoption of Japanese statues in Taiwan after its passage. First, any technical changes
required to transfer the original Japanese statute to Taiwan (such as substituting the word
"Supreme Court" within the original Japanese law with "Taiwan Higher Court") could be done
via chokurei, rather than through an act of the Imperial Diet. This simplified the procedure for
adopting Japanese laws and regulations in Taiwan immensely, thus preventing the Governor-
119 Den's complete subordination to Hara can be seen from Hara's journal entries. See in particular, the entries for
March 6, August 10, and November 15, 1920, in Hara Takashi nikki, vol. 5, pp. 222, 271, and 315. According to
Hara's journal entries, the reason for the resignation of Chief Civil Administrator Shimomura Hiroshi (who was a
holdover from the previous GGT administration) on July I1, 1921 was due to his unhappiness with the lack of
policymaking freedom under the post-1919 regime. See Hara Takashi nikki, vol. 5, pp. 407-08.
120 Here, it is important to note that while this reform had the effect of diminishing the status of the Taiwan
Governor-General, it did not necessarily decrease the quality of individuals appointed to this position. In fact, all
civilian Governor-Generals were highly capable individuals. Den Kenjir6 (both a Yamagata prot6gd and a Hara ally)
was an able administrator, who later served as Ministry of Justice and as Minister of Commerce and Agriculture in
the Japanese Cabinet. Three of Den's successors (Uchida Kakichi, Kawamura Takeji, and Ishizuka EizO) were
former high-ranking officials of the GGT, and another-Ota Masahiro-had extensive experience with colonial
policy, as the former Chief Executive of the Kwantung Leased Territory. However, none of these individuals were
able to pursue their own independent policy in Taiwan, as Kodama and Goto had done previously, and their talents
were therefore wasted. Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the
Systems of Political Control," Harvard Journal ofAsiatic Studies 30 (1970), pp. 131-32; Okamoto Makiko, "Seit6
seijiki ni okeru bunkan s6tokufu sei: rikken seiji to shokuminchi tochi no s6koku [The civilian government-general
system during the period of party politics: the conflict between constitutional government and colonial
administration]," Nihon shokuminchi kenkyia 10 (1998): 1-18; Okamoto, Shokuminchi kanryd no seiji shi, pp. 327-
489.
121 Gaimush6 Joyakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan hbritsu gijiroku, p. 463. The text of Law 3 can be found in Gaimush6
J6yakukyoku H6kika, Taiwan no inin ripp5 seido, pp. 26-27. For an English translation, see Wang, Legal Reform in
Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 193-94.
General from relying on a ritsurei for reasons of expedience. Second, the law specified the
conditions under which a ritsurei was to be used: (i) there was no appropriate law in Japan; and
(ii) the enforcement of a Japanese law was difficult due to special conditions found within
Taiwan. Consequently, the work of the Old Customs Investigation Committee was disregarded
by Den and his successors, and a modified version of Japan's civil code was extended to the
Taiwanese with much fanfare on January 1, 1923.m With the subordination of the Taiwan
Governor-General to the will of political parties in Tokyo now complete, Taiwan was thus firmly
placed on a path toward institutional assimilation into Japan.124
5. Conclusion: Agent Discretion and Colonial Institution-building
When Japan's "success" in the establishment of colonial governance in Taiwan is
explained, the focus is typically on the leadership of Governor-General Kodama and his chief
lieutenant, Goto Shimpei. 12 5 After all, when they landed in Taiwan in early 1898, the island was
embroiled in a guerrilla war, with no end in sight. Yet, by 1902, the island was largely at peace,
and by 1905, Taiwan had achieved fiscal independence from Japan, five years ahead of schedule.
The key to Goto's achievements in colonial institution-building was his belief in pragmatism, as
well as his commitment to basing policymaking on careful (scientific) research. Assimilation
was rejected in 1898 not because Got6 was against making Taiwan a permanent part of the
Japanese empire-he was an avid imperialist-but because Got6 reasoned that conditions in
Taiwan simply did not allow for such a policy, and its pursuit would in fact jeopardize Japan's
122 Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa," pp. 138-40.
123 A detailed analysis of the changes in civil code during the Den era can be found in Wang, Legal Reform in
Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 140-69. In the cases of family and succession laws (which concerned
marriage, divorce, adoption, and succession), however, existing Taiwanese customary laws were retained, even if
their specific applications were subjected to the biases of Japanese judges trained in the Western legal tradition.
124 For a brief overview of the steps taken by the Den administration (1919-1923) to advance assimilation, see
Kenjir6 Den, "Assimilation Keynote of Taiwan Policy," The Trans-Pacific 8 (1923): 45-47.
125 Chang and Myers, "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906"; E. P. Tsurumi, "Taiwan
Under Kodama Gentar6 and Got6 Shimpei."
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control over the island. He imagined an alternative modernity for Taiwan, where the
Government-General would function as an autonomous state ruled by "enlightened" Japanese
technocrats.
However, this account of Goto's leadership must be placed in its proper context-namely,
what allowed this relatively unknown bureaucrat to obtain such freedom of action in Taiwan and
to single-handedly abandon the long-term objectives of his government in Tokyo? Indeed, if we
turn to the Philippine case (to be discussed in detail in the following chapter), we find that within
the U.S. colonial government were also skilled colonial administrators-such as Governor-
General Luke E. Wright (1904-1906) and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Harry H.
Bandholtz (1907-1913)-who sought to govern the Philippines with flexibility and pragmatism.
However, unlike Goto, Wright was forced to abandon his attempt to rectify the mistakes of early
U.S. colonial officials (and was subsequently dismissed from his post), when his centralizing
reforms met the objections of U.S. War Secretary William Howard Taft. In Taft's view, by
concentrating power in the colonial government, Wright's reforms had the danger of
undermining the carefully constructed myth of the United States as a benevolent occupier.
Meanwhile, Bandholtz's repeated calls for placing the municipal police under the authority of the
Constabulary (the national-level police force) in order to strengthen the regulatory powers of the
colonial state were dismissed by Governor-General Wright's humbled successors, who feared
that such actions would invite further rebuke from Washington.
The causal importance of agent discretion is also observed when institution-building in
Taiwan is compared to that of Korea (which was formally annexed by Japan in 1910). In both
cases, the 1919 colonial bureaucracy reform allowed for the appointment of a civilian governor-
general. However, while the Governor-General of Taiwan received supervision by the Prime
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Minister, the Governor-General of Korea was responsible only to the Emperor. Furthermore,
because governor-generals occupied the highest bureaucratic rank of shinnin (or the Emperor's
direct servants), the Privy Council (as the Emperor's advisory body) could veto the Prime
Minister's recommendations for these posts. In the case of Taiwan, the Privy Council found no
reason to object to a civilian governor-general due to its (by now) relatively peaceful conditions.
In Korea, however, the Privy Council determined that continued instability resulting from the
March 1, 1919 independence movement required that the post of Governor-General be occupied
by a military officer. Consequently, Saito Makoto, a former Admiral and a navy reservist, was
chosen to become the new Governor-General of Korea in 1919, as the compromise candidate of
Hara and Field Marshall Yamagata (who was then Chairman of the Privy Council). In short,
while the GGT had been subordinated to the central government as a result of the 1919 reform,
the Government-General of Korea (GGK) retained its autonomy. 12 6
This variation in the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Taiwanese and Korean colonial
governments in the 1920s led to a divergence in colonial policy between the two, especially on
the issue of institutional assimilation. As discussed above, Got6 and Okamatsu sought the
political and legal separation of Taiwan from Japan through the creation of a Taiwanese
legislative assembly and the adoption of a Taiwan-specific law code. The policy, however, was
overturned by Governor-General Den Kenjir5 and his successors in the 1920s, who instead
strengthened the GGT Consultative Council (hyogikai) through the appointment of Taiwanese
notables, while introducing semi-popularly elected assemblies (with half of their members
chosen by a limited franchise) in the prefectural and city governments. The aim was to make
126 Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa," pp. 132-34; Okamoto, "Seito seijiki ni okeru bunkan
sotokufu sei"; Okamoto Makiko, "Sflmitsuin to shokuminchi mondai: ChOsen, Taiwan shihai taisei to no kankei kara
[The Privy Council and the problem of colonial territories: its effect on the structure of rule in Korea and Taiwan],"
in Sfimitsuin no kenkyi [Study of the Privy Council], ed. Yui Masaomi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 2003): 141-
91.
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Taiwanese prefectures resemble more closely Japanese ones in preparation of Taiwan's eventual
absorption into Japan.127 Meanwhile, Taiwanese political movements advocating the
establishment of a "national"-level legislative assembly in the island were criminalized, and in
1923, seven members of the League for the Establishment of a Taiwan Parliament were handed
sentences of three to four months in prison. Further political participation of the Taiwanese
would have to wait until they were culturally assimilated into the Japanese nation, the GGT
declared, and "ready" to send delegates to the Imperial Diet.'28
In contrast, during this same period, the GGK became increasingly receptive towards the
idea of a legislative body in Korea. In 1925, the very year that the Taiwan Police Headquarters
compiled a report condemning petitions by Taiwanese elites for the establishment of a native
legislative assembly, Soejima Michimasa (President of Keijyd Nippo, the GGK-sponsored
newspaper) penned an editorial advocating the need for a full-fledged lawmaking body within
the GGK. Subsequently, various proposals for the creation of a Korea Assembly were drafted
127 For a discussion of the role and functions of the Consultative Council under Den, see Ching-chih Chen,
"Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," Diss., Harvard University, 1973. The council was
comprised of nine ranking members of the colonial administration, nine Japanese civilians from the settler
community, and nine Taiwanese notables. The Japanese and Taiwanese civilian members of the council were all
appointed by the Governor-General for two-year terms, but could be dismissed at any time. Only seven Consultative
Council meetings were held between 1921, when the new system was initiated, and 1929, and its agenda was
entirely controlled by the Governor-General. In 1930, the rules for the Consultative Council were changed to allow
councilors to introduce any issue for discussion, but no record remains on the frequency at which the Council met
after 1930, as well as their deliberations. Meanwhile, a discussion of the new local government system under Den
and his successors can be found in Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan," pp. 374-84.
128 Edward 1-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," Journal ofAsian
Studies 31.3 (1972): 477-97; Ching-chih Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan," pp. 445-59; Ching,
Becoming "Japanese, " pp. 51-132; Den Kenjiro, "Taiwan S6tokufu Hyogikai no seishitsu [The characteristics of
the Taiwan Government-General Consultative Council]," Taiwanjih5i24 (1921): 10-14; Rya Kajo, "Shokuminchi
no h6seika katei to Taiwan Sotokufu Hyogikai (1896-1821): s6toku seiji, hosei kanry6, chih6 meiboka [The
legalization process of colonial territories: colonial politics, legal bureaucrats, and local notables]," Higashi Ajia
gendaishi 1 (1998): 59-92. Den writes in his January 21, 1921 journal entry how he rejected outright the proposal by
several young Taiwanese intellectuals for forming a legislative assembly in Taiwan, noting that this was
incompatible with the fundamental policy of Japanese rule. See the entry for January 21, 1921 in Den Kenjird nikki
[Journal of Den Kenjir6], National Diet Library, Tokyo.
129 For the GGT Police Headquarters report, see "Keinukyoku hoshin [Policy of the Police Headquarters]," in
Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan shakai und65 shi [History of Taiwanese social movements] (Taipei: Taiwan
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by GGK officials in the late 1920s and submitted to Tokyo for approval.'3 0 These efforts led to
very little substantive changes, given that a reform of the GGK's administrative structure
required approval by the Japanese government;' 3 nonetheless, they were indicative of the
overall policymaking approach of the GGK in the 1920s. Indeed, while seventy percent of all
laws and regulations in effect in Korea (prior to its independence in 1945) were those enacted via
GGK ordinance (seirei), only thirty percent of laws and regulations in Taiwan took the form of
GGT ordinance (ritsurei). The rest, enforced via imperial ordinance, were direct applications of
Japanese statutes. 32 Although the goal of Tokyo towards both Taiwan and Korea was
assimilation, only in Taiwan-the less autonomous of the two in the aftermath of the 1919
reform-was this reflected in actual colonial policy.
However, this focus on agent discretion provides only half of the story. It highlights the
causal importance of the structural relationship between the colonial administration and its home
government, but says little of how relations between colonial agents and local elites may lead to
different institutional outcomes. Indeed, while reform agents with discretionary power are more
likely to construct hybridic (as opposed to dualistic) institutions in the target territory, how such
Sotokufu Keimukyoku, 1939), pp. 316-25. For Soejima's editorial, see Soejima Masamichi, "Chosen tochi no
konpon gi [The fundamental meaning of Korean colonial policy]," Keijo nippo, November 26, 27, and 28, 1925.
13 These policy proposals can be found within the Saito Makoto documents, as (in order that they were drafted) No.
75.6, 75.5, 75.4, 75.7, and 71.4. Sait6's documents can be found in Saito Makoto kankei monjo [Documents related
to Saito Makoto], National Diet Library, Tokyo.
131 Lee Hyoung Sik, "'Bunka tOchi' shoki ni okeru Chosen Sotokufu kanryo no tochi kos6 [The vision of the
Japanese Governor-General's office during the early 'era of cultural integration' in Korea]," Shigaku zasshi 115.4
(2006): 510-34; Moriyama Shigenori, "Seito seijiki no shomondai: Nihon no Chosen shihai to ChOsen minzoku
shugi [The various problems pertaining to the period of party politics: Japanese rule of Korea and Korean
nationalism]," in Senso, fukko, hatten: Shdwa seiishi ni okeru kenryoku to koso [War, reconstruction, and
development: the framework of power in the political history of the Showa period], ed. Kitaoka Shinichi and
Mikuriya Takashi (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000): 1-34.
32 These figures for GGK and GGT ordinances as a percentage of the total numbers of laws and regulations in
Korea and Taiwan were calculated by the author from information provided in Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku Hokika,
Nihon t5chijidai no Chosen [Korea under Japanese colonial rule] (Tokyo: Gaimush6 J6yakukyoku HOkika, 1971),
pp. 64-7 1.
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institutions perform in the short-term, as well as their long-term evolutionary trajectory, is also
determined by the interactions between colonizers and native elites of the colonized territory.
As I argue in the ensuing chapters, successful institutions are more likely forged under a
foreign occupation when local powerholders have the capacity, and exhibit the willingness, to
effectively resist (with violence if necessary) specific institutional designs envisioned by foreign
agents. Importantly, the capacity and willingness of local elites to resist the reform program of
foreigners could well vary across different institutions. It was precisely for this reason that while
the institutional order forged under Goto's leadership was effective overall, there was some
variation in institutional durability across policy areas. Meanwhile, the sensitivity of the U.S.
colonial administration to the demands of local Filipino elites in some areas compensated for its
lack of discretion, and its consequent failure to integrate Filipino customs and traditions into the
formal institutional structures of the state. Placing the colonial state at the analytical center, why
institution-building succeeds or fails is ultimately determined by the ways in which its agency is
constrained from above as well as from below.
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Chapter 3: U.S. Occupation of the Philippines and State-building Failure
Consequences of a Subordinated Agent
1. Introduction
The Philippine mission had many of the right ingredients for institution-building success,
as enumerated by those grappling with the problem of nation-building today. Although ethnically
diverse, the Philippine Islands were largely at peace by 1902 due to an aggressive U.S. counter-
insurgency campaign and the administrative separation of territories populated by non-Christian
peoples from Christian-majority regions. It was also relatively easy for Americans to maintain
stability, as rival ethnic groups were spread out across the sparsely populated archipelago, with
enough distance (and usually mountains or bodies of water) between them to prevent inter-ethnic
conflict from arising. Policymakers in Washington were fully committed to state-building in the
Philippines, and had articulated a clear and coherent plan for institutional reform. American
colonial officials in the Philippines dominated the executive and legislative branches of the
occupational administration, and could appropriate the internal revenue of the islands to projects
as they saw fit. At the same time, strong collaborative ties were forged between American
officials and Filipino elites, in both Manila and the provinces, and many native elites spoke
enthusiastically of a liberal and democratic future for the Filipino people. However, despite the
existence of all of these positive factors, U.S. occupiers left behind institutional arrangements
that were modern in some ways, but distinctly Filipino in others and, for the most part,
dysfunctional. In this way, the American occupation of the Philippines, while far surpassing the
successful post-WWII occupations in Germany and Japan in duration and intensity, is similar in
outcome to the failing state-building missions of late.
To a large extent, American state-building failure in the Philippines can be attributed to
the incongruence between Washington's preferred strategy for institutional reform versus the
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political and socioeconomic realities on the ground. Although some attempt would be made to
incorporate Filipino customs and prejudices within the new institutional architecture, President
William McKinley and his advisors desired that American institutions serve as dominant models
for the new Filipino nation-state. Moreover, policymakers in Washington assumed that the
greatest evil of the existing political system in the Philippines, which was under Spanish colonial
rule prior to American occupation, was centralized despotism by the Government-General in
Manila. Hence, U.S. liberalization and democratization strategy would be one of decentralizing
political authority to municipal bodies and affording local Filipino elites with considerable
autonomy. Since American democracy first developed at the local level in small New England
towns, McKinley and his allies argued, a similar process of bottom-up democratization was also
most appropriate for the Philippines. The problem with this strategy, however, was that Filipino
elites were hardly nascent liberal-democrats in the waiting. Municipal governments during the
Spanish period were corrupt, not because of centralized despotism, but because of extreme
socioeconomic inequality and the prevalence of clientelistic relations between rich landlords and
poor landless peasants. It is therefore of little surprise that, after liberalizing and democratizing
reforms were undertaken by empowering illiberal and undemocratic elites in the localities, newly
established institutions did not function as intended by colonial reformers.
In this way, the attempt to transform the Philippine Islands in the American image failed
because U.S. state-building strategy was based on misinformation and false impressions. Yet,
what is most puzzling about America's failure in state-building is why U.S. policymakers were
unable to adjust their initial (and unsuccessful) institution-building strategy to reflect realities on
the ground. Early mistakes may be explained by the difficulty of obtaining accurate information
regarding a foreign territory in a state of war, but the U.S. occupation lasted for decades-that is,
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long enough for lessons to be learned and necessary adjustments to be made. Moreover,
American colonial agents stationed in the Philippines were clearly aware of the difficulty of
forging a Filipino democracy from the bottom up, as evidenced by their private correspondences
and diaries. Why, then, did the initial state-building strategy articulated by Secretary of War
Elihu Root in 1899 (less than a year after U.S. forces landed in Manila) persist unchanged under
successive Republican administrations, later to be adopted by Woodrow Wilson (in a modified
form) during his presidency? What explains the rigidity through which the state-building effort
was pursued, even as evidence mounted that a dramatic change in course was necessary?
As I demonstrate in this chapter, the debilitating rigidity of the U.S. state-building
mission was caused by two inter-related factors: First, the process through which the United
States undertook reforms in the Philippines became a matter of domestic partisan politics. Facing
an electorate that was skeptical of foreign entanglements, as well as a vocal anti-imperialist
movement, McKinley and his allies were compelled to characterize U.S. expansionary designs in
the Pacific as a "civilizing mission"-a duty bestowed upon the American people by an act of
Providence. Consequently, in order to maintain public support for the occupation, and to keep
the Democrats and their anti-imperialist allies at bay, successive Republican administrations
could not afford to take any actions that would undermine this storyline. With members of
Congress wondering aloud why a large U.S. military presence was needed in the archipelago if
American intentions were truly benevolent, Secretary Root found it politically expedient to
quicken the pace of transferring political authority from the U.S. military to Filipino
collaborators in the provinces. Even if the newly organized and Filipino-led municipal and
provincial governments did not function as anticipated, political power could not be
reconcentrated into the hands of American colonial officials without provoking protests from
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Democrats and anti-imperialists. Meanwhile, it was also not possible for Washington to accept
the fact that the Philippines would not easily be transformed into a liberal and democratic nation-
state in the American image. A more coherent and functional institutional order could have been
established if the prevailing system of clientelistic rule was recognized and incorporated into the
governance structure, but such would have undermined the raison d'etre of the occupation.
Second, and more importantly, precisely because the Philippine occupation became such
a contentious point in U.S. domestic politics, hardly any discretionary power was afforded to top
American colonial agents in the Philippines. Consequently, the colonial administration was made
into a loyal executioner of the agenda devised in Washington. Moreover, the various measures
taken to maintain colonial agents' faithfulness to Washington led to perverse incentives (on the
part of the agents) that were detrimental to institution-building success. By purposefully
appointing politically weak individuals to serve as colonial agents, and by denying them security
in tenure, the Secretary of War made sure that his agents would have little incentive to question
the preferred institution-building strategy of Washington, or engage is meaningful policy debates
with their politically-minded superiors. By punishing any deviation from the initial institution-
building strategy devised by Secretary Root, Washington made sure that its agents would not
dare to conjure innovative solutions or engage in on-the-ground experimentation with alternative
institutional arrangements. Rewarded for their faithfulness rather than their innovativeness,
America's colonial agents left unexplored a possible middle ground between the transformative
agenda of policymakers in Washington and the reality of entrenched Filipino institutions.
A defining characteristic of institution-building under foreign occupations (in comparison
to institutional reform within a domestic context) is that the implementation of the reform effort
is entirely delegated. Those who initiate the reforms (and are ultimately responsible for them) do
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not take part in the actual process of building institutions; rather, they dispatch agents to a target
territory on their behalf. Therefore, the act of adjusting initial expectations regarding attainable
goals, and that of modifying reform strategies in light of new information, is undertaken through
negotiation between two different actors: the principal and his agent. Both the principal (i.e., the
home government of the occupying country) and the agent (i.e., the occupational administration)
share the common goal of state-building success; however, while state-building is the primary
goal of the agent, it is only one of many domestic and foreign policy concerns of the principal.
Consequently, how the relationship between the principal and the agent is structured critically
affects the way in which the institution-building effort proceeds. If agents are under little
constraint from their home government, they will ignore the various domestic and foreign policy
priorities of the principal, and undertake reforms that they find most conducive to the
establishment of a strong state. On the other hand, a subordinated agent will take into account
such domestic and foreign policy concerns, but will lack the flexibility to reform institutions
innovatively. In the following pages, the U.S. occupation of the Philippine Islands is examined as
an illustrative example of institution-building by a subordinated agent, and the costs associated
with this arrangement are explored in detail.
2. The Birth of the Civilizing Mission Consensus
The Spanish-American War began as a conflict over Cuba in response to the 1895 Cuban
struggle for independence against Spain. As the yellow press agitated American public opinion
with stories of Spanish brutality in suppressing the revolution, and as U.S. shipping and sugar
interests complained of heavy losses due to ongoing political instability in Cuba, the McKinley
administration at first responded by securing an agreement with Spain to allow Cuban political
autonomy beginning on January 1, 1898. Yet, instability continued as Spanish officers rioted in
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Havana in response to this agreement. To ensure the safety of American citizens and U.S.
interests in Cuba, the USS Maine was deployed to Havana, while other naval squadrons were
moved to Key West and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as Hong Kong, to engage Spain's Pacific
armada (anchored in Manila) in case of war. On February 15, the Maine sank to the bottom of
Santiago Harbor after a massive explosion; Spain was immediately blamed for this incident.
With the press clamoring for war, business and religious communities also joined the
bandwagon.' On April 20, McKinley signed a joint resolution that authorized the use of force to
restore order in Cuba, but which also included a key amendment (by Senator Henry Teller)
disallowing the United States from establishing permanent control over Cuba in the aftermath of
the war. Yet, the first battle of the Spanish-American War did not take place in Cuba or, for that
matter, the Caribbean Sea. Instead, the war began with Commodore George Dewey's decimation
of the Spanish armada in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. The war, initially over Cuba, had become
an all out conflict between the United States and Spain over supremacy in the Caribbean and the
Pacific. Though supposedly fighting to secure Cuban independence, by early 1899 the United
States had transformed itself into an overseas empire by making Cuba its protectorate and by
annexing Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.
America was electrified by the news of Dewey's victory in Manila Bay. In a single
stroke, U.S. forces had crippled Spanish power in the Pacific, thus liberating the Filipinos from
three centuries of Iberian misgovernment. Seemingly guided by Providence, America was now
well positioned to extend liberty and freedom-along with its exports-not only to the
Philippines but also to the rest of Asia. Even for the many Americans who were unconcerned
with the specific implications of Dewey's victory, the news gave ample reasons to celebrate
'Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1936).
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American greatness. Yet, going against the public euphoria with their usual pessimism and
contrarian ways, the mugwumps 2 of the Northeast began a quest to prevent their beloved
republic (already threatened in their view by greedy businessmen, city bosses and their
immigrant supporters, and militant labor) from corruption and decay. Aware that expansionists
within the Republican Party, such as Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt and
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, would attempt to seize this opportunity to further their agenda,
mugwumps lost no time in organizing their opposition. As early as May 9, 1898 Carl Schurz (a
leading mugwump intellectual and former Republican senator) warned McKinley that the war
against Spain, with its noble goal of Cuban liberation, should not be transformed into one of
"greedy ambition, conquest, and self-aggrandizement." 3 On June 15, concerned mugwumps
gathered at Boston's symbolic Faneuil Hall to inaugurate their public campaign against
imperialism.4
As a group largely comprised of disgruntled professors and lawyers in their 60s and 70s,
and affiliated with neither the Democrats nor the Republicans, mugwumps lacked the political
acumen or strong organizational base to mount an effective challenge against imperialism on
their own. Even the Anti-Imperialist League, which was formed on November 19, 1898 under
the leadership of George Boutwell and Erving Winslow, was a failed political organization. They
initially gained the support of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor,
but due to the mugwumps' inherent dislike of organized labor, they were never able to fully
utilize Gompers' early assistance. Having been among the leaders of the anti-slavery movement,
2 The term mugwump originated during the 1884 presidential election and was used to describe a group of
Northeastern intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians who had spearheaded the anti-slavery movements of the
1840s and 1850s, but abandoned the Republican Party to support the reformist Grover Cleveland against the
seemingly immoral James G. Blaine. See Robert L. Beisner, Twelve against Empire: The Anti-imperialists, 1898-
1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 5-17.
' Quoted in E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 122
4 Ibid., p. 123.
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mugwumps tried to gain the backing of black organizations, but only Reverend William H. Scott
and his supporters were willing to abandon Lincoln's party. Due to their better-than-thou attitude
and self-righteousness, mugwumps alienated influential anti-imperialist Republicans, such as
Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts, House Speaker Thomas Reed, and the industrialist
Andrew Carnegie. They also failed to control the activities of their own members, and allowed
Edward Atkinson (honorary vice-president of the League) to embarrass them through his highly
graphic description of the various venereal diseases that American soldiers would contract in the
Philippines, which was only surpassed in notoriety by his widely condemned attempt at sending
anti-war propaganda to American soldiers in the archipelago.5
Despite their organizational weaknesses, the mugwumps were nonetheless effective in
influencing public discourse through voluminous publications and speeches. They could not be
easily ignored, for in spite of their small number and political incompetence, they included
within their ranks influential journalists like Edwin Godkin, as well as public intellectuals, like
Charles Iliot of Harvard University. Indeed, the tremendous disdain shown by Roosevelt and
other expansionists toward the mugwumps in part reflected a grudging recognition of the
mugwumps' ability to publicize their concerns and place the expansionists on the defensive. 6
Furthermore, even though mugwumps were themselves on the fringe of party politics, their
sentiments were shared by Southern Democrats, who feared (as did many mugwumps) that
annexation of the Philippines would bring hordes of "colored" people to American shores. 7
' Stuart Creighton Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation ": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 105-113; Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance
to the Philippine War (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company: 1972), pp. 7-18.
6 Beisner, Twelve against Empire, p. 56, 225.
7 Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," The Journal of Southern
History 24.3 (1958): 319-31.
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Consequently, Republicans were forced to use every rhetorical and political weapon in
their arsenal to obtain the needed two-thirds majority for Senate ratification of the annexation of
the Philippines in 1899.8 Moreover, with the 1900 presidential election only a year and a half
away, the McKinley administration not only had to convince wavering Senate Democrats (from
the mid-West) to their cause but also, more broadly, the majority of the American electorate.9
Hence, the battle over votes in the Senate was accompanied by a battle over ideology. Indeed,
the chief reason that mugwumps and other anti-imperialists ultimately failed in their quest to stop
the expansionists was due to the success of McKinley and his allies in responding to their
criticisms and usurping their rhetoric. Denying that America was becoming an empire,
expansionists argued that they (led by Providence) were reluctantly assuming the moral
obligation of a great republic by spreading liberty and good government to places that had
previously been ruled by despotism and corruption. 10 In this way, by forcing the McKinley
administration to commit to "benevolent assimilation,""] the anti-imperialists certainly left their
mark on U.S. colonial policy.
8 At the end, Senate ratification of the Treaty of Paris (between the United States and Spain over the annexation of
the Philippines) came down to one vote.
9 William Jennings Bryan, who had set his sights on becoming the Democratic presidential nominee for the 1900
election, believed that the Republicans were setting themselves up for electoral defeat if they were to obtain Senate
confirmation for the Treaty of Paris. Consequently, he urged his Democratic colleagues from the mid-West to
support annexation as a strategy for winning the 1900 election. Since Senate ratification of the treaty came down to
one vote, Bryan's cynical tactic proved decisive in placing the Philippines under American control.
0 Religious symbolism was ubiquitous throughout the debate on the Philippine Islands. The late nineteenth century
was a time of Christian revival in America (led by Dwight L. Moody), and references to Providence and other
Christian imagery strongly resonated with the American public. See Gerald H. Anderson, "Providence and Politics
behind Protestant Missionary Beginnings in the Philippines," in Studies in Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald H.
Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969): 279-300; Kenton J. Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the
Philippines, 1898-1916: An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality (Urbana, 11: University of Illinois Press,
1986); Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, pp. 279-316.
" The so-called "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation was delivered by President McKinley as an executive
order to the Secretary of War on December 21, 1898. The order may be found in James D. Richardson, A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, 1789-1897, vol. 10 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1899): 219-
21.
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The various arguments against Philippine annexation that filled the pamphlets of the
Anti-Imperialist League and the halls of Congress can be categorized into one of two general
themes. The first was inward-looking, and sought to defend American republicanism from decay.
Our Founding Fathers, argued Senator Hoar, "knew what caused the downfall of the mighty
Roman Republic. They read ... the history of freedom, of the decay, and the enslavement of
Greece. ... They learned from her the doctrine that while there is little else that a democracy can
not accomplish it can not rule over vassal states or subject peoples without bringing in the
elements of death into its own constitution."' 2 Specifically, Hoar argued that to rule foreign
people through conquest was in direct contradiction with the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution, and Congress had no authority to act against the
intentions of its Founding Fathers and the nation's most cherished principles:
[T]he question with which we must have to deal is whether Congress may conquer and
may govern, without their consent and against their will, a foreign nation, a separate,
distinct, and numerous people, a territory not hereafter to be populated by Americans, to
be formed into American States and to take its part in fulfilling and executing the
purposes for which the Constitution was framed ... [T]he question is whether the men
who framed the Constitution ... meant to confer that power among the limited and
restrained powers of the sovereign nation that they were creating.' 3
To Hoar, annexation of the Philippines posed a threat to American national identity
because it undermined the very principles upon which the American nation was founded. Other
anti-imperialists, however, perceived the threat to American nationhood to lie not only in the
realm of ideology, but also in reasons of race.' 4 Schurz, most notably, argued that if the United
States were to remain true to its republican principles, it could not rule over alien peoples
12 Senator Hoar on acquisition of territory, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d sess. (9 January
1899), p. 494. For his entire argument, see pp. 493-502.
" Ibid., 495.
'4 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 117-19; Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation, " pp. 124-25.
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undemocratically; hence, if any new territory were to be annexed, it should be placed on a clear
path toward statehood. However, the incorporation of tropical races into the Union would dilute
America's Anglo-Saxon nation. Thus it was best to leave the Filipinos alone. 5 Senator Benjamin
Tillman (Democrat of South Carolina) enthusiastically agreed. After passage of the Treaty of
Paris (which ratified U.S. annexation of the Philippines) on February 6, 1899 Tillman pointed
out that most Democrats from the South voted against the treaty because "we understand and
realize what it is to have two races side by side that can not mix or mingle without deterioration
and injury to both and the ultimate destruction of the civilization of the higher." 6
Second, in their more noble moments, anti-imperialists attacked annexation out of
consideration for the wishes of the Filipinos. Anti-imperialists asked what right the United States
had in denying Filipinos the universal human right to choose their own form of government.
Quipping that the constitutional argument for slavery was in fact stronger than that of the
annexation of the Philippines, Hoar invoked Abraham Lincoln's famous line that "No man was
ever created good enough to own another," and declared, "No nation was ever created good
enough to own another."17 Mugwumps, such as Moorfeild Storey and William James, expressed
similar sentiments. In his keynote speech for the June 15, 1898 meeting at Faneuil Hall, Storey
argued that "to seize any colony of Spain and hold it as our own, without the free consent of its
people is a violation of the principles upon which this government rests."18 Not only was the
annexation of the Philippines a blatant display of hypocrisy, James argued, but America was also
about to destroy "the one sacred thing in the world, the spontaneous budding of a national life."
"5 Beisner, Twelve against Empire, p. 22-23.
16 Senator Tillman on policy regarding the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d
sess. (7 Feb 1899), p. 1532. For his entire argument, see pp. 1529-33. See also, Benjamin R. Tillman, "Causes of
Southern Opposition to Imperialism," North American Review 171 (1900): 439-46.
" Ibid., p. 501.
18 Quoted in Tompkins, Anti-imperialism in the United States, p. 124.
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American intervention would nip at its bud the formation of a new and prosperous nation, for
"we can destroy their old ideals, but we can't give them ours." 19
If fear of national decay and commitment to republican principles motivated the anti-
imperialists in 1899, what, then, compelled expansionists to insist upon the annexation of the
entire Philippine archipelago? Exponents of the "large policy," such as Roosevelt and Lodge,
believed that the United States should play a role in international politics commensurate to its
economic prowess. It was also necessary for the United States to pursue foreign policy goals that
would maintain its rapid economic growth. Up to this point, the United States had relied on
Britain to protect the high seas and keep European markets open to U.S. manufactured goods, but
it was time the United States shared this burden with Britain by constructing a first-class navy
and becoming an active participant in great power politics. With the rise of Germany and
increasing friction among European states, Europe was moving away from free trade and toward
protectionism and economic nationalism. Britain, now increasingly concerned with the balance
of power in Europe (and having to concentrate its naval power closer to home), was not only
willing, but eager to share the responsibility of maintaining Anglo-Saxon supremacy over the
high seas with the United States. Moreover, while U.S. trade with China was still miniscule, it
was bound to become the most important destination for U.S. manufactured goods in the near
future, given the population of China.20 Therefore, when America suddenly found itself in
control of Manila Bay and well positioned to plant the U.S. flag a mere seven hundred miles
'9 Quoted in Beisner, Twelve against Empire, p. 44.
20 Senator Beveridge on policy regarding the Philippines, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (7 March
1900), pp. 704-05; Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British
and U.S. Empires," in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, ed. Julian Go and Anne
L. Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 54-55.
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from Hong Kong, the expansionists, supported by major business associations, were determined
not to let this tremendous opportunity slip by.
Indeed, even reluctant expansionists within the Republican Party could see the obvious
benefit of securing a coaling station or a naval base in the Philippines, but from there to the
annexation of the entire archipelago was a monumental leap. Two practical considerations
convinced McKinley and other cautious Republicans of the necessity of annexing it all.22 First,
Brig. Gen. Francis V. Greene, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, and other officers returning from the
first (1898) expedition to the Philippines testified to McKinley that the City of Manila and its
harbor were indefensible without control over the rest of the island of Luzon. Manila alone
would be a source of weakness, rather than strength, in a time of war. Yet, it was also not
possible to annex just Luzon, for that would likely lead to other powers laying claims to the rest
of the principal islands of the Philippines, forcing the United States to defend a long coastline
from multiple directions. Therefore, the only strategically viable option, if any Philippine
territory was to be placed under U.S. control, was annexation of the entire archipelago. 23
21 Strong support for Philippine annexation by business groups was in fact a reversal of their previous opposition to
the Spanish-American War. For example, the New York Journal of Commerce, which had argued against the war
for fear of its costs, was now insisting that the Philippines be retained to uphold American rights in China. Similar
views were expressed in other leading business newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, the American Banker,
the Banker and Tradesmen, the Age of Steel, the Iron Age, the United States Investor, the Financial Record, the
Brandstreet, and the New York Commercial. The argument that the Philippines should be retained for reasons of
trade was not confined to any one part of the United States. In the South, business newspapers saw annexation as a
way of securing access for American cotton goods into China, while those in San Francisco and Seattle believed that
acquisition of the Philippines would lead to growth of trans-Pacific trade. This is not to suggest, however, that
business associations were unanimous in their support for annexation. In particular, sugar-beet growers were
strongly opposed to annexation, for fear of competition from Filipino sugar plantations. This opposition from sugar
(as well as tobacco) interests would, in the ensuing years, come to play a critical role in delaying free trade between
the United States and the Philippines. For more on the business perspective on annexation, see Pratt, Expansionists
of 1898, pp. 266-78; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-
American War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 75-88.
22 For a review of scholarly debate on the motives behind the annexation of the Philippines, see Joseph A. Fry,
"Imperialism, American style, 1890-1916," in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993, ed. Gordon
Martel (London: Routledge, 1994): 52-70; Ephraim K. Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The
Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands," in Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American
War and Its Aftermath, ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993): 205-49.
21 Margaret Leech, In the Days ofMcKinley (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 327-36.
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Moreover, even if it were strategically possible to retain just Manila, there was the
question of what the United States would do with the rest of the islands. From both a political
and strategic perspective, it was inconceivable that America would hand the islands back to
Spain or sell them to another colonial power, such as Japan or Germany. Therefore, there were
only three practicable options for the Philippines: independence, existence as an American
protectorate, or outright annexation. 2 The possibility of granting Filipinos immediate
independence was rejected given the prevailing belief-shared by many anti-imperialists alike-
that Filipinos lacked the capacity for self-government. In a widely circulated and cited article
published in July 1898, John Foreman (an Englishman with extensive experience in the
Philippines) argued, "The Philippine Islands ... would not remain one year a peaceful united
Archipelago under an independent native Government."2 The problem, Foreman noted, was that
Filipinos lacked a sense of national unity. Emilio Aguinaldo, who (as the commander of the
revolutionary army) had formed an independent government in the city of Malolos, only
commanded the support of the Tagalog "tribe." Even if Aguinaldo could temporarily piece
together a national government, the Philippines would quickly splinter into smaller units, with
anarchy and civil war resulting.26 Importantly, Foreman's analysis was supported by U.S.
military officers returning from the Philippines, such as Greene and Merritt, as well as by
Senator Albert Beveridge, who had visited the islands to gain "firsthand" knowledge.27
According to Beveridge, the problem was not only that the Filipino majority distrusted
Aguinaldo, but also, that the Filipinos were simply incapable of self-government. "My own
24 Ibid., p. 325; Ernest May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence ofAmerica as a Great Power (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 253-54.
25 John Foreman, "Spain and the Philippine Islands," Contemporary Review 74 (1898), pp. 29-30.
26 Ibid. "Tagalog" referred to the dominant ethnic group in the Philippines to which Aguinaldo and many of his
lieutenants belonged.
27 May, Imperial Democracy, p. 255.
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belief is that there are not 100 men among them who comprehend what Anglo-Saxon self-
government even means," Beveridge asserted, "and there are over 5,000,000 people to be
governed. I know many clever and highly educated men among them, but there are only three
commanding intellects and characters-Arellano, Mabini, and Aguinaldo." 28
Once it was established that the Filipinos were incapable of self-government, further
implications followed that undermined the anti-imperialist position. First, if the United States
granted independence to Aguinaldo and his revolutionaries, the islands would quickly descend
into a state of anarchy. It would then be a matter of time before other powers would lay claims to
the islands. There was ample evidence for this scenario. Immediately after America defeated the
Spanish armada, German warships began making provocative maneuvers in Manila Bay, while
Japan's Prime Minister, It6 Hirobumi, offered his assistance (given his knowledge of the
"Asiatic" mind) to the Americans. Not only would the colonization of the Filipinos by
imperialist nations be detrimental to their wellbeing, but also, takeover of the islands by any
power but the United States, the British warned, would greatly complicate the balance of power
29in Asia. Moreover, the (perceived) fact that Aguinaldo lacked the popular support of the
Filipinos implied that the American protectorate proposal, as championed by moderate anti-
imperialists, was infeasible.3 0 It is absurd, Lodge argued, "that we should acknowledge
[Aguinaldo] as a government, enforce his rule upon the other eighty-three tribes and upon all the
28 Senator Beveridge on policy regarding the Philippines, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (7 March
1900), p. 705. For his entire argument, see pp. 704-12. Cayetano Arellano was a leading Filipino jurist, who became
the first Philippine Supreme Court Justice under U.S. rule. Apolinario Mabini was a political philosopher and
leading member of the Philippine Revolution.
29 Leech, In the Days ofMcKinley, p. 327; Welch, Response to Imperialism, p. 9; Dean Worcester to Mrs.
Worcester, 14 February 1899, Vol. 16, Worcester Papers, Special Collections Library, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor.
30 Senator Tillman on policy regarding the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d
sess. (7 Feb 1899), p. 1531. The protectorate proposition was also adopted by William Jennings Bryan in his 1900
campaign to unseat McKinley. For his speeches concerning imperialism, see William Jennings Bryan, Republic or
Empire? The Philippine Question (Chicago: The Independence Company, 1899).
120
other islands, and then protect him from foreign interference." This plan "would involve us in
endless wars with the natives and keep us embroiled with other nations ... "31 If the United States
was to shoulder the duty of protecting the islands, it must also possess the power to forge a
Filipino nation-state out of the many "tribes" that inhabited the islands. The way to do this
effectively, Lodge argued, was for the United States to directly govern the islands.3 2 Thus, the
only defensible option from a practical standpoint was none other than annexation. 33
Committed to annexation, the administration and its allies now faced the task of
defending their policies against anti-imperialist critics and convincing the public that despite the
appearance of imperialism, America was in fact a force of freedom and democracy. To this end,
the administration sought to characterize the annexation of the Philippines as a continuation of
America's westward continental expansion, akin to President Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana
Purchase of 1803.34 In response to Senator Hoar's argument that annexation of the Philippines
was unprecedented (in that the islands were densely populated by over seven million non-white
inhabitants), Senator Orville Platt rebutted, "[W]hat did we do with the Indians of this country?
31 Senator Lodge on the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (7 March
1900), p. 26 17 . For his entire argument, see pp. 2616-30.
32 Senator Beveridge on policy regarding the Philippines, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (9 January
1900), p. 709.
33 According to James Rusling, McKinley said the following to a delegation of Methodist Church leaders on
November 21, 1899: "When I next realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know
what to do with them. ... And one night late it came to me this way-I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That
we could not give them back to Spain-that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them
over to France and Germany-our commercial rivals in the Orient-that would be bad business and discreditable;
(3) that we could not leave them to themselves-they were unfit for self-government-and they would soon have
anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take
them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very
best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and
slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and I told
him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office), and
there they are, and there they will stay while I am President!" See James F. Rusling, "Interview with President
William McKinley," The Christian Advocate 22 January 1903: 17.
34 This argument, while presented by various Republican senators, was most clearly articulated by Orville Platt of
Connecticut, who was considered to be among the best legal minds in the Senate by his peers. For his argument, see
Senator Platt on acquisition of territory, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d sess. (19 December
1898): 287-97.
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... We found here a continent in the hands of the Indians, aborigines, who did not want us to
come here, who did not want to be governed by us without their consent, and with them
incapable of consenting, we have nevertheless, gone on and legislated for them and governed
them ... "" The literal application of the anti-imperialist doctrine that no people may be governed
without their consent would have "turned back the Mayflower from our coast and would have
prevented our expansion westward to the Pacific Ocean." 36
Furthermore, the anti-imperialists' interpretation of the Declaration of Independence was
not based on an accurate reading of history. Lodge asked his esteemed colleagues, "Upon whose
consent did [the Declaration of Independence] rest?"-certainly not those of African descent,
women, or minors, for none of them had possessed the right to vote. Not all white adult males
consented to the Declaration either, for many Americans had fought on the side of Britain.
"From this it follows that the consent of the governed is a phrase which represents a great and
just principle, but which in practice must have its existence determined by actual facts and
conditions, and is not to be ascertained merely by voting or in any other way."37 Even Senator
Henry Teller, who had but a year ago spearheaded a resolution preventing the annexation of
Cuba, agreed: "There is no government in the world, and there never has been one, founded upon
a strict observance of [the principle of the consent of the governed], and there can not be. ...
Because the interests of the few must give way to the interests of the great mass; because it might
be dangerous to the body politic to allow a certain class to participate in the affairs of the
3 Senator Platt on acquisition of territory, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d sess. (9 January
1899), p. 502.
36 Ibid.
31 Senator Lodge on the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., I st sess. (7 March
1900), p. 2 6 1 8 .
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government. Here again, the widely held belief that Aguinaldo lacked the sympathy of the
majority of the Filipinos proved critical in justifying annexation.
If Americans were to be true to the vision of the Founding Fathers, expansionists argued,
they had no choice but to follow Jefferson's expansionist program, and extend America's
democratic principles and republican institutions to the seven million Filipino souls, who had
previously known only despotism and oppression. Since the Filipinos were not ready for self-
government, to leave them to their own devices would be an act of cowardice and an
abandonment of America's God-given duty.39 Platt thus asserted to his fellow senators:
I believe in Providence. ... I believe the same force was behind our army at Santiago and
our ships in Manila Bay that was behind the landing of the Pilgrims on Plymouth Rock. I
believe that we have been chosen to carry on and to carry forward this great work of
uplifting humanity on earth. From the time of the landing on Plymouth Rock in the spirit
of the Declaration of Independence, in the spirit of the Constitution, believing that all
men are equal and endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights, believing that
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, we have spread
that civilization across the continent until it stood at the Pacific Ocean looking ever
westward."
In this way, McKinley and his allies in the Senate successfully turned the table on the
anti-imperialists. Extension of American sovereignty into the Philippine Islands was not an act of
imperialism, but one of emancipation; America was not building an empire, but rather, spreading
republicanism. Soon after the passage of the Treaty of Paris on February 6 (which ratified
America's "purchase" of the Philippines from Spain), McKinley traveled to Boston-the home
of the anti-imperialist movement-and stated to an enthusiastic audience, "No imperial designs
38 Senator Teller on acquisition of territory, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d sess. (20 December
1898), p. 328. For his entire argument, see pp. 325-30.
39 Senator Lodge on the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess. (7 March
1900), p. 2620.
40 Senator Platt on acquisition of territory, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3d sess. (9 January
1899), p. 502-03.
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lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose." What
his administration had done was to "commit the free and enfranchised Filipinos to the guiding
hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies, the uplifting education, not of
their American masters, but of their American emancipators."41
Having thus committed the United States to the building of a Filipino nation-state, it was
up to McKinley's advisers to devise a plan for carrying out the "civilizing mission." Chosen to
undertake this arduous assignment was Elihu Root, who was appointed the Secretary of War in
August 1899. Root's selection for the portfolio took the public by surprise, given Root's
background as a corporate lawyer. But in Root, McKinley saw exactly the type of man he would
need to move forward: Root's skills as a lawyer would not only be useful in defending the
administration's Philippine policy against the public, but he also possessed the legal training and
knowledge to lay the foundation for a governance structure over the colonial possessions. First,
Root was to examine the constitutional question regarding the newly annexed territories and to
present the administration's case to the Supreme Court. Root persuasively argued that the United
States, as a sovereign state, possessed the inherent right to annex new territories, but since the
Constitution could only be promulgated for new territories through an act of Congress, the
inhabitants of these "unincorporated" territories had no automatic claim to the legal rights
provided by the Constitution.43 Second, Root was tasked with the establishment of a permanent
system, within Washington, for administrating the unincorporated territories. The result,
4' William McKinley, "Speech at Dinner of the Home Market Club, 16 February 1899," in William McKinley,
Speeches andAddresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900 (New York: Doubleday and
McClure: 1900), pp. 191-92.
42 Root's skills in defending the administration against anti-imperialist critics were vividly displayed on the
campaign trail, where Root acted as the administration's primary spokesman regarding the Philippines issue. See,
for example, "Address of the Secretary of War, at Canton, Ohio, October 23, 1900," in Elihu Root, The Military and
Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1916): 27-64. See also Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead and
Company, 1939), pp. 331-37.
43 Leech, In the Days of McKinley, p. 387.
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discussed below, was the creation of the Bureau of Insular Affairs within the Department of
War.44 Third, McKinley instructed Root to devise a plan for the government of the islands.45
After months of study and investigation, Root's plan for governing the Philippines was presented
to the American public as the "Instruction of the President of April 7, 1900, to the Secretary of
War."46 While this document lacked a profound title, and even obscured its true author, it came
to be regarded as the "Magna Charta given to the Philippine people."47
Although Root's Instructions were deliberately vague on some points, in three key areas
he clearly laid out the priorities of the McKinley administration, and provided detailed direction
as to the institutions he expected to establish in the archipelago. First, the Philippines was to have
a decentralized political structure. Following the "example of the distribution of the powers
between the States and the National Government of the United States," the Instructions mandated
that the central government of the Philippine Islands "shall have no direct administration except
of matters of purely general concern, and shall have only such supervision and control over local
government as may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by
local officers."48 Second, it was the responsibility of the American administration to protect the
life, liberty, and, in particular, property of the Filipinos. Recognizing how disputes in land
ownership between Spanish land-owning Catholic orders, Filipino landlord elites, and peasants
were breeding rural unrest, Root instructed the colonial government to make a thorough
44 Clarence R. Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," The National Geographic Magazine 15.6
(1904), pp. 239-40.
4s According to Philippine Vice-Governor (and later Governor-General) Luke E. Wright, "From the beginning we
have experienced the benefits of [Root's] counsel and direction and have appreciated the fact that he was, more than
any other man in the United States, master of the Philippine question." Luke E. Wright to Henry T. Allen, 20
February 1902, Folder 1, Box 2, Clarence Ransom Edwards Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.
46 "Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission," in Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the
Commission Government: A Study in TropicalDemocracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917), pp. 485-
90.
47 These were the words used to describe the document by Clarence Edwards, the first Chief of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs. Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," p. 247.
48 "Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission," pp. 487-88.
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investigation "into the justice of the claims and complaints made against such landholders by the
people of the Islands, or any part of the people, and to seek by wise and peaceable measure a just
settlement of the controversies and redress of the wrongs which have caused strife and bloodshed
in the past."49 Root's solution to settling land disputes was distinctly conservative, reflecting
ideological currents of the time. In accordance to the "principle of our own Government,"
disputes over land were to be resolved through "due process of law," rather than by the colonial
state. Land redistribution was out of the question; if struggling peasants felt that their land had
been unjustly usurped by powerful landed elites prior to American occupation, it was up to them
to take the matter to court and fight for their claims. Finally, Root instructed that it was the duty
of the colonial administration to establish a secular education system in the islands. "In doing
this," Root wrote, "[American reformers] should regard as of first importance the extension of a
system of primary education which shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for
the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community."50 English
was to be the medium of that education.
The reason why this document, which came with no legal authority (as would an Act of
Congress), had such a constraining effect on American state-building efforts in the Philippines
was because it came to be used as a potent campaign tool by McKinley and his cabinet, as well
as by successive Republican administrations. Although the document made assurances and
guarantees (at least in rhetoric) to the Filipinos regarding their rights and duties, it was primarily
a promise to the American public that the U.S. Government had only benevolent intentions in the
Philippine Islands. When the document was presented, the war in the Philippines, which was




claim that the vast majority of Filipinos desired American sovereignty sounded less credible as
the body count increased and news of both Filipino and American atrocities reached the yellow
press. Indeed, it was Root's primary duty (as the administration's "defense lawyer") to sell the
war of conquest against Filipino revolutionaries to the American public. The "benevolent"
Instruction, along with frequent reports from William Howard Taft (who was sent by McKinley
to the archipelago in April 1900 to implement the administration's state-building strategy) that
the military situation was going well, were Root's primary weapons against his anti-imperialist
critics.1 He reasoned (correctly) that it would be difficult for the Democrats to call for an
immediate end to the occupation when victory against Filipino "insurgents" seemed so close, and
when the objective of the occupation was unambiguously framed as to provide the Filipino
people with a just and democratic system of government. Hence, any deviation from his
Instructions on the part of the colonial administration could not be tolerated, as it would provide
Democrats the opportunity to reveal the administration and its allies as imperialists in disguise.
" For Taft's many correspondences to Root on the matter of the war effort, see Reel 640, William Howard Taft,
Papers: 1890-1930 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1969). In particular, see Taft to Root, 14 July 1900, 18
August 1900, 23 August 1900, 31 August 1900, and 10 October 1900. See also Taft to Root, 21 August 1900, Folder
15, Box 1, Edwards Papers. On the administration's aggressive efforts to spin the progress of the war in a positive
light, see Edwards to Taft, 17 August 1900, Folder 15, Box 1, Edwards Papers; Edwards to "John," 27 September
1900, Folder 16, Box 1, Edwards Papers; Root, "Address of the Secretary of War, at Canton, Ohio, October 23,
1900" in Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States; Taft to Root, 31 October 1900, Reel 463, Taft,
Papers.
5 For example, following the November 1900 presidential election, Root continued to press the Taft Commission to
proceed with the transfer of provinces from military to civil control in order to prevent the American presence in the
Philippines from being characterized and criticized as cruel and oppressive. Hence, even those districts where
security conditions did not necessarily permit the transfer to civilian hands were thus demilitarized. For example,
Vice-Governor Wright wrote to Harry H. Bandholtz (civil governor of Tayabas), "I quite understand the difficulties
under which you labor with reference to Principe and Infanta. It is of course not expected that you shall do the
impossible, but only the best you can. These districts were added to your province more for the purpose ofputting
all the territory of the islands under civil government preparatory to the issuing of the amnesty proclamation than
for any other reason, and in this matter we were acting under instructions from the Secretary of War" [emphasis
mine] (1). Wright to Harry H. Bandholtz, 11 August 1902, Section 1907-1908, Reel 7, Harry H. Bandholtz Papers,
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. For an illustration of how Congressional
questioning of American atrocities led Root to hurry the process of establishing civil government throughout the
islands, see Wright to Taft, 19 April 1902, Reel 36, Taft, Papers; Taft to Wright, 6 May 1902, Reel 36, Taft, Papers;
Root to Taft, 9 June 1902, Reel 36, Taft, Papers.
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Largely as a result of this effort to portray themselves as the true defenders of republican
principles, Republicans not only secured Senate confirmation of the Philippine annexation in
1899, but moreover, they transformed the 1900 presidential election from a fight over
imperialism to an affirmation of America's duty to spread civilization to the Philippine Islands.
The enthusiasm that greeted President McKinley in October 1899 as he toured the battleground
states of the mid-West was palpable; deafening were the cheers and the ovation he received
when he spoke of the sacrifices of American soldiers in the Philippines and of America's
responsibility in enlightening the Filipino people. It was clear to both Republicans and
Democrats that Philippine annexation and the civilizing mission were now a winning cause for
McKinley. Consequently, although William Jennings Bryan (the Democratic candidate) had
initially sought to make imperialism a paramount issue in the campaign, he had little choice but
to abandon it.54 Even the official Democratic platform now favored limited retention of the
archipelago.5 5 The primary difference, then, between the two parties was that while the
Democrats explicitly guaranteed independence after a period of direct American administration
and tutelage, Republicans promised this implicitly through their rhetoric of preparing the
Filipinos for self-government. The "great debate" over imperialism was thus over even before
the results to the 1900 presidential election were known. The policy of assimilating Filipinos into
America's own republican image emerged triumphantly as the national consensus.
53 Opinion polls did not exist at this time, so it is not possible to accurately gauge the degree to which the American
electorate supported annexation. The best indication of public sentiment comes from descriptions of audience
reactions to speeches given by candidates. See McKinley, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, pp. 226-
346.
54 Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 24.1 (1937): 43-52; Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation, " pp. 136-37; Welch, Response to
Imperialism, pp. 63-71.
5 Kirk H. Porter, ed., National Party Platforms, 1840-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 113.
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3. From Conquest to Collaboration: Emergence of a Dualistic System of Local Governance
Root was indeed a master manipulator of information, as he selectively presented to the
American public the optimistic reports of Taft, while hiding the more pessimistic assessments
that were coming in from his generals.56 Nonetheless, it is likely that Root and other members of
the McKinley cabinet truly believed that the transformation of the Philippine Islands in the
American image was an achievable goal. After all, this was the conclusion reached by Jacob
Schurman and his fact-finding missing, which was dispatched in early 1899 by McKinley to
investigate the conditions in the archipelago.57 The problem, however, was that Schurman and
his Commission's conclusions were largely incorrect, as they were made when the United States
had little understanding of the situation on the ground. In early 1899, when the Commission was
conducting its investigation, the offensive against Aguinaldo and his revolutionary army had
barely begun. The focus of Maj. Gen. Elwell Otis (commander of the Division of the Philippines
from August 1898 to May 1900) was on defeating Aguinaldo's forces in the field, rather than in
occupying and controlling territory outside of Manila (which the United States had occupied
since the summer of 1898).58 As such, the prevailing political conditions of the provinces were
unknown to the Americans, other than through testimonies of Filipino collaborators.
Unfortunately, those elites whom the Americans found trustworthy and related most
closely to-that is, the highly educated and Europeanized urban notables of Manila, known as
56 Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime: America Overseas (Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill, 1916), p. 488; Leech, In the Days of McKinley, pp. 133-34; Henry Parker Willis, Our Philippine
Problem: A Study ofAmerican Colonial Policy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1905), p. 29.
57 A thorough discussion of the Schurman Commission can be found in Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., "Reluctant
Expansionist: Jacob Gould Schurman and the Philippine Question," The Pacific Historical Review 36.4 (1967): 405-
21. An account of the activities of the Schurman Commission, as well as the interaction among commissioners, is
described in detail by Commissioner Dean C. Worcester in letters to his wife. See Vol. 16, Worcester Papers,
Special Collections Library. Other than Schurman, who was President of Cornell University and a known anti-
imperialist, the Commission included Otis, Dewey, Charles Denby (former U.S. Minister to China), and Worcester
(a zoologist from University of Michigan with prior experience in the Philippines).
58 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 88-
116.
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the ilustrado-were hardly representative of the entire Filipino elite stratum. Indeed, it was
precisely because many of them lacked political power (despite their wealth and education) that
they became the most enthusiastic supporters of American rule. They hoped that by collaborating
with the American regime, they would finally obtain the power and prestige that had long eluded
them under Spanish rule. To this end, the ilustrados helped establish three myths (some of them
purposefully, some accidentally) that became the foundation upon which the Schurman
Commission's erroneous report was written, and provided the assumptions undergirding
America's initial pacification efforts and institution-building strategy.
First, based on testimonies of ilustrado elites, the Commission reported to Root that the
greatest evil of the Spanish system was centralized despotism. As a result of excessive
centralization, "[t]he local institutions of the archipelago had fallen into such decay and
confusion that their several members were atrophied and useless, if not indeed transformed into
instruments of corruption." Where once municipal offices were sought "as the highest honor,"
they had "degenerated into base, ignoble, and odious charges which no self-respecting man
would voluntarily accept." The problem, the Commission explained, was that because Spanish
governors could admonish, fine, or suspend Filipino municipal officials at will, these officials
had little incentive to undertake "vigorous initiative in office." Rather than working for the
benefit of the townspeople, the municipal mayor was "in truth a political representative of the
general government [in Manila] and, as it were, an arbitrary governor of the town." 59
Consequently, the surest way to transform the Philippines into a democracy was to devolve
political power to the localities and empower those respectable Filipino elites that had previously
refused to serve as servants of the despotic Spanish regime.
59 Jacob Schurman, et al., Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1900), pp. 60-61.
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However contrary to the Commission's depiction of the position of gobernadorcillo
(municipal mayor) as desired only by petty crooks, it was in fact hotly contested among rival
Filipino elite factions. After all, the gobernadorcillo was at once a judge and the highest-ranking
administrator in a township government. His duties were numerous, and included collection of
taxes, supervision of public works projects (including the allocation of cov6e labor), trial of
minor civil and criminal cases, investigation of more serious criminal cases (to be tried by a
Spanish provincial judge), deployment of the local police force, and implementation of various
ordinances and decrees of the Spanish colonial state. These various duties provided ample
opportunities for self-enrichment, as well as the ability to distribute favors to allies and to punish
enemies. In this way, the gobernadorcillo and other Filipino municipal officials, known as
principales, were hardly pawns of the Spanish government, but were wielders of immense
political, social, and economic authority in their own right, who enjoyed considerable local
autonomy given the short reach of the Spanish colonial state. Insofar as they were "corrupt," it
was due more to the prevailing clientelistic social structure and stark economic inequality, rather
than because of Spanish despotic rule. Hence, while the Spanish Governor-General in Manila
was unambiguously a despot, the political system of the archipelago was more accurately one of
decentralized despotism by local Filipino elites. 60
The second myth, which was accepted as truth by the Schurman Commission (although
through no fault of the ilustrados) was that "the most encouraging feature in the difficult
problem we have undertaken in the Philippines is the perfect coincidence between the theory and
60 Greg Bankoff, "Big Fish in Small Ponds: The Exercise of Power in a Nineteenth-century Philippine
Municipality," Modern Asian Studies 26.4 (1992): 679-700; Brian Fegan, "The Social History of a Central Luzon
Barrio," in Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C.
de Jesus (Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982): 91-129; Glenn Anthony May, "Civil Ritual
and Political Reality: Municipal Elections in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Philippine Colonial Democracy, ed.
Ruby R. Paredes (Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989), pp. 13-22; Norman G. Owen, "The
Principalia in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898," Philippine Studies 22 (1974): 297-324; Dean C.
Worcester, The Philippine Islands and Their People (New York: Macmillan, 1899), pp. 132-36.
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practice of our government on the one hand, and the aspirations and ideals of the Filipinos on the
other."6' It was indeed certainly the case that ilustrados had repeatedly expressed their desire for
liberalizing reforms since the late nineteenth century. However, as Julian Go cogently displays in
his analysis of ilustrado political discourse, the meaning that they attached to terms such as
"liberty" was different from that of American colonial reformers. When ilustrados called for
liberalizing reforms under the Spanish regime, they had in mind the establishment of a proper
system of reciprocity between rulers and the ruled-that is, a mutually beneficial system of
patron-client exchanges, where ilustrados would serve as political representatives of the Filipino
people. Liberty was not a matter of individual rights, but a state achieved at the communal level
when subjects were rewarded for their loyalty and service. 6 2 Therefore, when Americans
introduced local elections (in 1901), as a method of practical training in democracy, it was
interpreted by Filipino elites as recognition of their loyalty to the American regime and as
permission to buttress their existing clientelistic networks under American auspices.63
The third and final myth, which most significantly affected America's pacification effort,
was that Aguinaldo and his lieutenants had only the backing of a small minority of the Filipino
people, and the ilustrados were the true and natural leaders of the Filipino nation. The ilustrados
were in fact late participants in the 1896 Filipino Revolution into which the United States
intervened in 1898. While Aguinaldo and other regional elites engaged in a futile struggle
against superior Spanish forces, the ilustrados initially remained allied to the Spanish colonial
61 Schurman, et al., Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, vol. 1, p. 85.
62 Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto
Rico during U.S. Colonialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 98-105. For a similar analysis, see also
Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., American Institutions in the Philippines, 1898-1941 (Quezon City, P.I.: R. P. Garcia
Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 21-23.
63 Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order': The Structure and Supervision of Local Government During
the Taft Era," in Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule, ed. Norman Owen (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), pp. 24-25; Go, American
Empire and the Politics of Meaning, pp. 122-30.
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regime in Manila. They had little interest in supporting a revolution that was seemingly on its
path toward failure. It was only after American forces intervened in the revolution, and defeated
the Spanish armada in the 1898 Battle of Manila Bay, that the ilustrados enthusiastically joined
Aguinaldo and members of the principalia class to form a unified Filipino government in
Malolos. 64 If the ilustrados were the last to join, they were the first to defect upon learning of the
annexationist intentions of the United States. 65 Yet, even as the ilustrados abandoned the
revolutionary cause, support for Aguinaldo did not wane among the principales, for Aguinaldo
had successfully cultivated ties with local elites throughout the archipelago prior to the opening
of hostilities between U.S. and Filipino forces in February 1899. As towns were liberated from
Spanish control by the revolutionary army, municipal elections took place immediately,
returning to office precisely those individuals who had held positions in local government under
the Spanish. Moreover, in order to secure the support of principales throughout the archipelago,
Aguinaldo granted them considerable autonomy in the management of municipal affairs.
Schurman and his fellow commissioners were not the only ones ignorant of the actual
situation on the ground. Maj. Gen. Otis, although having served in the Philippines since summer
of 1898, was also very much a victim of the general lack of information and of the deliberate
misinformation of the ilustrados. Based on the testimonies of ilustrado elites, Otis' military
strategy was a combination of relentless pursuit of Aguinaldo's conventional forces (with the
aim of defeating the "Tagalog insurrection") and of attracting the support of local elites through
64 Michael Cullinane, ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Quezon City, P.I.:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 8-48; Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Provincial and Municipal Elites of
Luzon During the Revolution, 1898-1902," in Philippine Social History, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus
(Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), pp. 155-70; John A. Larkin, The Pampangans:
Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 103-28; Resil B.
Mojares, War Against the Americans: Resistance and Collaboration in Cebu, 1899-1906 (Quezon City, P.I.: Ateneo
de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 5-16; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule,
1901-1913 (Quezon City, P.I.: New Day Publishers, 1968), pp. 4-21.
65 Miller, "Benevolent Assimilation," pp. 3 8-55; Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the
United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 58-60.
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display of American benevolence. Misled by the ilustrados, Otis came to believe that the only
thing that prevented Filipino elites from accepting U.S. sovereignty was Aguinaldo's propaganda
against the American regime.66 Not only would the U.S. military engage and defeat Aguinaldo's
forces on the battlefield, but it would also devote equal energy to civil affairs, like building roads
and bridges, enforcing hygienic codes, and providing primary education to the local population.
It was hoped that through these acts, Filipinos would come to understand the benevolent
intentions of the Americans, and realize that rumors of American maliciousness were untrue.67
Therefore, despite objections from his field commanders, Otis dispersed his army into small
garrisons throughout the archipelago, and instructed his officers to assist Filipinos in providing
much needed public goods and services. 68 Once towns were "liberated" from insurgent control,
township governments were organized under military auspices and existing municipal officials
were retained and embraced as partners. 69
As the U.S. military advanced outward from Manila, it became evident that a more
coherent framework for municipal organization was needed. To this end, Otis' first plan for local
governance (drafted by Col. William Kobb6) was implemented on July 31, 1899, as General
Order (G.O.) 43. The underlying assumption of G.O. 43 was that the municipal laws of the
Spanish were wisely framed, but had been corruptly administered by the Spanish colonial
government. Therefore, in organizing municipal governments, Spanish decrees and customs
66 As the Schurman Commission reported in 1900, "[The Schurman Commission] early became convinced that the
Tagalog rebellion was due to the ambitions of a few and the misunderstanding of the many." Schurman, Report of
the Philippine Commission to the President, vol. 1, p. 3. Calder6n was particularly instrumental in presenting the
thesis that America would have little trouble winning the "hearts and minds" of the Filipinos. For Calder6n's
testimony, see Schurman, Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, vol. 2, pp. 67-70.
67 Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 30-31.
68 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 108-12; Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 139-59; Kenneth Young, The General's
General: The Life and Times ofArthur MacArthur (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 249-50.
69 Kramer, The Blood of Government, p. 112.
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were to be retained as much as possible.70 The most important, and perhaps only, innovation of
G.O. 43 was the expansion of the electorate. While under the Spanish regime, the franchise only
extended to members of the principalia, G.O. 43 allowed for the town-at-large to elect the
presidente (as the gobernadorcillo was now called). 71 However, this liberal (and potentially
socially transformative) provision was reversed when G.O. 40 (drafted by Cayetano Arellano, a
prominent ilustrado and future Philippine Chief Justice) replaced G.O. 43 on March 29, 1900.
Under G.O. 40, the electorate was limited to men over 23 years of age, who had one of the
following qualifications: were municipal officeholders under the Spanish regime, paid 30 pesos
in taxes annually, or were fluent in either English or Spanish.7 2 Nonetheless, while both G.O. 43
and 40 created a system of Filipino local rule, Otis did not intend to give the Filipinos a free hand
in managing their affairs. U.S. military officers approved election results, supervised the conduct
of municipal councils, and were authorized to organize townships without reference to either
G.O. 43 or 40, if necessary. 73 Although Otis had underestimated the degree of popular support
Aguinaldo had attained, he was much too cautious, and generally distrustful of the Filipinos, to
believe that they would behave according to American wishes without sufficient supervision.
70 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, p. 88; William Kobb6, "Circular Letter," 8 August 1899, Folder p. 164-204, Vol.
17, Dean C. Worcester Papers, Special Collections Library.
7' Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, p. 89; The full text of G.O. 43 can be found in Eswell S. Otis, Report of Major-
General E.S. Otis, U.S. Volunteers, on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1899), pp. 144-45.
72 Enoch H. Crowder, "Report of the Military Secretary," in Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur,
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Impact ofAmerican Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), pp. 44-45.
73 Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 200-01. The autonomy granted to local military officers, however, led to
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the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 33-37; William Howard
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officer on his experience with organizing and administering local governments, see Arlington Betts, "Memoirs of
Captain A. U. Betts," in Recollections of the American Regime, ed. Arlington Betts, et al. (Manila: Historical
Conservation Society, 1973), pp. 19-2 1.
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Meanwhile, the military aspect of the pacification campaign had the appearance of
success by the time G.O. 40 was implemented. Aguinaldo's conventional forces were defeated in
November 1899 and insurgent activity had largely ended (for the time being) in the early months
of 1900.74 Confident of military success, Otis handed over his command to Maj. Gen. Arthur
MacArthur on May 5, 1900, and returned home to a hero's welcome. Judging that the military
campaign was largely over (based on Otis' reports), McKinley appointed a second Philippine
Commission, headed by Taft, to replace the U.S. military as the new executive and legislative
body on the islands.75 By June, Taft and his fellow commissioners had arrived in the Philippines
and reported to Secretary Root that the insurrection was practically over, except in a few Tagalog
strongholds.76
Nonetheless, not all U.S. military officials agreed with Otis' sunny prognosis, and
MacArthur in particular was far less sanguine. Much of Aguinaldo's military leadership
remained at large. 77 Reports were coming in that Filipino revolutionaries were in the process of
regrouping, and were preparing to intensify attacks against the American forces with the aim of
swaying the outcome of the 1900 U.S. presidential election. 8 MacArthur, nonetheless, at first
clung to the hope that a display of "benevolence" could alone prove sufficient to end the war, for
he understood that the American public (and hence politicians in Washington) would be uneasy
with aggressive anti-insurgency measures.79 On June 21, 1900, MacArthur issued a "Notice of
Amnesty" to Filipino insurgents as a final push for peace. However, his amnesty proclamation
fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, although there was some increase in the number of surrenders
74 For an example of Otis' optimistic reports, see Elwell S. Otis to Henry C. Corbin, 26 June 1899, Folder p. 124-
163, Vol. 17, Worcester Papers, Special Collections Library.
75 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, pp. 148-49; Young, The General's General, p. 262.
76 Taft to Root, 14 July 1900, Reel 640, Taft, Papers.
77 Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 187, 209-11.
78 John M. Gates, "Philippine Guerillas, American Anti-imperialists, and the Election of 1900," Pacific Historical
Review 46.1 (1977), pp. 58-59.
79 Taft to Root, 31 November 1900, Reel 463, Taft, Papers.
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following McKinley's reelection in November, the revolutionary leadership remained committed
to resisting the occupation, and sporadic ambush of American columns continued. The insurgents
could not deal a serious blow to the U.S. forces, but the death toll mounted.80
It had become abundantly apparent to MacArthur by the end of 1900 that Otis' policy of
"attraction," in its present form, was failing. Ilustrado assurances that principales would quickly
switch allegiance from Aguinaldo to the American regime were discovered to be untrue. As
MacArthur reported, "[M]ost towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal
governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American governments,
and in many instances through the same personnel." While cooperating with the U.S. military in
the building of roads, the opening of schools, and the enforcing of hygienic codes during the day,
many "pacified" towns furnished supplies and provided places of refuge for insurgents at night.
"In other words," MacArthur wrote, "the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation
and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities." When chased by
U.S. forces, insurgents would disband, and with local assistance were "transformed into the
appearance of a peaceful native . MacArthur came to realize that the revolutionaries were
more widely supported by the Filipino people than had been imagined initially. He reasoned that
it was certainly the case that many principales and villagers cooperated with the insurgents out
of intimidation and the threat of assassination, "but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to
account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One
traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex organization."81
80 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, pp. 171-76; Arthur MacArthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur
MacArthur, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila: [s.n.], 1900), pp. 1-21;
Young, The General's General, pp. 265-66.
81 MacArthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, vol. 1, 1900, pp. 5-6. This assessment was
largely based on Lt. William T. Johnston's May 21, 1900 report, titled "Investigation into the Methods Adopted by
the Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a Guerrilla Force." Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in
the Philippine War, pp. 40-43, 124-26.
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On December 20, 1900 (with McKinley safely reelected), MacArthur announced his new
counter-insurgency strategy; simply put, those who refused American "benevolence" would be
severely punished.82 To this end, all individuals suspected of aiding the insurgency were tried by
a military tribunal, and insurgents captured in civilian clothes no longer received the privileges
afforded to prisoners of war.83 Since guerrilla warfare could only be sustained through the
cooperation of the principales, measures that directly threatened the wellbeing of local elites
were formally sanctioned. When principales were found aiding the insurgents, their crops were
destroyed and their houses burned; they also faced the threat of imprisonment and deportation. In
addition, the number of garrisons was increased from 400 before the campaign to 502 within a
few months, so that security could be adequately provided to Filipino collaborators. The system
of intelligence gathering was revamped, and a robust network of spies and informants was
established. "Water cure" (which involved forcing gallons of water into the victim's stomach)
was now widely used to obtain information. MacArthur also increased the number of native
troops (known as the Scouts) and began organizing municipal police forces to bolster the security
of the garrisoned towns, and to support the Army's intelligence operations. U.S. troops, now
reaching 70,000 men in number, were continuously deployed on a relentless offensive campaign
in order to exhaust and starve the guerrilla forces into submission. 84
8 For the full text of MacArthur's December 20, 1900 proclamation, see Arthur MacArthur, Annual Report of
Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Army, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila: [s.n.]:
1901), pp. 6-9. The anti-insurgent tactics outlined in the proclamation had already been in use by many local
commanders by the time MacArthur announced its implementation. In the First District of the Department of
Northern Luzon, officers had published and circulated on June 15, 1900 the sections of G.O. 100 (written in 1863)
that authorized harsh treatment of spies, rebels, traitors, and prisoners of war during irregular (guerrilla) warfare.
Nonetheless, MacArthur's December 20 proclamation officially sanctioned the anti-insurgent measures already in
use and allowed officers to increase pressure on the local population through measures such as reconcentration. It
also had the effect of sending a strong and clear message to principales all over the archipelago. Linn, The US.
Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, pp. 42-61.
83 Accordingly, in the three months following this pronouncement, 79 Filipinos were hanged.
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Most controversially, the use of "reconcentration" was authorized. Under this policy, a
select number of municipalities were designated as safe zones and heavily guarded by U.S.
troops. All inhabitants in the region were ordered to relocate to one of the reconcentrated towns,
and were allowed to leave only when accompanied by troops. Harbors were closed and all trade
between municipalities ceased. Outside of the reconcentrated towns, soldiers were allowed to
shoot indiscriminately at all adult males and destroy crops as they pleased. This policy not only
cut off the insurgents from their source of food and shelter, but also made life unbearable for
both ordinary Filipinos and principales alike. The mortality rate skyrocketed from lack of food
and unsanitary conditions. Although clearly inhumane, the strategy proved highly effective and
compelled both insurgents and their principales supporters to yearn for peace.
On March 15, 1901, the United States scored its first and most important victory in the
counter-insurgency campaign when Mariano Trias (commander of revolutionary forces in the
Tagalog heartland of Southern Luzon) came to terms with the United States, thus triggering a
rush of insurgent surrenders, as seen in Figure 1. Aguinaldo's capture on March 28 delivered a
further blow to the insurgency. Soon thereafter, Manuel Tinio in northern Luzon (April 29), Juan
Cailles in Laguna (June 24), Vito Belarmino in Albay (July 4), and Juan Climaco in Cebu
(September 26) laid down their arms. 86 By the end of 1901, the only major military commanders
left in the field were Vicente Lukbain in Samar and Miguel Malvar in Batangas. Lukbin, widely
known and feared for orchestrating the annihilation of the 74-man garrison in Balangiga, was the
Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, pp. 143-47; Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 208-16; Young, The General's
General, pp. 280-81.
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first to capitulate. Sick and malnourished, he was captured on February 18, 1902.87 Malvar and
his men survived several more months of battering by Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell (who, as the
Army's most skilled counter-insurgency tactician, was transferred from his command in northern
Luzon to Batangas), but with his soldiers starving, his ammunition depleted, his wife ill with a
newborn child, and his people crammed into disease-ridden reconcentrated towns, Malvar finally
surrendered on April 16.88 Although sporadic fighting continued for the next few years, the
Filipino-American War was practically over with more than 4,000 Americans and an estimated
50,000 Filipino soldiers dead. 89
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Source: Arthur MacArthur, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Army, Commanding, Division
of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila: [s.n.]: 1901), pp. 77-85. Data does not include small surrenders or instances when
the names of surrendering officers were not given.
The problem with MacArthur's counter-insurgency success, however, was that it did not
follow the accepted storyline of Republican policymakers back in Washington. Filipinos were
87 Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 310-21.
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supposed to have welcomed Americans as liberators and emancipators, not resisted them to the
point of needing to be coerced into submission. Everything MacArthur and his men learned in
the course of the military campaign was therefore to be purposefully forgotten, so that the myths
eloquently articulated by Lodge and Beveridge in the halls of Congress, substantiated by
Schurman's investigative commission, and encapsulated in Root's Instructions to Taft could be
maintained. When U.S. lives were no longer at stake, it again became permissible to invent
convenient truths that appealed to U.S. domestic politics, rather than to face harsh realities on the
ground. Draconian counter-insurgency tactics were needed to subdue Filipino revolutionaries,
because Aguinaldo's "insurrection" was in fact a widely supported independence movement, and
because Filipino elites had little interest in welcoming America's "civilizing mission." Yet, the
account presented by the Republican administration (now led by President Roosevelt after
McKinley's assassination) and its allies was that the insurgent army led by Aguinaldo prolonged
the insurrection by terrorizing the Filipino people into cooperation. Since Aguinaldo and his men
had largely been captured or killed, liberated Filipinos could express their "true" preference for
American benevolent rule. It was now up to Taft, as the Republican administration's loyal
representative in the archipelago, to make sure that America's state-building mission would at
least take on the appearance of this preferred reality.
First, and most consequentially, Taft undid the delicate balance of autonomy and
supervision Otis and MacArthur had constructed in Filipino municipalities by extricating
military involvement in civil affairs. Although MacArthur had hoped that heavy military
presence in the archipelago would continue for the foreseeable future in order to consolidate
141
American rule, this proposition proved simply untenable in Washington. 90 The Army Bill of
February 1899, which created a 65,000-strong regular army, as well as a 35,000-men volunteer
army for service in the Philippines, had generated considerable debate among senators across
party lines. Senator George Vest, most prominently, noted how strange it was that if U.S. forces
were in the Philippines as liberators and emancipators (as argued by the administration and its
allies just a few weeks prior), the President would need "100,000 missionaries with rifles to
shoot his good resolution into effect."9' Ultimately, the bill passed 55 to 13, but it was not
without a crucial amendment by Senator Francis Cockrell making the enlargement of the army
into a temporary measure to expire in July 1901.92 When a new army bill was introduced in early
1901 (to replace the 1899 bill), members from both the House and Senate again wondered why
such a large army was needed. 93
Hence, it was clear to the administration that political necessities demanded that the de-
escalation of U.S. military involvement in the islands happen sooner rather than later. The
administration could not keep asking Congress for more troops if it was to effectively hold anti-
imperialist challenges at bay. Enough forces would be supplied to American generals for their
military campaign, but the army would not be available to play a role in governing the "pacified"
regions of the archipelago. Any hint of coercive military rule was out of the question if domestic
support for the occupation was to be maintained. Consequently, as early as February 26, 1901
(that is, even before the surrender of prominent "insurrecto" generals), Root made it clear to
90 For an account of the dispute between MacArthur and Taft on the establishment of civil rule, see Ralph Eldin
Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," Ohio Historical
Quarterly 70.4 (1961): 308-31. Note that this article is heavily biased in supporting Taft's perspective on the matter.
91 "Senate for Army Increase," New York Times 28 February 1899: 5.
92 bid.
93 Frank Hindman Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison: Center for
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Filipino War was declared to be over, President Roosevelt ordered to fix U.S. military strength at the 1901 bill's
minimum of 56,989. "Reduction of the Army," New York Times 25 October 1902: 8.
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Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee (who was to succeed MacArthur later in the year) that it was his
intention to establish civil (colonial) government under Taft as quickly as possible "because we
wish the army to avoid the prejudice which always arises when military government is too long
continued, and because we want to get the Army out of the governing business and get its
officers back to the performance of their proper function as soldiers." 94 As reports of atrocities
by U.S. military personnel against Filipino civilians filled the press, and as inquiries regarding
American (mis)conduct in the archipelago were demanded by Congressmen, Root understood
that the patience of the American public was quickly running out.95
Operating under Root's Instructions, Taft and his fellow members of the Second
Philippine Commission immediately took to the task of drafting new laws for the organization of
local governments, once legislative duties were transferred from MacArthur's military regime to
the Taft Commission in September 1900.96 The act for the organization of municipal government
(completed in January 1901) was far more detailed than G.O. 40, specifying various rights and
94 Root to Chaffee, 26 February 1901, Reel 640, Taft, Papers.
95 For reports of abuses by military officers, see George K. Hunter to Taft, 16 May 1900 and 4 June 1900, Reel 30,
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96 The Philippine Commission operated as the sole law-making body of the U.S. colonial government before the
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duties of the presidente and the municipal council under the new system. Comprised of nine
chapters and one-hundred and five sections, the act described the lawful process through which
presidentes were to be elected (largely following the system under G.O. 40), the duties of the
presidente, the type of taxes that should be collected and the ends to which they should be used,
and how the finance of the municipalities should be maintained and audited, among other topics.
The act even came with an appendix listing all of the official forms presidentes and municipal
councils were expected to fill out and submit to higher authorities as they performed their duties.
The passage of this act was followed by an act for the organization of provincial governments
that, while a much shorter document with "only" twenty-three sections, was still far more
complex than any previous legislation designed to set up a system of governance in the islands. 97
The primary difference between this new system of local and provincial government in
comparison to the system under the U.S. military (other than their sheer length and complexity),
was that supervision over municipal governments was to be conducted entirely at the provincial
level by the governor and the provincial board. It was the duty of the governors (many of whom
were Filipino) to tour municipalities under their jurisdiction every year in order to ascertain that
local officials were performing their duties as rnandated by law. Meanwhile, provincial treasurers
(who were all initially American) were to make sure that the finances of each municipality were
in sound condition. This was in stark contrast to the local governmental system under the U.S.
military, where commanders of the 500-some garrisons kept a close and constant eye on the
performance ofpresidentes and municipal councils. 98 Under the new system, clear instances of
corruption and electoral fraud were certainly punished by American authorities in Manila, but
97 These acts can be found as Act No. 83 and 84 in Division of Insular Affairs, Public Laws and Resolutions Passed
by the United States Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1901), pp. 133-77.
98 For a review of the system of local government from the Spanish to the American era, see Jos6 P. Laurel, Local
Government in the Philippine Islands (Manila: La Pilarica Press, 1926).
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without direct intervention by U.S. officials, it was difficult to compel local elites to enforce new
American rules and regulations in education, road maintenance, health and hygiene, and such. In
this way, outside of Manila and the principal cities of major provinces, Filipinos were largely left
to their own devices. While Americans dominated policymaking in Manila, Filipinos were now
fully in control of their own hearts and minds everywhere else in the archipelago. 99
Consequently, the new governance system of the American regime (especially at the
municipal level) came to be characterized by a dualistic institutional order, where the way in
which Filipino elites actually behaved had little resemblance to how they were supposed to act
under the newly instituted laws and regulations. The new municipal and provincial acts were
certainly popular among the principalia class (for it assured them significant local autonomy),
but as these laws were designed without any appreciation of the prevailing clientelistic social
order (where completing cliques of landed elites ruled as petty despots over dependent peasants),
they hardly functioned as intended by Arnerican colonial officials. Simply parachuting in a new
set of "enlightened" laws was not about to change the entrenched system of clientelistic rule.
More than anything else, the new laws simply became a method through which Americans could
belittle the political competence of Filipino elites by applying a standard of efficient and
upstanding political behavior that did not even exist in American cities (with their political
bosses and gangs) at the time. 100
99 Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order'; Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National
Development (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 264-77; Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politicos,
and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913," The
Journal ofAsian Studies 59.2 (2000): 277-306; Larkin, The Pampangans, pp. 140-43.
100 In an effort to differentiate "bossism" that existed in American cities with the prevailing system of clientelism in
the Philippines, colonial officials determined that what they observed in the archipelago was a distinctly Filipino
system called "caciquism." According to James LeRoy (a scholar-administrator, who served as Taft's personal
secretary in the Philippines), caciquism could be best understood in the following manner: "Imagine a rural
community, secure in the political dominion of one selectman, or of one or two families of selectmen, and at the
social wink and nod of the unofficial manor-house; but picture that sort of local leadership set in a community where
only two, four, or twelve families out of a population of ten thousand or more live in stone houses with wood floors,
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4. The Occupational Administration as a Subordinated Agent
It did not take long for Taft and fellow American Commissioners to realize that their
system of local rule, which they had established with such haste in 1901, was not functioning as
intended. For example, as shown in Table 1, fifty to sixty cases of fraud, negligence of duty,
abuse of authority, and other major and minor crimes were charged against presidentes on a
yearly basis between 1904 and 1913.101 While already a high number (given that there were
approximately seven to eight hundred local governments), this likely represented only a small
fraction of the actual abuses that took place, for the type of acts considered illegal by American
authorities were often accepted as a fact of life by Filipinos. The widespread practice of
collecting "voluntary contributions" is a case in point. While these contributions were ostensibly
collected to provide for public goods and services, much of it ended up in the pockets of the
presidentes. Peasants, nonetheless, made these contributions dutifully, as a similar form of
informal taxation was levied during the Spanish period.10 2 Furthermore, while municipalities
were given responsibility for providing primary and intermediate education, American colonial
agents quickly discovered that this was beyond their means.' 03 Municipalities also failed to
provide safe roads, thereby hampering commercial activity.104 Finally, presidentes showed little
desire or aptitude for enforcing sanitary codes, even after the devastating cholera epidemic of
and the rest in cane shacks, dependent upon those above them for employment, or a piece of land to till, or the
money advances inevitably needed each year to till it; finally, transfer your manor to the tropics, where fertility of
soil and enervation of climate breed laziness and inertia, above and below in society, and you may have some
conception of what caciquism is in Philippine village life." James A. LeRoy, Philippine Life in Town and Country
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), pp. 172-73.
101 Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order'," pp. 54-55. For more data on abuses by municipal officials, see pp.
52-53, 56-58.
102 Thomas Cary Welch, "Memorandum regarding Voluntary Contributions," in WPC, Folder 26, Vol. 1; Go,
American Empire and the Politics of Meaning, pp. 1 23-24. See also, "Record in the matter of the charges against
Nicholas de los Reyes, Justice of Peace, Catarman, Samar, for partiality, arbitrariness and abuse of power," in WPC,
Folder 38, Vol. 1.
03 W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 431-32.
04 Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, 31 May 1909, Vol. 3, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, p. 159.
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1902-1904 had demonstrated the need for such.' In sum, as Glenn Anthony May writes, "From
the outset, the experiment in political education appeared to founder, and what foundered most of
all was the attempt to establish efficient municipal governments." 10 6
Table 1: Charges Brought Against Municipal and Township Officials, 1904-1913
1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
Charges against 58 51 55 NA NA 64 67 54 51 50Presidentes
Charges against all 186 203 212 182 318 321 338 252 230 152local officials
No. of municipal
and township 706 651 679 695 720 762 789 NA 808 825
governments
No. of municipal
and township 11,333 10,783 10,842 11,438 11,842 12,356 12,519 12,793 12,315 13,435
officers
Sources: Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order': The Structure and Supervision of Local Government
During the Taft Era," in Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule, ed. Norman
Owen (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), pp. 52-55. For
data on the number of local governments and municipal officials, see the reports of the Executive Secretary (Bureau)
for years 1904-1913 in Annual Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1900-1916).
As a remedy to this situation, the Commission undertook a series of reforms starting in
1903. First, municipal treasurers were made members of the civil service, to be appointed by the
American provincial treasurer. Provincial boards were also given the duty to review municipal
ordinances and annul any acts by the municipal government found detrimental to American
interests. Meanwhile, Manila's control over provincial governments was strengthened by giving
the Executive Bureau (which had the dual role of the Governor-General's secretariat and the
'05 Commissioner Dean Worcester noted, "Towns which had temporarily been put in decent sanitary conditions
[following the epidemic] relapsed to their original state of uncleanliness ... A large majority [of the presidentes]
apparently viewed the situation with complete indifference contenting themselves with making ... the inspection
trips required by law without any real, determined effort to improve sanitary conditions." Dean C. Worcester, A
History of Asiatic Cholera in the Philippine Islands (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908), p. 94.
06 May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, pp. 41-42.
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interior ministry) the authority to review all legislation passed by provincial boards, as well as
the task of investigating and punishing suspected acts of corruption and electoral fraud. Most
importantly, in 1905, the duty of supervising provincial treasurers was transferred from the
Insular Treasurer to the Executive Bureau to streamline Manila's control over local government.
Yet, despite these efforts, there was a limit to what the one or two Americans within the
provincial boards (lacking in both resources and information) could do to adequately monitor
and supervise the conduct of the presidentes and their associates. While the Executive Bureau
could ascertain whether or not the laws passed by provincial governments (as well as municipal
councils) accorded with those passed by the Philippine Commission, the bureau did not have the
manpower to actually inspect whether local officials acted in compliance with these laws.10 7
Frustrated with its inability to compel Filipino compliance to new rules and regulations, the
Commission ultimately decided to transfer key functions from municipalities and provincial
governments to local branches of the central bureaucracy starting in 1906. Maintenance of both
public works and public health thus became the duty of respective American district officers of
the Bureau of Public Works and Bureau of Health.' 0" Although the financing of primary
education was initially seen as a rightful responsibility of municipal governments, it was now
almost entirely undertaken by Manila.'0 9
To some extent, these centralizing reforms were effective: superior roads were being built
by the Bureau of Public Works, and the Bureau of Health did a better job at controlling the
spread of cholera than did the provincial governments. However, none of these reforms actually
107 Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order'," pp. 21-25; Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politics, and
Provincial Lords," pp. 286-88; Laurel, Local Government in the Philippine Islands, pp. 199-210;
18 Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politics, and Provincial Lords," pp. 290-88.
109 While township governments in the United States were responsible for approximately seventy-three percent of
the total educational expenditure in 1913, the figure was less than fourteen percent in the Philippines (where it was
supposedly modeled on the American system). Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of
the Philippine Islands (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925), p. 588.
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addressed the root problem of the new institutional order-namely, the existence of a dualistic
system of formal American institutions co-existing alongside, but not interacting with, informal
Filipino ones." 0 In effect, U.S. colonial reformers simply abandoned their efforts to improve
local governance, and instead focused their energies on directly providing public goodsand
services to a small segment of the Filipino population. As long as new roads, schools, and
hospitals were being built, the colonial administration could report to the Secretary of War and
Congress that the United States was indeed governing over the Filipinos with "benevolence."]
In order to have truly tackled the problem of local governance by uprooting corruption and
punishing misconduct by municipal officials, the colonial administration would have had to
significantly curtail Filipino local autonomy and place elected Filipino municipal officials under
direct American supervision. However, even if such a policy were feasible, it would have been
politically and ideologically unacceptable to policymakers in Washington. Such actions would
have transformed (or at least appeared to transform) America into a European-style empire by
replacing "benevolence" with naked coercion. 12 On the other hand, to have recognized
clientelism as a key characteristic of Filipino politics, and to have created a more coherent
institutional structure by directly linking new American political institutions with existing
Filipino ones was impermissible. If the "uncivilized" ways of the Filipinos were legitimated,
110 Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order'," p. 38; Larkin, The Pampangans, pp. 132-35. For "caciquism" in
practice, see W. Cameron Forbes, 25 November 1904, Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, Vol. 1, Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, pp. 107-08; Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 278-80; Dean C. Worcester, The
Philippines Past and Present, ed. Joseph Ralston Hayden (New York: Macmillan, 1930), pp. 587-88.
"' For example, see Governor-General Forbes' "Progress Barometer" in Forbes, The Philippine Islands, vol. 2, pp.
459-66.
112 Clymer, "Humanitarian Imperialism," p. 515; Norman G. Owen, "Introduction: Philippine Society and American
Colonialism," in Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule, ed. Norman Owen (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), pp. 5-6. Bandholtz (soon
to be appointed as Chief of the Philippine Constabulary), for example, complained to his friend John Bruce that "our
form of government is not highly adapted to handling colonies, especially at such a great distance as the Philippines
are from America. Our philanthropists get most distorted ideas of what should be done in such cases and the
politicians are invariably influenced by these ideas ... In Mindanao, the Moro Province, where the government is
more paternal, there is more downright prosperity than in any other place in the Islands (1)." Bandholtz to John E.
Bruce, 16 February 1907, Reel 1, Bandholtz Papers.
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America's raison d'etre for exercising sovereignty over the Philippines would be lost, providing
fodder to the anti-imperialists.11 3
The constraints placed upon colonial agents by policymakers in Washington were
considerable, disallowing any deviation from the administration's policy as originally articulated
in Root's Instructions, andfaithfully followed by successive Republican administrations and
their allies in Congress."4 First, the U.S. Congress possessed the authority to directly legislate
over Philippine matters, as well as place limits on the type and content of laws that the Philippine
Commission could draft for the islands. Consequently, the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
which defined the powers and duties of the Insular Government (as America's colonial regime in
the Philippines came to be known), was a comprehensive bill consisting of eighty-eight sections
on the following topics: commercial relations, citizenship and immigration, rights and liberties,
political participation, judiciary, navigation, public lands, forestry, mining, bond issuance,
granting of franchises, business activity, coinage, treasury, and accounting. The Organic Act was
significant not only for its breadth, but also for its content. In light of concerns by such anti-
imperialists as Senator Joseph Rawlins that American capital would be used for investment
opportunities (provided by the American occupation) to exploit the islands, the bill placed strict
limitations on what the Insular Government could do to promote business activity in the
3 Gleeck, American Institutions in the Philippines, pp. 33-34. As David P. Barrows (Director of Bureau of
Education) critically noted, "Doubtless to many Americans at the beginning, assimilation seemed the desirable and
logical outcome but this expectation at no time led to the adoption of measures calculated to force the Philippines
along lines uncongenial to their racial aptitude. There is a difference between offering to a colonial people like the
Filipinos, the choice of what are judged to be the best of our own ideas and institutions and compelling such
selection, and this difference has been observed in the Philippines." Barrows to Taft, 5 August 1907, Folder Jan-Dec
1907, Box I (Outgoing Correspondence), David P. Barrows Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley. Frustration regarding the strategy of "benevolent assimilation" is palpable in early correspondences by W.
Cameron Forbes (the newly appointed Secretary of Commerce and Police) to his friends and superiors after his
arrival in the Philippines. See, for example, Forbes to Henry Higginson, 13 February 1905; Forbes to Theodore
Roosevelt, 28 February 1905; Forbes to Leonard Wood, 22 April 1905, Outgoing Correspondence, Vol. 2, W.
Cameron Forbes Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge.
114 For an overview of the American colonial system, see Lanny Thompson, "The Imperial Republic: A Comparison
of the Insular Territories under U.S. Domain after 1898," Pacific Historical Review 71.4 (2002): 535-74.
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Philippines. It is debatable whether the resulting restrictions on mining, forestry, public lands,
and franchises had a positive effect on the long-term economic development of the islands. Yet,
the bill unambiguously succeeded in making it apparent that the Philippines would be governed
according to concerns and interests within the United States, whether or not this was beneficial to
the Filipinos themselves. 115
Furthermore, the lawmaking authority of Congress had the important effect of greatly
strengthening the hand of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA), which (under the direct
management of the War Secretary) was the primary entity overseeing the day-to-day behavior of
the Insular Government. The BIA was organized on July 1, 1902 with Clarence Edwards as its
first chief, but its origin dates back to 1898, when the Department of War assigned officers to
sort and redirect various information and data concerning tariff and revenue matters coming in
from Cuba. In anticipation of the occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines (in addition to
Cuba), it was determined that a formal organization was needed not only to assess incoming
data, but also to more broadly regulate relations between the United States and its new territories.
The Division of Customs and Insular Affairs was thus created within the Department of War on
January 1, 1899, and later reorganized into the Division of Insular Affairs on December 10,
1900. This was expanded and renamed the Bureau of Insular Affairs under the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902 and came to be comprised of the following divisions: Correspondence,
115 For a critique of excessive intervention by Congress in Philippine affairs, see Julian Go, "The Chains of Empire:
State Building and 'Political Education' in Puerto Rico and the Philippines," in The American Colonial State in the
Philippines: Global Perspectives, ed. Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp.
197-201; May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, pp. 4-5. For a detailed analysis of the Organic Act, see Golay,
Face of Empire, pp. 78-89. The Philippine Organic Act is reproduced as "An Act Temporarily to Provide for the
Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes," 57th Cong.,
1st sess. (1 July 1902), ch. 1369, U.S. Statutes at Large 32 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903): 691-712. For Rawlins'
concerns regarding exploitation, see Senator Rawlins on civil government for the Philippine Islands, U.S. Senate,
Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess. (22 April 1902): 4522-28. Finally, a good illustration of the type of
issues requiring Congressional legislation is "Legislative Needs of the Philippine Islands," undated, Philippine Data:
Political, Vol. 1, Forbes Papers, pp. 208-09.
151
Record, Compilation and Cuban Records, Statistical, Accounting, Philippine Insurgent Captured
Records, and the Purchasing and Disbursing Division. To ensure that the BIA acted in
accordance with the priorities of the administration, it was placed directly under the control of
the Secretary of War.1 16
The primary method by which the BIA exercised its power over the Insular Government
was through its routine function as a "clearinghouse for all questions as between the government
of the Philippine Islands and the government of the United States."" 7 When heads of bureaus or
departments within the Insular Government needed anything from supplies to personnel, they
obtained them through the BIA. Thus, the BIA could block the implementation of any policy or
program needing permission or support from Washington by bureaucratic fiat."'8 More
significantly, however, was that whenever Congressional legislation was required by the Insular
Government to implement a newly proposed program, it was the law officer within the BIA that
played a prominent role in drafting the Executive's legislative proposal (to submit to Congress)
by selectively incorporating suggestions by the Insular Government."19 Conversely, the law
officer evaluated the legislative proposals of the Philippine Commission (at least the more
important or controversial ones) to ascertain that they were in accordance with American laws
and precedents." For example, when disputes over land ownership between the Catholic Church
and municipal governments led to agitation and violence, Governor-General Wright could not
116 Romeo V. Cruz, America's ColonialDesk and the Philippines, 1898-1934 (Quezon City, P.I.: University of the
Philippines Press, 1974), pp. 23-43; Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," p. 244.
117 Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," p. 244.
"8 For an illustration, see Forbes, 18 May 1907, Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, Vol. 2, p. 227; Forbes, 30 October
1907, Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, Vol. 2, p. 338.
"9 The most important legislation that the BIA created was the Philippine Organic Act of 1902. For the BIA's role
in this matter, see Edwards to Allen, 5 January 1902, Folder 1, Box 2, Edwards Papers; "Draft of Bill for an Act to
Provide for the Administration of Government in the Philippines, etc.," in Correspondences of the Philippine
Commission, Compiled 1900 and 1906, Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 350, The U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park.
120 Cruz, America's Colonial Desk and the Philippines, pp. 56-65, 99-104; Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of
Insular Affairs," pp. 247-48.
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move to solve the crisis until his policy regarding the matter (which was to let the Philippine
courts adjudicate the dispute) was first reviewed and approved by Charles Magoon, the BIA's
law officer at the time. Given the importance placed by President Roosevelt in courting the
Catholic vote (within the United States), it was imperative that the issue be thoroughly vetted by
policymakers in Washington before Wright could take any action.m
In this way, although the BIA did not directly formulate policy, it served as the eyes and
ears of the Secretary of War, and helped to ensure that successive Governor-Generals followed
the administration's overall state-building strategy and its domestic political priorities. As Root
explained to Henry Cooper (Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs), the BIA "is
the only thing which enables us to keep our hands at all on the government of our distant
possessions ... the successful conduct of this Bureau is essential to secure efficiency and
accountability in insular government, and to keep the Government in Washington, both
Legislative and Executive, always informed of what is going on."m Precisely for this reason, the
BIA, and especially its chief, was at times the target of scorn by American colonial officials.
"That fool Edwards is always scenting some mischief or some fuss," James LeRoy (who served
as Taft's private secretary in the Philippines) lamented. "The mistakes and blunders that bureau
makes could hardly be increased in number by deliberate effort. They are always trying to
121 Cruz, America's Colonial Desk and the Philippines, p. 118; Wright to Taft, 13 April 1904, Folder 16, Box 3,
Edwards Papers; Wright to Taft, 27 April 1904, Folder 17, Box 3, Edwards Papers; Wright to Taft, 15 June 1904,
Folder 20, Box 3, Edwards Papers. Any dispute involving the Catholic Church attracted the most careful
consideration by the law officer during the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, given the desire by both
McKinley and Roosevelt to court the Catholic vote. See, for example, John Ireland to Charles E. Magoon, 28 June
1902, Folder 5, Box 2, Edwards Papers; Edwards to Wright, 16 January 1904, Folder 14, Box 3, Edwards Papers;
Thomas A. Hendrick to Roosevelt, 30 September 1904, Folder 9, Box 4, Edwards Papers; Wright to Taft, 14
October 1904, Folder 11, Box 4, Edwards Papers; Edwards to Wright, 6 July 1902, Reel 36, Taft, Papers; Taft to
Henry C. Ide, 22 January 1906, Reel 487, Taft, Papers; LeRoy to Barrows, 21 June 1906, Box 21, Barrows Papers.
22 Root to Henry A. Cooper, 25 January 1905, Folder 4, Box 5, Edwards Papers. To this end, BIA Chief Edwards
even intervened in personnel matters concerning high-ranking officials in the Insular Government. See Edwards to
Taft, 23 December 1908, Folder 13, Box 7, Edwards Papers; Edwards to Jacob M. Dickinson, 14 October 1909,
Folder 19, Box 7, Edwards Papers.
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influence or forestall 'public opinion', and they always succeed in poking up a row."123
Constantly under the watchful eye of the BIA, colonial administrators were thus compelled to
continually justify their actions to their superiors at home, and in doing so, were conditioned to
faithfully follow Washington's priorities.124
The third and most important factor that helped to maintain Washington's control over
Philippine affairs was the subordination of the Governor-General to the Secretary of War. As
discussed above, it was hard for America's colonial agents to escape the BIA's watchful eyes,
since most new policy initiatives of the Philippine Commission (which became the archipelago's
legislative body in September 1900) necessitated support by the BIA in the form of supplies,
personnel, or Congressional legislation. Another source of formal oversight was the Philippine
auditor, who, while stationed in the Philippines, reported directly to the Secretary of War. 2 1
American civilians in Manila and Filipino collaborators also served as useful and reliable
informants, for they did not hesitate to write to the Secretary when they found the policies of the
Commission to be disagreeable.126 Finally, it was customary for the Governor-General to pen a
detailed unofficial report once or twice a month to keep the Secretary well informed of matters
within the islands, as well as to discuss any initiatives that were under consideration by the
Commission. The mere act of writing these reports led to considerable self-restraint on the part
of the Governor-General, but in instances where there were any hint of disagreement between the
123 LeRoy to Barrows, 21 June 1906, Box 21, Barrows Papers.
124 This dynamic is illustrated in a letter from Forbes to Edwards, 28 June 1910, Confidential Letter-File, Vol. 1,
Forbes Papers.12s Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government, pp. 121-22; Root to Taft, 7 January 1901,
Reel 47, Taft, Papers.
126 For illustrative examples, see Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, pp. 167-72; Frederick Z.
Rooker to Edwards, 28 March 1904, Folder 15, Box 3, Edwards Papers; Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 4 September 1905,
Reel 52, Taft, Papers.
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Governor and the Secretary, the latter did not hesitate to rebuke the former, thus keeping his
colonial agent in line.127
Opium legislation in the Philippines serves as a clear example of this dynamic. Many
evangelical Protestant clergymen and laypersons (who were among the Republican Party's core
supporters) viewed America's annexation of the Philippines as an act of Providence, and
wholeheartedly accepted the conviction of the "white man's burden." As such, they closely
monitored the actions of the Insular Government and made sure that its actions were justifiable
in the eyes of God.128 Given their self-proclaimed role as guardians of American morality in the
Philippines, the Protestant churches and missions immediately took note of the Philippine
Commission's opium policy. Under Spanish rule, the import of opium had been legal and was
regulated by a system of state-sponsored monopolies. When the United States took over, this
system of opium monopolies was abolished, but the drug itself remained legal, its distribution
instead regulated through tariffs. However, this tariff-based system encouraged smuggling and,
in 1903, the Commission proposed a reintroduction of opium monopolies to more effectively tax
and regulate the drug. Upon learning that the Commission's proposal would directly involve the
United States in the distribution of opium, Christian leaders immediately lobbied the Roosevelt
administration against this measure. So strong was the outrage displayed by religious groups that
Root ordered Taft to shelve the Commission's opium proposal and instead draft a plan for its
prohibition. As the Commission hesitated to adopt such a radical course, Washington stepped in
to directly solve the crisis. At the suggestion of the Executive, Congress determined on March 3,
1905 that opium would become illegal in the Philippines in three year's time. The Insular
127 This custom started with Taft. The first of such lengthy unofficial reports was Taft to Root, 14 July 1900, Reel
640, Taft, Papers.
128 Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, pp. 154-57.
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Government was thus left to figure out how it could possibly carry out this policy when the drug
was traded legally in the rest of Southeast Asia.12 9
The Insular Government's inability to exercise discretionary power was also caused by its
weakness as a bureaucratic organization. 3 0 In the first place, the Governor-General, members of
the Philippine Commission, and secretaries of executive departments of the Philippines were all
political appointees without set terms, whose careers depended entirely on the continued support
of the War Secretary and the President. Moreover, Philippine colonial officials-even those
appointed to the post of Governor-General-tended to be plucked out of obscurity, and hence
possessed little political leverage of their own in Washington. If they crossed either the Secretary
of War or the President, there were no political networks or bureaucratic organizations within
Washington to come to their defense. Governor-Generals, despite their immense responsibility,
were therefore easily disposable. 3 1 As shown in Table 2, between 1901 and 1913, the following
individuals served as Governor-General: Taft, Luke Wright, Henry Ide, James Smith, and W.
Cameron Forbes. Taft, although he went on to an illustrious career, was a little-known circuit
court justice with no experience in politics prior to his appointment to head the second Philippine
129 Ibid., p. 167; Anne L. Foster, "Models for Governing: Opium and Colonial Policies in Southeast Asia, 1898-
1910," in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, ed. Julian Go and Anne L. Foster
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003): 92-117. As Taft wrote to Root, "Your telegrams with respect to the Opium
bill do not surprise me. I feel very sure that the opium bill would do good, and it would bring us a good revenue, but
it is difficult to reconcile the religious people of the United States to any system which in the slightest degree
recognizes the fact that opium is smoked in spite of whatever prohibition is sought to be imposed. We shall comply
with your request and hear the public discussion, and then not decide the question until we have heard your
judgment [emphasis mine]." Taft to Root, 15 June 1903, Box 165A, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. See also Root to Taft, 10 August 1903, Reel 40, Taft, Papers; Taft to
Wright, 8 January 1905, Reel 492, Taft, Papers; Taft to Wright, 1 March 1905, Reel 492, Taft, Papers; Taft to
Wright, 23 June 1905, Reel 493, Taft, Papers; Taft to Edwards, 16 July 1907, Reel 491, Taft, Papers. These letters
and cables also demonstrate that after Taft succeeded Root as Secretary of War, he abandoned his previous pro-
opium stance, and fully embraced the view that opium should be prohibited in the Philippines.
130 For a theoretical discussion of how bureaucratic structure affects the principal-agent relationship, see Andrew B.
Whitford, "Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics 14.2 (2002):
167-93.
"31 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Quezon City, P.I.: Institute of Public Administration,
University of the Philippines, 1957), p. 163; Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime, pp. 496-97;
Ruby R. Paredes, "The Origin of National Politics: Taft and the Partido Federal," in Philippine Colonial
Democracy, ed. Ruby R. Paredes (Quezon City, P.1.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989), pp. 45-47.
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Commission. 132 As for the others, Wright was a former attorney general in private practice, Ide
the Chief Justice of Samoa, Smith a soldier turned Philippine provincial governor, and Forbes a
rich businessman bitten by the colonial bug.m3 In short, these were not the kind of men destined
to be remembered by history prior to their service in the Philippines, and (with the exception of
Taft) they led undistinguished careers thereafter.
Table 2: Governor-Generals of the Philippine Islands, 1901-1913
Employment prior to the Other positions held in the Length of tenure as Government employment
Philippines Philippines Governor-General (Civil after the Philippines
Governor before 1905)
William H. Taft Justice, U.S. Court of Commissioner (1900- July 4, 1901 to January Secretary of War (1904-
Appeals for the Sixth 1904); President of 31, 1904 1908); President of the
Circuit Philippine Commission United States (1909-
(1900-1901) 1913); Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (1921-
1930)
Luke E. Wright Lawyer in private practice Commissioner (1900- February 1, 1904 to April Ambassador to Japan
1906); 1, 1906 (1906-1907); Secretary of
Secretary of Commerce War (1908-1909)
and Police (1901-1904)
Henry C. Ide Supreme Court Justice of Commissioner (1900- April 2, 1906 to Ambassador to Spain
Samoa 1906); September 19, 1906 (1909-1913)
Secretary of Finance and
Justice (1901-1906)
James F. Smith Lawyer in private practice Govemor of Negros September 20, 1906 to Justice of the Court of
(1899-1901); Justice of November 10, 1909 Customs Appeals (1910-
the Philippine Supreme 1928)
Court (1901-1 903);
Commissioner (1903-
1909); Secretary of Public
Instruction (1903-1906)
W. Cameron Forbes Executive in a consulting Commissioner (1904- November 11, 1909 to Ambassador to Japan
firm 1913); Secretary of August 23, 1913 (1930-1932)
Commerce and Police
(1904-1909)
Sources: Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in the Philippines:
Proconsuls, Nation-Builders and Politicians (Quezon City, Phil.: New Day Publishers, 1986); Philippines,
Handbook on the Executive Departments of the Government of the Philippine Islands (Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1912).
32 For an account of Taft's career, see Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939).
133 Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in the Philippines: Proconsuls,
Nation-builders and Politicians (Quezon City, P.I.: New Day Publishers, 1986).
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The incident that most vividly illustrates the complete subordination of the Insular
Government to the Secretary of War was the 1906 dismissal of Governor-General Wright by
Taft, who had succeeded Root as Secretary of War in 1904. During his tenure as the Philippine
Civil Governor, Taft labored faithfully to implement Root's policy as laid out in the Instructions.
As Taft left for the United States on December 23, 1903 to become Secretary of War, he did not
remain in the islands long enough to sufficiently evaluate the outcome of his efforts, and to
appreciate the inherent contradiction in America's state-building agenda.13 4 It was during
Wright's governor-generalship that American colonial agents were able to assess more fully the
effects of their early reform efforts, and the prognosis was hardly encouraging. The primary
problem, as discussed above, was the complete incompetence of municipal governments in the
provision of basic public goods and services, such as roads, education, and health and sanitation.
It seemed that the only thing at which presidentes excelled was in enriching their friends,
families, and themselves. Since local governments were supposed to serve as the backbone of the
new Philippine nation-state (and the site for political education), their failure to function as
envisioned-that is, like early New England towns-was a cause of great concern.m
Furthermore, while the leaders of the revolutionary army had all surrendered by 1902, the Insular
Government was having difficulty maintaining peace, as armed bands continued to engage in
acts of violence throughout the archipelago, and particularly in the provinces of Batangas,
134 Gleeck, The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in the Philippines, pp. 5-33; Pringle, The
Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vol. 1, pp. 181-255; Helen Harron (Mrs. William Howard) Taft,
Recollections ofFull Years (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1914), pp. 91-273; Daniel R. Williams, The
Odyssey of the Philippine Commission (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1913).
135 For a detailed account of the state of provincial and municipal governments during the governorship of Wright,
see the third through fifth annual reports of the Executive Secretary, which cover the period from October 1, 1903 to
June 30, 1906. These reports can be found under the title, Annual Report of the Executive Secretary of the Philippine
Islands to the Honorable Governor-General, and are all published by the Bureau of Printing in Manila.
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Cavite, and Samar.' 36 These problems were exacerbated by the fact that the Insular Government
was short on funds. The inefficient Spanish taxation system remained unreformed, and American
authorities were having difficulty paying for the various programs meant to uplift the Filipinos,
while also maintaining peace and security on the islands.1 37
In order to address these problems, Wright first instructed Ide (Secretary of Finance and
Justice) to oversee a comprehensive reform of the internal revenue system.1 38 Second, he placed
Forbes (Secretary of Police and Commerce) in charge of a committee to reorganize the
bureaucratic organization of the Insular Government, with the aims of reducing waste and
increasing its effectiveness at directly providing the goods and services that had so far been
neglected by local governments. 139 Third, as shown in Table 3, Wright increased the number of
Americans in the Philippine Civil Service as part of his effort to strengthen the bureaucratic arm
of the colonial government. Fourth, he tightened Manila's grip over provincial and municipal
governments by expanding the functions and the jurisdiction of the Philippine Executive Bureau
to include supervision of the provincial treasury, in addition to its existing mandate of overseeing
local elections and reviewing provincial and municipal acts and ordinances. Finally, Wright
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in provinces with continued insurgent activity, and
condoned the aggressive "peacekeeping" tactics of the Philippine Constabulary (the national
136 Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 130-42.
m The problem of revenue shortage was repeatedly the source of complaint by Forbes. See, for example, Forbes'
journal entries on 25 August 1904, Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, Vol. 1, p. 53. This shortage of funds was also a
result of the Insular Government's inability to issue bonds without Congressional legislation. See Wright to Taft, 13
April 1904, Folder 16, Box 3, Edwards Papers.
138 For the text of the internal revenue law (Act 1189), see U.S. Department of War, Acts of the Philippine
Commission (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), pp. 319-69. The new internal revenue law is explained by John S.
Hord (who was its principal author) in "Internal Taxation in the Philippines," Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science 25.1 (1907): 1-45.
139 The committee's recommendation can be found in the Forbes Papers under the heading, Report of Committee on
Organization of the Insular Government. The resulting law was passed by the Philippine Commission on October
26, 1905, as Act 1407. See U.S. Department of War, Acts of the Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1905), pp. 239-60.
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paramilitary police), which included the harassment ofprincipales and ilustrados suspected of
sympathizing with the rebels.140
Table 3: Separations of Americans from the Philippine Civil Service, 1903-1913
Fiscal Year No. of Americans in No. of Americans Separated
(ending on Jun 30) Service on Jan 1 Voluntary Involuntary Total
1903 2,777 617 269 886
1904 3,228 787 313 1,100
1905 3,307 614 195 809
1906 no data
1907 2,616 536 90 626
1908 2,479 407 77 484
1909 2,659 376 62 438
1910 2,633 508 92 600
1911 2,633 481 71 552
1912 2,680 412 50 462
1913 2,623 461 44 505
Source: Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Quezon City, Phil.: Institute of Public
Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), p. 178.
In undertaking these reforms, however, Wright clashed with high-ranking Filipino
collaborators, such as Trinidad Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda, both of whom served on the
Philippine Commission alongside Wright. The increasing American presence in the bureaucracy,
as well as the general strengthening of the bureaucratic arm of the state, were perceived by
Filipino elites as measures meant to slow progress toward Filipino self-government. The new tax
law placed a greater financial burden on the provincial and municipal authorities by instituting a
system of land taxes, as well as on leading ilustrados, who possessed business interests that were
hurt by taxes on tobacco and alcohol. Their greatest source of dissatisfaction, however, was the
aggressiveness of the Constabulary in combating the insurgency. In particular, Pardo de Tavera
and Legarda were outraged by the fact that the Constabulary had arrested their dear friend and
fellow ilustrado, Pedro Roxas, who was suspected of aiding the rebellion in Batangas. They thus
140 Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order'," pp. 22-23; Gleeck, The American Governors-General and High
Commissioners in the Philippines, pp. 33-57; Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial
Lords," pp. 288-90; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 130-42.
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lost no time in complaining to Taft regarding the new policies instituted by Wright, as well as in
making the general case that Wright was deviating from Root and Taft's policy of
"benevolence." 41 In one letter, Pardo de Tavera even taunted, "Dont [sic] you believe that with
this precedent another governor could suppose himself free to follow whatever policy he might
choose, supposing that he would be supported in Washington ... ?",142 These letters ultimately
proved effective. In August 1905, Taft returned to the Philippines for a month-long tour to
evaluate the situation himself, and concluded that Wright had indeed strayed from the path laid
down by Root.143 Soon thereafter, Wright was forced to tender his resignation and to accept the
humiliation of demotion to an ambassadorship in Tokyo. The dismissal of Wright sent a clear
message to all Americans in the Philippines that anyone suspected of abandoning the
administration's state-building policy would be dismissed mercilessly.144
Finally, it was not just the Governor-Generals who were compelled to constantly worry
about pleasing their superiors at home. Since Americans were employed in the Philippine Civil
Service (and not the U.S. Federal Service), and since their employment in the Philippines was
seen as temporary (that is, until the Filipinos were ready for self-government), there was little job
'4' Legarda to Taft, 29 November 1904, Folder 16, Box 4, Edwards Papers; Pardo de Tavera and Legarda to Taft, 22
December 1904, Folder 17, Box 4, Edwards Papers; Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 17 April 1905, Folder 17, Box 5,
Edwards Papers; Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 1 July 1905, Folder 17, Box 5, Edwards Papers; Legarda to Taft, 28
February 1905, Reel 48, Taft, Papers.
142 Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 4 September 1905, Reel 52, Taft, Papers.
143 For an account of this inspection trip by Taft, see LeRoy, "Manuscripts of Travelogue Account of Trip to the
Philippine Islands," 1905, Box 1, James A. LeRoy Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor.
144 Upon hearing of Wright's dismissal, Ide wrote to Taft, "The remark in one of your cablegrams that you were
greatly delighted in the changed sentiment and to know that I agreed with your policy is very satisfactory to me,
except so far as it implies that you had had some doubts as to whether I had agreed with your policy. There are no
reasons, Mr. Secretary, why you ever should have had such a doubt. I never have had any other view and have
always regarded your large and wise method as the only practicable and finally successful one of dealing with the
Philippine problem and the Filipino people [emphasis mine]. The policy of attraction must be pursued if we are to
be successful. ... But while I was in a subordinate position, it was an unfitting thing for me to be declaring policies
and undertaking to take the lead in entertainments and methods of administration. It was the duty of my chief
[Wright] to perform those functions, and mine loyally to support him, as I have always done ... " Ide to Taft, 4
February 1906, Reel 55, Taft, Papers, p. 17. Ide, however, seemed to be in sincere agreement with Wright prior to
Taft's intervention.
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security for Americans at all levels in the Insular Government. In addition, Americans working
in the Philippine Service did not receive pensions upon their retirement and were not assured
reemployment in the U.S. Federal Service after returning from the islands.14 5 As such, American
colonial agents faced the grim reality that they could be forced to return to the United States at
any moment and find themselves jobless and without pension in the middle of their careers. For
this reason, most colonial officials stayed in close contact with their patrons in the United States,
as is apparent from the correspondences of David Barrows (Director of Education), Victor Heiser
(Director of Health), and Frank Lamson-Scribner (Director of Agriculture) with, respectively,
Benjamin Wheeler (President of University of California, Berkeley), Walter Wyman (U.S.
Surgeon General), and James Wilson (U.S. Secretary of Agriculture).14 6 Colonial agents were
thus always on the lookout for opportunities at home and did not hesitate to end their service in
the Philippines the moment that something more permanent arose in the United States.14 7 Hence,
as Table 3 (above) displays, the turnover of American officials in the Philippine Service was
high. This not only weakened the cohesiveness of the colonial bureaucracy, but also led to a
14s Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines, pp. 177-81. This was the constant source of complaint by Executive
Secretary Arthur W. Fergusson in his annual reports. See, for example, Fourth Annual Report of the Executive
Secretary of the Philippine Islands to the Honorable Governor-General (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906), pp. 25-
28.
146 These correspondences can be found in the collected papers of Barrows (at University of California, Berkeley),
Heiser (at the American Philosophical Society), and Lamson-Scribner (at the Library of Congress). Correspondences
between Lamson-Scribner and Wilson are particularly illuminating. In once instance, Wilson wrote, "I think
attention should be given [in the Philippines] to things we can not grow [in the United States]. The people are likely
to run off in the direction of producing sugar. We can do that here, and will eventually produce all we require.
Fibers, coffee, rubber, spices, and such things we can not produce, should really have most attention." Wilson to
Lamson-Scribner, 17 October 1903, Box 3, Frank Lamson-Scribner Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
'47 See, for example, Morgan Shuster (the Insular Collector of Customs) to Taft: "The recent press notices of the
expected passage of the bill for the reorganization of our Consular Service have decided my course. I am very
desirous of obtaining, if possible, a suitable appointment in that branch of the Government ... The fact that I am not
so young as I was eight years since [coming to the Philippines], coupled with the apparent uncertainty attending the
situation and future of those in the Insular Service here, leads me to believe that one having my family
responsibilities should endeavor to enter some more permanent line of work, wherein certain special conditions are
fulfilled. These I take to be the following: - permancy [sic] of the work; the entire elimination of what is commonly
known as 'politics'; the establishment of the merit system; adequate compensation; and above all, a chance to rise in
that or into some other service." Shuster to Taft, 28 April 1906, Reel 57, Taft, Papers, pp. 1-2.
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constant inflow of individuals with little knowledge of the Philippines, not to mention the
frequent departure of those that had finally obtained some understanding of the situation.14 8
5. Conclusion
Ultimately, to have a state-making agenda in the Philippine Islands was much more
important to the McKinley and succeeding administrations than to have tangibly succeeded in
this mission. With the Filipino revolution defeated and the islands under firm U.S. control, the
actual progress of the reform effort was inconsequential to U.S. domestic politics or diplomatic
relations. What would have been detrimental to U.S. interests was not the failure to remake the
archipelago into a prosperous democracy, but the abandonment of the promise to Congress and
the American people that the reason for the occupation was the transformation of the Filipinos in
the American image. What the administration in Washington wished to prevent was the raising
of any questions about U.S. "benevolent" intentions in the Philippines, or the deprival of the
raison d'etre for a large American civilian and military presence in the islands.
Yet, this fact alone cannot explain the failure to establish a functional governance
structure in the Philippine Islands. As institution-building under foreign occupations is conducted
through delegation, how a reform effort unfolds is dependent upon the nature of the relationship
between the home government that initiated the reforms and the occupational administration
tasked with their implementation. Ironically, state-building in the Philippines failed because the
pursuit of democratization and liberalization there became an important issue in U.S. domestic
politics, and because Washington was highly effective in keeping its agents focused on this goal.
148 Elliott, The Philippines to the End of Commission Government, p. 126; Peter W. Stanley, "'The Voice of
Worcester is the Voice of God': How One American Found Fulfillment in the Philippines," in Reappraising an
Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History, ed. Peter W. Stanley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984), p. 124; Visitacion R. De la Torre, History of the Philippine Civil Service (Quezon City, P.I.:
New Day Publishers, 1986), pp. 64-65.
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Consequently, the fundamental incongruence of pursuing democratizing and liberalizing reforms
by empowering undemocratic and illiberal native elites remained unresolved, for agents did not
have the flexibility to deviate from the initial institution-building strategy as devised by
Secretary Root and sanctioned by Congress. New laws granting considerable local autonomy to
provincial and municipal governments were promulgated without taking into account how they
would fit into the prevailing system of clientelism.
In this way, state-building fails when reform agents are constrained from above. What
remains to be discussed, however, is the way by which native elites may also affect the process
of establishing new institutions in an occupied territory. Although the system of local
government in the Philippine Islands was largely dysfunctional-that is, local governments
failed to perform according to the expectations of colonial agents-laws pertaining to provincial
and municipal organizations were themselves popular among Filipino elites. Indeed, it is likely
that the passage of these acts contributed to pacification efforts, as it assured local elites
considerable autonomy in managing their affairs. It was in fact quite remarkable that local
elections were held in an orderly fashion as early as 1902 (a year after municipal and provincial
governments were organized, while resistance continued in various parts of the archipelago) and,
moreover, that elected officials displayed loyalty to the United States.
This outcome did not occur by chance. Maj. Gen. Otis was quite aware that the only way
the United States was going to pacify the islands was to gain the cooperation of local and
provincial elites. Hence, G.O. 40 was written with the assistance of the Filipino elites to ensure
that it would be widely supported. Similarly, Taft's provincial and municipal organization acts
were vetted against Filipino members of the Commission and subjected to public hearings. The
realization of Root's democratization and decentralization plan proceeded quickly and smoothly
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(at least on the surface) largely because native elite demands for local autonomy coincided with
America's federal tradition, and the importance placed on local governmental units as a "school"
for democracy.
The coincidence in the goals of American policymakers and the demands of Filipino
elites did not pertain to other key institutional areas, however. In reforming the police and
education institutions, for instance, the initial model proposed by colonial agents threatened to
undermine the existing power structure of the Philippine Islands. As I argue in the following
chapters, when the agenda of the occupiers and the interests of native elites conflict (which is
most often the case), effective and durable institutions are more likely to arise when native elites
possess the will and capacity to resist the reform effort. Paradoxically, when institutional reform
is undertaken within the context of a foreign occupation, conflict between the local population
and foreign reformers during the initial period contributes to the establishment of successful
institutions in the long-run.
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Chapter 4: Police Reform in Colonial Taiwan versus the Philippines
Institutional Hybridity and the Effectiveness of Institutions
1. Introduction
The U.S. institution-building effort in colonial Philippines (1898-1935) is commonly
depicted as a resounding failure, and for good reasons.2 As a result of America's aggressive
education campaign there, postwar Philippines was littered with publically funded primary
schools, but they were largely of poor quality and did little to improve the lot of those unable to
afford private education. Democratic institutions had been introduced as early as 1902 at the
municipal and provincial levels (and in 1907 at the national level), but after four decades of
democratic "tutelage," elections remained hopelessly corrupt, as rival families vied for political
office through bribery and intimidation. Instead of producing a more equitable distribution of
land ownership, U.S. land reform efforts contributed to the growth of large plantations and a
corresponding outburst of peasant discontent, culminating in the 1946 Hukbalahap (Huk)
Rebellion. Last but not least, the legacy of U.S. institution-building in the area of policing was to
give rise to a multitude of private militias that have since carved up parts of the archipelago into
personal fiefdoms. The Philippines now boasts the worst score in the area of internal security
among all East Asian countries in a comprehensive 2008 study on state weakness. 3
' The U.S. occupation of the Philippines lasted from 1898 to 1946, with a brief interlude between 1942 and 1945
(when the Philippines was under Japanese wartime occupation). Yet, after the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth in November 1935, U.S. colonial officials no longer took an active role in shaping domestic policy.
Thereafter, only actions that directly challenged U.S. interests in the Philippines were subject to a veto of the
Philippine High Commissioner.
2 For recent works that trace Philippine state failure in the postcolonial period to U.S. institution-building efforts, see
Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico
during U.S. Colonialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Paul D. Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The
Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and
Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Dan Slater, Ordering Power:
Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
3 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 2008). In this study, the degree of state weakness was measured by four indicators of
economy, politics, security, and social welfare, each of which was further comprised of five elements. Specifically,
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Notwithstanding the overall adverse legacy of U.S. colonization in the Philippine Islands,
some American institution-building efforts were more successful than others. Indeed, as shown
in the pages below, the new police institution created by American officials functioned with
much effectiveness during the period of U.S. occupation. The colonial police not only suppressed
a widely-supported insurrection in the first decade of U.S. rule, but it later became the political
linchpin that held together the entire governance system. Importantly, the police fulfilled this
role by functioning as the colonial regime's primary instrument for promoting inter-elite
collaboration between Americans and Filipinos, rather than through the excessive use of physical
violence. We are thus presented with a puzzle: Why did an institution that was so thoroughly
successful under colonial conditions fail so markedly in the postcolonial period?
A possible answer is that an institution designed to function effectively under an
illegitimate and oppressive form of government is naturally unsuited for an independent and
democratic nation-state. Such an explanation is most convincing when the Philippines is studied
in isolation. Excessive politicization, often regarded as a chief shortcoming of the police in
postcolonial Philippines, can be traced directly to the colonial police's role as the facilitator of
collaboration. Yet, things look different when compared to other post-colonial territories, such as
Taiwan. In Taiwan, as in the Philippines, the Japanese police were instrumental in defeating a
vigorous resistance; the colonial police in Taiwan also functioned as a political institution.
Involved in nearly every aspect of local administration, the police made collaboration between
the Japanese state and Taiwanese elites possible. Unlike in the Philippines, however, the
postcolonial legacy of the police institution in Taiwan was the bolstering of a strong bureaucratic
the "security basket," included measures of conflict intensity; gross human rights abuses; territory affected by
conflict; incidence of coups; and political stability and absence of violence. In all of these categories, except for
"incidence of coups," the Philippines was at the bottom 25 percentile of weak states.
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state, such that contemporary Taiwan now ranks among the safest and most stable territories in
all of Asia.
I argue that this variation in postcolonial legacies of Taiwanese and Philippine police
institutions can be explained by the specific ways in which existing and new institutions were
combined in the forging of colonial governance. First, local ownership bolsters the effectiveness
of new institutions: When a new institution is supported by elites possessing grass-root ties with
the local population, it is more likely enforced than institutions lacking such a foundation.
Specifically, in both Taiwan and the Philippines, the effectiveness of the police came to depend
on the assistance of landed elites, given their socioeconomic prominence within these agrarian
societies. This, however, was not something that was planned, or even desired, by respective
colonial administrators in Taiwan and the Philippines; rather, it was forced upon them as a result
of the strength of the insurrection. Reliance on local militias in a counter-insurgency campaign is
not without risk;4 it was only when all other options were exhausted that Japanese and American
administrators decided to integrate landed elites into the colonial police institution as partners.
Local ownership explains why police institutions in Taiwan and the Philippines were
similarly successful under colonial rule; it does not explain their contrasting postcolonial
legacies. For this, I turn to the concept of hybridity. In addition to being supported by local
powerholders, the police institution in Taiwan was a hybrid of a Japanese-style modem police
organization and a traditional Taiwanese system of coercion and surveillance called baojia. In
4 For example, the following passage can be found in The United States Army and Marine Corps, The U.S.
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manuel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007): "If militias are
outside the HN [host-nation] government's control, they can often be obstacles to ending an insurgency. Militias
may become more powerful than the HN government, particularly at the local level. They may also fuel the
insurgency and a precipitate [sic] a downward spiral into full-scale civil war (113)." By substituting the term "I-N
government" with "colonial administration," we have the exact dilemma Japanese and American colonial forces
faced in Taiwan and the Philippines, respectively. Indeed, when Japanese and U.S. officials first organized local
militias as an auxiliary force to the colonial army, they found that such militias cooperated with both government
forces and rebel groups.
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contrast, U.S. colonial officials reorganized the Spanish-era system of village-level militias
(cuerpo de cuadrilleros) as the municipal police, but then placed this local police organization
outside the Philippine Constabulary-centered national police structure. Unlike in Taiwan, the
police structure in colonial Philippines was dualistic. Consequently, while all legitimate forms of
coercion were integrated into a single institutional order in colonial Taiwan, the incoherence of
the Philippines police institution contributed to its weakness.
This outcome, however, was not a result of a lack of foresight on the part of American
colonial administrators, but was caused by their inability to undertake hybridizing reforms in the
face of constraints from above. From Washington's political calculus, the incorporation of the
municipal police into the national police structure contradicted America's ideal of local
autonomy, and endangered the carefully constructed myth of "benevolent rule." Japanese
politicians in Tokyo also held strong views on how institutions ought to be constructed in
Taiwan, but what they lacked (at least for the first two decades) was the ability to impose their
unrealistic vision onto their highly autonomous colonial agents. In the following pages, I contrast
these two tales of police reform in detail, concluding with further discussion on the role of agent
discretion and local resistance in the forging of effective institutions under foreign occupation.
2. Hybridic and with Local Ownership: Japanese Police Institution in Taiwan
Taiwan was Qing China's wild, wild east. It was a settler society, where Hokkienese
migrants from Fujian and Hakka from Guangdong fought one another as well as the aboriginal
headhunting tribes for control over agricultural land, which had become increasingly scarce and
valuable since the 1780s. Revolts against the Qing government and inter-ethnic "armed affrays"
(xiedou) were so frequent that a common saying in Taiwan held that at least one small rebellion
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occurred every three years and a major disturbance every five.5 Between 1840 and 1860, at least
four major outbreaks were recorded in the Hsinchu plain (roughly corresponding to current-day
Hsinchu City), which in fact was a relatively peaceful region within Taiwan. Contributing to this
frequent eruption of violence was the complexity of inter-ethnic relations combined with the
density of ties in each village community. Although the Hakka remained a cohesive group, the
Hokkienese were divided between those from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou
migrants were further sub-divided into ethnic categories of Anxi, Tongan, and Sanyi. Different
alliance combinations could be found among these groups, but in-group solidarity within these
ethnic communities was robustly enforced throughout the Qing era and even into the Japanese
colonial period. It wasn't until the 1920s, for example, that a marriage took place for the first
time between a woman from a Zhangzhou village in Hsinchu and a man from a neighboring
Anxi community, a mere fifteen minutes by foot.6
In this settler society, the state was weak and security scarce. The ranking Qing official in
Taiwan was a military commander, who maintained nominal government control over the island
through a professional army comprised almost entirely of men from the mainland. Although this
force was deployed during large-scale rebellions, day-to-day security was the responsibility (as
in mainland China) of a community-based self-defense unit called baojia, which typically
comprised around one thousand households. In addition to keeping local population records,
baojia (at least theoretically) was tasked with raising a local militia to protect rural settlements
against bandits and to keep city districts safe from organized crime. Yet, this system largely
5 Ino Yoshinori, Taiwan bunka shi [Cultural history of Taiwan], vol. I (Tokyo: Tk Shoin, 1928), p. 751.
6 Mark A. Allee, Law and Local Society in Late Imperial China: Northern Taiwan in the Nineteenth Century
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 31-37; Stevan Harrell, "From Xiedou to Yjun, the Decline of
Ethnicity in Northern Taiwan, 1885-1895," Late Imperial China 11.1 (1990): 99-127; Harry J. Lamley, "Subethnic
Rivalry in the Ch'ing Period," in The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, ed. Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981): 282-318.
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failed to function as intended, and interethnic conflict was endemic. To the chagrin of Qing
officials, local militias often went beyond self-defense to attack neighboring communities, and
would occasionally rebel against the state, if the state was found to be "excessively" intrusive in
local affairs or levy taxes that were "unreasonably" high.7
Hence, when Japanese conquerors landed in Taiwan in 1895, it was little surprise that
they struggled mightily to pacify the island. For some three-hundred years, the Taiwanese people
had resisted the state, and they were not about to change their ways without a fight. Yet, by 1902,
the western half of Taiwan, where the majority of the Taiwanese lived, was subjugated.
Although pacification of aboriginal tribes in the cast took longer, by 1915, they too had been
incorporated into the colonial governance structure. Moreover, the colonial state succeeded in
penetrating Taiwanese society to an unprecedented degree, both in comparison to Taiwan's own
historical record as a Chinese frontier province, as well as to other colonized societies around the
globe. Perhaps as surprising as this outcome was the way in which the Japanese achieved this
end: Rather than transplanting Japanese governance institutions to Taiwan, colonial officials
built from the bottom up. The very institution that failed to provide security under Qing China-
i.e., the baojia system-underpinned the entire governance structure under Japanese rule. In the
following pages, I explain how this was possible.
Central to my account is the concept of hybridity. Japanese success did not lie in simply
resurrecting an old institution, but in reinventing it. This reinvention, moreover, took a specific,
and what I call hybridic, form. Borrowing pieces from Taiwan's own past, from Japan itself, and
' Ching-chih Chen, "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945," Journal ofAsian
Studies 34.2 (1975), pp. 410-16; Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The
Traditional Order," Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 4.2 (1971),
pp. 503-06.
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even from eighteenth-century Prussia, Japanese administrators succeeding in constructing a
modem and effective police institution that continues to characterize contemporary Taiwan.
2.1. Initial Failures in Pacification and Institution-building
Governor-General Kabayama Sukenori encountered greater than expected resistance
when his expeditionary force landed in Taiwan in summer of 1895. Much of the resistance,
moreover, came not from the regular army of the newly declared Republic of Formosa
(comprised largely of mainland Chinese troops), but from local (irregular) forces led by
Taiwanese elites-elites who had but a few decades ago been fighting each other in a series of
interethnic feuds, but had now come together to repel the invaders.8 Consequently, opposing
forces hardly engaged in large-scale battles in open fields or over large cities, but rather, they
clashed in skirmishes alongside narrow roads surrounded by thick bamboo groves, or in towns
and villages that had been converted into small fortresses.9 Subjected to guerrilla warfare, the
Japanese struggled to distinguish between "insurgents," or villagers who actively aided the
resistance, and civilians that were simply caught between the warning forces.
Two contradictory depictions of Taiwanese villagers by James Davidson (who, as the
U.S. Consul in Taiwan, had accompanied the Japanese forces) illustrate the military situation the
Japanese encountered, as well as provide the growing sense of their frustration. On one hand,
Davidson acknowledges that many Taiwanese simply desire to stay out of harms way: "[T]hree
Japanese scouts entered Aulang [on August 11, 1895] without meeting any opposition. The
villagers informed the new arrivals that they had no desire of resisting the Japanese, and would
8 Harrell, "From Xiedou to Yjun, the Decline of Ethnicity in Northern Taiwan, 1885-1895"; Harry J. Lamley,
"Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray
A. Rubinstein (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 206.
9 James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial
Prospects (New York: Macmillan, 1903), pp. 328-30.
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be very grateful if they would take quick possession of the place, as it was feared the insurgents
would return."' 0 Yet, this image of peace-seeking Taiwanese peasants lies in stark contrast to
Davidson's more unsympathetic depiction of the local population-a characterization that likely
reflected the viewpoint of the Japanese army:
The greatest obstacle that the Japanese encountered was the smiling villagers who stood
in their doorways, over which they had flown a white flag, watching the troops pass by.
For these natives the Japanese had at first a kind word and a smile. But scarcely were the
troops out of sight before guns were brought out through the same doorways and shots
fired at the first unfortunate party whose numbers were sufficiently small to make it
appear safe to the treacherous occupants. Troops now return and find the mutilated bodies
of their companions in the streets; while at the doors and windows of the houses near, are
the same grinning friends and the same little white flag, an emblem of peace, still floating
over their guilty heads.'
This inability of the Japanese to distinguish between friend and foe, combined with the
constant ambushes, the heavy rain, the heat, and the rising death toll from infectious diseases,
brought out the worst in the invaders. Rather than attempting to win the "hearts and minds" of
the local population, or to secure key towns along the main corridors linking Taiwan's northern
and southern regions with garrisons (which would have required a larger occupational force), the
Japanese decided to burn to the ground those villages that had given them trouble.' 2 Perhaps the
Imperial Army also calculated that such acts of excessive violence would impress upon villagers
the consequences of aiding the resistance and compel them to assist the conquerors. The most
notorious of such acts of indiscriminate retaliation took place between June 16 and 22, 1896,
when thirty villages were destroyed by fire in response to an insurrection that broke out in the
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0 Ibid., p. 333.
Ibid., p. 323.
2 Ibid., pp. 329-30.
Yunlin Sub-district (in central Taiwan).' 3 As one classified Japanese document reported, "During
the punitive campaign, the number of bandits, implicated persons and suspected persons killed
was considerable, and private houses destroyed by fire actually exceeded three thousand." 4
However, rather than aiding the pacification effort, such acts of violence by the Japanese,
combined with their cruel treatment of the local population, simply drove many Taiwanese elites
who had initially taken an ambivalent stance toward the Japanese to resist the occupation.
Indeed, indiscriminate killing in the Yunlin Sub-district in June 1896 led to the capture of
virtually all urban centers in the area by rebel forces in early July. In another incident, the killing
of an influential leader in the town of Ilan (current day Yilan City) by Japanese military
officials-merely for his failure to pay a mining license fee-led to an insurrection in the
region.' 5 Indeed, such barbarous actions only aided the propaganda of rebel leaders, who
(according to Davidson) spread word that under the Governor-General's orders "all must pay
tribute to the Japanese, that not even the pig, dog, cat, goose, or chicken would be exempt from
taxation; and that the Chinese should not close their doors against the Japanese, but give freely to
the conquerors of all they had, even to the women [sic], who should be placed at the disposal of
the soldiers."' 6
Lt. Gen. Katsura Tar6, who replaced Admiral Kabayama Sukenori as Governor-General
of Taiwan on June 2, 1896, immediately recognized that abusive rule by the Imperial Army was
fueling further resistance. Particularly problematic was the fact that Army officers acted as local
administrators in pacified territories, and directed all hatred, resentment, and prejudice that they
had acquired during the counter-insurgency campaign toward the local population. Despite his
13 Ching-chih Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," Diss., Harvard University, 1973, pp.
34-36.
" Quotation found in ibid., p. 35.
"5 Ibid., pp. 30-31, 35-36.
16 Davidson, The Island of Formosa Past and Present, pp. 323-24.
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military background, establishment of civil administration thus became a priority of Katsura. He
also recognized that a hard line policy alone would not lead to a successful pacification effort;
friendly ties needed to be cultivated between local elites and the colonial administration, and the
establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful reintegration of former rebel leaders was a
prerequisite if they were to be convinced to surrender. Before Katsura had a chance to implement
these reforms, however, he was recalled to Tokyo a mere two months into his tenure to help
resolve a political crisis back at home. 7
His successor, Lt. Gen. Nogi Maresuke, sought to follow the policy laid down by Katsura
in some areas (such as the introduction of civil administration in the locality), but not in others
(such as the display of clemency toward insurgents who were willing to surrender). Nonetheless,
Nogi was convinced of the overall need to replace military rule with civil administration, and
undertook large-scale recruitment of Japanese police officers to serve in Taiwan. Under Nogi's
direction, police officers stationed in the localities were increased from a meager force of 726 in
1895 to 3,270 by the end of 1897, distributed among 84 police stations and numerous more
police branch stations.' 8 Nogi also sought to strengthen the local administration by replacing the
existing sub-districts (of which there were twelve) with 78 "management offices" (bemusho),
and by organizing "natural" Taiwanese towns and villages into official administrative units
headed by a Taiwanese town/village chief. Each management office, which was placed under the
jurisdiction of either a province (in the more developed western half of the island) or a district (in
the less developed areas) was further divided into three administrative sections: general affairs,
police affairs, and tax affairs. Of these three sections, the police affairs section was most
important, and in addition to its assigned tasks of maintaining security and public sanitation, it
"7 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 37-41.
18 Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan Sotokufu keisatsu enkakushi [A history of the Taiwan Government-
General police], vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan Sotokufu Keirnukyoku, 1933), p. 810.
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assisted the other two sections in performing their functions. In order to reduce military
involvement in civil administration, a final reform initiated by Nogi was the "triple-guard
system" (sandan keibi sei). Accordingly, Taiwan was divided into three security regions: the
mountain and forest zone, which was assigned to the military and gendarmerie; cities, towns, and
villages, which came under the jurisdiction of the civil police; and intermediate areas, where
police and gendarmerie were jointly responsible.' 9
These reforms, however, achieved none of the objectives of the colonial government. In
fact, the security situation slowly deteriorated under Nogi, even as the cost of administration
inched upward. Responsibilities of the police section within management offices and the local
police station overlapped, leading to confusion and redundancy. Management offices also proved
both expensive to maintain (as they were staffed by highly-paid Japanese bureaucrats) and
ineffective (as they were too small to undertake their assigned functions). The triple-guard
system did little to keep gendarmes out of civil administration, given ambiguities regarding the
category of the "intermediate" zone. Friction between the army and local civil administration
was thus common. The civil police also failed in their effort to obtain the trust of the local
population. Rapid expansion of the police force resulted in its ranks being filled by unqualified
Japanese individuals, who not only lacked general training in policing, but also knew neither the
dialects nor the customs of the Taiwanese people. Yet, little effort was made to rectify this
situation by providing Japanese policemen with rigorous language training or by recruiting
Taiwanese into the force. Finally, Nogi's uncompromising stance toward the insurgents-in
'9 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 158-59; Hiyama Yukio, "Taiwan tochi no
kikO kaikaku to kanki shinshuku mondai: Meiji 30-nen no Taiwan tochi [Reform of the Taiwan colonial
administration and the problem of bureaucratic discipline: colonial rule of Taiwan in 1897]," in Taiwan Sotokufu
monjo mokuroku, ed. Chfikyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyfijo, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yumani Shob6, 1995), pp. 326-3 1;
Muk6yama Hiroo, Nihon 1ochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi [A history of the national movement in Taiwan
under the Japanese rule] (Tokyo: Chi6 Keizai Kenkyaijo, 1987), pp. 123-25.
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particular, his refusal to grant clemency to surrendered rebels-strengthened the resolve of the
regime's opponents, who increased in number as the island's population continued to be
subjected to abuse by the various security forces.2 0
At the heart of the Nogi administration's failures was the belief that the Taiwanese could
be coerced into submission. Little energy was spent, therefore, on engaging Taiwanese elites and
incorporating them into the colonial governance structure. In turn, this had two adverse effects
on the development of effective institutions. First, Taiwanese elites were politically excluded.
Instead of partnering with town and village leaders to jointly govern Taiwan, Nogi attempted to
micromanage local administration through management offices, which were staffed by high-paid
Japanese bureaucrats with little knowledge of the local language, culture, and political networks.
Second, this reliance on the management office also led to the de facto segregation of traditional
Taiwanese institutions at the local level. Taiwanese towns and villages were officially
recognized as local administrative units, but were not linked to the management offices. Town
and village heads were simply expected to assist Japanese officials whenever their services were
called for. Self-defense associations (jiei kumiai)-inspired by the Qing-era baojia system-
were organized in towns and villages throughout Taiwan; however, while they received
instruction from the local police station, they remained outside the police hierarchy.
20 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 159-60; Yosabur6 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule
in Formosa, trans. George Braithwaite (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), pp. 144-45; E. Patricia
Tsurumi, "Taiwan Under Kodama Gentar6 and Goto Shimpei," Papers on Japan, Harvard University, East Asian
Research Center 4 (1967), pp. 97-100.
21 Nogi's attempt at appeasing the Taiwanese elites took the form of awarding them titles of shinsh6 ("gentlemen")
in recognition of their wealth, social status, or community service. Yet, such titles did little to endear the Japanese
colonial administration to the Taiwanese elites, as they did not involve any tangible economic or political benefits.
Harry J. Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915: A Study of Their Reactions to the
Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization, Diss., University of
Washington, 1964 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1965), p. 2 15 .
22 Hiyama, "Taiwan tochi no kiko kaikaku to kanki shinshuku mondai," pp. 326-31; Muk6yama, Nihon tochika ni
okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi, pp. 123-25; Suzuki Masuhito, "Taiwan no hoko seido [Taiwan's hoko5 system],"
Toshi mondai 39.5 (1944), pt. 1, pp. 4-5.
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In sum, the institutional order that emerged during the first three years of Japanese rule
was one that was both dualistic (in terms of the relationship between new and old institutions)
and lacking in local ownership. The cause of this was the incompetency of Nogi and his team.
By the start of Nogi's administration in August 1896, the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT)
had come to enjoy considerable autonomy from Tokyo, as a result of the passage of Law 63 and
the establishment of the military governor-general system (discussed in Ch. 2). Nogi thus had a
free hand to shape Taiwan's institutional order as he wished. Yet, lacking in both vision and
talent, his administration failed to make use of its autonomy to design institutions that were
appropriate for Taiwan. Nogi and his associates also failed to recognize that without active
cooperation from local elites, not only would the Japanese fail to prevail in the counter-
insurgency campaign, but any new institutions created by the Japanese would rest on a fragile
foundation. Nonetheless, the two preconditions for institution-building success under foreign
occupation-i.e., agent discretion and effective local resistance-were present. Indeed, with the
arrival of the talented Kodama Gentar6 and Got5 Shimpei in early 1898, Taiwan would soon be
transformed into the symbol of Japan's success in colonial administration.
2.11. Police Reform and Pacification under Kodama and Goto
By late 1897, the lack of any improvement in Taiwan's security condition, coupled with
high-profile corruption scandals within the GGT led to a collapse in Tokyo's confidence in the
Nogi administration. The situation in Taiwan was so dire that there were even calls to cut Japan's
losses by selling Taiwan to France. One-hundred million yen (or fifty million dollars) was
proposed as an appropriate price for the disease-infested and insurgent-ridden island. Taiwan,
however, had now become an integral component of the military's strategy of "northern defense
23 E. P. Tsururni, "Taiwan Under Kodama Gentar6 and Got6 Shimpei," pp. 100-101.
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and southern advance" (hokushu nanshin), and to lose Taiwan was out of the question for
Japanese leaders. In fact, rather than giving up on Taiwan, the Imperial Army leadership
redoubled its commitment by nominating Lt. Gen. Kodama Gentaro (a rising star within the
Army leadership and widely recognized as the military's top intellect and strategist) as
Governor-General in February 1898. Handpicked as Kodama's civilian counterpart was Got6
Shimpei, who was then a bureau chief within the Home Ministry, but had attracted the attention
of Katsura (now Army Minister), for his highly original and perceptive analysis of the opium
problem in Taiwan.25
Kodama and Goto's pacification and governance policy stood on two key pillars. First, as
Goto wrote in "Taiwan Thchi Kyfikyin An" (Rehabilitation of the Taiwan Administration), past
administrations failed because they disregarded native Taiwanese institutions of "self-rule"
(jichi),26 and overburdened Taiwan with a complex governance structure that followed Japanese
models. Second, Goto argued that the police-that is, the formal bureaucratic police organization
staffed predominantly by Japanese officials-should be placed at the center of the colonial
administration. Furthermore, the type of police institution most appropriate for Taiwan was not
the kind found in modern nation-states, but rather, one modeled on the "police prior to the
eighteenth century; that is, a police organization whose duties are wide-ranging." 27 Although
24 Oe Shinobu, "Yamagata-kei to shokuminchi bundan tochi [The Yamagata clique and military rule in the
colonies]," in Iwanami koza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami series on modem Japan and its colonies], ed. Oe
Shinobu, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 3-15; Tokutomi Soho, K5shaku Katsura Tard den [Biography
of Prince Katsura Taro], vol. 1 (Hara Shob6: Tokyo, 1967[1917]), pp. 705-33.
25 Tsurumi Yisuke, Seiden Goto Shimpei [Official biography of Goto Shimpei], ed. Ikkai Tomoyoshi, vol. 2 (Tokyo:
Fujiwara Shoten, 2004), pp. 581-662. For further discussion, see Ch. 2.
26 For a discussion offichi, see Kohara Takaharu, "Goto Shimpei no jichi shiso [Got6 Shimpei's thoughts on self-
rule]," in Got5 Shimpei, 1857-1929:jidai no senkakusha [Got6 Shimpei, 1857-1929: a pioneer of the era], ed.
Mikuriya Takashi (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2004): 115-24. For Goto's clearest formulation of the concept of jichi,
in his own words, see Goto Shimpei, "Kokka eisei genri [The principles of national hygiene]," in Gotd Shimpei to
teikoku tojichi [Goto Shimpei, empire, and self-rule], ed. Ozaki K6ji (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, 2003[1889]): 1-208.
27 "Taiwan tochi kyfikyti an [Rehabilitation of the Taiwan administration]," in Goto Shimpei monjo [Documents
related to Goto Shimpei], Reel 12, No. 4.33 (Tokyo: Yfishd5 Firumu Shuppan, 1979). The entire document can
also be found in Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 2, pp. 650-55.
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Got6 does not specify in this policy proposal the exact precedent he had in mind, given his study-
abroad experience in Germany, he was likely influenced by the notion of Polizeistaat (police-
state)-a concept that emerged in seventeenth-century German states and was later developed by
Frederick William I of Prussia. Under this model, the purpose of the police was to assist the
government in mobilizing society for the realization of a nation's full potential. The police were
responsible not only for maintaining peace and security, but also for advancing the population's
general welfare, both spiritual and material. Under this framework, the police institution was to
become synonymous with the state.2 8
The first step in transforming Taiwan into a Polizeistaat supported by native Taiwanese
institutions was the strengthening of the police organization itself. To this end, Japanese
patrolmen stationed in local police stations were gradually increased at a pace that would not
sacrifice the quality of the force: from 3,020 men in 1897 to 3,291 by the end of 1898, and 4,061
by the end of 1899.29 The Japanese police institution was also strengthened by subtraction-that
is, by limiting the use of the army and gendarmerie in everyday policing. Accordingly, the
reduction in the size of the gendarmerie was dramatic. In early 1898, the total number of
gendarmes, at 3,400 men, was greater than that of the civil police force. By 1900, however, this
force had been reduced by half, and in 1905, only one company of gendarmerie (comprise of 230
men) still remained in Taiwan.30
28 For a discussion of the concept of Polizeistaat, see Marc Raeff, "The Well-ordered Police State and the
Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative
Approach," The American Historical Review 80.5 (1975): 1221-43. For this model's later development in
Prussia/Germany, see Mathieu Deflem, "International Policing in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Police Union of
German States, 1951-1866," International Criminal Justice Review 6 (1996): 36-57; Alf Lidtke, Police and State in
Prussia, 1815-1850, trans. Pete Bugress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
29 Taiwan Stokufu keisatsu enkakushi, p. 810.
30 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 197-98. The size of the Japanese Army
presence in Taiwan was also drastically cut. During the summer months of 1895, the Japanese occupational force
came to be comprised of two and a half divisions, or approximately 50,000 men. In late 1895, this force was reduced
to four brigades (roughly 20,000) men and remained at this level throughout the Nogi administration. In 1898, one
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Goto also improved the quality of the civil police force by dramatically expanding the
meager training facility created under the Nogi administration into a full-fledged police academy
in June 1898. The academy offered two types of courses. In the elite track, cadets were trained to
become police inspectors and assistant police inspectors; upon graduation, they were to be
stationed in one of many police stations and sub-stations as local administrators. Reflecting their
wide-ranging duties, they took courses in administrative law, criminal procedure, and accounting,
as well as in opium policy, household registration system, and hok6 code (to be discussed
shortly) during a one-year program. Those at the rank of patrolmen (junsa) had the option to
enroll in a twenty-week program on the art of jailing. An important component of both programs
was Taiwanese language instruction. To further incentivize patrolmen to learn the local language,
the GGT gave bonuses to those who learned to speak one of the various Taiwanese dialects.
Meanwhile, Kodama and Goto ended the previous policy of relying almost exclusively
on the Japanese to serve as policemen, when Taiwanese were recruited for the first time as
assistant patrolmen (junsaho). Police records show that the number of Taiwanese policemen was
1,254 (or 23.2 percent of the total number of patrolmen and assistant patrolmen) in 1900, and
was maintained at a level between 20 to 30 percent of the police force at least until 1932 (the end
of the period for which data is available). Typically one Taiwanese and two Japanese policemen
of the four brigades was withdrawn, and sometime thereafter, two more brigades were recalled. The Japanese
military force in Taiwan, until the 1931 Manchurian Incident, thus consisted of a single mixed brigade
(approximately 5,000 men).
Mochiji Rokusabur6, Taiwan shokumin seisaku [Colonial policy in Taiwan] (Tokyo: Fuzanb6, 1912), pp. 72-73;
Yoshihara J6ji, Nihon tochika Taiwan keisatsu seido oyobi hoko seido noto [A note on the police and hoko systems
under Japanese colonial rule] (Tokyo: Tsuzukiinshokan, 1998), pp. 33-38; Washinosu Atsuya, Taiwan keisatsu
yonjainen shiwa [Discussion of the forty-year history of the Taiwan police] (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobo, 2000[1938]),
pp. 97-115. Washinosu Atsuya (1896-1942) served as police officer in Taiwan, and his numerous works provides an
insider's account of Taiwan's police institution. His recollection as a cadet in the police academy can be found in
Washinosu Atsuya, Keisatsu seikatsu no uchiake monogalari [A frank account of my experience as a police officer]
(Tokyo: Ryokuin Shob6, 2000[1934]), pp. 1-39.
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were stationed in a police branch station (hashutsujo).32 Given that only one out of every ten
town and village heads understood Japanese prior to 1920 (when the colonial state began the
practice of appointing Japanese or Japanese-speaking Taiwanese as town and village chiefs), the
stationing of at least one Taiwanese policemen in every police branch station greatly enhanced
the police's effectiveness in maintaining peace, and in assisting the local administration to
undertake various non-policing duties.33
Judicial reforms also buttressed police powers. In 1896, the GGT authorized the police to
hand out summary judgments in cases where statutory punishments were either detention or fines,
in a manner not too different from how local officials handled judicial affairs during the Qing
period. The 1904 Summary Judgment Law further strengthened the police's judicial role by
allowing officers to settle two additional types of crimes by discretion: (i) offenses of gambling
and of assault; and (ii) violations of administrative regulations punishable by not more than three
months of detention and/or a fine of not more than 100 yen. Consequently, summary judgments
were used to decide the vast majority of criminal cases in colonial Taiwan. In 1905, the first full
year under the new law's provisions, 37,965 criminal cases were settled by summary judgment
as opposed to 5,892 by the court of first instance. Even during the 1920s (when liberalizing
trends in Japan proper affected the conduct of the GGT), the ratio of summary judgment to trial
by court was still no less than four to one. Meanwhile, it was possible for a defendant to appeal
summary judgments to trial by court, but such acts were rare. Between May (when the Summary
Judgment Law was passed) and December 1904, for example, a request for trial by court was
made for only 12 out of the 28,770 cases decided by summary judgment. As one might expect,
32 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 203-11; Taiwan Sotokufu Keisatsu
Enkakushi, p. 810.
33 Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai, One Kind of Control: The "Hok5" System in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,
Diss., Columbia University, 1990 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1991), p. 137.
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decisions handed down by the police tended to be more severe than those by the courts: Among
those who appealed their summary judgment convictions between 1904 and 1934, 588 (38.4
percent) received the same punishment, 118 (7.7 percent) were handed heavier punishments, 581
(37.9 percent) were given lighter punishments, and 244 (15.9 percent) were acquitted.
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Note: This diagram does not apply to the eastern half of Taiwan, populated by aboriginal tribes, which was governed
under a different administrative structure.
The final measure taken to strengthen the police institution was local administrative
reform, as illustrated in Figure 1. Problems of the previous system were twofold: first, the size of
a typical management office district was too small, thus producing a system that was both costly
and inefficient; second, given the various administrative duties assigned to policemen (such as
3 Tay-sheng Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: The Reception of Western
Law (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), pp. 99-103.
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enforcement of sanitary codes, collection of taxes, supervision of road construction, and
promotion of scientific agriculture), the existence of police stations separate from management
offices led to jurisdictional ambiguities and overlap in tasks. To address these issues, Got6
collapsed and reshuffled the existing system of provinces and management offices into 20 mid-
sized districts and 87 sub-districts through two rounds of reforms (in 1898 and 1901). Meanwhile,
towns and villages headed by a Taiwanese headman remained the lowest level of the colonial
governance structure. These entities were not fully incorporated into the local administration,
however, and the Taiwanese town and village chiefs, chosen among existing leaders within each
locality, were without official bureaucratic rank.
Goto also overhauled the police organization in 1901 -a reform that was initially rejected
as too extreme by Tokyo, but implemented after strong insistence by Kodama and Got6.36 Under
the previous system, provincial governors were primarily responsible for overseeing the conduct
of the police within their districts; Kodama and Goto found that this system made it difficult to
coordinate police activities between provinces. Given the continued strength of the insurgency,
Goto decided that a more centralized police structure was needed. A powerful Police
Headquarters (Keisatsu Honsho) was formed within the Department of Civil Administration
(which oversaw all non-military functions of the GGT), and Taiwan was divided into two police
divisions, one in the north and the other in the south. A police superintendent headed each
division, and supervised the ten district police bureaus under his jurisdiction. Yet, despite
35 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 159-64; Taiwan Sotokufu keisatsu enkakushi,
pp. 468-73; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 39-43; Yoshihara, Nihon t5chika Taiwan keisatsu seido oyobi hokol
seido noto, pp. 15-17.
36 As discussed in Ch. 2, this 1901 police reform was initially rejected by the government in Tokyo, especially by
the Home Minister, who found this system to be contrary to what he saw as the proper relationship between police
and local administration in a modern state. After further negotiations with Tokyo, and with Kodama's full support,
Got6's was granted permission to undertake his sweeping reform for the most part, but was compelled to abandon
his original plan of appointing police inspectors as district chiefs. He nonetheless obtained the desired effect by
appointing police inspectors as sub-district heads. See Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-
1945," pp. 211-16.
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centralization of the police organization under the Police Superintendent-General, police and
local administration remained closely integrated as each of the twenty police bureaus became a
branch of the local administration. Furthermore, to ensure smooth coordination between sub-
district administration and police stations, Goto appointed police officers as sub-district heads. In
this way, the police became more than just a powerful branch of the local administration, but the
local administration itself.37
The second set of reforms initiated by Kodama and Got6 concerned the treatment of rebel
leaders, estimated to number thirty in 1898 and with a following of 20,000 men. The Kodama-
Goto administration's strategy concerning the insurgents, which they called dohi (bandits), was
part carrot (or perhaps more accurately handcuffs disguised as a carrot) and part stick (a very
powerful one for that matter). The "stick" used by the colonial regime to defeat the insurgency
was the enhanced police force (described above), as well as the Bandit Punishment Law (Hito
Keibatsu Rei), passed on November 17, 1898, as Ritsurei (GGT Ordinance) No. 24.38 The most
notable characteristic of this law was that it made most instances of "banditry" punishable by
death.39 Accordingly, while in 1897 the regular court applied capital punishment to 54 of 526
cases of "banditry," 247 out of 935 cases tried by the Temporary Court in 1898 resulted in death
(see Table 1). In 1899, the number of death sentences handed to those guilty of "banditry"
increased to 60 percent, reaching a peak of 74.3 percent in 1902.4
37 Mochiji, Taiwan shokumin seisaku, p. 73; Muk~yama, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi, pp. 226-
27; Taiwan Sotokufu keisatsu enkakushi, pp. 506-07, 513-15; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 43-45: E. P. Tsururni,
"Taiwan Under Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei," pp. 117-18.
38 The text of this law can be found in Muk6yama Hiroo, "Shokuminchi Taiwan no chian hosei [Peace preservation
laws in colonial Taiwan]," Kokugakuin h6gaku 5.2 (1967), pp. 107-08. An English translation of the law can be
found in Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 196-97.
39 Muk6yama, Nihon tchika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku und5 shi, pp. 231-42; Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under
Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 105-12.
4 It should be noted that although the ordinary court was more lenient than the Temporary Court, it was not the case
that Kabayama or Nogi showed more leniency towards insurgents than Kodama did. Many "bandits" prior to 1898
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Table 1: Disposition of Accused Bandits in the District Courts in Taiwan, 1895-1906
Year No. of Defendants Death Penalty Life Sentence Other Sentences Not Guilty
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1895 89 100.0 35 39.3 3 3.4 20 22.5 31 34.8
1896 298 100.0 71 23.8 29 9.7 135 45.3 63 21.1
1897 526 100.0 54 10.3 99 18.8 331 62.9 42 8.0
1898 935 100.0 247 26.4 162 17.3 447 47.8 79 8.4
1899 1,436 100.0 863 60.0 142 9.9 303 21.1 128 8.9
1900 1,336 100.0 582 43.6 259 19.4 344 25.7 151 11.3
1901 1,325 100.0 910 68.7 87 6.6 236 17.8 92 6.9
1902 686 100.0 510 74.3 38 5.5 75 10.9 63 9.2
1903 133 100.0 82 61.7 13 9.8 27 20.3 11 8.3
1904 25 100.0 13 52.0 1 4.0 5 20.0 6 24.0
1905 17 100.0 6 35.3 1 5.9 1 5.9 9 52.9
1906 6 100.0 0 0.0 1 16.7 2 33.3 3 50.0
Source: Tay-sheng Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: The Reception of
Western Law (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 109.
On the "carrot" side, Japanese officials reached out to known relatives of rebel leaders to
convince their rebellious kin to surrender. Kodama expressed regret that abuse by past
administrations had driven good Taiwanese into "banditry," and that his policy was to reintegrate
such "good bandits" back into Taiwanese society. To accomplish this, Kodama authorized (at
least superficially) generous surrender terms to insurgents willing to accept Japanese authority.
For example, in the surrender of Lin Huowang in the Ilan District, terms of surrender included
complete amnesty, as well as provision of jobs (or unemployment benefits if none were to be
found) to Lin Huowang and his associates. An even more generous offer was made in May 1899
to Lin Shaomao of southern Taiwan, who was the last major insurgent leader to surrender. The
rebel leader was permitted to keep his men armed (despite the anti-gun and anti-ammunition law
that was in effect), and local authorities even promised not to apprehend any of Lin Shaomao's
men for criminal charges unless first consulting him. Officials also agreed to seek Lin
Shaomao's permission before the government's security forces entered his sphere of influence.
were simply executed on the spot by soldiers or gendarmes before their cases reached the courts. Wang, Legal
Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 105-07.
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Finally, the GGT promised to compensate him for any property damages caused by the military
41
campaign, as well as a VY2,000 stipend to distribute as he pleased among his men.
Such overly generous terms were handed out because the colonial government had little
intention of honoring them once the rebel forces were placed under police surveillance. Even the
surrender ceremonies, attended by the Governor-General himself at times (and perceived by
insurgent leaders as a gesture of good will on the part of the colonial government), were a means
of enhancing police control over the dohi. The taking of a commemorative photograph was
always a part of such occasions; photographs were then filed away in the local police station as a
means of identifying past troublemakers. Also included within the surrender process was the
rebels' obligatory reporting of name, age, and household information, surely to be used to hand
out the promised unemployment checks, but also useful for the police to keep close watch of ex-
insurgents. Systematic abrogation of the surrender terms by the colonial state began in late 1901,
when pacification of the island had largely been completed. In May 1902, for example, Japanese
police fired upon and killed all 275 surrendered rebels in the Yunlin region during a surrender
ceremony when rebels allegedly refused to hand in their weapons. Meanwhile, during the final
1902 offensive against insurgents in southern Taiwan, among those eliminated were individuals
who had already surrendered (under generous terms), such as Lin Shaomao and his relatives. In
all, 11,950 dohi (or approximately half of the estimated 20,000 insurgents in 1898) were killed
between 1898 and 1902 according to official reports: 3,279 (27.4 percent) during pacification
campaigns, 5,673 (47.5 percent) after they were apprehended, and another 2,999 (25.1 percent)
through the application of the Bandit Punishment Law.
"1 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 42-63.
42 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 65-67; Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under
Japanese Colonial Rule, p. I 11.
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Yet, despite such treacherous acts by the colonial government, genuine efforts to obtain
the support of local Taiwanese elites were also made by Kodama and Goto. In addition to the
practice of appointing local notables to positions of counselor (sangi) in local governments
(initiated by Nogi in 1897), Kodama and Goto pursued a vigorous policy of appeasement toward
the gentry class (which numbered only 810 known individuals in 1900 from a pre-1895 size of
approximately 5,000).43 In particular, Kodama (who was well versed in Chinese poetry) held
poetry recitals in his official residence and invited Taiwanese scholars to demonstrate their talent.
Kodama made it a habit to mingle with the local literati whenever he inspected towns and
villages. He also organized inspection tours of modern buildings, factories, and other
"improvements" in urban space in an attempt to convince the literati of the benefits of Japanese
colonization. Extending his outreach program beyond the small gentry circle, Kodama also
"revived" the custom of grand feasts honoring the elderly-a tradition observed at times in the
Chinese mainland, but never actually recorded to have occurred in Taiwan. Other programs
initiated by the colonial government to win local elite support included: government assistance in
the restoration of temples (which had been devastated by the counter-insurgency campaign);
4 In 1895, it is estimated that Taiwan had about 350 upper gentry members, who held higher academic titles and
degrees (which were prerequisites for membership in the Qing bureaucracy). In addition, those who possessed lower
gentry grades and titles (which did not afford the privilege for official service) may have numbered as many as
5,000. Below this was a non-gentry literati group, which consisted of scholars who had never sought a formal
academic degree, individuals who failed the state-administered exams, and young scholars who had not yet gained
entry into the state-sponsored academies. This non-gentry portion of the literati group is estimated to have number
five or six times the number of the gentry class. Hence, a rough estimate of the literati class in Taiwan in 1895
comes to between 30,000 and 40,000, or 1.5 percent of the population. Meanwhile, roughly 6,400 individuals are
estimated to have left Taiwan between 1895 and 1897 by taking advantage of the provision within the Treaty of
Shimonoseki (which ended the Sino-Japanese War) that residents of Taiwan had two years to choose Japanese
citizenship and stay in Taiwan or reject Japanese citizenship and "return" to China. The majority of these
"returnees" were from the gentry class. Hence, when the GGT forged an island-wide literary association comprised
of higher and lower Taiwanese gentry in 1900, the colonial state could only identify 845 individuals as qualifying
for membership. See Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 276-77; Lamley, The
Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 234-52; idem., "The Y6bunkai of 1900: An Episode in the
Transfromation of the Taiwan Elite during the Early Japanese Period," in Ri-ju shi-qi Taiwan shi guo-ji xue-shu yan-
tao-hui lun-wenji [Intemational conference on Taiwan history under Japanese colonization], ed. Department of
History, National Taiwan University (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1993), p. 140; idem., "Taiwan under
Japanese Rule, 1895-1945," p. 208; Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The Traditional
Order," pp. 507-10.
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creation of a fund for helping those in need due to sickness, old age, or natural disasters; and the
building of hospitals, homeless shelters, and orphanages.4 4
Most importantly, the GGT took several measures specifically intended to appease the
landowning and merchant classes, which comprised the bulk of the local elite stratum following
the post-1895 exodus of the gentry. Although the Kodama-Goto regime ended the practice of
allowing local communities to select their own town or village heads, the colonial government
took care to appoint locally influential individuals to these posts. Other positions available to
town and village elders were representatives of a hok6 organization, which was the lowest-level
administrative unit comprised of between 50 and 300 households. By taking up these positions,
not only were local elites integrated into the colonial governance structure, but they were also
made dependent upon the state for their political power and social prestige. Yet, there were
certainly benefits to collaboration for Taiwanese elites. In exchange of their support, the
Japanese made Taiwanese township and village officials the sole point of contact between the
local population and the colonial state. Given that the GGT taxed the population heavily, while
spending a large portion of government revenue on agricultural and infrastructure development
projects, Taiwanese elites thus gained tremendous influence within their local communities by
serving as intermediaries. Moreover, they were given ample opportunities to personally profit
from Japanese colonization through the awarding of sale permits of monopolistic goods (such as
opium, salt, camphor, and tobacco), as well as through access to insider information regarding
the government's development projects.
44 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 285-301; Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and
Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 324-97; Muk6yama, Nihon tochika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undo shi, pp.
242-44.
4 For examples of Japanese efforts to appease the Taiwanese elite, as well as ways in which collaborate ties were
structured, see Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 282-84; Chih-ming Ka,
Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945 (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995), pp. 49-87; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 125, 214-15, 267-69. For a discussion of local Taiwanese
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Such policies of elite inclusion were born out of Kodama and Got5s acknowledgement
that the only way to effectively govern Taiwan was by collaborating with local powerholders. No
matter how hard the Japanese tried to penetrate Taiwanese localities through bureaucratic means,
the problem of structuring the interface between Taiwanese society and the colonial state could
not be resolved if local elites remained excluded from the governance system. Recruitment and
incorporation of town and village elders into the colonial state, along with appeasement of the
urban gentry class, thus became a priority of Kodama and Got6. Yet, elite incorporation was not
enough in the building of strong colonial institutions. As long as collaborative relationships were
constituted only at an inter-personal level, and institutional sources of elite power remained
outside the formal structure of the state, native support for colonial authority-and the
institutions undergirding this authority-was inherently unstable. In other words, in order to
prevent native Taiwanese institutions from competing with newly established Japanese ones as a
source of elite empowerment, it was necessary to thoroughly integrate the former with the latter.
Goto certainly understood this, and in light of his successful counter-insurgency campaign, he
initiated the process of hybridizing the existing dualistic institutional order of colonial Taiwan.
At this center of this transformation was the institution of hoko.
politics and socioeconomic relations more broadly, see Chiukun Chen, "From Landlords to Local Strongmen: The
transformation of Local Elites in Mid-Ch'ing Taiwan 1780-1862," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A.
Rubenstein (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 133-63; Lawrence W. Crissman, "The Structure of Local and Regional
Systems," in The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, ed. Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1981): 89-124; Bernard Gallin, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966), pp. 114-17. As Gallin writes, "Traditionally, the village landlord has played a
major role in the leadership of his village and its immediate vicinity. During the Japanese period, such leadership
roles were greatly reinforced by the Japanese, who preferred to handle village problems through the wealthy
landlord class rather than by dealing directly with the 'peasants.' ... Consequently, if the villagers were to get along
successfully with the Japanese, they had to work through their landlords. They usually elected a landlord to handle
local village affairs and to represent village interests in dealing with the Japanese authorities. The arrangement was
also to the landlord's advantage. As the official leader, he wielded greater power by which he could more easily
manipulate the villagers, and even the tax collector, to his own advantage. His recognition as a leader by his fellow
villagers and by the authorities also increased his prestige (114-15)."
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2.111. Hoko5 and the Hybridization of Taiwanese Local Governance
The baojia system dates back to the eleventh century, but it was not until the first half of
the eighteenth century that this institution of local rule was extended across the Qing Empire,
reaching Taiwan in 1733. In an ideal-typical baojia unit, ten households (except for those headed
by a gentry member) constituted a pai, ten pai formed a jia, and ten jia were group together into
a bao. The primary tasks assigned to a baojia unit was recruitment of peasants into self-defense
militias and the reporting of census data to the state. This system, however, was a failure in
Qing-era Taiwan both as a security organization and as an instrument for collecting necessary
household information for tax assessment. In the nineteenth century, various reforms were
proposed to remedy baojia's defects, including those by the activist governor Liu Minchuan
(1885-1891), but the failed system remained largely unchanged.46 As such, when Taiwan came
under Japanese rule in 1895, baojia was hardly an obvious solution to the establishment of
Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan.
In discussing the reestablishment and evolution of hoko--as baojia is pronounced in the
Japanese language-since 1898, it is important to note that it developed in three distinct phases.
The first period was between the initial passage of the Hok6 Bylaw (Hok6 Jorei) in August 1898
to the standardization of the hoko system in May 1903 with the adoption of the Working Rules
for the Implementation of the Hoko Bylaw (Hoko Jorei Shik6 Kisoku). During this period, hoko
served predominantly as an auxiliary force of the police and was not yet fully integrated into the
local administrative structure. It was not until next phase of hok5's development, between 1903
(when the new Hok6 Working Rules were applied throughout Taiwan) and 1936 (when the
46 y. Y. Hsu, "The Pao-chia System in China," Far Eastern Survey 12.24 (1943), pp. 237-38; Tong Lam, "Policing
the Imperial Nation: Sovereignty, International Law, and the Civilizing Mission in Late Qing China," Comparative
Studies in Society and History 52.4 (2010), pp. 885-86; Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895,"
pp. 503-06; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 5-12.
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policy of kominka-imperialization-was initiated) that the hybridization of hoko with the
system of local administration was attained. Finally, during the final phase from 1936 to 1945,
the centrality of hok6 in the maintenance of colonial governance rapidly declined. The very
success of hoke in integrating Taiwanese society into the colonial state, as well as the
establishment of parallel organizations of wartime mobilization (such as the Komin Kok6kai, or
the Association of Imperial Subjects for Patriotic Service), made its existence increasingly
superfluous, until hok5 was abolished in June 1945, two months prior to the end of World War II.
In short, as the following discussion will demonstrate, the creation of hybridic institutions
of policing and local rule in colonial Taiwan was hardly a result of a deliberate plan formulated
by Got6 Shimpei in 1898, but emerged through an institution-building process characterized by
pragmatism and trial and error. After all, the stated policy of Goto in 1898 was one of "no
policy." The greatest virtue of Got6 and his successors was not that they had all of the answers to
begin with, but that, freed from demands by Tokyo to assimilate the colonial governance
structure to institutions found in Japan proper (as discussed in Ch. 2), they were inclined to
flexibly solve problems as they arose. Charged with the unprecedented task of building a
Weberian bureaucratic state within a war-torn and traditional society, they were unafraid to
experiment with unconventional solutions.
Phase 1 (1898-1903): As Goto acknowledged later, he learned of the existence of baojia
from Qing magistrate Huang Liuhong's seventeenth-century treatise on governance, titled A
Complete Book Concerning Happiness and Benevolence (Fuhui Quanshu). Particularly appealing
to Goto was hok5's potential to serve as the focal point of his policy offichi ("self-rule"). 47 Yet,
Got6 was not the only Japanese administrator to notice the potential of hok5 as an instrument for
47 Yuiyu Caroline Ts'a, Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering
(London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 120-21; Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 3, p. 194.
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both the pacification campaign and the colonial state-building effort. It was Furush6 Kamon, the
Chief of the Bureau of Internal Affairs, who first attempted to reintroduce hoko in 1897 after
learning of its existence from a village elder in central Taiwan, and consulting its establishment
with members of the local gentry. However, Furush6's experiment with hok, which was used
primarily as a means of recruiting pro-Japanese militias, produced mixed results. It succeeded in
stabilizing the troubled Yunlin region (perhaps due to the backing of the Lin clan), but in both
the north and the south, hoko-based "self-defense associations" (jiei kumiai) assisted Japanese
and rebel forces alike, rendering them useless as an auxiliary force to the police.4 8
Goto was undeterred from these early setbacks with hok6, perceiving Nogi's troubles to
have been caused more by his administration's general incompetence. As reconstituted by Goto
in the Hok6 Bylaw of August 1898, the original three-tier baojia structure was simplified, so that
ten households comprised one k5, and ten k5 formed a ho.4 9 Nonetheless, due to the fact that
actual communities came in different sizes, a hok6 unit varied anywhere from 50 households (in
towns and villages) to 300 (in large cities). Both non-Chinese foreigners and Japanese were
excluded from participation in hoko, while membership was required of all native Taiwanese
inhabitants as well as Chinese nationals from mainland China, regardless of social status. As an
auxiliary force of the police, hok6 units were characterized by a strict hierarchical structure
where a k5 was led by an individual with the title of kocho, and a ho was led by a hosei. A hosei
48 After the declaration of victory against Taiwanese insurgents by Gov-Gen Kabayama in early 1896, Yunlin region
in central Taiwan came to be particularly famous for producing the most ferocious insurgents. The fame of Yunlin's
insurgents even reached the ears of Emperor Meiji, who ordered newly appointed Gov-Gen Katsura to look into the
matter. In turn, Katsura appointed Furush6 Kamon, who was head of the GGT Bureau of Internal Affairs, to lead a
pacification campaign in the region. During his inspection trip in Yunlin, Furusho was informed by a village elder
about the baojia system, and after consulting its revival with leaders of the Lin clan of central Taiwan, he proceeded
to organize self-defense associations (jiei kumiai) through the use of baojia. Due to its success in the Yunlin region,
Furush6 then ordered the formation of self-defense associations throughout Taiwan. However, in most places,
leaders of baojia units simultaneously cooperated with both the Japanese forces and the insurgents, thus making
self-defense associations utterly useless as a weapon against the insurgency. See Suzuki, "Taiwan no Hok6 Seido,"
pt. 1, pp. 4-5; Washinosu Atsuya, Taiwan hoko kiminka dokuhon [A reader on hoko and imperialization in Taiwan]
(Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobo, 2000[1941]), pp. 61-75.
49 The text of the Hok6 Bylaw can be found in Tsurumi Y., Seiden Goto Shimpei, vol. 3, pp. 195-96.
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was then placed under the supervision of the local Japanese police officer. Each hoko unit was
responsible for recruiting men to serve within militia organizations known as soteidan (able-
bodied corps), which were led by a Taiwanese corps chief, who in turn received direction from a
Japanese policemen. In all, approximately 45,000 Taiwanese individuals within the rural elite
stratum (out of a population of approximately three million) served in leadership positions within
hokW units or steidan in 1903 (when the earliest data of this kind is available), helping to forge
collaborative ties between the colonial state and local Taiwanese communities.
Thus organized, hok6 played three primary duties in the maintenance of security and
"welfare": (i) assigning collective responsibility (renza) among the Taiwanese; (ii) recruiting
men to serve as soteidan members and as coolies; and (iii) assisting police officers in peacetime
policing duties, such as eradicating infectious diseases and monitoring population movements.
First, hoko was a means of administering the practice of collective responsibility (renza). Renza
came in two forms: criminal and non-criminal. Criminal violations typically involved the failure
of a Taiwanese subject to prevent insurgent attacks or riots from taking place. For example, the
village of Puzijiao in southern Taiwan was fined 2,400 yen in 1901 for "not keeping the unrest
from developing into a riot."5' In another instance (also in 1901), the town of Puzi was fined
1,200 yen for its failure to report information regarding an insurgent attack that led to the death
50 Mochiji, Taiwan shokumin seisaku, pp. 75-76; Suzuki, "Taiwan no hok6 seido," pt. 1, pp. 7-9; Ts'ai, One Kind of
Control, pp. 66-70; Yoshihara, Nihon tochika Taiwan heisatsu seido oyobi hoko seido noto, pp. 62-73. For yearly
data from 1903 to 1942 concerning the total number of individuals who held leadership positions within hoko units
and soteidan, as well as the total size of the soteidan, see Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 67-68. Here, it should be
noted that while individuals selected to leadership positions within hok6 units came predominantly from the rural
landowning class for most of the Japanese period, this began to change in the late 1930s, as members of the "new"
elite-that is, those educated in Japanese colonial schools and employed in corporations and professional
associations-began to serve as intermediaries between the colonial state and Taiwanese society. In part, this
reflects a change in Japanese colonial strategy from one focusing on preserving existing social relations to one
seeking to radically transform Taiwan in the Japanese (wartime) image. For more on the social transformation of
hoko elites, see Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 523-35.
51 Quotation found in Ts'ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building, p. 101. On this point, see also Washinosu, Taiwan
hoko kominka dokuhon, p. 107. To put this fine of 2,400 yen in perspective, the total revenue of the GGT in 1901
was only slightly over 10 million yen. Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan, p. 53.
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of a sub-district head and other Japanese officials. 2 Non-criminal violations concerned one of
various regulations specified in the local hok6 code, such as failure to the report population
movements or violation of sanitation laws.53 Data concerning the use of renza during the
insurgency's height is lost. However, its wide-scale use can be guessed from the fact that as late
as 1919-that is, more than fifteen years after the end of the insurgency in the western half of
Taiwan-eighteen cases of renza were reported for criminal cases and another 532 for non-
criminal ones.
The second function of hoke was to assist in the recruitment of men to serve within local
pro-government militias (soteidan); to work as laborers in the building of roads, bridges,
railroads, and other public works projects; and to act as coolies for Japanese forces in their
campaigns against insurgents. Of these tasks, s5teidan recruitment was hoko's primary labor-
related assignment, and indeed the reason why hok was organized in the first place. However,
as Washinosu Atsuya (a former Japanese police officer in Taiwan) writes in his memoir,
soteidan were not particularly effective in fighting insurgents (at times even cooperating with
them), and their utility was largely in helping to maintain peace once a rebel presence was
eradicated by Japanese forces, or in helping the police in natural disaster relief.55 Meanwhile,
hokd provided invaluable assistance to the colonial government in recruiting labor to help with
52 Suzuki Masuhito, "Taiwan no hok6 seido [Taiwan's hok6 system]," Toshi mondai 39.6 (1944), pt. 2, p. 29.
53 For a full list of issues typically covered in a local hok6 code, see Yoshihara, Nihon tochika Taiwan keisatsu seido
oyobi hoko seido noto, pp. 74-76.
54 See Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," p. 398, for data concerning renza between
1919 and 1940. After 18 cases of criminal renza was recorded in 1919, there were only eight more instances, seven
of which were in 1920 and one in 1924 before criminal renza was discontinued in 1925. As for non-criminal renza,
the number of cases gradually declined over the years from 542 in 1919, 243 in 1920, 164 in 1921, 153 in 1922, 139
in 1923, and so on, until it reached single digits in 1927. 1935 was the last year in which the use of renza for non-
criminal cases (four instances) was recorded. The ending of criminal renza was a part of Gov-Gen Den Kenjir6's
policy of "assimilation," whereby he sought to bring the Taiwanese criminal justice system as close as possible to
one found in Japan. Also discontinued under Den's administration was the use of flogging as means of punishing
minor offenses. For the evolution of the criminal justice system in Taiwan under Japanese rule, see Wang, Legal
Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 105-39.
* Washinosu, Taiwan hoko k6minka dokuhon, pp. 106-13. For a similar analysis, see also Suzuki, "Taiwan no hokb
seido," pt. 2, p. 30.
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public works projects (especially road-building) and to serve as military coolies. For example,
during Gov-Gen Sakuma Samata's final campaign against aboriginal tribes in April 1914, it was
through the assistance of hoko units that 55,600 Taiwanese were mobilized as military porters.56
The everyday assistance of police in maintenance of colonial governance-the third and
final set of functions assigned to hoko during the initial 1898-1903 period-was perhaps its most
important. It was precisely due to hoko's effectiveness in collecting population data that the
colonial government was able to keep a close eye on the movement of people, as well as have the
necessary information to undertake a series of land and tax reforms between 1903 and 1905.57
Furthermore, of their various peacetime policing activities, the importance of hok& in campaigns
against infectious diseases was particularly notable. In the island-wide effort to eradicate the
plague by capturing rats, hok& units all over Taiwan were mobilized through the use of both fines
and rewards. In the city of Tainan, a policy was initiated in November 1901 where each
household was rewarded 5 sen (100 sen = 1 yen) for every rat caught, and households that turned
in 1000 rats earned a ticket in a lottery with a top prize of 10 yen. In a town in central Taiwan,
households were given a quota of 10 rats a month and were fined 5 sen for failure to meet this
quota. In all, four to five million rats were caught island-wide by 1904 as a result of this policy. 58
56 Suzuki, "Taiwan no hoko seido," pt. 2, pp. 30 and 33; Ts'ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building, pp. 107-08.
57 Chiang Ping-k'un, Taiwan chiso kaisei no kenkyi: Nihon ryoyi shoki tochi chosa no honshitsu [Study of
Taiwanese land-tax reform: The true nature of Japan's early colonial land investigation] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1974), pp. 161-62; Mochiji, Taiwan shokumin seisaku, p. 77; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 90-93.
58 Rat extermination was not the only area hoko was used in the government's various health and sanitation policies.
Hokd officials were also responsible for notifying to the police all deaths, especially those in areas infected by
infectious diseases, so that the infectious diseases could be contained. See Joseph C. Wicentowski, Policing Health
in Modern Taiwan, 1898-1949, Diss., Harvard University, 2007 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 2007), pp. 60-66, 69-74. For a
discussion of health and medical practices more broadly in colonial Taiwan, see Hsien-yu Chin, "Colonial Medical
Police and Postcolonial Medical Surveillance Systems in Taiwan, 1898-1950s," Osiris 13 (1998): 326-38; Michael
Shiyung Liu, Prescribing Colonialism: The Role of Medical Practices and Policies in Japan-ruled Taiwan, 1895-
1945 (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2009).
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Phase 2 (1903-1936): As reconstituted by Goto in 1898, the organization of hok6 was
unsystematic. The 1898 Hoko Bylaw was a simple seven-clause document lacking in specificity,
thus providing communities some degree of freedom in structuring their local hok6 unit. Given
the confusion of the initial years, and the need for the colonial administration to rely on local
elites to defeat the insurgency, this loose arrangement was perhaps unavoidable. One outcome of
this freedom was the unplanned emergence of multi-village hok6 bureaus (diagramed in Figure 1,
above), as quasi-governmental organizations led by an all-Taiwanese leadership. 59 Without a
doubt, the hok5 bureau received firm guidance from the Japanese police. However, the fact that
hok5 bureaus remained outside the formal structures of the colonial state meant that a certain
degree of autonomy was preserved within hok6 units, as was the case during the Qing period.
This was a development that certainly did not escape Goto's watchful eyes. Indeed, a common
theme that characterizes the period between 1903 and 1936 is the gradual removal of hoko's
autonomy, as hok5 was made an integral component of both the police institution and the local
administration. In particular, this latter development transformed hok6 from a predominantly
security organization into the cornerstone of Japanese governance more broadly, thus extending
its reach into cultural and economic realms of colonial rule.
It was not a coincidence that the colonial government tightened its grip on hok6 units
through the passage of the Working Rules for the Implementation of the Hok6 Bylaw (Hoko
J6rei Shiko Kisoku) in 1903, after the insurgency was thoroughly defeated in the western half of
Taiwan. With the local population subdued, time was ripe for the colonial government to
consolidate its rule. Accordingly, the structure of hok6 was standardized throughout Taiwan and
individual hok6 units were officially placed under the police hierarchy. The responsibilities of
59 Suzuki, "Taiwan no hoko seido," pt. 1, pp. 6-7.
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kocho and hosei were specified, and their election methods determined. 60 The Hok6 Working
Rules made no mention of the semi-autonomous hoko bureau, and created the allied hok5
association (hoko rengokai), as hoko's official decision-making body. Importantly, allied hok6
meetings were held inside local police stations (or sub-stations), thus advancing the hybridization
of hok with the formal police organization. Consequently, the relative autonomy hoke units
enjoyed under the 1898 system came to an end.6'
After the passage of the Hok6 Working Rules in 1903, the structure of hoko remained
unchanged until 1943 when soiteidan was abolished. Nonetheless, periodic reforms to the system
of local administration were to have profound effects on the role of hoke within the colonial
governance structure. The first major reform came in 1909 when the number of province-like
districts were reduced from 20 to 12, and wards (ku) were created under sub-district governments,
thus producing a three-tier system of local government (12 districts, 86 sub-districts, and 454
wards). 62 Furthermore, the 1909 reform transformed hoko units into an auxiliary arm of wards by
officially sanctioning local authorities to assign the following non-policing duties to hoko units:
(i) dissemination of information regarding laws and regulations; (ii) collection of information on
local industries and economic activity; and (iii) assistance in the collection of taxes. Yet, a kuch5
(ward chief) did not have the authority to directly command a hoke unit in undertaking these
60 Suzuki, "Taiwan no hoko seido," pt. 1, pp. 6-7; Yoshihara, Nihon tochika Taiwan keisatsu seido oyobi Hoko seido
noto, pp. 79.
61 Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 85-86; Yoshihara, Nihon tochika Taiwan keisatsu seido oyobi hoko seido noto, pp.
74-76.
62 Wards (ku), which were led by appointed Taiwanese officials with the title of kucho, were for the most part
created out of existing "natural" towns and villages. In some cases, however, several communities were combined to
create a ward. Within this structure, a kucho was treated as though he possessed a hannin rank (i.e., the lowest grade
within the Japanese bureaucracy). This treatment, however, was unofficial, and a ward was technically not a formal
organ of local government. For the 1909 local government structure, see Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 134-137.
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tasks. Instead, he was required to obtain the permission of Japanese police officials, who gave
consent to such requests during allied hoki meetings.63
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Note: Although the local administration portion of the above diagram (left-hand side) was established as early as
1909, the police structure pictured above (right-hand side) was temporarily abolished between 1909 and 1911.
Hence, it was not until 1911 that the post-Goto system was set. This diagram applies only to the western (non-
aboriginal) region of Taiwan.
This trend toward the transformation of hoko into a branch of the local government was
further advanced in 1920, as part of a comprehensive reform program initiated by Gov-Gen Den
Kenjiro. As discussed in Ch. 2, Den was the first civilian to be appointed as Governor-General
by Prime Minister Hara Kei in 1919 with the explicit purpose of advancing Taiwan's
assimilation into Japan. Local administrative reform, along with legal and educational reforms,
63 Suzuki, "Taiwan no hok6 seido," pt. 1, p. 9 ; Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 150-52.
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was a key component of this program.64 Indeed, faithfully executing Hara's agenda, Den
reorganized western Taiwan into five provinces (shi), which were largely equivalent in size to a
typical prefecture (ken) in Japan proper. (Eastem Taiwan, on the other hand, retained the old
district/sub-district/ward system.) Under the five provinces were placed three semi-autonomous
municipalities (shi) of Taihoku (Taipei), Taichii (Taichung), and Tainan, along with 47 counties
(gun) that administered all areas in western Taiwan outside of these three municipalities. Under
the counties were then created two-hundred and some towns (gai) and villages (shA) that served
as the lowest tier of local government. Contrasting with the unofficial status of wards (ku) under
the previous system, these administrative towns and villages were made into official corporate
bodies with powers to levy taxes and determine their own budgets.65 Consequently, and also
most ironically (given the new regime's goal of assimilation), the increased importance of
township and village governments led to a dramatic rise in the number of Japanese individuals
serving as town and village heads from a mere 3 percent in 1920 to 52 percent in 1936, until
reaching 82 percent in 1942.66
Within this new administrative system, several notable changes were made to the police
and hok5 institution that further advanced their integration into the structure of local government.
First, as seen in Figure 3, the post-1901 police hierarchy was dismantled and supervision over
local policing became primarily the responsibility of the provincial governor. In the three
64 Kenjiro Den, "Assimilation Keynote of Taiwan Policy," The Trans-Pacific 8 (1923): 45-47.
65 Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 375-81; Edward 1-te Chen, "Japanese
Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," Harvard Journal ofAsiatic
Studies 30 (1970): 126-58. Another key feature of the new local government system was that consultative councils
(kydgikai) were created at the provincial, municipal, and town/village levels. The number of conferees ranged from
20 to 35 in the provincial councils, 15 to 30 for the municipal councils, and 7 to 20 for the town and village councils.
Unlike the previous sangi (counselor) system were individual counselors provided advise on an ad hoc basis,
members of newly created consultative councils held official positions and met as a body to provide suggestions to
the executive. Members of consultative councils were all initially appointed, but elections were introduced to
distribute half of the council seats in the 1935 reform.
66 Detailed data concerning the ethnic composition of town and village heads from 1920 to 1942 is found in Ts'ai,
Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building, p. 157. Although the size of the Japanese settler community had gradually
increased over the years, it was a mere 5 percent of total population by the end of Japanese rule.
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municipal governments, the previous dominance of police thus ended with the subordination of
the municipal police chief to the mayor's office. The fusion of police with local administration,
however, was maintained at the county level (which was the equivalent of a sub-district in the
old system). Unlike the other organs of local rule, counties were not corporate bodies comprised
of an executive branch and a consultative assembly, but rather, strictly administrative entities
dominated by the police. Moreover, this police-state structure was extended further down under
the 1920 system with the creation of zones (ku) within towns and villages. Typically appointed to
serve as zone heads were incumbent hosei, thus uniting the police and local administrative
hierarchy at the hoki level for the first time.
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Note: This structure of local government persisted until the abolition of hok6 in June 1945, but three key refonrs
during this period should be noted. First, elections for members of provincial, municipal, and town/village council
were introduced in 1935. Second, the Association of Imperial Subjects for Patriotic Services was established in 1941,
as a parallel structure for maintaining colonial governance during the wartime years. Third, sateidan was abolished
as a police auxiliary force in 1943. This diagram applies only to the western (non-aboriginal) region of Taiwan.
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As a result of these successive reforms between 1903 and 1920, responsibilities of hoko
expanded dramatically to involve virtually every aspect of Taiwanese life.67 Hoko's participation
in land reform, infrastructure development, and sanitation campaigns at the turn of the twentieth
century has already been discussed. Continuing this trend of hok5's importance in promoting
Taiwan's economic development, those serving as hosei were now invited by local Japanese
authorities to attend meetings of production cooperatives (which were essentially agrarian credit
unions) with the aim of using their political connections and social prestige to recruit landowners
and farmers into these organizations. Although the role of hosei in popularizing production
cooperatives is hard to measure, the cooperatives were indeed a resounding success, increasing
precipitously from a total of 16 in 1913 to 500 by 1940, while expanding their functions from
provision of credit to purchasing, marketing, utilization, warehousing, and rice milling. Other
agro-development tasks assigned to hosei included soliciting contributions for the maintenance
of irrigation systems, as well as organizing efforts to clear fields of weeds and rid farms of pests
and locusts. Allied hok5 meetings were made into forums for disseminating information
regarding new (and scientific) planting and husbandry techniques. 68
67 Indeed, the police and local administration had become so intertwined in the 1920s that police officers themselves
began to call for reforms separating the two. From their perspective, non-policing duties were distracting them from
executing their primary duties as police officers. Top GGT administrators in the late 1920s agreed, and several
reforms meant to disentangle the police-state structure was proposed in late 1929 by Gov-Gen Ishizuka EizO (who
had served previously as Kodama's chief legal counsel in the GGT Secretariat). However, just as these reforms were
about to be implemented, a large-scale revolt broke out in the aboriginal town of Wushe (Musha) in Taichung
province on October 2, 1930, leading to the death of 134 government officials and civilians (all but two who were
Japanese). An expeditionary force of 1,163 police officers and more than 800 troops (assisted by air power) was
mobilized to restore order, resulting in approximately 600 deaths among the revolting aboriginal tribes (along with
49 deaths on the government side). Subsequently, Ishizuka resigned to take responsibility of this incident and efforts
to reform the police-state structure were shelved. Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945,"
pp. 388-94; Taiwan o5tokufu keisatsu enkakushi, pp. 685-97; Yoshihara, Nihon tochika Taiwan keisatsu seido oyobi
hoko seido neto, pp. 92-96.
68 Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 357-89; idem., "Engineering the Social or Engaging 'Everyday Modernity'?
Interwar Taiwan Reconsidered," in Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. Ann Heylen and Scott
Sommers (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010): 83-100.
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Hok6's involvement in sustaining colonial governance went beyond political and
economic realms and into the cultural. As noted above, hok6 officials were rewarded for their
services to the state through the provision of lucrative opium sale permits. Yet, hok6 units were
additionally tasked with monitoring and containing the use of opium, as part of the GGT's policy
of eradicating of "evil" Taiwanese customs and habits. Also targeted by the GGT were
footbinding and the styling of male hair into a long ponytail (queue), which came under full
assault in 1915 when local governments were ordered by the Governor-General to mobilize
Taiwanese society-that is, hoko units-to end these practices. Finally, hoko were involved in
campaigns to spread the use of the Japanese language. In particular, hosei were encouraged to
recruit traditional elites, such as themselves (i.e., those who had either received schooling prior
to the Japanese period or attended private Confucian schools post-1895) to form nighttime
Japanese language study groups (yagakkai). By 1917, these groups even began recruiting
members of the lower classes, such as farmers, rickshaw pullers, and aborigines, as well.69
In sum, by the end of the second period (1903-1936), what was once a semi-autonomous
and auxiliary form of village-level security organization had been thoroughly integrated into both
the police hierarchy and the local administrative structure. Ironically, however, hokd's complete
hybridization and absorption into the formal state also made it increasingly superfluous. After all,
if hosei functioned essentially as local administrators and police assistants, then what was the
need for retaining the hoko structure in the first place? Why have hosei serve as both zone
representatives and heads of local hok& units, when these two responsibilities completely
overlapped? Indeed, these questions became particularly pertinent in the third and final period
starting in 1936, as Japan readied Taiwan for wartime mobilization.
69 Ts'ai, Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building, pp. 128-40; idem., "Engineering the Social or Engaging 'Everyday
Modernity'? Interwar Taiwan Reconsidered."
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Phase 3 (1936-1945): As Japan was transformed through the course of the 1930s from a
dysfunctional democracy to a proto-"fascist" state,70 Japan's colonial policy also changed from
gradual to forced assimilation, or k5minka (which can be translated as imperialization). The
belief by military officers in the need to remake colonized peoples into loyal Japanese subjects
for the purpose of wartime mobilization was indeed ubiquitous; as such, Government-Generals
in both Korea and Taiwan simultaneously adopted k~minka as their colonial policy in late 1936.
In Taiwan (as well as in Korea) kominka policy first and foremost sought a cultural
transformation of its colonial subjects. To this end, many native Taiwanese temples were
demolished and Japanese shrines built in their place; the teaching of classical Chinese was
discontinued in schools and various measures promoting Japanese language learning were
instituted; and the adoption of Japanese names by Taiwanese subjects was strongly encouraged
starting in 1940.1
Such efforts to indoctrinate the Taiwanese people from the inside out were accompanied
by the creation of various organizations (some of which predated the 1936 k~minka movement)
aiming to strengthen the colonial state's capacity for societal mobilization. Examples of such
organizations were found in all areas of colonial life: Societies for Conforming Customs, Village
Arousing Societies, Youth Corps, Health and Sanitation Unions, and Taiwan Federation of
Agricultural Cooperatives. Most important of them all was the K6min H6kokai (Association of
70 There is some debate as to whether Japan was a fascist state in the 1930s. On this issue, see Peter Duus and Daniel
Okimoto, "Fascism and the History of Pre-war Japan: The Failure of a Concept," Journal ofAsian Studies 39.1
(1979): 65-76; Janis Mimura, Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011). For a portrayal of how Japan was culturally transformed through its wartime expansion, see Louise
Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998).
7' For a discussion of the difference between da5ka (assimilation) and k~minka (imperialization), see Leo T. S. Ching,
Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2001), pp. 89-132. An examination of the most important components of k6minka policy in both Taiwan and
Korea is found in Wan-yao Chou, "The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and
Interpretations," in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, ed. Peter Duus, et al. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996): 40-68.
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Imperial Subjects for Patriotic Services, or ISPS), which was created in 1941 as the GGT version
of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association,
or IRAA). ISPS was structured so as to parallel the local government system. Hence, branches of
ISPS were found at the prefectural, county, and township levels. Meanwhile, under the township
branch of the ISPS were ward and village alliances, the former for urban neighborhoods and the
latter for rural communities. At the very bottom of the pyramid were public service teams, which
received direction from the village alliances. Perhaps unsurprisingly, local-level branches of the
ISPS were created around the hoko system, and hok6 officials, as well as cadres of the s~teidan,
came to take up leadership positions in village alliances and public service teams. The result was
that hok6 units and ISPS organizations almost perfectly overlapped with 5,300 village alliances
and 50,512 public service teams compared to 6,167 ho and 58,916 k5 units in 1941.
It was precisely because ISPS could be grafted onto the existing hoko structure that it
succeeded in subsuming the entire Taiwanese population under its umbrella. (In contrast,
branches of IRAA in Japan proper only covered about a third of towns and villages.) However,
once hok6l was used as a means of subsuming all of Taiwanese society under ISPS, it became
instantaneously anachronistic. ISPS covered not only all hoko units but occupational groups,
public and private corporations, and Taiwanese and Japanese subjects alike. Having both ISPS
and hok6 only added administrative burden to local governments and produced confusion in
responsibilities among Taiwanese elites, who served simultaneously as zone representatives,
hok6 leaders, and heads of ISPS village alliances. In addition, the hok system was in direct
contradiction to the spirit of k~minka: If the state desired the complete assimilation of Taiwanese
subjects into the Japanese national identity, how then was the existence of hok&, which excluded
Japanese subjects, justifiable? By the early 1940s, hoko had therefore become superfluous at best
72 Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 452-56, 485-91.
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and an obstacle to the realization of Japan's wartime goals at worst. On June 17, 1945, two
months prior to the end of World War II, hoko was abolished, and with it disappeared the last
vestiges of what was once an autonomous source of local-level coercion.
2.1V. Legacy of Japanese Colonial Policing in Post-WWII Taiwan
The transfer of Taiwan from Japanese to Chinese (Guomindang) control on October 25,
1945 presented an opportunity for a radical institutional break from the colonial past. Indeed,
Taiwanese elites greeted retrocession with much anticipation, believing that after decades of
political subordination, they would be embraced by the incoming Guomindang administration as
partners in building a new Taiwan. Such expectations were quickly dashed, as the new Chen Yi
administration ruled as conquerors of a foreign people. The Taiwanese people, in fact, found
opportunities for government jobs to be even more limited under the Guomindang regime. In the
twilight of Japanese rule, 46,955 of the 84,559 of GGT positions were filled by Taiwanese, albeit
at lower grades. In 1946, one the other hand, of the 44,451 government positions, only 9,951
were filled by those native to Taiwan. The new administration did employ a greater percentage
of Taiwanese in the upper bureaucratic ranks than the Japanese had, but almost all top
government positions, such as district chiefs, city mayors, and township heads, were handed out
to those from the Chinese mainland.74 As for the police organization, despite the fact that
approximately 5,600 Taiwanese served as police officers (in a force of about 13,000 men) prior
to the end of Japanese colonial rule, very few of them were promoted by the Chen Yi regime to
7 Ts'ai, One Kind of Control, pp. 456-66, 493-513; Suzuki, "Taiwan no hoko seido," pt. 2, pp. 34-36.
74 Tse-han Lai, et al., A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising ofFebruary 28, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1991), pp. 63-67.
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top positions upon the departure of Japanese officials. As was the case with other bureaucracies
of the new regime, the norm was to appoint mainlanders to upper bureaucratic positions.75
Dissatisfaction by the Taiwanese was also fueled by Chen Yi's decision to retain many of
the governance institutions of the previous regime. The 1945 Organic Regulations of Taiwan
Provincial Administrative Executive Order was in essence the same as the Organic Regulations
of the Government-General of Taiwan. Like the Japanese Governor-Generals of the past, Chen
Yi was responsible for managing all administrative affairs in Taiwan, as well as heading the
Taiwan Garrison Command. Although without the power to promulgate law-like ordinances as
did Japanese Government-Generals, he was still responsible for drafting special laws for Taiwan
to be approved by the Chinese central government in Nanjing. As for the structure of local
government, the familiar three-tier system of the Japanese period was restored in 1946. In some
areas of administration, the Chen Yi administration even backtracked on liberalizing reforms
instituted by Japanese officials in the 1920s and early 1930s. The newly established
Administrative Council, for example, took the form of the GGT Consultative Council of the
1896 vintage. While the previous system of elected councils was retained at the county
(provincial) and municipal levels, the practice of holding township and village council elections
76
was discontinued. Frustration mounted and finally turned explosive on February 28, 1947,
when Taiwanese took to the streets in a wide-scale rebellion against the Guomindang regime. As
the police, now staffed by mainlanders, massacred civilians and executed suspected rebel leaders
without trial, the Taiwanese were thus reminded of just how little things had changed with
retrocession.77
7s George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 190-93.
76 Lai, A Tragic Beginning, pp. 64-65; Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 177-78.
77 For a detailed account of the causes, progress, and the aftermath of the February 28 Incident, see Steven E.
Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950
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In particular, Chen Yi was explicit in his desire to retain the Japanese police structure, as
expressed in the inaugural issue of Taiwan Police, the official magazine of the new Taiwan
Provincial Training Academy. "From now on in Taiwan, although our policies will be
completely different from those of the Japanese," he declared, "the things that the police had to
do should continue to be done as before."78 Among the most important institutional continuities
between the Japanese and Guomindang periods was the use of police summary judgments.79 The
Japanese system of community-level policing and surveillance-the colonial police's most
central feature-was also retained. Through a network of police sub-stations, the police
continued to regulate inter-personal relations not just by enforcing laws, but by relying on
detailed household records to understand how people were connected and who should be
contacted were some incident to occur. In this way, collaborative ties between local elites and the
police, rather than "rule of law" per se, remain the source of order and stability within
democratic Taiwan, as it did under Japanese colonialism and Guomindang despotism. In the last
fifty years, the Taiwanese police organization has indeed undergone considerable change, but the
norms and practices of policing innovated during the Japanese period live on.80
3. Locally Owned but Dualistic: U.S. Police Institution in the Philippines
From its inception, the Philippine Constabulary was both a politicized and a political
institution. It was initially conceived in late 1900 out of Philippine Civil Governor William
Howard Taft's attempt to wrestle control over provincial and municipal administration away
from the U.S. Army, and it increasingly turned into a quasi-military organization in the ensuing
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 64-88. Although the exact number of people killed or wounded
during the February 28 Incident and the government crackdown that followed is disputed, a rough estimate among
scholars is 10,000 killed and 30,000 wounded.
78 Quotation found in Wicentowski, Policing Health in Modern Taiwan, pp. 164-65.
'9 Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 181-82.
80 Jeffrey Martin, "'Police Status' in Taiwan: Accountability and the Political Life of Civil Force," AAS-ICAS Joint
Conference, Hawai'i Convention Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 31 March 2011, Conference Paper.
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years, as colonial officials sought to avoid the reintroduction of the army in rebellious provinces.
Having declared the Philippine War to be over in 1902, return to formal military rule was
unacceptable to Taft's superiors in Washington. In 1905, when militarization of the Constabulary
and its terrorization of the local population in central Luzon threatened to destabilize the colonial
governance structure, the Constabulary was reconstituted and its officers were ordered to
cultivate friendly relations with provincial and municipal elites. Thus marked the beginning of
the Constabulary's transformation into the U.S. colonial government's main channel of
collaboration with local powerholders. The Constabulary would help "friendly" politicians win
elections and turn a blind eye toward landlord abuses of tenant farmers in exchange for
cooperation in combating insurgents, bandits, and leftist organizations. Provincial governors and
municipal presidents sympathetic to U.S. control were allowed to form private militias to
reinforce the Constabulary, which was confined (due to budget constraints) to a force of five to
six thousand men.
This legacy of placing the police at the center of collaborative arrangements between
national and provincial elites was to have lasting, and ultimately adverse, consequences on post-
independence Philippines. It allowed the landed elite to oppress peasants, setting the stage for
peasant rebellions starting in the 1930s. Meanwhile, private militias became increasingly
powerful over time (especially after 1945), leading to the rise of warlordism in the Philippines.
However, it was precisely because the Constabulary was steeped in politics that it was able to
serve as an effective police institution during the colonial period. The American colonial regime
was founded upon collaboration with local elites, and the Constabulary was perfectly positioned
to facilitate this arrangement.
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Indeed, as observed in the Taiwan case, politicization of a police institution during the
colonial period does not necessarily lead to its demise post-independence; nor does an institution
that proved effective under colonial conditions necessarily fail in the post-colonial period. The
colonial police in Taiwan, similar to that in the Philippines, was first and foremost a political
actor, serving as the representative of the colonial state at the local level. Its responsibilities went
far beyond maintenance of peace, and pertained to nearly every aspect of Taiwanese life. The
primary difference, then, between policing in Taiwan and the Philippines was not degree of
politicization, but institutional structure-in particular, the way in which traditional and modern
institutions of policing were combined. In the case of Taiwan, the relationship between old and
new was hybridic, while in the Philippines it was dualistic.
3.1. The Municipal Police System under the U.S Army
In Secretary of War Elihu Root's Instructions to the Philippine Commission (which
initially functioned as both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. colonial regime),
not a word is written on the subject of policing.8' Similarly, while the 1902 Philippine Organic
Act (which served as the Constitution of the Philippines under U.S. rule) offers detailed
instructions on a wide range of topics, from rules regarding mining and franchises to those
concerning rights and liberties and political participation, it is silent as to how the archipelago
should be policed.82 This omission is perhaps unsurprising: Since the U.S. institution-building
strategy in the Philippines largely aimed at reproducing American institutions in the archipelago,
the lack of precedent in the United States for a federal police force left Secretary Root without a
" Elihu Root, "Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission," in Chalres B. Elliott, The Philippines to the
End of the Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917),
pp. 485-90.
82 "An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine
Islands, and for Other Purposes," 57th Cong., I st sess. (1 July 1902), ch. 1369, U.S. Statutes at Large 32
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1903): 691-712.
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concrete model for the Philippines.83 This did not mean, however, that colonial agents possessed
complete freedom in designing a police institution in the archipelago. The McKinley
administration had a clear vision of how political institutions were to be structured in the
Philippine Islands, and it was imperative that the police institution conform to this ideal, that
being one of local autonomy.84 Just as American states and counties were responsible for fielding
their own police force, so too would Philippine municipalities be. A centralized police institution
was simply un-American.
At least initially, America's colonial agent-that is, the U.S. Army led by Maj. Gen.
Elwell Otis-did not question this ideal that policing should be predominantly a local affair.
After all, the desire by the U.S. Army to rapidly conclude its offensive against the revolutionary
forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo meant that Filipino municipal officials had to be relied upon to
maintain order in "liberated" towns and villages, as U.S. Army columns marched forward to
"pacify" more territory. The first municipal police organizations under American rule were thus
organized in March 1899 by Maj. William Kobb6 in the areas surrounding Malolos, after this
"insurgent" capital was captured by American troops. Impressed with Kobb6's accomplishments,
Otis tasked Kobb6 to draft a general plan for establishing municipal governments throughout the
archipelago, with the formation of a police organization among its key components.
Implemented on July 31, 1899 as General Order (G.O.) 43, Kobbd's plan for municipal
83 The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation was formed in 1908. The U.S. Marshals system (where U.S.
marshals, sometimes with the assistance of deputies, were stationed in judicial districts) was perhaps the closest
thing to a federal police system at the turn of the twentieth century. David Prescott Barrows, who was among the
staunchest believers in the Americanization of the Filipinos, in fact suggested that the system of policing by
Constabulary units be replaced by a system akin to the U.S. Marshal system in a letter sent to an unidentified
recipient (likely Governor-General Luke Wright or Secretary of Police and Commerce W. Cameron Forbes). See
Barrows, Folder Jan-Dec 1905, Box 1, Outgoing correspondence, David Prescott Papers, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Meanwhile, the primary (and in some ways, only) example of a state-level police
force in nineteenth-century United States was the Texas Rangers. Massachusetts also had a small and informal
police organization in the nineteenth century, but it was not until the 1920s that this structure was formalized and
expanded.
84 On this, see "Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission."
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governments largely formalized existing Spanish-era rules and practices, and set the basic tone
for all succeeding frameworks of municipal organization.85
Under this scheme, each town would have a municipal council whose president
(presidente) was responsible for organizing a police force. As was the case with G.O. 43 more
broadly, this system of village-level policing followed Spanish-era traditions. In this instance, the
precedent was a police organization known as cuerpo de cuadrilleros, which was a village-level
militia led by a local Filipino official-the gubernadorcillo-and comprised entirely of men
personally loyal to the municipal mayor.86 Also following Spanish colonial methods, the U.S.
Army made sure to retain oversight over the activities of the municipal police force. As such,
while the police was authorized to "arrest or order the arrest of persons violating a city
ordinance," they could only detain suspects for twenty-four hours before handing them over to
the U.S. Army's provost court. 87
Further reforms to the municipal police organization were made in the summer of 1900
by Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who had replaced Otis as commander of the U.S. forces in May
1899. With the aim of employing the municipal police as an auxiliary unit, MacArthur mobilized
a native police force of 6,150 men, arming 2,500 of them with Colt .45 revolvers and the rest
with short swords called bolos. Meanwhile, his army, numbering over 70,000 by the end of 1900,
was assigned to one of 502 garrisons dispersed throughout the islands so that the actions of
85 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 88; Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), pp. 129-30; William Kobbd, "Circular Letter," 8 August 1899, Folder p. 164-204, Vol. 17, Dean
C. Worcester Papers, Special Collections Library.
86 Greg Bankoff, "Big Fish in Small Ponds: The Exercise of Power in a Nineteenth-century Philippine
Municipality," Modern Asian Studies 26.4 (1992): 679-700; idem., Crime, Society, and the State in the Nineteenth-
Century Philippines (Quezon City, P1: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), pp. 129-33.
87 Quotation found in Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and Rise of
the Surveillance State (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), p. 75.
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presidentes and their police could be closely monitored.88 However, MacArthur's police
institution, where municipal police forces were backed by the overwhelming firepower of the
U.S. Army, was dismantled in early 1901, as criticisms toward "military rule" mounted in
Washington. The U.S. public was becoming increasingly concerned over reports of atrocities by
the U.S. military against Filipinos, and more generally, by the fact that the Army was engaged in
a bloody counter-insurgency campaign when Americans were supposed to have been welcomed
as liberators by the Filipino people.8 9
The Army's strategy of attaining complete pacification through military power prior to
the introduction of civilian rule was politically unacceptable to Elihu Root and other membcrs of
the McKinley, and later, Roosevelt, cabinets. Continued U.S. military activity in the archipelago
strengthened day by day the position of anti-imperialists and Democratic critics of Philippine
annexation, thus threatening Republican prospects for the 1902 midterm elections. Forced to
reconcile the political priorities of Washington with the actual condition of instability in the
Philippines, the establishment of the Philippine Constabulary (the brainchild of Philippine
Secretary of Commerce and Police Luke Wright) was an ingenious solution. By replacing the
U.S. Army with the Philippine Constabulary (which was under the authority of civilians),
Washington could declare that the U.S. military campaign in the Philippines had ended without
compromising America's coercive capability in the islands at a time of continued instability.
Military officers, however, were clearly unhappy with this policy, as it relied on a new
and untested force to maintain, and in fact build upon, security gains made with much difficulty
88 Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, pp. 204-11; Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the
Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 143-47; idem., The
Philippine War, pp. 208-16; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, p. 75; Kenneth Young, The General's General:
The Life and Times ofArthur MacArthur (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 280-81.
89 Luke E. Wright, "Report of the Secretary of Commerce and Police," in Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine
Commission (hereafter RPC), 1903, pt. 3 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), pp. 3-4. For further discussion, see Ch. 3.
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by the U.S. Army. They were also alarmed that political considerations were driving decisions
regarding military matters. On February 28, 1902 Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee (who had taken over
the post of Commander of the Division of the Philippines from MacArthur in July 1901), for
example, wrote to Adjutant General Henry Corbin:
As General [J. Franklin] Bell's work was about to begin [in Batangas], I foresaw the
probability that [the neighboring province of] Tayabas would be refuge ground for
[Miguel] Malvar's people ... so I dictated a letter to [acting Civil Governor Wright]
requesting the transfer of the Province to Military control during the campaign ....
[Wright] did not wish to accede to the request for political reasons which you and I
understand readily enough, but willing to assist in other ways as best he could ... .90
Indeed, even to top U.S. civilian officials in the Philippines acknowledged that military rule was
prematurely ended in some provinces out of political calculations in Washington that had little to
do with actual conditions on the ground. As Wright explained in a letter to Harry H. Bandholtz
(then the governor of Tayabas province):
I quite understand the difficulties under which you labor with reference to Principe and
Infanta. It is of course not expected that you shall do the impossible, but only the best you
can. These districts were added to your province more for the purpose of putting all the
territory of the islands under civil government preparatory to the issuing of the amnesty
proclamation than for any other reason, and in this matter we were acting under
instructions from the Secretary of War.91
Finally, and ultimately most consequentially, left outside the new security civilian-led
structure was the municipal police. With a total force of roughly 5,000 men, the Constabulary
simply did not possess the manpower (let alone the authority) to maintain a watchful eye over the
90 Chaffee to Henry Corbin, 28 February 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. Meanwhile, Allen wrote to Taft (who was away in the United States), "If we bring the Leyte
question to a happy conclusion with the Constabulary there will be no doubt about our ability to deal with almost
any ladrone or insurrecto measures that may appear. Of course, General Chaffee feels that he should be authorized
to utilize his soldiers for bringing to terms these ladrones and insurrectos that are still out, but the difficulty is that
the military want these provinces returned to their control, or want to adopt such measures as are inconsistent with
Civil Government. In addition to this it is indeed unfortunate that a province, once organized under Civil
Government, should be returned." Allen to Taft, March 28, 1902, Container 7, Henry T. Allen Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C
91 Wright to Harry H. Bandholtz, 11 August 1902, Section 1907-1908, Reel 7, Harry Hill Bandholtz Papers, Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, p. 1.
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municipal police as MacArthur's army (at 70,000-strong) had. Thus, even as the Constabulary
was gradually transformed into an effective colonial police force over the ensuing years, the
poorly trained and fragmented municipal police was left to evolve on its own. Perpetually a
source of embarrassment for U.S. administrators for their incompetence and corruption, they
were to eventually become the foundations upon which local bosses would exert their autonomy
from Manila in the postcolonial period.
3.11. The Establishment of the Philippine Constabulary as a Paramilitary Force
The Insular Constabulary (later renamed the Philippine Constabulary) was established on
July 18, 1901, as a force comprised of approximately 2,500 men, but it was quickly expanded to
over 5,000 men in the following year. The model used for the Philippine Constabulary was none
other than the guardia civil, a paramilitary force that served as the coercive arm of the Spanish
colonial government until its defeat by joint U.S. and Philippine Revolutionary forces in 1898.
Created in 1868, The guardia civil was designed to combat bandit organizations-known as
ladrones-that roamed the countryside. In addition, it apprehended those suspected of treason
against the Spanish crown and detected enemies of the Catholic Church. At its height, this hated
symbol of Spanish despotism numbered 3,500 men and was divided into three regiments (two in
Luzon and one in Visayas). Adorned in military outfits and living in barracks, the guardia civil
was more an army guarding the colonial regime against its own subjects than a police force
concerned with protecting the wealth and welfare of Filipinos. Furthermore, not only was the
guardia civil a model for the Philippine Constabulary, but also, a large number of Filipinos
recruited to serve in the Constabulary were former members of the Guardia Civil, creating direct
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continuity between the new American police force and its Spanish-era predecessor." As Taft
explained to Root, the Philippine Commission's plan for policing was "a departure from the
ordinary methods pursued in America, but it was a departure rendered necessary only by the
difference in condition." 93
Mimicking the structure of the guardia civil, the Constabulary's main organizational unit
was the company, comprised of about forty to sixty constables with two or three officers, and
assigned to one of five police districts (three in Luzon, one for Visayas, and one for Mindanao).
In Mindanao-the Muslim majority southern island-the Constabulary operated alongside the
U.S. Army, but in all other police districts, it was the primary source of colonial coercion. The
jurisdiction of a constabulary company included several towns, which could range from a few
square miles to a few hundred square miles, and from a population of ten thousand to a third of a
million. Constables lived in barracks, which were typically located within or in close range of the
principal towns of a province. Hence, although it was ostensibly created as a national-level
police force, its organization (like the guardia civil) was distinctly military. Each Constabulary
company was then supported (in theory) by the municipal police, which in total numbered
between seven to eight thousand men during the American colonial period. 94
92 Emanuel Agrava Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems (Manila: Pobre's Press, 1933), pp. 37-44;
Bankoff, Crime, Society, and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines, pp. 134-37; George Yarrington Coats,
The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917, Diss., The Ohio State University, 1968 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1969), pp. 14-
15; Charles Sumner Lobingier, "The Peacekeepers of the Philippines," American Review ofReviews 42 (Sept. 1910),
p. 311.
93 Taft to Root, 2 August 1901, Reel 464, William Howard Taft, Papers: 1890-1930 (Washington, D.C.: Library of
Congress, 1969).
94 For the law organizing the Constabulary, see Act 175, Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States
Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1901), pp. 369-74. For a discussion of the structure of the
Philippine Constabulary between 1901 and 1935, see BajA, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 87-98;
Margarita R. Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," in Konstable: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1901-1991,
ed. Margarita R Cojuangco, et al. (Manila: AboCan, 1991), pp. 12-14; William C. Rivers, "The Maintenance of
Order in the Philippine Islands," in Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of
the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples (New York: Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian and Other
Dependent Peoples, 1911), p. 126.
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The ethnic composition of the Constabulary followed two principles. First, during the
first decade and a half of its existence (that is, prior to the period of "Filipinization" starting in
1913), commissioned officers were generally Americans detailed from the U.S. Army, with
Filipinos filling its lower ranks.95 Second, each province furnished its quota of men, whose
assignments were generally confined to their province. It was in this decision to allow Filipinos
to police their home regions that the new police force departed most significantly from the
structure of the guardia civil. As Wright reasoned, the benefits of recruiting police officers from
their home regions seemed to outweigh the potential costs: While those entrusted to police their
own communities were more susceptible to treachery than outsiders, their familiarity with local
dialects, geography, and political conditions was seen as an important asset in combating outlaws
and insurgents. Moreover, by having Filipinos police co-ethnics, the Philippine Commission
sought to prevent the brutality exhibited by the guardia civil during the Spanish era, as well as by
Filipino soldiers enlisted in the Philippine Scouts (a native military force within the U.S. Army)
against those belonging to ethnic groups different from their own.96
In addition to its five regional districts, the Philippine Constabulary included within its
structure the Information Division, which, along with the system of policing co-ethnics, was
among the most notable innovations of American colonial officials in the area of policing. If
Wright was responsible for devising the overall structure of the police force, it was Brig. Gen.
Henry Allen, the first Chief of the Constabulary, who spearheaded the effort to create an
extensive network of intelligence gathering and spying in the archipelago. It was not a
95 A change in U.S. Army rules in 1913 limited the detailing of commissioned officers of the Army (who constituted
approximately 70 percent of officers prior to 1917) to the Constabulary. Furthermore, American officers remaining
in the Constabulary in 1917 resigned with America's participation in World War I, and were replaced by Filipinos.
By 1933, only three percent of the Constabulary commissioned service were Americans. Baji, Philippine Police
System and Its Problems, p. 70.
96 Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," p. 12; Jeremiah W. Jenks, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Chief,"
American Monthly Review of Reviews 26 (Oct. 1902), p. 436; Rivers, "The Maintenance of Order in the Philippine
Islands," pp. 126-27.
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coincidence that Allen, formally an officer in the Information Division of the U.S. Army and a
military attache in czarist Russia, excelled in his new role as the spy-in-chief.97 He was critical of
the Army's practice of obtaining information through torture, and instead cultivated hundreds of
both paid and "volunteer" Filipino agents. In 1904, the last year this statistic was released by the
Constabulary, there were 118 paid informants and an undisclosed number of volunteer ones.
Their presence was felt throughout the archipelago, as agents infiltrated dissident groups, and
kept detailed (and unflattering) information on the private lives of prominent politicians."
Indeed, it was precisely because of the effectiveness of the Information Division that the
Constabulary was able to maintain U.S. colonial governance over a population of ten million (in
1918) with a force numbering merely five to six thousand men. 99
Such was the basic structure of the Constabulary-a structure that borrowed heavily from
Spanish precedent, as well as from Allen's own experience in military intelligence. There was
little about the Constabulary that resembled the police forces found in American cities and
towns, or that of the U.S. Marshal service in the more rural regions of the United States. If
anything, the Constabulary was similar in structure to the U.S. Army, leading American military
97 Jenks, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Chief," pp. 436-38.
98 In 1905, the activities of the Information Division was represented by a single table in the annual report of the
Constabulary Chief, which indicated that a total of 1,589 cases had been investigated. In subsequent years, despite
the fact that the Information Division was among the most important branches of the Constabulary, it completely
disappeared from the annual reports.
99 Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 98-100, 533-39; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp.
104-06, 175-205. As Forbes, in his memoirs, The Philippine Islands, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928),
recalls, "On one occasion, when General Harbord was acting chief, an organization which had been working for
months planned an insurrection. The night before the outbreak was to occur, six Filipinos were invited to assemble
in General Harbord's office, where they found six chairs placed in a row and upon which they were told to sit. He
then informed them that an insurrection was planned to break out at ten-thirty the following morning, and that it
would be the duty of the Constabulary to put it down; that there would be some loss of life attached to the process,
and that probably a good many innocent lives would be lost because the real culprits in these movements usually
acted under cover. He informed them that in this case, however, the real instigators of the insurrection were known
to the police, and that they would be the first men shot. With this information he opened the door and told them they
could go out and start their insurrection if they wished. Six badly frightened conspirators spent the next ten and a
half hours in suppressing a movement they had spent as many months in fomenting. No blood was spilt, no arrests
made, no harm ensued (220-21)."
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officials in the archipelago to suspect (correctly) that the force was created with the purpose of
supplanting the Army. Hence, when Maj. Gen. Chaffee learned of Wright's Constabulary plan,
he bitterly stated, "I am opposed to the whole business... It seems to me ... that you are trying to
introduce something to take the place of my army." In response, Wright did not hesitate to
inform Chaffee that "that was exactly the purpose of the bill." 00 It was no secret that the
Constabulary was created precisely to realize Secretary Root's policy "to get the Army out of the
governing business and get its officers back to the performance of their proper function as
soldiers." 0'
Both MacArthur and Chaffee were indeed rightfully concerned that this scheme, which
relied on a new and untested force composed largely of Filipinos, could undermine whatever
gains the U.S. Army had made in establishing U.S. colonial authority over the past year and a
half. After all, when the idea for a new colonial police was first proposed to MacArthur in
November 1900, most of the archipelago was under de facto insurgent control, and the situation
was only marginally better at the time of Chaffee's appointment in summer 1901. If municipal
elites throughout the Philippines secretly aided the revolutionary army while superficially
kowtowing to U.S. military commanders, what would stop insurrectos from defeating the
counter-insurgency campaign from within by infiltrating the Constabulary? The constabulary
proposal therefore remained unrealized as long as MacArthur served simultaneously as
commander of the U.S. Army in the Philippines and as the Governor-General, with the power to
veto the legislative proposals of the Philippine Commission. Nonetheless, he was willing to give
civil administration itself a chance to succeed. He could see that civilians were better suited to
form collaborative ties with Filipino elites, and dispersing his army into small garrisons was
"" This conversation, which took place between Wright and Chaffee in private is retold by Taft in his biweekly
report to Secretary Root. See Taft to Root, 2 August 1901, Reel 463, Taft, Papers, pp. 2-3.
0 Root to Chaffee, 26 February 1901, Reel 640, Taft, Papers.
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clearly taking a toll on military discipline. Therefore, as soon as a province was deemed free of
insurgent activity, MacArthur transferred it to civilian control-that is, to an American or a
Filipino provincial governor appointed by the Philippine Commission-and placed the municipal
police in charge of local security. The U.S. Army, nonetheless, maintained a large presence in
the archipelago and was ready to reestablish its control over any province if insurgent activities
resumed. 0 2
Although Chaffee was equally suspicious of the constabulary proposal, he did not possess
the authority to block its creation, as all legislative and executive authority had been transferred
to Civil Governor William Howard Taft (who served as Secretary Root's representative in the
archipelago) and his Philippine Commission on July 4, 1901.103 Hence, the Commission's nearly
yearlong plan to replace the U.S. Army in the conduct of police duties with its own paramilitary
force finally came to fruition. It did not take long, however, before the concerns of military
officers were in part realized. In several provinces in central and southern Luzon, as well as in
the Visayan islands, insurgency resumed shortly after civilian rule was established. Yet, to the
surprise (and annoyance) of skeptics within the U.S. Army, the Constabulary was able to
suppress small-scale rebellions (in provinces such as Sorsogon, Tayabas, Albay, Leyte, Negros,
Cebu, and Panay), while desertions and other acts of insubordination by Filipino constables
rarely became a problem. Even in Batangas and Cavite, where insurgents initially overwhelmed
the Constabulary, Allen's forces ultimately prevailed and restored stability. It was only in Samar,
102 Ralph Eldin Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," Ohio
Historical Quarterly 70.4 (1961): 308-31. For MacArthur's opposition to the Constabulary plan, see Taft to Root, 14
November 1900, Reel 463, Taft, Papers. For MacArthur's changing attitude towards the issue of civilian control of
provinces, see Taft to Root, 21 February 1901 and 17 March 1901, Reel 464, Taft, Papers.
03 See, for example, Chaffee to Corbin, 2 September 1901, Container 1, Corbin Papers; Chaffee to Taft, 16 October
1901, Container 164, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. He did,
nonetheless, succeed in delaying the organization of the Constabulary until August 8 by initially refusing to detail
his officers to lead the Constabulary (until he was convinced otherwise by Adjutant General Henry Corbin, who
happened to be visiting the Philippines at this time). Taft to Root, 2 August 1901, Reel 464, Taft, Papers.
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where the Constabulary became embroiled in an ethnic struggle between highland tribes (known
as the Pulajanes) and lowland farmers that civil authorities was compelled to relinquish control
to the U.S. Army.104
In these campaigns, the Constabulary succeeded in establishing order by behaving as a
colonial army. With its newly obtained authority (granted by the U.S. Congress in January 1903)
to command companies of U.S. Army Philippine Scouts (along with local volunteer units),
Constabulary deployments at times numbered over a thousand men.'0 5 It was not only in
organization that the Constabulary began to increasingly resemble a military, but also in its
counter-insurgency tactics. In Cavite and Batangas, where resistance was especially fierce,
Constabulary officers adopted the controversial policy of reconcentration (whereby Filipinos
were ordered to relocate to one of several designated "safe zones" for the purpose of isolating
insurgents from their source of food, supplies, and shelter). Travel within Cavite and Batangas
was strictly limited and all ports were closed. Local elites (many of then suspected of aiding the
insurgents) were subjected to monitoring and harassment by agents of the Information Division,
and Filipino papers reported widespread abuse by the Constabulary against townspeople and
villagers. The use of torture (such as the "water cure," where gallons of water was forced into the
victim's stomach) to extract information from suspected rebels was now common. Finally, the
104 For an overview of these campaigns, see Coats, The Philippine Constabulary. A more dramatized rendering is
offered by Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary (Los Angeles: Globe Printing Company,
1949); Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company,
1938). For a first-hand account of these campaigns, see John R. White, Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the
Philippine Islands (New York: Century Co., 1928).
'0 As Chaffee confided to Corbin in mid 1902, "[I]t is observed that in nearly all localities vacated by the Army the
Civil Government is required to install a considerable force of constabulary, usually materially stronger than
contemplated by the Act of the Commission organizing this force. It is this manifest necessity for military
surveillance that unsettles my mind with regard to the necessity for the presence of the moral influence exerted by
the Army of the United States." Chaffee to Corbin, 9 June 1902, Container 1, Corbin Papers, p. 3.
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writ of habeas corpus was suspended on January 31, 1905, making both Cavite and Batangas
under civil administration in name only.10 6
With increasing brutality of the Constabulary, even ardent Americanistas (pro-U.S.
Filipinos) began to voice concern. Relations between American colonial authorities and Filipino
collaborators finally reached a breaking point when Pedro A. Roxas, a prominent plantation
owner in Batangas and a close associate of Trinidad Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda (who,
as Filipino members of the Philippine Commission, were among America's most prominent
collaborators), was arrested on sedition charges in early 1905. It also did not help that the
Constabulary's heavy-handed campaign in Cavite and Batangas was taking place as Governor-
General Wright (who had succeeded Taft as chief executive of the Insular Government in 1904)
sought the implementation of various bureaucratic and taxation reforms that seemed to favor the
American civilian community (in Manila) over Filipino landed elites. Filipino-American
relations finally reached a nadir when the Federal Party-originally conceived as an all-Filipino
and pro-American counter-revolutionary organization-renounced its founding goal of seeking
statehood in the United States and instead embraced eventual Philippine independence. 07
What followed was a war of letters, where Pardo de Tavera and Legarda wrote
voluminously to officials in Washington, especially Taft (now Secretary of War), complaining of
Wright's leadership and the Constabulary's conduct, going so far as to suggest that military rule
106 This was the first time the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in a province under civil rule, and U.S. military
as well as Filipino critics of the colonial administration argued that this undermined Filipino confidence in U.S.
government more than if a province was returned outright to U.S. military rule. The Constabulary campaigns in
Cavite and Batangas are described in Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, pp. 139-89; McCoy, Policing America's
Empire, pp. 132-38. Coat's account is defensive of the actions of the Constabulary, while McCoy provides a more
evenhanded treatment of the subject. Specific data regarding the Cavite/Batangas campaign can be found in the
Annual Report of the Philippine Commission for years 1903 to 1905. See, in particular, reports by the Chief of the
Constabulary and the commanding officer of the First District.
107 McCoy, Policing America 's Empire, pp. 138-42; Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and
the United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 118-22.
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was preferable to that by the Constabulary.1 08 With the political situation in the archipelago
spiraling out of control, Taft was compelled to return to the Philippines in order to inspect
conditions firsthand, and most importantly, to repair the strained relationship between
Americanistas and the colonial administration.' 09
Yet, this political drama should not obscure the fact that the Constabulary had succeeded
in suppressing the insurgency in Cavite and Batangas by the summer of 1905, as well as in most
other provinces under its jurisdiction. Given that the Constabulary had only been in existence for
a few years, and given that the loyalty of Filipino soldiers (precisely in this kind of a brutal
campaign) had been a cause of concern, this was a major achievement." 0 Ironically, however, it
was precisely because the Constabulary was so successful in militarily defeating the insurgency
that its raison d' tre came to be questioned, not just by Filipino elites, but also by American
officials (both military and civilian). In other words, while the Constabulary had succeeded as a
108 For example, Legarda forwarded to Clarence Edwards (the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs), the following
letter he had written to Wright in April 1905: "In the first place, I am very far from believing that the situation in
Cavite and Batangas, however grave it may be, can in any way affect the complete success of Civil Government in
these Islands, nor can I agree that, on account of one of the branches of this Government, let us call it the
Constabulary, having been unfortunate in its action, can it be said that the Civil Government is in any way a failure.
These two provinces, if events should make it necessary, could be, as is the Island of Mindanao, under military
control, and if the Constabulary force has not been successful in controlling ladronism in them, the same cannot be
said with regard to the rest of the Archipelago (1)." Legarda to Wright, 15 April 1905, Folder 9, Box 5, Clarence
Ransom Edwards Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. For examples of Pardo de Tavera and Legarda's
complaints of Constabulary abuses, see Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 7 February 1905, Reel 48 Taft, Papers; Legarda to
Taft, 28 February 1905, Reel 48, Taft, Papers; Pardo de Tavera to Theodore Roosevelt, 10 March 1905, Reel 49,
Taft, Papers; Legarda to Taft, 14 April 1905, Reel 49, Taft, Papers; Pardo de Tavera to Taft, 17 April 1905, Folder
10, Box 5, Edwards Papers; Legarda to Taft, 27 April 1905, Folder 12, Box 5, Edwards Papers; Pardo de Tavera to
Taft, 19 May 1905, Reel 50, Taft, Papers.
109 For a detailed account of Taft's 1905 trip, see LeRoy, "Manuscripts of Travelogue Account of Trip to the
Philippine Islands," 1905, Box 1, James A. LeRoy Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor.
110 As Taft wrote to Allen in November 1906, "You have rendered excellent services in the Islands and had a lot of
hard work, and have constructed a good force. As you know, there have been times when General Wright and I were
disposed to criticize your methods and course, but no one can be familiar with the entire history of your command
and not acknowledge the efficiency of the service which you have rendered." Taft to Allen, 21 November 1906,
Allen Papers.
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police organization, it was contributing to the failure of the institution of policing.'" As James
A. LeRoy (who returned to the archipelago as Taft's private security in 1905) wrote in 1906:
My Criticism of the Constabulary is because its form is increasingly military. Banditry
will not end by the Constabulary taking a military form, and more Filipino cooperation
should be secured and more responsibility put upon the governors of the provinces. Also
it is a great waste to have both the Constabulary and the useless municipal police. I would
abolish the Constabulary as an organized force, keeping its good officers, and placing
local governments in charge of local police."12
As LeRoy clearly recognized, by coercing Filipinos into submission, the Constabulary
had acquired a reputation of ruthlessness-a reputation that threatened to undermine its
effectiveness in obtaining local cooperation in law enforcement at times of peace. As a highly
coercive force, the Constabulary was able to defeat insurrections as they arose, but its actions
prevented cooperative ties from forming between the local population and the colonial regime
that would have helped prevent an insurrection from developing in the first place." 3 Moreover,
the United States already had a powerful military force in the Philippines-the U.S. Army-and
despite the successes of the Constabulary in several counter-insurgency campaigns, the Army
was ultimately far better equipped at defeating rebel and bandit groups. In fact, by entrusting
military operations to the Constabulary, conflict was often unnecessarily prolonged. This was
This observation also demonstrates the conceptual importance of distinguishing between an organization and an
institution. As discussed in Ch. 1, the perspective taken here is that an organization is a component of an institution,
along with formal rules, norms, and beliefs.
112 LeRoy to Worcester, 3 August 1906, Philippine Islands Folder: Correspondence 1904-1909, LeRoy Papers, p. 14.
Worcester responds indirectly to LeRoy's letter in his 1914 memoir by noting that there were certainly some abuses,
and it was undoubtedly true that the U.S. Army was better at fighting insurgents. However, "[e]ven if it were true
that the army could have rendered more effective service to this end than could have been expected at the outset
from a newly organized body of Filipino soldiers, the argument against the organization and use of the constabulary
would in my opinion have been by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy to prepare the Filipinos to establish
and maintain a stable government of their own. The proper exercise of police powers is obviously necessary to such
an end." Dean C. Worcester, Philippines Past and Present, ed. Joseph Ralston Hayden (New York: Macmillan,
1930), p. 311. He then lists on page 314 the various ways Constabulary officers are preferable to U.S. Army officers
in providing peace and security in the Philippines. For a defense of the Constabulary along similar lines, see also,
Lebbeus Redman Wilfley, Peace Problems of the Philippines (Manila: E. C. McCullough & Co., 1905).
113 For a rendering of the various abuses by the Constabulary, see Henry Parker Willis, Our Philippine Problem: A
Study ofAmerican Colonial Policy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1905), pp. 120-49.
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made abundantly clear in 1905, as the Army suppressed the Samar insurrection in a matter of
months after it took over the campaign from the Constabulary, which had been operating
unsuccessfully against the Pulajanes for several years. 14
Nonetheless, while the colonial administration certainly did not require two military
organizations-one more efficient than the other-to secure U.S. governance in the archipelago,
it did need an effective police institution. Defenders of the Constabulary were correct in pointing
out that the Constabulary was tasked with duties-such as disaster relief, regular patrolling of the
countryside, and enforcement of quarantines against cholera and rinderpest-that were outside
the jurisdiction of Philippine municipal police organizations or inappropriate for the U.S.
Army.115 In order to solidify U.S. rule in the archipelago, what was demanded was not the
abolition of the Constabulary but its transformation from a pseudo-military organization into a
full-fledged colonial police force. Indeed, this was precisely the course taken under sound
leadership, and the Constabulary reinvented itself as a cornerstone of the U.S. colonial
administration in the aftermath of the 1904-05 campaigns. From then on, it would refocus its
energy on police duties, and (with its presence throughout the islands) even come to serve as the
primary channel of collaboration between Filipino provincial elites and U.S. officials in Manila.
Importantly, this radical institutional transformation was possible because an alternative
model of maintaining peace and order-one that depended heavily on partnerships with local
"4 Even Adjutant General Corbin, who initially supported the creation of the Constabulary, had come to advocate its
abolishment by the end of 1905. Specifically, he presented a proposal to Taft whereby the Constabulary and the
Scouts would be merged into one force and placed under the control of the U.S. Army. Under this plan, the
commander of the U.S. military's Philippine Division would then be made a member of the Philippine Commission.
Corbin to Taft, 1 January 1906, Reel 54, Taft, Papers. See also Corbin to Taft, April 15, Reel 49, Taft, Papers. For
a description of the Samar campaign, see Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, pp. 310-51; McCoy, Policing
America's Empire, pp. 130-32.
"5 For examples of the various civil duties of the Constabulary, see Worcester, Philippines Past and Present, pp.
312-15, 320-21. In particular, the Constabulary played a crucial role in enforcing quarantines against cholera and
rinderpest, and in eradicating the plague. See Folders 3.3 and 3.5 in Vol. 3, Worcester Philippine Collection, Special
Collections Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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powerholders-had already been developed by regional Constabulary commanders, such as Col.
Harry Bandholtz and Capt. James Harbord. The Constabulary, while borrowing heavily from
Spanish precedent, was not necessarily forged out of a pre-conceived model, nor was there ever a
clear vision as to how it ought to be organized. Consequently, unlike in other institutional areas
(such as education), a certain level of flexibility was afforded to colonial agents in the matter of
policing. However, there were clear limits as to what colonial agents could do in establishing a
Philippine police institution. Police reform was permissible only so far as it followed Root's
original script of "local autonomy," which had been faithfully followed by his successors in the
War Department. In turn, this prevented America's colonial agents from undertaking hybridizing
reforms and had the effect of reifying the dualistic structure of the Philippine police institution.
3.111. Politicization of the Constabulary and Its Attainment of Local Ownership
From the very beginning of his thirteen-year career in the archipelago, Harry Bandholtz
demonstrated his capability as a liaison between the American colonial regime and Filipino
elites. A West Point graduate and veteran of the Cuba campaign, he was first assigned to the
province of Tayabas in Central Luzon when he arrived in the Philippines in July 1900. Critical of
fellow Army officers for their insensitivity toward the local population and brutality against
revolutionary leaders, he sought an end to the military campaign in Tayabas by cultivating
alliances with local powerholders and by negotiating with insurgent generals for their surrender.
By the time Tayabas was pacified, Bandholtz had become a trusted figure in the province: a
person who could be relied upon by local elites to maintain the balance of power among the
prominent families of Tayabas, while attracting patronage to the province from the colonial
government in Manila. When Tayabas held its first provincial governor's election in February
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1902, Bandholtz was the surprising victor. Bandholtz was seen as one of them-an American
cacique (boss)-and he certainly did not disappoint. 11
With his military background and his ability to work closely with Filipino elites, he was
ideally suited to become a constable. In April 1903, he resigned his post as governor of Tayabas
and joined the Constabulary as the commanding officer of the Second District in Southern
Luzon. As a Constabulary officer, Bandholtz was the anti-Allen. While Allen believed that the
duty of the Constabulary was to eliminate corrupt elites and enlighten the masses (through force
if need be), Bandholtz happily mingled with Filipino powerholders and even encouraged their
corrupt behavior by showering his Filipino prot6g6s with gifts, lucrative government contracts,
and political appointments."17 They both believed in the importance of intelligence, but while
Allen relied upon intelligence to weed out and capture insurgents, Bandholtz used it to turn
Filipinos into informants and collaborators, and to stymie the political advancement of those
regarded as unsupportive of American rule.' 8 Allen was an ambitious military man, dreaming of
becoming a field general in the regular U.S. Army; Bandholtz was a consummate politician, who
sought a position in the Department of War, perhaps en route to even higher political office."' 9
These differences between the two men were clearly manifested in their approaches to
policing, which in turn reflected two paradigmatic models of maintaining security within an
occupied territory. On one hand was a model that saw effective policing as a function of the size
116 Rene R. Cruz, "The Colonial Experience," in Konstable: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1901-1991,
ed. Margarita R Cojuangco, et al. (Manila: AboCan, 1991), p. 48; Michael Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: Filipino
Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Quezon City, PI: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 181,
185; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, p. 178.
".7 See, for example, correspondences between Don Anicento Medel (of Legaspi), Bandholtz, and Horace L. Higgins
(General Manager of Manila and Dagupan Railway) from 25 February 1907 to 5 March 1907, Reel 1, Bandholtz
Papers. Here, Bandholtz recommends the appointment of Don Anicento Medel as a railroad construction inspector
to Higgins, who Bandholtz met during his service in Albay. See also, Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, pp. 282-85;
McCoy, Policing America's Empire, p. 145.
118 McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 109-11, 177-96.
"9 For a brief biography and personality of Allen, see McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 88-90.
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and quality of an autonomous and modem police force; on the other was the notion that policing
is best undertaken through collaboration between the colonial state and existing traditional power
structures. If the campaigns in Cavite and Batangas were quintessential Allen, representing the
former model, Bandholtz's "policing through collaboration" method was displayed in Albay,
against a rebellion led by Simeon Ola. Instead of relying exclusively on military force in hunting
down Ola, Bandholtz enlisted the support of Filipino elites to convince the rebel leader to
surrender. On September 25, 1903, Bandholtz's strategy paid off, and a province that seemed to
be at the brink of complete meltdown (a la Cavite and Batangas) was largely pacified just a few
months after Bandholtz's arrival.12 0
Bandholtz's success in Albay boosted his reputation as both a seasoned counter-
insurgency tactician and a diplomat. It was therefore hardly surprising that he was reassigned
from the Second District to the First (which included Cavite and Batangas, as well as Manila) in
late 1905 in the aftermath of the Cavite/Batangas fiasco. As commander of the First District, his
mission was to round up remaining insurgents in the two troubled provinces and, most critically,
to restore cooperative relations between the colonial administration and local elites.' 2 ' Moreover,
his transfer to the First District, with its headquarters in Manila, did not simply concern Cavite
and Batangas: In light of Taft's instructions to regain the confidence of Filipino elites, Bandholtz
emerged as the ideal candidate to lead a comprehensive reform of the Constabulary and to
replace Allen as its chief.
When Secretary of War Taft returned to the Philippines in mid-1905, he was shocked to
find that the political situation was much worse than what he had imagined. Pardo de Tavera and
Legarda had not exaggerated when they reported that the collaborative arrangement between
120 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, pp. 93-99; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, p. 144.
2 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, pp. 183-88; McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 136-37.
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Filipino elites and American colonial officials was heading toward collapse. The Constabulary
had succeeded in restoring peace for the time being, but it had also sown the seeds for future
insurrections. Friendly relations between the colonial government and Filipino elites had to be
immediately restored, and it was evident to Taft that this was to begin with a reform of the
Constabulary. In Taft's assessment of the political crisis, the primary culprit was Governor-
General Wright. In addition to allowing the Constabulary to harass Filipino elites, Wright had
initiated a series of centralizing reforms meant to decrease the autonomy of provincial and
municipal governments. Such reforms were in clear contradiction to Secretary Root's original
Instructions, which Taft had so faithfully followed when he was Civil Governor of the
Philippines, and now as War Secretary himself. The dismissal of Wright as Governor-General
thus soon followed Taft's inspection trip, and sent a clear message to Wright's successors that
any departure from Washington's desired policy of "benevolence" was not to be tolerated.12 3
Specifically on the issue of policing, Taft instructed Allen to purge the Constabulary of
its military mentality and refocus its attention on police (civil) duties. Constables were to show
courtesy to provincial governors and other Filipino elites, and accomplish their duty through
cooperation with local powerholders. Interference of constables in responsibilities properly
belonging to presidentes should be minimized, if not eliminated. Humbled, and with his
reputation and position as Constabulary Chief on the line, Allen relayed the Constabulary's new
policy to his officers in a series of circulars and orders:
122 Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the 'New Order': The Structure and Supervision of Local Government During
the Taft Era," in Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule, ed. Norman Owen (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), pp. 22-23; Lewis E.
Gleeck, Jr., The American Governors- General and High Commissioners in the Philippines: Proconsuls, Nation-
builders and Politicians (Quezon City, P..: New Day Publishers, 1986), pp. 33-57; Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Colonial
Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American
Philippines, 1900-1913," The Journal ofAsian Studies 59.2 (2000), pp. 288-90.
23 On this point, see a revealing letter written by Henry C. Ide to Taft on February 4, 1906. The letter, which can be
found in Reel 55 of the Taft papers is reproduced in Ch. 3, footnote 144.
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It is necessary that district chiefs be personally well acquainted with the governors and
the other members of the provincial boards in their districts as well as with the officials of
the towns and the principal citizens thereof, and that they require their officers to keep in
close touch with them. In order to accomplish this important end, district chiefs will visit
the different provinces in their districts as often as possible. It is through that this is one
of the most necessary means of securing the co6peration of the officials and people of the
provinces, without which the Constabulary work cannot be considered successful. ...
Constabulary officers must not forget that they are civil employees of a Bureau of the
Civil Government ... [emphasis mine]. 124
Nonetheless, the September 15 Constabulary Circular (from which the above passage is
quoted) was careful to warn against "undue interest" in local politics by constables: "Officers
should be very particular to render proper courtesy to governors of provinces and to all local
officials and to be on friendly terms with them, but they should keep their balance and not take
such undue interest in any one party as to damage their reputation for impartiality." 125 Yet, this
theoretical distinction between cultivating friendly ties between the Constabulary and local elites
and the participation of constables in politics was blurred in practice. Under Bandholtz's
leadership, the Constabulary came to serve a function that went far beyond what Taft had
initially planned for it in 1900, and reemphasized in 1905. In addition to chasing bandits and
enforcing quarantines with the help of Filipino elites, Constabulary officers would also directly
participate in Philippine politics to ensure that those most sympathetic to U.S. colonial rule
would be elected as municipal presidents and provincial governors. 12 6 In fact, the man who
124 Bureau of Constabulary, Circular No. 33, 15 September 1905, Reel 52, Taft, Papers, p. 1. See also Headquarters
Philippine Constabulary, General Orders No. 66, 22 July 1905, Reel 52, Taft, Papers; Allen to James Harbord (The
Chief of the Fifth Constabulary District), 1 September 1905, Reel 52, Taft, Papers.
25 Bureau of Constabulary, Circular No. 33, p. 1.
26 For example, a detailed account of John W. Swann's (Senior Inspector of Sorsogon) role in the 1906 reelection of
Governor Monreals of Sorsogon is found in Swann to Bandholtz, 6 February 1906, Reel 1, Bandholtz Papers.
Meanwhile, in clear violation of the principle of impartiality in Filipino politics, Bandholtz recommends the
appointment of Juan Nieva (presidente of Santa Cruz) as a member of the provincial board of Tayabas. See
Bandholtz to Ide, 17 March 1906, Reel 1, Bandholtz Papers.
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eventually became the most important Filipino politician during the American colonial period-
Manuel Quezon of Tayabas-was an early Bandholtz protegd. 2 7
Furthermore, the Constabulary officers did not merely promote the careers of a few
promising Filipino politicians, but they also helped to forge close ties between U.S. officials in
Manila with provincial elites. Originally, U.S. rule in the archipelago rested upon collaborative
ties with members of the Manila intelligentsia class-the ilustrados-who in turn used their
influence to handpick individuals to serve as provincial governors and municipal presidents.12 8
However, after two rounds of municipal and provincial elections between 1902 and 1905, the
original crop of appointed provincial and municipal leaders (belonging to the Federal Party) had
been largely replaced by individuals who relied on their local base, rather than on patronage from
Manila ilustrados, to obtain political power and prestige. Correspondingly, the influence of the
ilustrado-led Federal Party was increasingly confined to Manila and a few adjoining towns and
villages by the time of the Cavite/Batangas crisis. If the U.S. colonial government was to
maintain its authority in the archipelago, a new collaborative arrangement had to be
established.12 9 Constabulary officers, with their knowledge of local politics and intimate ties with
provincial and municipal elites, were ideally positioned to contribute to this end, and under
Bandholtz's leadership, they were more than willing. 30
m For an account of Bandholtz's intervention on behalf of Quezon during the 1906 provincial governor's election in
Tayabas, see Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, pp. 189-92. Bandholtz's role in the matter can also be pieced together in a
series of correspondences between Bandholtz, Harbord, Wardall, Muerman, and Balch between 3 December 1905
and 11 January 1906, found in Reel 1, Bandholtz Papers. A discussion of Quezon's ties with Bandholtz is also
discussed in Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, pp. 184-93. McCoy finds that not only did Quezon serve the colonial
regime in his capacity as a politician, but was also a key informant-i.e., a "voluntary" secret service agent. See
McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 187-88.
128 On this point, see Ch. 3.
129 Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, pp. 143-71.
130 Indeed, when provincial governors convened their first governors' meeting in Manila in October 1906, Bandholtz
hosted a banquet on their behalf to impress upon them the Constabulary's desire to work closely with the provincial
governors. As Bandholtz correctly predicted, it was from this group of young governors that the next generation of
Filipino leaders, such as Quezon (governor of Tayabas), Sergio Osmeia (Cebu), and Jaime Carlos de Veyra (Leyte),
emerged. Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, p. 274-81.
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With Bandholtz as its helm, the Constabulary was therefore transformed from the most
hated organization in the Philippines to a close ally of Filipino elites, and the institution of
policing was changed from one based on coercion to one relying on diplomacy and steeped in
politics. In 1912, Dean C. Worcester (the Secretary of Interior and a member of the original
Philippine Commission) wrote the following account of Bandholtz's police institution to Taft:
Mr. Forbes feels grateful to General Bandholtz for making the Constabulary a popular
organization. In so far as its present popularity is due, and it is in no small degree, to
improved discipline and the resulting cessation of abuses, [Bandholtz] is entitled to a very
great credit for what he has done, but I have always been suspicious of a police force
which was too generally popular, and General Bandholtz has carried politics into the
work of his Bureau until the public service has been seriously prejudiced. 3 1
Worcester wrote the above as a critique of Bandholtz. Ironically, however, the above
passage succinctly captures why the Constabulary was so successful as the organizational arm of
the police institution in colonial Philippines. By 1911, all of the remaining insurgencies led by
revolutionary leaders had been defeated and the islands were largely at peace (except for the
administratively separate Muslim-majority island of Mindanao). "Ladronism," which had
inflicted the Philippines since Spanish times, ceased to be a concern. Starting in the 1920s, with
rising inequality and land tenancy, rural unrest became the new source of potential instability in
the Philippines. Yet, the Constabulary was quick to detect discontent (aided by its wide network
of spies and informants), and with the cooperation of local elites, suppressed most armed
uprisings within a few hours of outbreak. It was not until 1946, when the islands were in a state
of chaos and disarray following World War II, that the Philippines became embroiled in its first
13' Emphasis by Worcester. Worcester to Taft, 2 May 1912, Dean C. Worcester Papers, Bentley Historical Library,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, p. 3.
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major uprising-the Huk Rebellion-since those in Cavite, Batangas, and Samar in the early
1900s.13 2











Note: Here (as in previous diagrams) the dotted lines represent nominal oversight, while the solid lines represent
effective control. This diagram does not apply to the "non-Christian" tribal regions of central Luzon, nor to the
Muslim-majority islands of Mindanao and Sulu.
Despite the Constabulary's effectiveness in maintaining U.S. rule in the Philippine
Islands, post-1905 police reforms remained incomplete in one key aspect: While Filipino landed
elites were successfully integrated into the colonial state via the Constabulary, their source of
coercive capability-that is, the all-Filipino municipal police force-remained outside the U.S.
colonial police organization's chain of commands, as depicted in Figure 4. The problem of
exerting control over the municipal police was further exacerbated by the fact that the authority
to appoint or dismiss municipal police officers rested with the presidente (except between 1912
m For an account of the peasant uprisings from 1923 to the end of the American period, see David R. Sturtevant,
Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 141-255.
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and 1924, when this authority belonged to the provincial governor). Moreover, regulations
regarding who could be appointed to the municipal police force, as well as the circumstances
under which one could be dismissed, existed on paper, but were hardly enforced in practice. It
was all too easy for a presidente to cow qualified individuals into declining appointment to the
municipal police, or to accuse incumbent police officers belonging to a rival clique of some
misconduct to make room for his own cronies.' 33 Consequently, as described by Captain J. W.
Swann (Senior Inspector of Albay), the municipal police largely functioned as body-guards and
personal servants of the presidente, rather than as an instrument of law enforcement:
They are almost without exception from the lowest and least respected class, are ignorant,
undisciplined, and practically servants for the presidente and other municipal officials. If
a representative presidente buys a fighting cock in the nearest town he sends a municipal
policemen after it. If his wife and children go on a trip they are attended by two
policemen, who generally play the part of nurse and maid of all work. When the
presidente comes to the provincial capital he rides a horse and is frequently followed by
three or four policemen on foot, who bring his lunch, hand bag, and other baggage, and if
he writes a note to a friend in a neighboring town a policeman delivers it.'34
As seen from his annual reports, Bandholtz was certainly aware of these shortcomings
and expressed year after year the need to fundamentally restructure the existing system of
policing. In particular, his recommendation was to merge the municipal police force and the
Philippine Constabulary into a single organizational structure. In other words, he proposed the
hybridization of the centuries-old system of semi-privatized local policing with the new national
police system. Bandholtz recognized that "the most effective remedy might be to abolish the
13 Bajh, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 222-37.
13 J. Warren Swann, "Report of the Officer Commanding the Second District," RPC 1905, p. 74. This unflattering
depiction of municipal police organizations clearly reflected prejudices held by U.S. police officers, but racist
attitudes notwithstanding, an effective municipal police force was likely the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, it
was not just the Americans who complained about the performance of the municipal police. According to
Bandholtz's 1905 report, fourteen of sixteen prominent Filipino officials within the Second Constabulary District,
including all provincial governors, reported that the "municipal police are at present utterly incapable of
maintenance of order." W. Cameron Forbes, "Report of the department of Commerce and Police," RPC 1905, p. 10.
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municipal police and increase the strength and enlarge the scope of the constabulary sufficiently
to enable it to handle the municipalities in addition to its other duties." Nonetheless, he was
aware that displacing the existing system of local policing would thoroughly antagonize Filipino
elites, undermining the Constabulary's ability to serve as an intermediary between the colonial
state and local powerholders. Therefore, his recommendation was simply to organize the
municipal police into "a provincial corps under the immediate orders of the senior inspector of
the constabulary, who, subject to approval of the provincial board, should have authority to
appoint, promote, dismiss, and assign to stations any of its members." Under this scheme, the
police would remain under the authority of the presidente "to the extent of enforcing local
ordinances, keeping the peace, and making arrests, and likewise under the general supervision of
the provincial governor as executive officer of the province." Nonetheless, the Constabulary
would obtain effective control over the municipal police by making frequent inspections and
transferring police officers from one town to anther. m3
This plan was never to be implemented, however, despite Bandholtz's (or his deputy
Harbord's) repeated calls for such reforms from 1905 to 1913 (when Bandholtz's tenure as Chief
of Constabulary was terminated by the War Department).13 6 When Act 2169 was finally passed
by the Philippine Assembly in 1912 to modify the existing municipal organization law, the
Constabulary was assigned the long-sought responsibility of inspecting the municipal police; yet,
it was not given the authority to directly discipline them, and only to make general
recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce and Police. Following the guidelines originally
135 Harry H. Bandholtz, "Report of the Officer Command Second District, Philippines Constabulary," in RPC 1905,
p. 80.
36 Bandholtz's reports between 1905 and 1908 are contained within PRC. For his reports between 1909 and 1912,
see Philippine Constabulary, Annual Report of the Director of Constabulary (Manila: Bureau of Printing). Note that
the 1908 and 1912 reports are written by Harbord, who served as acting director of the Constabulary during
Bandholtz's absence.
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set forth by Secretary Root in 1900 and reaffirmed by Taft during his 1905 trip, it was imperative
(for the now disciplined colonial administration) that municipal and provincial autonomy be
maintained to uphold the fagade of benevolent rule. Hence, the only meaningful change to come
out of the 1912 reform was that examinations were now required for those seeking to serve as
police officers. (However, it was permissible to appoint unqualified individuals to the municipal
police when those qualified could not be found, which, incidentally, was frequent.) Another
"change" found within the 1912 Act was that the municipal chief of police was no longer to be
appointed by the presidente, but instead, by the provincial governor-as long as, of course, the
candidate first obtained the presidente's recommendation. 37
Finally, and most importantly, by allowing the municipal police to operate separately
from the Constabulary, the police structure prevented the state from monopolizing coercive
power. Stated differently, with their control over the municipal police, local powerholders
possessed the legitimate authority to field a largely autonomous security force. Yet, instead of
remedying this defect by strengthening the Constabulary and integrating the two legs of the
colonial police system into a coherent whole (along the lines recommended by Bandholtz), the
U.S. colonial administration made matters worse by sanctioning the existence of a third type of
police organization known as the "rural police"-a private force fielded by provincial governors
to guard rural roads against highway robbers and haciendas against angry peasants. Examples of
these so-called "rural police" included: the private militia maintained by the governor of
Pangasinan from 1918 to 1926; a force known as the National Volunteers, which operated in
Cavite during the 1930s; and the Knights of Peace, a self-proclaimed "conservative labor union"
m3 On this point Baja's (who was a former Filipino Constabulary officer) discussion of the relationship between the
municipal police and the Constabulary is particularly informative. See Baja, Philippine Police System and Its
Problems, pp. 182-83. For the paragraphs pertaining to the issue of municipal policing within Act 2169 (enacted on
February 6, 1912), see Philippines Legislature, Acts of the Second Philippine Legislature (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1912), pp. 155-59.
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led by Governor Sotero Baluyot (of Pampanga) with the mission to promote "understanding"
between landlords and tenants.1 38
In this way, the legacy of U.S. institution-building efforts in the area of policing was the
establishment of two sets of legitimate security forces in the Philippines. The first was the
Constabulary, which combined the organizational structure of the guardia civil with a U.S. Army
ethos, and innovations in intelligence gathering techniques. The other was a multitude of private
("rural police") and semi-private (municipal police) security organizations, which continued the
Spanish-era tradition of gobernadorcillo directly fielding units of cuerpo de cuadrilleros.
Attempts by Bandholtz and his associates to reform this system went nowhere, as members of
the Philippine Commission redoubled their commitment to local autonomy in the aftermath of
Taft's 1905 inspection trip and the dismissal of Gov-Gen Wright. Nonetheless, despite obvious
shortcomings, the American police institution functioned well enough during the colonial period.
U.S. authority was never to be seriously challenged by armed uprisings after its first decade of
colonial rule, and the partnership between the Constabulary and local powerholders (with their
private police forces) kept leftist movements at bay in the 1920s and beyond. Yet, the success of
the U.S. colonial police system rested on unstable institutional foundations, which were exposed
upon Philippine independence in 1946.
3.IV. Legacy of U.S. Colonial Policing in Post-WWI] Philippines
As long as interests of the state and of local elites coincided, the adverse consequences of
a dualistic police institution were not immediately apparent. Moreover, since the Constabulary
was ultimately backed by the powerful U.S. military, it was certainly unwise for Filipino elites to
openly defy the U.S. colonial regime. Local powerholders understood that their relative freedom
38 Baji, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 532, 539-40; Sturtevant, Popular Uprisings in the
Philippines, pp. 249-50.
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under the U.S. regime would be immediately suspended if American officials detected any hint
of disloyalty toward the regime. However, the weakness of the Philippine police institution
became evident once Filipinos achieved independence in 1946. In early 1951, for example,
Philippine internal security forces, including the Constabulary, were ordered to be on high alert
in Negros Occidental, as the province prepared for its local and legislative campaigns. The
governor of the province, Rafael Lacson controlled a private militia with a history of violence
against anybody who dared challenge him. As expected, the 1951 local and legislative election
turned into a brutal affair, resulting in the death of Moises Padilla (a candidate for mayor in the
town of Magallon) and in the injury of many others.' 39
Yet, what made this incident particularly controversial was that the local Constabulary
officer, Cpt. Marcial Enriquez, was under Lacson's influence, and had betrayed public interest
by ordering his men to stand by as Lacson's private militia terrorized the population. As a
provincial governor, Lacson should not have had any power over appointments within the
Constabulary. Yet, Philippine President Elpidio Quirino was indebted to Lacson for ensuring that
Negros Occidental voted overwhelmingly for him during the 1949 presidential election, and in
return, had allowed Lacson to determine who was assigned to the local Constabulary unit. As a
result, the loyalty of Constabulary officers in Negros Occidental was to Governor Lacson rather
than to the Filipino people. 4 0 Moreover, this was not an isolated or unique incident, as witnessed
by similar acts of violence perpetrated by private militias in Cavite, Cebu, and elsewhere.' 4'
The use of violence during elections was something rarely seen when the Philippines was
under U.S. colonial rule, but the collusive relationship between Constabulary officers and
139 McCoy, Policing America's Empire, pp. 379-83.
140 Ibid.
141 For discussion of warlord politics from the post-independence period to the present, see Alfred W. McCoy, ed.,
An Anarchy ofFamilies: State and Family in the Philippines, 2nd ed. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
2009); Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines.
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provincial governors that permitted the rise of political violence in postcolonial Philippines was
an unmistakable legacy of the American period. What foreshadowed the 1951 Negros Occidental
incident was when, in 1906, Bandholtz received complaints from Sergio Osmefla (governor of
Cebu) and Jaime Carlos de Veyra (governor of Leyte) regarding the performance of Col.
Wallace Taylor (commander of the Third District in the Visayas). Bandholtz promptly requested
to have Taylor removed, and lobbied for the appointment of Harbord (who, as commander of the
Second District in Southern Luzon, had helped Quezon win reelection as governor of Tayabas
the previous year) in his place. 142 In fact, Bandholtz even went so far as to criticize other
branches of the Insular Government when they failed to follow the lead of the Constabulary:
"While the Constabulary, whenever it finds one of its senior inspectors does not get along well
with the provincial governor, always changes such an officer," wrote Bandholtz to Harbord in
1906, "the Bureau of Education will do nothing of the kind." 4 3 Giving provincial governors a
say in the Constabulary's personnel decisions was commonplace during the American period, as
it was an effective method of cultivating collaborative ties between the Constabulary and local
Filipino elites.
In this way, the interests of the Constabulary had already become indistinguishable from
those of the provincial ruling class during the U.S. colonial period. By protecting landowners
from peasants during harvest season, and preventing tenant and labor groups from seeking social
justice through the only means available to them-that is, the threat of violence-constables
vigorously defended the selfish interests of landed elites against those of peasants and laborers
142 Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, p. 275.
14 Bandholtz to Harbord, 1 September 1906, Reel 1, Bandholtz Papers, p. 3. To Bandholtz, Barrows (the Director of
Education) was a fool by refusing to transfer out of Tayabas a school teacher (Wardall) who had made himself an
enemy of Quezon by actively campaigned against him in the governor's election.
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long before Filipino politicians gained control over the national police force.14 4 As Lewis Gleeck
(a longtime American resident in Manila and scholar of the U.S. occupation) notes, the
Constabulary's approach of earning the support of local officials "soon put an end to brigandage
and organized rebellion. But its basic philosophy of cooperation with the local authorities, which
was in line with the co-optation strategy at the national level, greatly limited its power to enforce
justice against those of influence." 14 5
Nonetheless, politicization of the Constabulary would not have led to the destabilization
of the entire policing system if it were not for the dualistic nature of the police institution that left
the municipal police, and later the "rural police," outside of the Constabulary's organizational
structure. It was due to the existence of private security forces-and their legitimization by the
U.S. colonial regime-that local elites could carve out their own sphere of influence. These local
power centers placed Constabulary officers in the difficult position of having to choose between
personal and professional loyalty, since they tended to served in the province from which they
originated, as was the case with Captain Enriquez in Negros Occidental. Insofar as the U.S.
remained supreme in the archipelago, they could maintain the loyalty of local powerholders to
the colonial state by threat of overwhelming force. In this way, the inherent contradiction
associated with the dualistic police institution was contained, and the collusive relationship
between local elites and Constabulary officers was employed to the benefit of the colonial
regime. However, such was no longer the case in post-independence Philippines, where the
state's security apparatus had been thoroughly weakened through the course of World War II,
'44 Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, pp. 279-301; Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., Nueva Ecia in American
Times: Homesteaders, Hacenderos and Politicos (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1981), pp. 113-16;
Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 379-
80; Richard Bruce Meixel, An Army for Independence? The American Roots of the Philippine Army, Diss., The Ohio
State University, 1993 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1994), pp. 250-53; James Putzel, Captive Land: The Politics ofAgrarian
Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992), p. 57.
14s Lewis E. Gleeck, Americans on the Philippine Frontiers (Manila: Carmelo & Bauermann, 1974), p. 158.
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and where private militias had grown in strength through their resistance against the Japanese
occupation and from the confusion and lawlessness that followed.
4. Conclusion
In comparing the development of police institutions in Taiwan and the Philippines, what
is striking is the similarity observed in the conditions under which these institutions were forged,
as well as their initial stages of development. As summarized in Figure 5, in both cases, the Qing
and Spanish regimes disintegrated upon the arrival of Japanese and U.S. forces in the respective
target territories. "Displacement" 146 became the de facto institution-building strategy of the
colonial powers. This in turn led to the emergence of a dualistic police structure, as colonial
authorities also failed to utilize pre-existing non-state security organizations. A shift in strategy
occurred in Taiwan in 1897 (with Furush6 Kamon's revival of hokd) and in the Philippines in
1905 (with the Cavite/Batangas fiasco): Thereafter, in both Taiwan and the Philippines, local
elites were welcomed as partners and their private militias turned into auxiliary forces of the
colonial police. This is where the similarities end, however. In 1903, Goto Shimpei initiated the
process of integrating hokd units into the official security apparatus, thus producing a hybridic
institution in the area of policing. Meanwhile, Harry Bandholtz sought to implement a similar
type of reform as early as 1905 in the Philippines, but to no avail. For the entirety of the U.S.
colonial period (and beyond), the Philippine police institution remained dualistic.
146 Displacement is used by Thelen and Streeck to describe one of five strategies of institutional change. The other
four are: layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion. See Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, "Institutional
Change in Advanced Political Economies," in Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political
Economies, ed. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 1-39.
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Taiwan, 1903 Taiwan, 1896
- p
Philippines, 1935 Philippines, 1901
Ineffective
As discussed in some detail in the two preceding chapters, this divergence in institution-
building trajectories of occupied Taiwan and the Philippines is explained by differences in the
degree of discretion enjoyed by Japanese and American colonial agents. In Taiwan and the
Philippines, the strength of the insurgency, the disintegration of the previous governance
structure, and complexity of inter-ethnic cleavages, all made the building of effective police
institutions similarly difficult. Moreover, in both colonial cases, these adverse conditions were
overcome by qualified administrators: Kodama and Goto in Taiwan and Wright and Bandholtz in
the Philippines. However, while Kodama and Goto were able to display their talents to the fullest
and engage in institution-building with much creativity and flexibility, such was not the case for
Wright and Bandholtz. Attempts by Wright between 1904 and 1905 to integrate local and
national governance institutions came to a halt when Taft reprimanded him for deviating from
the official U.S. policy of local autonomy. Seeking to avoid the wrath of the War Secretary (and
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later President), Wright's successors displayed little interest in adopting Bandhotlz's hybridizing
reform initiatives, which were proposed yearly until Bandholtz's resignation in 1913.
It must be stressed, however, that while differences in discretionary authority afforded to
Japanese and U.S. colonial agents explain variation in institution-building outcome between
Taiwan and the Philippines, agent discretion is not a sufficient condition for success. Like
Kodama and Gotd, Gov-Gen Nogi was also afforded much discretion in governing Taiwan, but
given his, and his administration's, lack of talent and vision, he only made matters worse. In this
sense, agent discretion is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it is a necessary condition for
institution-building success under foreign occupation; on the other, it gives colonial officials
awesome powers to do great harm.14 7 Indeed, it is for this reason that institution-building efforts
are more likely to succeed when colonial administrators are constrained from below-that is, by
the colonized peoples-even as they may enjoy autonomy from above. In both Taiwan and the
Philippines, the strength of the insurgency was the primary variable that compelled Got5 and
Bandholtz to incorporate native elites into the governance structure. This, in turn, was to have a
moderating effect on the zeal to "civilize," as colonial administrators were compelled to preserve
the norms and practices of the local population, even as new and "enlightened" institutional
designs were introduced.
In the case of policing, the relationship between resistance toward the occupation and
incorporation of local elites into the institutional order was direct. This, however, was not the
case in other areas of institution-building, such as education. Here, neither did the insurgency
compel colonial agents to accommodate the educational demands of local elites, nor did these
elites take up arms against the state to push their priorities in pedagogy. This does not mean that
147 For further discussion, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a Slate: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
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institutional reform in areas such as education necessarily produces institutions lacking in local
ownership. While physical violence is not the only means available to native elites in demanding
that their voices are heard, and non-violent forms of resistance do exist, it is certainly the most
effective. As I demonstrate in the proceeding chapter on education, native elites can obtain the
power to veto institutional designs when colonial governance cannot be maintained without their
strong support. Finally, in instances where local opposition takes a non-violent form, the
significance of an institutional area to the fulfillment of the occupier's overall objective
determines the extent to which local interests are accommodated. Ironically, strong commitment
by foreign reformers to institution-building success crowds out the voices of the colonized,
producing the dysfunctional outcome they sought to avoid.
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Chapter 5: Education Reform in Colonial Taiwan versus the Philippines
The Advantages and Pitfalls of Local Ownership under Foreign Occupations
1. Introduction
Education was arguably the most important policy area for both Japanese and American
empire-builders. The establishment of economic and security institutions was certainly a more
immediate concern, as they provided foreign occupiers the revenue and security necessary to
maintain colonial governance. Yet, it was only through education that Japan and America's
contrasting visions of empire could be realized to their fullest extent. The annexation of Taiwan
in 1895 was intended to turn the island into an integral component of the Japanese nation-state,
and the Taiwanese into Japanese nationals. It was within the colonial schools that this
transformation would occur, as Taiwanese children would not only learn, but internalize, their
new "national language" (kokugo) and the significance of the "national essence" (kokutai). The
United States also rejected an imperial system for its emerging empire. The American "empire"
was to consist of a network of nominally sovereign states under U.S. leadership, bound together
by common beliefs and values in liberty and democracy. Under this model, the Philippines was
initially placed under formal U.S. occupation, but was to ultimately gain independence when the
Filipinos were "ready." It was through education that this empire of the willing was to be forged:
Schools would instill Filipinos with liberal and democratic values, thus ensuring their perpetual
participation within America's informal empire. Despite the contradictory goals of Japanese and
U.S. imperialism, their blueprint for regional domination thus converged in the classrooms.
This commonality in the strategic objectives of Japan and the United States did not lead
to similar institutional outcomes in education, however. Taiwan's new colonial school system,
having been carefully adapted and incrementally expanded in light of pre-existing institutional
conditions, was highly effective. Although education did not transform the Taiwanese into self-
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identifying Japanese nationals (as hoped by the colonizers), they nonetheless made fluent
Japanese speakers out of those who attended the colonial schools. The success of Japan's
educational reforms is also reflected in the fact that the new education institution ultimately
attained "local ownership." The intelligentsia gradually abandoned traditional Confucian schools
and came to favor the modem curriculum provided by the Japanese. In contrast, the American
education institution in the Philippines was ineffective due to its dualistic structure, as well as the
ambivalent attitude of Filipino elites toward the new public school system. Given the size of the
Philippine population (at approximately seven million in 1898) relative to the number of
American teachers serving in the archipelago (a little less than a thousand at its peak), the U.S.
plan to replace the existing Catholic, Spanish, and limited school system with a secular, English,
and universal one was simply infeasible. However, rather than modifying their ambitions to
accommodate local conditions, colonial officials persisted in their quixotic education policy. The
result was the emergence of a twin-track system comprised of private Catholic schools on one
hand, and public secular ones on the other. This dualistic structure was made worse by the elites'
overwhelming preference for the former, which led the latter-perceived as schools for the lower
classes, especially at the primary level-to deteriorate in quality.
The cause of this variation in institution-building outcome is two-fold: First, the extent to
which foreign reformers may establish a hybridic institution, which integrates new and old
institutional components into a coherent whole, is a function of their discretionary power. It is
only when institution-building agents are liberated from the political and ideological concerns
and preferences of their home government that they may undertake institutional reforms with
flexibility and pragmatism. Second, whether new institutions attain "ownership" by the subject
population-or more precisely, those who are in positions of power and influence vis-d-vis the
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local community-is determined by the population's ability effectively resist the occupation.
Paradoxically, the more effective the resistance, the more likely new institutions will eventually
take root. The priorities of foreign agents, as well as what they imagine to be in the best interests
of the subject population, are often different from those held by local elites. Given the inherently
undemocratic nature of a foreign occupation, it is through armed resistance that the voices of the
colonized are reflected within the institution-building effort. Successful institutions are thus
established under foreign occupations when reform agents are constrained from below but not
from above.
Although both causal variables-agent discretion and effective resistance-were equally
significant in determining institution-building outcomes in the Taiwan and the Philippines cases,
the empirical focus of this chapter is on the second. In colonial Taiwan, the initial plan for
education reform involved the creation of new primary and secondary schools that employed
Confucian classics as textbooks to accommodate the demands of the Taiwanese gentry-scholar
elites. They were the recognized leaders of Taiwanese society, and the only ones capable of
convincing rebel groups to submit to Japanese colonial rule. Yet, with the restoration of peace
and stability on the island, this plan was quickly abandoned in favor of a six-year primary school
system focused entirely on instilling Japanese-language proficiency. Significantly, these schools
(reflecting Japanese prejudices against the local population) were designed to produce manual
laborers and low-ranking bureaucrats. Opportunities for post-primary education were extremely
limited, even for children of the wealthy. Education policy was again reversed in the early to mid
1910s in the direction of accommodation and local ownership. Responding to elite demands for
improvement in the quality of education, the number of post-primary schools for native children
was increased, and Taiwanese children were allowed to enroll in high-quality schools that
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previously catered exclusively to the Japanese settler population. As I demonstrate below, this
temporal variation was caused by the changing importance of the Taiwanese intelligentsia in the
maintenance of colonial governance. The key turning point was the Xinhai Revolution of 1911.
Thereafter, colonial officials, fearing that republican and revolutionary ideologies could leapfrog
from mainland China to Taiwan, actively co-opted the intellectual elite to help lead Taiwanese
nationalism in a "peaceful" direction.
No such exogenous shock rattled the colonial administration in the Philippines, which in
turn found little need to accommodate native elite interests by altering their preferred education
policy. Filipino elite resistance to the new American educational system, in comparison to the
Taiwan case, was also subdued. The intellectual elite (known as the ilustrado) was perfectly
satisfied with the education provided by holdover Catholic schools from the Spanish colonial era.
As long as American officials allowed these schools to co-exist alongside new secular schools,
elites could provide their own children with high-quality Catholic education, while public
schools were largely patronized by the poor. In fact, in was in the interest of Filipino elites to
express support for U.S. education policy, as this helped convince American officials of their
loyalty toward the colonial regime at a time when the archipelago was under siege by 70,000
trigger-happy U.S. troops. Such feigned support eventually turned into more genuine enthusiasm
for American colonial schools. This, however, was not due to any change of opinion regarding
the new public schools (which continued to be viewed in a negative light), but had much to do
with the fact that appropriation for education was a way for Filipino legislators (after the creation
of the Philippine Assembly in 1907) to bring a slice of the national expenditure back to their
home districts. With their own children safely enrolled in Catholic private schools, supporting
U.S. colonial education was thus a win-win situation for the Filipino elite.
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This final point brings the discussion to an issue that has so far been unexplored in this
dissertation: The cost/benefit calculus of native elites can change during the course of an
occupation, leading previously unpopular institutional designs to acquire local ownership.
Moreover, what is striking is that this shift in the strategic calculus of native elites may not
involve a deeper change in their interests, as witnessed in the Philippine case. Filipino elites
ultimately supported the new public school system not because they became convinced of its
superiority over private Catholic schools, but because the building of these schools helped
advance their political position within Philippine society. This observation, which may at first
seem cynical, is precisely what gives one hope that institution-building under foreign occupation
will succeed given the right formula. If it is not necessary to change deep-rooted interests in
order for new institutions to take root, then transformative state-building schemes become
strategically viable propositions.
2. Building an Education Institution in Taiwan
The geographic proximity of Taiwan to mainland China led Japan's military planners to
push for its annexation in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), but this very
factor also implied that establishing colonial rule over the island would be plagued with
difficulties. On one hand, Taiwan served as an effective launching pad for extending Japanese
economic influence to the continent by exploiting inter-ethnic ties between Taiwan and southern
Chinese provinces. On the other, the Japanese colonial administration, known as the
Government-General of Taiwan (GGT), was fully aware that such ties also flowed in the reverse
direction. Loyalty of the Taiwanese to the Japanese empire was thus suspect from the very
beginning, leading the Japanese government to institute an unprecedented policy of allowing the
Taiwanese two years (after annexation) to choose between Japanese and Chinese citizenships.
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Moreover, as revolutionary activity began to shake the Qing dynasty in the early twentieth
century, the GGT was faced with the possibility that, given the density of relations between
Taiwan and the mainland, republican or leftist ideologies could leapfrog to Taiwan and
destabilize Japanese rule. Their worst fears were realized in 1912 when the GGT discovered at
least six revolutionary movements within Taiwan directly linked to the Chinese (Xinhai)
Revolution of 1911. Education policy thus took on a particularly important role in the
maintenance of colonial governance. If Taiwan was to remain a permanent component of the
Japanese state, then the Taiwanese would have to be transformed into self-identifying Japanese
subjects. Only through education was this possible.
Japanese education policy in Taiwan proceeded with many twists and turns, rendering a
linear account of its development difficult. In part, this variance in education policy, especially
during the first two decades of Japanese colonial rule, was due to the complete freedom GGT
officials enjoyed from Tokyo. Under the policy of "no policy," colonial officials experimented
with different educational systems and school curricula, sometimes radically reversing the policy
developed by their predecessors. If the high degree of discretion enjoyed by GGT officials was
what allowed them be experimental in the first place, the directionality and the magnitude of
these shifts fluctuated with changing effectiveness of local resistance to colonial rule. During
periods when the GGT's ability to establish and/or maintain control over the subject population
depended on support from Taiwanese gentry-intellectual elites (i.e., between 1896 and 1902 and
after 1911), the education institution was structured in such a way as to accommodate their
interests. Meanwhile, when the actions and sentiments of the Taiwanese intelligentsia had little
repercussion on peace and stability of the island colony (i.e., from 1902 to 1911), the GGT
simply ignored their demands.
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Nonetheless, despite the many reversals that characterized the GGT's colonial education
policy, what remained constant throughout was its commitment to institutional hybridization.
During each round of education reform, officials sought to maintain coherence between policy
toward the preexisting Chinese-style education of Taiwan and the new Japanese schooling
system. During the early period, this meant adjusting the curriculum of Japanese colonial schools
to reflect those found in traditional Taiwanese schools. Later, the GGT "upgraded" the content of
traditional schools to mimic those found in the new colonial schools. The aim from the very
beginning was to create an integrated educational structure, where public and private schools
jointly advanced the goal of instilling a new national identity into the Taiwanese population. In
the end, the Japanese succeed in establishing such an institution. Ironically, however, evidence of
their "success" is that the Taiwanese people now consider Mandarin Chinese-a language that
was foreign to Taiwan prior to 1945-as their national language. The GGT was never able to
fully Japanize the Taiwanese population during its fifty-year rule over the island. Yet, what the
Japanese colonizers did accomplish was to leave behind a highly effective education institution
that allowed Taiwan's postwar Chinese rulers, led by Chiang Kai-shek, to make native Mandarin
speakers out of the "re-colonized" Taiwanese population.
2.1. Local Ownership and Hybridization of the Education Institution under Political Instability
In Qing-era Taiwan, education and elite status were closely intertwined due to a class
system that divided the population into two main categories: "scholar-gentry" (shenshi) and
commoner. There were three primary methods through which an individual could become a
member of the gentry class. First was by purchase. A commoner in 1831, for example, could
obtain a title offiangsheng for 108 tael of silver. This lower gentry title, however, did not come
with the key privilege of consideration for appointment to the Qing bureaucracy. The second
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method was through military achievement. Yet, even those with illustrious military careers were
required to pass an academic examination in order to join the ranks of the upper (that is, office
holding) gentry. This brings the discussion to the third and most important path toward
admission to the gentry class: through years of mastering Confucian classics, along with poetry
and other texts deemed pertinent for bureaucratic service. Scholarly pursuit began in a private
school and continued at a state-sponsored academy upon passage of a district or provincial
examination. Further study at these academies culminated in the attainment of the right to take
the bureaucratic examination at the sub-provincial, provincial, or metropolitan levels; Successful
candidates were awarded the corresponding upper gentry rank of gongsheng,juren, orjinshi.I
Hence, membership in the ruling class-at least at the highest levels-was closely associated
with scholarly achievement. Education policy, therefore, was of utmost concern to precisely
those individuals that Japanese colonial officials came to rely upon (at least in the early colonial
period) as intermediaries between the colonial state and Taiwanese society.
Education, however, was not a concern of policymakers in Tokyo when they initially
planned for Taiwan's invasion and occupation. In the June 20, 1895 draft proposal of the GGT
bureaucratic structure, there is no mention of creating a bureau or section within the colonial
administration dedicated to educational affairs. Meanwhile, a report submitted to the Taiwan
Affairs Bureau (which served as the highest decision-making body in Tokyo on matters
concerning Taiwan from 1895 to 1896) in the same month simply stated that schools in Taiwan
should teach the Four Books of Confucianism (Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects
' Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule, 1684-1895: The Traditional Order," Journal of the
Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 4.2 (1971), pp. 507-09; Chiukun Chen, "From
Landlords to Local Strongmen: The Transformation of Local Elites in Mid-Ch'ing Taiwan 1780-1862," in Taiwan:
A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubenstein (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 133-62; Zhong Qinghan, Nihon
shokuminchika ni okeru Taiwan kydiku shi [History of Taiwan's education under Japanese colonial rule] (Tokyo:
Taga Shuppan, 1993), pp. 59-78.
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of Confucius, and Analects of Mencius) as they had done before. Absent in this report was a
vision regarding what colonial education in Taiwan should achieve. 2 The fact that education
policy was not among Tokyo's priorities can also be gleaned from the fact that the Ministry of
Education was unrepresented in high-level discussions on Taiwan led by Prime Minister It
Hirobumi.3 As a result, the task of shaping Japan's colonial education policy fell squarely on the
man handpicked by Taiwan Governor-General Kabayama Sukenori to serve as his director of
education: Izawa Sh-iji. 4
Like many of his contemporaries, Izawa assumed that Taiwan had become an integral
part of Japan upon annexation, and that Japanese colonial policy should aim to assimilate the
island's inhabitants into the Japanese national community as quickly as possible. He understood
his purpose in Taiwan, as director of education, as one of realizing this goal through a radical
restructuring of the existing educational system. His zeal for reform was also shaped by his
2 Chen Peifeng, "Doka" no dosho imu: Nihon tochika Taiwan no kokugo kyoiku shi saiko [Strange bedfellows of
Japan's "assimilation policy": Japanese language education in colonial Taiwan revisited] (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2001),
pp. 36-37.
3 The Taiwan Affairs Bureau was composed of eight members (in addition to Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi) who
represented key ministries and agencies: Ito Miyoji (Chief Cabinet Clerk), Kawakami Soroku (Vice Chief of Staff),
Kodama Gentaro (Vice Army Minister), Yamamoto Gonnohy6e (Vice Navy Minister), Hara Kei (Vice Foreign
Minister), Suematsu Kencho (Chief of Legislation Bureau), Tajiri Inajir6 (Vice Finance Minister), and Den Kenjiro
(Chief of Communications Bureau of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation). Edward I-te Chen, "The
Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H.
Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 250.
4 Izawa was a prot6gd of former Minister of Education Mori Arinori, and like his mentor (whose pioneering reforms
centralized control over education under the Ministry of Education), he believed in the superiority of the Western
educational system, and moreover, that the purpose of education was to serve the state. Yet, unlike his mentor,
Izawa advocated that the state should provide free and compulsory education to its population. Izawa's position
proved unpopular within the Ministry, as the Japanese government clearly did not have the financial ability to
realize this goal of universal education at the time. With his position within the Ministry further weakened after
Mori's assassination in 1889, Mori left government service and founded the Society for State Education (Kokka
Kyoiku Sha) to continue his advocacy of universal education. In February 1895, he was introduced to Admiral
Kabayama (through the recommendation of the Vice Education Minister at the time), and was selected to serve as
Kabayama's advisor on educational affairs. For more on Izawa's background, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese
Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 13.
s Izawa, however, did not believe that the Taiwanese could be absorbed into the Japanese ethnic community. Noting
that the German policy of imposing its language onto the French-speaking inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine was
failing, Izawa offered an alternative model based on Britain's experience with the French inhabitants of Quebec:
"intermixing" (kongo) and "harmonization" (chowa). As such, not only were the Taiwanese people encouraged to
learn the Japanese language, but the Japanese community in Taiwan should also be able to communicate with the
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experience studying abroad. Having spent three years learning modern pedagogical methods in
the United States from 1875 to 1878 (at Bridgewater Normal School in Massachusetts and then
at Harvard University), he was an enthusiast for Western-style education.6 At the same time,
Izawa understood that a school system had to be carefully adapted to local conditions if it was to
achieve its pedagogical goals. In Taiwan, this meant that Confucian texts would have to be
incorporated into the curriculum, at least initially, so that students could easily make the
transition from the traditional to the new schools.7
After experimenting with various curricula and pedagogical methods for a year and a
half, Izawa's plan for education reform finally came together in 1897, and a "public school"
system comprised of a six-year elementary and four-year middle course was proposed. Adapting
the school system to local conditions, Izawa chose Confucian classics, such as Three Character
Classic and the Four Books (minus the Analects of Mencius, which included the idea that
subjects possessed the right to overthrow a corrupt sovereign), as primary texts for the
elementary level reading (dokusho) class. The Five Classics of Confucianism, meanwhile, made
up the core of the middle school curriculum. Under Izawa's plan, Japanese schools thus taught
more or less the same texts as the traditional one-teacher Chinese schools, which the GGT
collectively called shob5.8 Other classes included in Izawa's "public school" proposal were
ethics (shaishin), "national language" (kokugo), writing (shiagaku), arithmetic, geography,
local population through their languages. Izawa thus envisioned a multiethnic empire in the Far East that was held
together by a common language (Japanese) and mutual obligations toward a single sovereign (the Japanese
Emperor). Izawa Shiiji, "Shin hanto jinmin ky6ka no h6shin [Policy for educating subjects of the new territory]," in
Izawa Shaji senshai [Selected writings of Izawa Shnji], ed. Shinano Ky6ikukai (Nagano: Shinano Ky6ikukai, 1958):
632-41. For further discussion of Izawa's education policy, see Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no
bunka togd [Cultural integration of the Japanese colonial empire] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp. 52-57.
6 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 13.
7 Takeshi Komagome and J. A. Mangan, "Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan 1895-1922: Precepts and
Practices of Control," History ofEducation 26.3 (1997), pp. 313-17.
8 For a description of a typical shob5, see Takeuchi Sadayoshi, Taiwan kanshi [Customs of Taiwan] (Taipei:
Taiwan Nichinichi Shinposha, 1915), pp. 634-40.
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history, art, music, and exercise.9 In short, and in Izawa's own words, his plan "acknowledged
the existing educational structure, but also infused within it a new spirit; unnecessary literature
was abolished, and necessary scholarship was added."10 However, Izawa's proposal for a ten-
year "public school" school system, to be funded entirely by the colonial state, was rejected by
top GGT officials as being too extravagant at a time when austerity was demanded of them by
Tokyo. Exasperated, Izawa resigned as director of education in July 1897.11
It was not until 1898, when leadership over the colonial government was assumed by
Governor-General Kodama Gentaro and Chief Civil Administrator Got6 Shimpei, that the GGT
finally formalized its education policy. The 1898 Common School Regulation (CSR) departed
from the Izawa's earlier proposal in three ways: First, colonial schools for Taiwanese children,
now called "common schools" (kogakko), provided only six years of primary education. Middle
school subjects of history, geography, and science, as well as the Five Classics, were therefore
dropped entirely from the school curriculum.' 3 A medical school and three normal schools were
established in 1899 as institutions of higher education, but post-primary academic (as opposed to
vocational) education was not to be provided by the state.' The second major difference was the
source of funding: While Izawa believed that education should be paid entirely by the state, the
1898 CSR designated local taxes and private donations as the primary source of funding.15 Third,
9 Izawa Shfiji, "Taiwan k6gakk6 setchi ni kansuru iken [Opinion on the establishment of public schools in Taiwan],"
in Izawa Shaiji senshai [Selected writings of Izawa Shaji], ed. Shinano Kyoikukai (Nagano: Shinano Ky6ikukai,
1958): 608-26.
'0 Ibid., p. 612.
" E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 16-17.
12 For the text of the CSR of August 26, 1898, see Taiwan Kyoikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi [History of
education in Taiwan] (Taipei: Kotei Shooku, 1973[1939]), pp. 2 2 9 -3 6 .
13 The common school curriculum under the 1898 CSR, as well as the textbooks used in each of the classes, is found
in ibid., pp. 232-33.
14 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 22-26.
"5 For the text of the July 28, 1898 Taiwan Common School Ordinance (Taiwan Kogakko Rei) mandating that the
source of primary school funding come primarily from local taxation and private donations, see Taiwan Ky6ikukai,
Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 223-24. For figures displaying the shift in source of funding before and after the 1898
reform, see Yoshino Hidekimi, Taiwan kydiku shi [History of education in Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwan Nichinichi
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Got6 sought to conform the curriculum of shobo-style schools, which at the time was far more
popular among Taiwanese elites than the new colonial schools,16 to that of the common schools.
Although regulations pertaining to shobo were not strictly enforced at first (largely due to their
unpopularity among Taiwanese elites), Goto nonetheless laid the foundations for a unified
education system to eventually emerge in Taiwan.'7
The fact that Got6's proposal for education reform departed from Izawa's in significant
ways was hardly surprising, as the two men held contradictory views on Taiwan's current and
future relationship to the Japanese nation-state. Whereas Izawa believed that the common bonds
uniting the Japanese people were the Emperor and the Japanese language, Goto adopted a more
ethnic view of nationhood, metaphorically arguing that one "cannot suddenly change the eyes of
a halibut to look like those of a sea bream."' 8 As such, while Izawa was optimistic of Taiwan's
assimilability to Japan, Goto was pessimistic. To Izawa, Taiwan constituted the outermost rim of
the Japanese nation-state; Goto perceived Taiwan as the inner layer of Japan's (to be expanded)
colonial empire.' 9 Izawa thus advocated the systematic provision of state-sponsored primary and
Shinposha, 1927), p. 237. This table is also reproduced in E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p.
42.
16 From 1898 (when data is first available) to 1903, the number of students officially enrolled in shobo was fairly
stable, fluctuating yearly at a range between approximately 25,000 and 30,000 pupils. It was only in 1904 that the
number of students (predominantly from middle and upper class families) enrolled in common schools (23,179)
exceeded those in shob5 (21,661); thereafter, the number of shob5 students gradually declined, as those attending
common schools increased precipitously. Here, it should be noted that many students attending common schools are
likely to have also attended shobd to obtain a better grounding in Confucian texts. Furthermore, enrollment figures
were quite different from daily attendance rates. For example, the daily attendance figure for common school in
1904 (when common school enrollment exceeded shob6 enrollment for the first time) was 60.66 percent, likely due
to the fact that many students who were officially enrolled in common schools spent a large portion of their time
attending shobo. As enrollment in shob5 declined starting in 1904, both the enrollment number and the daily
attendance percentage for common schools increased, reaching the 60,000 mark and 90 percent, respectively. For
enrollment figures between 1898 and 1934, see Taiwan Ky6ikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 408-10 (for
common schools) and pp. 984-86 (for shob6); for daily enrollment percentages for common schools, see Yoshino,
Taiwan ky5iku shi, p. 199 (for 1898 to 1906) and pp. 315-16 (for 1907 to 1918).
"7 Taiwan Kyaikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 973-80. Regulations concerning shobo were not part of the 1898
CSR but were passed separately in November 1898.
" Tsurumi Yfisuke, Seiden Goto Shinpei [Official biography of Goto Shimpei], vol. 3, ed. Ikkai Tomoyoshi (Tokyo:
Fujiwara Shoten, 2004), p. 39.
19 Ibid., p. 45.
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secondary Japanese language education to the Taiwanese to quicken the pace of assimilation.
Meanwhile, starting from a different set of assumptions, Goto sought to emulate the British
practice of creating a clear barrier between foreign rulers and colonial subjects through education.
Hence, while Japanese settler children received free public elementary and middle schooling, the
Taiwanese had to pay for primary education. Observing that independence movements were
typically led by the educated elite, Goto also reasoned that a policy of keeping the Taiwanese
uneducated or undereducated was better for maintaining Japanese colonial governance.20
Nonetheless, since Goto and Izawa were both pragmatists who faced the same problem of
undertaking school reform in a territory with an entrenched education system, their policies
inevitably converged. In particular, Goto adopted Izawa's signature proposal (albeit for different
reasons): the heavy use of Confucian texts in the common school curriculum. As Got6 reasoned,
this contributed to his policy of accommodating the demands of Taiwanese gentry-scholar elites
at a time when the GGT desperately sought their support in defeating the anti-Japanese
insurgency. During the initial years of Japan's occupation of Taiwan, the gentry class was largely
marginalized under Governor-General Kabayama's military rule. When Imperial Army officers
occupied a Taiwanese locality, rather than showing deference to the local gentry, they recruited
managers of city wards and village chiefs as collaborators. This group of local Taiwanese
officials certainly included low ranking gentry members, but the more prominent individuals of
the literati class-with their qualification to serve in the Qing bureaucracy-saw themselves as
above the pettiness of local politics.2 Kabayama also may have sought to undermine the
'0 Goto's views on colonial education are most clearly articulated in a November 10, 1903 speech to a gathering of
Japanese educators in Taiwan. This speech is reproduced in Mochiji Rokusabur6, Taiwan shokumin seisaku
[Colonial policy in Taiwan] (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1912), pp. 282-93. For more on Goto's views on education, see Chen
P., "D6ka " no dosho imu, pp. 75-78.
2 Harry J. Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915: A Study of Their Reactions to the
Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial Rule and Modernization, Diss., University of
Washington, 1964 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1965), pp. 330-38.
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influence of the gentry within Taiwanese society by placing merchants and commoner landlords
in positions of power.2 2
Kabayama's strategy of sidelining some of the most respected individuals within
Taiwanese society backfired, however, at least in the short run. Village chiefs, ward managers,
and recently empowered merchants simply lacked the authority necessary to repel insurgent
attacks, or the gravitas to convince rebel leaders to surrender. Nogi Maresuke, who took over as
Governor-General in October 1896, realized the shortcoming of Kabayama's strategy and began
to court the favor of influential gentry members by handing out honorary titles and appointing
them as counselors to local and provincial governments, based on their rank within the gentry
hierarchy. Meanwhile, Japanese provincial governors sponsored banquets and poetry recitals in
honor of the local gentry. Yet, it was under the direction of Kodama and Got6, starting in early
1898, that a more coordinated, and ultimately successful, effort to forge collaborative ties
between the colonial administration and the gentry was introduced.
Central to the GGT's campaign to win the trust and support of the gentry-literati was
Kodama, who, in addition to his renown as a master military strategist and an astute politician,
excelled in classical Chinese poetry. Kodama's effort to mingle with the local gentry during his
inspection trips, as well as frequent poetry recitals at his official residence in Taipei, helped ease
the literati's concern over their apparent marginalization. Kodama also spearheaded the
22 Perhaps partly as a result of Kabayama's antagonism toward the gentry, many of its members left Taiwan for
mainland China soon after Japanese annexation. According to one estimate, while approximately 350 individuals in
Taiwan belonged to the three upper gentry ranks in 1895, by 1900, only 57 of them remained. Furthermore,
individuals who possessed the lower gentry grade offiangsheng numbered as many as 5,000 under Qing rule, but
the Japanese colonial administration counted only 845 individuals possessing any gentry rank five years after
annexation. Ching-chih Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," Diss., Harvard University,
1973, pp. 276-77; Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 234-52; idem., "The
Yobunkai of 1900: An Episode in the Transformation of the Taiwan Elite during the Early Japanese Period," in Ri-ju
shi-qi Taiwan shi guo-ji xue-shu yan-Iao-hui lun-wenji [International Conference on Taiwan History under Japanese
Colonization], ed. Department of History, National Taiwan University (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1993),
p. 140.
23 For Nogi's appeasement policy, see Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 339-
48 and 56-60.
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establishment of charitable organizations, and sponsored, according to Chinese custom, grand
banquets honoring the elder. The continuation of Izawa's education policy, which displayed an
appreciation of Confucian teachings through the incorporation of the Four Books into the
curriculum of publically funded schools, dovetailed these efforts. The literati was highly
impressed by Kodama's seemingly sincere respect for their customs and values, and increasingly
lent their support to the anti-insurgency campaign. Working with representatives of the GGT,
locally influential gentry members were particularly instrumental in negotiating surrender terms
with rebel leaders across Taiwan.
The capstone event of the literati appeasement campaign was the March 1900 Y~bunkai
meeting, a GGT sponsored academic conference for those belonging to the top gentry ranks.
Invited to this event were 151 qualified individuals of which over 70 attended. Yet, this event,
which was ostensibly held to solidify the collaborative relationship between the gentry class and
the colonial administration, also revealed that Goto's support of Confucian education was largely
superficial. In his opening remarks, Goto noted that the purpose of Yabunkai (initially planned as
a permanent organization) was to serve as a vehicle for the island's inhabitants to become
"reacquainted with the old and cognizant of the new."26 Although Goto extolled Confucianism
for its respect for learning and ethical teachings, the content of education was to come largely
from the West. Goto went so far as to criticize Qing-era scholars for focusing too much on
literary embellishments and not enough on practical education. The pedagogical methods and
24 C. Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 285-87 and 292-301; Lamley, The Taiwan
Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 349-56 and 360-64.
25 Specifically, those belonging to the jinshijuren, gongsheng, as well as the linsheng rank among the lower gentry,
were invited. Of the 151 invited, 76 individuals submitted essays to the conference. The commemorative photo,
however, suggests that 79 gentry members actually attended. Lamley, "The Y6bunkai of 1900," pp. 137-38.
26 Ibid., p. 134.
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curriculum found in shobo were attacked as antiquated. The gentry, as intellectual leaders,
should join the GGT in pushing for a cultural transformation of Taiwan, Goto proclaimed.27
As the first (and last) Y6bunkai meeting vividly displayed, while Japanese colonial
officials recognized the importance of the gentry as leaders of Taiwanese society, they were
nonetheless dismissive of their traditional values and beliefs. Support of Confucian education by
Got6 and the rest of the GGT leadership therefore ensued only so far as appeasement of the
literati's educational demands was necessary for the counter-insurgency campaign.
Consequently, with the surrender of leading rebels by 1900, and complete pacification of the
western (non-aboriginal) provinces achieved in early 1902, Got6's feigned enthusiasm for
Confucianism quickly faded. Thereafter, while Goto and his lieutenants carefully adapted the
new and modem education system to local conditions (to ensure its effectiveness), its ownership
by the literati elite was no longer a priority and hardly sought. When the 1898 CSR was formally
amended in 1904, it was clear that only those who accepted Japan's intellectual superiority were
welcome to participate in the new schools.
2.11. The New Political Order and the Exclusion of the Literatifrom Educational Reform
The initial impetus for change to the 1898 CSR (Common School Regulation) came from
Japanese primary school teachers and principals. Largely handpicked by Izawa to teach in
Taiwan, they firmly supported an educational system that focused on the spread of Japanese
language proficiency. However, unlike Izawa, who was as much a pragmatist as he was an
idealist (given his background as both bureaucrat and educator), many of the more influential
Japanese teachers were uncompromising true-believers in the transformative power of language.
From their perspective, if Japan's goal in Taiwan was indeed d~ka (assimilation)-as officially
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2 Ibid., pp. 132-42.
maintained by the GGT-then a drastic change to the 1898 CSR, which did more to preserve
traditional Chinese education than to promote "new learning," was a top priority. Leading this
charge was Kimura Tadashi, who had taken over the educational affairs portfolio in June 1898,
and Hashimoto Takeshi, who was appointed to head a group of reformist Japanese educators in
August 1900 (that is, a few months after the Y6bunkai meeting) to draft a new CSR.2 8
First, Japanese educators were unanimous in their belief that the number of common
schools should be increased exponentially. (Kodama Kihachi, who briefly served as Chief of
Education Bureau recommended to Goto in 1898 an increase of common schools from the
existing 74 to 254 in three years. 2 9) The popularity of shoba among Taiwanese elites was
tolerated for the time being, since the anachronistic and impractical education they provided was
better than no schooling, but the GGT had to do its utmost to replace them with common school,
Kimura argued. For the realization of this goal, the colonial state was to finance the expansion of
primary education through state funds rather than leaving this to local governments and private
donors. Second, the existing common school curriculum, which devoted much time to the study
of Chinese language texts, was attacked; in the view of reformist educators, there was little
benefit (practical or otherwise) to teaching the Four Books in common schools.3 1 Also, by
accommodating the desire of Taiwanese parents to have their children study Confucian texts (as
though they were preparing for the Qing bureaucratic examination), Hashimoto argued that
28 Chen P., "Doka" no desho imu, pp. 58-59; Komagome, Shokuminchi ieikoku Nihon no bunka 1ogo, p. 46.
29 For Kodama Kihachi's 1898 report, see "Gakumubu sosetsu ik6 jigyo no gairyaku [Outline of the work of the
Bureau of Educational Affairs since its founding]," in Goto Shimpei monjo [Documents related to Goto Shimpei],
Reel 32, No. 7.87.1 (Tokyo: Yfish6 Firumu Shuppan, 1979).
3 Kimura Tadashi, "Taiwan no futs0i ky6iku [General education of Taiwan]," Taiwan Kydikukai zasshi 28 (1904):
521-33; Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka 1og5, p. 46. Unsaid by Kimura, but what had become
obvious to Japanese educators by that time, was that Got6 had little intention of promoting Tokyo's official colonial
policy of doka. See Ch. 2 for an analysis of Goto's colonial policy.
" Compared to the first point, Japanese educators were more divided on this issue with individuals such as Takaoka
Takeaki and Hirai Matahachi defending the status quo. See Takaoka Takeaki, "K6gakko shishinka ni tsuite [On
ethics education in common schools]," Taiwan Kydikukai zasshi 4 (1902): 435-55. For a summary of Hirai's defense
of the use of Confucian texts, see Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka 15g5, p. 66.
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educators were allowing them to cling on to the dangerous hope that one day Taiwan would
retrocede to China. It was certainly true that ethics (shaishin) should be a major component of
education, but it was hardly the case that this subject was best taught through Confucian texts:
The Japanese sense of loyalty to an unbroken line of Emperors was different from the notion of
loyalty found in Confucianism. Literature, Hashimoto asserted, was first and foremost an
expression of a nation's fundamental spirit. Anything short of a complete Japanese-language
education was thus an obstacle to d~ka.
This belief by Hashimoto, and by Kimura to a lesser extent, in linguistic nationalism was
not shared by top GGT officials such as Goto and Ishizuka Eizo (whose influence within the
GGT, as Kodama's chief legal counselor, rivaled that of Goto's). Instead, they adopted a more
primordial view of nationhood. Accordingly, in an article published in November 1900, Ishizuka
sent a warning to over-ambitious (and idealistic) educators by praising British colonial rule in
India for its explicitly anti-assimilatory education policy.33 Meanwhile, just as a new draft of the
CSR was nearing completion in late 1903, Goto reminded Japanese educators that assimilation
only occurred through a long and natural process (requiring no less than two to three generations
by his estimation). Japanese language education was useful insofar as it trained a cadre of
Taiwanese functionaries to serve within the lower ranks of the GGT, but it should not be used as
32 Hashimoto Takeshi, "K6gakk ni okeru kanbunka ni tsuite [On Chinese literature education in Taiwan's common
school]," Taiwan Kyokai kaiho 65/66 (1904): 10-18/13-21. For further discussion of Hashimoto's arguments, see
Komagome, Shokuminchi ieikoku Nihon no bunka tog6, pp. 64-65. It must be noted that a new zeal among Japanese
educators to increase Japanese language proficiency was not the only reason for this change in curriculum. It also
reflected a radical shift in pedagogical methods. Izawa believed that the best way to teach a new language to
children was to start with a text written in the language they already knew and then to provide a translation of the
text in the new language-i.e., the "translation method." Children thus first read the Four Books in Chinese and then
reread these books in Japanese. By the turn of the twentieth century, Frangois Gouin's "direct method," where
children learned a new language by simultaneously observing an object and the associated word in the new
language, was accepted as superior to the "translation method." Instrumental to the popularization of the "direct
method" in Taiwan was Hashimoto Takashi. On this point, see Catherine Shu-fen Fewings, "Japanese Colonial
Language Education in Taiwan and Assimilation, 1895-1945," Diss., Curtin University of Technology, 2004, pp.
82-108.
3 Ishizuka Eizo, "Kokumin-teki seizonky6so oyobi d6ka zetsumetsu [Survival of the fittest among nations and
extinction by assimilation]," Taiwan Kyokai kaiho 27 (1900): 1-10.
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a tool for promoting d~ka.34 Finally, tired of the "kiron" (empty ideas) of Izawa-era holdover
educators and administrators, Goto dismissed Kimura as Educational Affairs Chief, and rather
than promote one of Kimura's deputies, he appointed Mochiji Rokusabur6, who, as a Home
Ministry veteran and a recent arrival to Taiwan, had no background in education. In turn,
Mochiji dutifully served as Gotos henchman, purging experienced teachers and bringing in new
recruits from Japan. 35
What led to this unconventional appointment was a position paper penned by Mochiji in
1902 (when he was a mid-ranking administrator within Tainan province in southern Taiwan)
positing that public education's chief goal was to support economic development. The existing
academic curriculum (which used the Four Books as the primary text) should therefore be
replaced by one focusing on vocational education, along with Japanese language training.
Moreover, in order to place Taiwan on sound financial footing, even public education should be
paid for by those who demand it. The current practice of placing local officials responsible for
approving the construction of new common schools was also criticized, as it had led to the
proliferation of financially unviable schools that then became a burden to the GGT. (By
Mochiji's account, 24 out of 35 common schools in Tainan could not survive without financial
assistance from the central administration.) The Education Affairs Section in Taipei (the former
Education Bureau) should instead possess the sole authority of approving or rejecting
applications for the construction of schools, as central governmental officials were less likely to
be subjected to lobbying by local elites. Finally, most Taiwanese did not need six years of
schooling, Mochiji reasoned, since they were best employed as laborers, farmers, shopkeepers,
and low-ranking colonial officials. He thus proposed to abolish the existing six-year common
3 Got6 Shimpei, "Got6 Chokan no kunji [Instructions of Chief Civil Administrator Goto]," Taiwan Kydikukai
zasshi 27 (1904): 2-3.
3 5 Chen P., "Doka " no dosh6 imu, pp. 84-85 and 94.
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school program (attended primarily by children of middle- and upper-class families), and to
adopt a 4-4 system in its place, where most school-attending Taiwanese (merely 3.21 percent of
the total school-aged population in 1902) would receive only four years of education, and a few
of the most privileged moved on to the four-year higher school curriculum.36 In short, Mochiji's
proposal was nothing less than a wholehearted acceptance of Goto's preferred policy.
The 1904 CSR ultimately adopted the middle ground between the prevailing view of
Japanese teachers in Taiwan (represented by Hashimoto) and Mochiji's 1902 proposal (favored
by Goto). In terms of the curriculum, the previous separate subjects of reading (dokusho) and
writing (shaigaku) were absorbed into the "national language" (kokugo) class. The time spent on
kokugo increased from five to twenty hours a week, while the Three Character Classic and the
Four Books (minus the Analects of Mencius) were eliminated from the curriculum. A new class
on Chinese language (kanbun) was added, but the textbook used was a GGT approved reader of
useful words and phrases in everyday life. It was only in this class, which met for a mere five
hours a week (compared to the twelve hours previously spent on reading Confucian classics
under the 1898 CSR) that the Chinese language was even taught. Reflecting Goto and Mochiji's
preference for practical education, girls were instructed in sewing starting in the second grade,
while boys learned handicraft, farming, and commerce in the fifth and sixth grades. Meanwhile,
the authority to approve or reject the construction of new common schools was transferred from
the provincial to the central administration. In this way, expansion of the school system was kept
36 Mochiji's 1902 report, titled "Kenchi kanken [My humble opinion on provincial governance]," is found in Goto
Shimpei monjo, Reel 31, No. 7.73. For a discussion of this unpublished paper, see Chen P., "Doka " no dosh6 imu,
pp. 85-86 and 92-93. Mochiji later explains the logic underlying his education policy in his 1912 memoir, Taiwan
shokumin seisaku. See in particular, pp. 279-320. Also of interest is his analysis of colonial education policy in the
Philippines, India, and Java (Indonesia), which is found in pp. 525-94. Here, he is highly critical of U.S. and Dutch
education policies in their respective colonies, while praising British policy in India. For data on Taiwan's common
school enrollment and daily attendance from 1898-1906 (that is, during the Kodama-Goto administration), see
Yoshino, Taiwan kyoiku shi, p. 199.
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at a rate where a certain level of quality of common schools, as well as their financial viability,
could be maintained.
What thus emerged in 1904 was an education system that thoroughly disregarded the
educational demands of all literati elites, whether they were conservatives (who preferred shobd-
style education) or progressives (who accepted the need for "new learning" and enrolled their
children in common schools). 38 Moreover, with each successive CSR reform-until education
policy was again reversed in the mid 1910s-the common school curriculum diverged further
and further away from the type of education desired by Taiwanese elites. In 1907, the 4-4 system
was introduced, although its implementation in particular localities was left to the discretion of
provincial administrators. 39 However, due to the fact that local Japanese officials were slow to
convert 6-year schools to four or eight year ones, amid opposition from Taiwanese elites, the
Education Section (of the central government) took over all decisions regarding the school
curriculum in 1910. Accordingly, the number of eight-year common schools increased from 1 to
9 and (to the chagrin of Taiwanese elites) four-year schools from 5 to 77. The number of strictly
six-year schools was reduced to 84, while 48 schools adopted a split structure, where both the
four-year and six-year curriculum were offered. Finally, the 1912 CSR further decreased the
more academic content of common schools and placed greater emphasis on vocational training.
Specifically, classes on science, handicraft, agriculture, and commerce, previously taught only in
the seventh and eighth grades of the eight-year schools, were introduced at the fifth grade level.
To accommodate this, hours allotted to both the Chinese language and kokugo were slightly
3 The official explanation of the 1904 CSR is found in Taiwan Kyoikukai, Taiwan ky5iku enkakushi, pp. 259-61,
and the full text of the new regulation is reproduced on pp. 261-70. For the 1898 common school curriculum, see pp.
232-33, and for the 1904 curriculum, see pp. 271-72.
38 A summary of these two views can be found in Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-
1915, pp. 379-82.
39 Taiwan Kyoikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 278-88. The curriculum of the four-year school is found on p.
284, while that of the eight-year school is found on pp. 285-86. This change was part of the 1907 CSR. For a
discussion of differences between the 1904 and 1907 CSR, see pp. 278-81.
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reduced. The eight-year common schools were abolished (while the four-year ones were
retained) and a separate two-year post-primary school specializing in vocational training was
created.4 0
Ironically, as evidenced by the steep drop in shob6 attendance starting in 1904, the
transformation of common schools into training grounds for manual laborers occurred just as an
increasing number of Taiwanese elites began to accept the value of "new learning."4' However,
for progressive Taiwanese parents desiring high-quality (and modem) academic education for
their children, there was very little choice besides the state-run common schools and their
second-class curriculum. Starting in 1905, the GGT tightly regulated the establishment of new
private schools, thus preventing their proliferation in Taiwan. Between 1895 and January 1919
(when the education system underwent a fundamental reform), the GGT approved licenses for a
meager 62 non-shobo-style private schools, and at no time during this period were more than 19
42private schools (with an aggregate student body of 1,589) in operation simultaneously.
Moreover, as was the norm in Japan itself, private schools were compelled to conform to the
state's educational goals and standards.4 3 For example, when a British missionary (by the name
of Runkin) sought permission to establish a school providing post-primary secular education
with English as its language of instruction, the GGT refused, noting that since the Taiwanese
40 Ibid., pp. 286-324.
4' Shob5 attendance (which fluctuated yearly between 25,000 and 30,000) was down to the 15,000 to 20,00 range
during the years 1904 to 1917, before plummeting thereafter. Meanwhile, the number of students attending common
schools had surpassed the 100,000 mark (which equaled over 15 percent of the total school-aged population) for the
first time in 1918. Ibid., pp. 408-10 and 984-86.
42 Of the 62 approved schools, 34 (including two special education schools), or a little over a majority, were either
primary or language training schools, and another eight were vocational schools (either in agriculture or commerce).
As for the rest, fifteen were missionary schools (where post-primary education was likely provided) and three were
middle schools (which was the equivalent of a high school in the Western educational system). For a full list and
brief description of private schools in Taiwan up to 1936 (for which data is available), see ibid., pp. 995-1002.
Yearly data on the number of private schools (in operation), as well as the number of students attending these
schools is found in Hirotani Takio and Hirokawa Toshiko, "Nihon t6chika no Taiwan, Chosen ni okeru shokuminchi
ky6iku seisaku no hikakushi-teki kenkyi [A comparative historical study of colonial education policy in Taiwan and
Korea under Japanese colonial rule]," Hokkaido Daigaku Kydikubu kiy5 22 (1973), p. 37.
4 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 34-38.
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were Japanese subjects, their education should focus primarily on achieving "national language"
proficiency.44
If options for primary education were severely limited for the Taiwanese, opportunities
for post-primary schooling were nearly non-existent. Other than the largely religious secondary
education offered by Christian missionary schools, there were only two choices available to
Taiwanese students (prior to the opening of the Taichi0 Middle School in 1915). The first was to
enroll in a teacher-training program at the National Language School, where a separate
department for training Taiwanese common school teachers was established in 1902.45 The other
was to earn a spot in the GGT Medical School, which was established by Got6 Shimpei-a
medical doctor by training-in 1899. Starting with 88 pupils in 1900, by the end of 1918, the
46
school had an enrollment of 248 students. In both the National Language School and Medical
School, Taiwanese students were required to live in Japanese-style dorms, where they were
prohibited from speaking in their native language, and where students were required to abide by
Japanese customs (such as those pertaining to bathing and eating) in their daily lives.4 7
In sum, what emerged under the leadership of Mochiji Rokusabur6 was an educational
system that lacked local ownership. On one hand, with peaceful conditions prevailing in Taiwan
from 1902, Mochiji found no need to accommodate the desire by conservative Taiwanese elites
for Confucian-style education; on the other, believing that assimilation could not be socially
engineered, he saw no benefit in increasing modern educational opportunities as demanded by
the progressive elite. Indeed, as Goto and Mochiji reasoned, accommodating the literati's
preference for either Qing-style education or modern Western education was more destabilizing
44 Chen P., "Doka " no dosho imu, p. 166.
4' This replaced the three existing common schools that had been established in 1899. Taiwan Kyoikukai, Taiwan
kyoiku enkakushi, pp. 606-28.
46 Ibid., pp. 917-28. For data on Medical School enrollment, see pp. 961-62.
4? E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 64.
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for colonial governance than not: the former kept alive cultural ties between Taiwan and
mainland China, while the latter could give rise to an "over-educated" elite demanding political
equality or even independence. Yet, precisely because the GGT's education policy-
unconstrained by political or ideological calculus in Tokyo-reflected pragmatic calculations on
the relationship between public education and colonial governance, it was sensitive to underlying
shifts in power balances between the colonial state and the native elite. Hence, under new and
deteriorating security conditions in the 1910s, the pendulum swung back in the direction of
accommodating native elite interests.
2.I11. The Xinhai Revolution and GGT's Reengagement of Literati Elites
When Kumamoto Shigekichi was transferred from Korea to Taiwan in February 1911 to
head the Educational Affairs Bureau, there was little indication that a dramatic shift in education
policy was to come in succeeding years. Kumamoto was the architect of the 4-4 curriculum in
Korea under Japanese rule (similar in content to the one favored by Mochiji for Taiwan). Indeed,
upon his arrival in Taiwan, he penned a secret memorandum arguing that while it is necessary to
provide some primary education to the Taiwanese-in order to convince Western powers of
Japan's fitness to administer colonies-too much education for the native population, especially
at the post-primary level, would destabilize Japanese rule.48 Yet, less than a year after these
words were written, the Xinhai Revolution of October 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty,
ushering in a new era of republican government, warlord rule, and communist uprisings in
China. The fear that the intellectual and cultural ties of the Taiwanese gentry to Qing China kept
48 Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka t5go, pp. 131-32. Kumamoto's 1911 secret memorandum is
found within the Kumamoto Shigekichi monjo [Documents related to Kumamoto Shigekichi], which is currently
being edited for publication and thus unavailable to the public. It will soon be published under the colossal Nihon
shokuminchi kydiku seisaku shiryd shaisei [Collection of documents pertaining to Japanese colonial education
policy] series, which will ultimately include 110 volumes sorted into 12 series. Currently nine of the twelve planned
series have been published, with the Kumamoto Shigekichi monjo, comprised of 10 volumes, among the three
remaining series awaiting publication.
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alive hopes for retrocession was thus replaced overnight with the even greater threat of Chinese
revolutionary thought and activity leapfrogging from the continent to Taiwan.
Fears within the GGT that Taiwan might be engulfed by revolutionary fervor were
quickly justified. As noted in previous chapters, peaceful conditions had prevailed in the western
and Han Chinese region of Taiwan since the conclusion of the anti-insurgent campaign in 1902.
Small-scale skirmishes continued in the eastern and aboriginal half of Taiwan, but conflict in this
region was contained by a long and fortified line that physically cut off aboriginal lands from the
rest of the island. Yet, the decade-long peace was suddenly shaken by the Xinhai Revolution:
Between 1912 and 1913, six rebellions were attempted by individuals inspired by events
unfolding across the Taiwan Straits. Although five of these six attempted rebellions were foiled
through the work of Taiwanese informants-such as village chiefs and hok& officials who feared
that their towns would be subjected to collective punishment if a revolt were to break out--GGT
officials were nonetheless compelled to reevaluate their governance policy. 49 Education received
particular scrutiny, as the existing policy of limiting educational opportunities did little to
address the problem of Taiwanese students coming into contact with revolutionary ideas in
shob-style schools (which had so far escaped close GGT regulation), as well as through their
study-abroad experience in the imperial metropole, where democratic and socialist ideas were
hotly debated in the liberal intellectual environment of early twentieth-century Japan.50
49 After an island-wide round up between October 1913 and January 1914, 921 individuals were executed for
conspiracy against Japan, and another 284 were handed varying degrees of prison sentences. For a brief overview of
these rebellions, see Wakabayashi Masahiro, "S6toku seiji to Taiwan dochakujishu shisan kaikyfi: Koritsu Taichi
Chngakko setsuritsu mondai, 1912-1915 nen [The politics of Japanese colonialism and the national bourgeois-
landowner class of Taiwan: the problem to set up a middle school for Taiwanese students, 1912-1915]," Ajia kenkyi
29.4 (1983), pp. 24-25.
50 On the anti-colonial activities of Taiwanese study-abroad students in Japan, see Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku,
Taiwan shakai undo shi [A history of social movements in Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku, 1939),
pp. 23-27. For informal estimates on Taiwanese study-abroad students by the GGT police, see p. 24. For GGT's
official figures of known study-abroad students, see Yoshino, Taiwan kydiku shi, pp. 247-48. There is considerable
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Kumamoto thus implemented a three-pronged offensive against "dangerous" thought.
First, he instructed local colonial administrators to crack down on shobo-style schools. In
particular, the regulation prohibiting the teaching of certain types of books-especially those
recently published in China by reformist thinkers-was to be strictly enforced. 5' Second, he
sought to regulate the activities of Taiwanese students studying abroad in Japan; to this end, a
GGT-sponsored dormitory for Taiwanese students was constructed in Tokyo in 1912. Finally,
he reversed the existing policy of limiting educational opportunities for the Taiwanese.53 In the
aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution, it was no longer possible for the GGT to prevent the local
population from coming into contact with "dangerous" thought simply by denying the prospect
of higher education to the Taiwanese. If not through their study-abroad experience in Japan, the
Taiwanese would gain access to such ideas via business and personal ties to mainland China. The
hope was that by expanding the common school system, Taiwanese (or pan-Chinese) nationalism
could be tamed through the indoctrination of the elite with pro-Japanese ideology. Moreover,
the GGT recognized that the era where colonial governance could be maintained simply through
police suppression had ended. If Japan was to keep its empire, it needed to win the battle over
national identity and to make the Taiwanese feel that they were stakeholders in Japanese
governance structure.55
The establishment of a middle school for Taiwanese children became the central issue in
the GGT's larger effort to advance local ownership of colonial institutions. Starting in 1912, Lin
incongruence between these figures, suggesting that the GGT really had no clear idea on how many Taiwanese were
actually in Japan.
5 Taiwan Kyoikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 979-80.
12 Kumamoto also sought help from the home government's Ministry of Education by requesting the prohibition of
Taiwanese children's enrollment into public Japanese schools. This request, however, was denied due to the fact that
the Taiwanese had every right, as Japanese citizens, to enroll in Japanese schools, provided that they passed the
required entrance exams. Ibid., pp. 147-48.
1 For common school enrollment data from 1898 to 1934, see ibid., pp. 408-10.
1 Chen P., "Doka " no dosho imu, pp. 162-64.
ss Wakabayashi, "Sotoku seiji to Taiwan dochaku jishu shisan kaikyfi," pp. 23-26.
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Xiantang, the head of the prominent Lin family of Wufeng, began soliciting donations for the
founding of a public middle school for Taiwanese children. By 1913, he had succeeded in
collecting 247,325 yen, which was more than enough for the school to be financially self-
sustaining. The list of contributors-204 in all-was impressive, reading as a roster of the most
prominent Taiwanese elites. What this group of leading Taiwanese elites demanded was nothing
less than an institution of secondary education that was equal in quality as a Japanese middle
school both in name (i.e., the designation of "middle school") and in substance (i.e., a five-year
academic curriculum leading up to higher education in Japan).56 Yet, the prominence of
individuals involved did not guarantee the movement's success. Although colonial officials
certainly recognized (in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution) the need to appease the literati
elite and to advance local ownership of the education institution, they feared that too much
schooling would lead to increased demands for political autonomy (which they were unwilling to
grant). The dominant perspective among officials was therefore to split the difference: The GGT
would consent to the demand for a Taiwanese middle school, but the new school would be made
inferior to that for Japanese-settler children.57 However, this consensus was overturned in favor
of fully accepting the petition for a Taiwanese middle school by an unlikely ally of Lin Xiantang
and his group of literati elites: Governor-General Sakuma Samata.
At the time, the Governor-General was in the midst of his five year campaign to pacify
the aboriginal tribes of eastern Taiwan. 58 However, Sakuma's war against the aborigines was
56 Wakabayashi, "Sotoku seiji to Taiwan dochaku jishu shisan kaikyii," pp. 9-13.
57 Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka togo, pp. 132-33.
58 For GGT's policy toward the aboriginal tribes both under Sakuma and his predecessors, see Oe Shinobu,
"Shokuminchi sens6 to Sotokufu no seiritsu [Colonial war and the establishment of the Government-General]," in
Iwanami k5za kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami Series on Modem Japan and Its Colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu,
vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 3-1 1; Kond6 Masami, "Taiwan S6tokufu no 'Riban' Taisei to Musha
Jiken [Taiwan Government-General's 'Riban' System and the Wushe Incident]," in Iwanami koza kindai Nihon to
shokuminchi [Iwanami Series on Modem Japan and Its Colonies], ed. Oe Shinobu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1992): 35-50.
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immediately stymied by the problem of rising cost and lack of manpower. In order to finance the
entire operation without financial assistance from the Japanese treasury, Sakuma had introduced
a special tax in 1910, which increased the already heavy tax burden by an average of about 3
million yen per year. (During this period, total yearly tax revenue averaged 16.1 million yen,
and taxation from land-the main source of taxation for most tax-paying Taiwanese-was a little
over 3 million yen a year.60) Even this, however, proved insufficient to finance his campaign. In
1913-that is, the year Lin Xiantang and his fellow literati elites sought GGT approval for a
Taiwanese middle school-a combination of bad harvest (which decreased the state's income
from sugar sales) and increasing cost of the offensive (as Japanese forces ventured deeper into
the eastern hinterland) left the GGT with a deficit of one million yen short for 1914. Failing to
obtain financial aid from Tokyo to fill this budget shortfall, Sakuma thus had little choice but to
seek help from wealthy Taiwanese.61 Literati elites in turn made their support contingent on
Sakuma's cooperation in the middle school affair.62
Despite receiving Sakuma's unconditional support in establishing a five-year academic
middle school for Taiwanese children, Taiwanese elites were ultimately forced to settle for an
inferior four-year school, however. Although Sakuma (for all of his faults) proved to be a man of
his word, since the new middle school was to employ public servants-i.e., school teachers paid
for by the state-it required Tokyo's approval for its establishment. However, the Legislation
59 ibid.
60 Chih-ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 56.
61 Wakabayashi, "S6toku seiji to Taiwan dochaku jishu shisan kaikyfi," pp. 29-30.
62 Taiwanese elite support came in two types. First, leading shinsho elites made private donations to the GGT in
support of the campaign. Second, and more importantly, they helped recruit local labor to serve as porters for the
military campaign. Due to the fact that Japanese troops operated deep within the eastern hinterland, they required
considerable logistical support, particularly in transporting food and camping supplies. However, by 1913, the GGT
was running short on funds to recruit local Taiwanese labor. Moreover, this was a dangerous mission where
unarmed Taiwanese porters were particularly vulnerable to attack. Even with decent pay, volunteers were therefore
hard to come by. Nonetheless, through Taiwanese elite support, the GGT was able to recruit 55,000 coolies for the
final 1914 campaign led by Governor-General Sakuma himself. Ibid., pp. 30-33; C. Chen, "Japanese Socio-political
Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," pp. 238-39.
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Bureau of the central government in Tokyo refused to grant this permission, arguing that it was
improper for Taiwan to have an educational system that was far superior to the 4-4 system found
in Korea. At the end of a year-long negotiation between Tokyo and the GGT, it was decided that
the new school would adopt the lower standards demanded by the Legislation Bureau. The
curriculum was to focus largely on "national language" (kokugo) instruction and vocational
training, and would be four years in length. Furthermore, in order to place this school in line with
the 4-4 system found in Korea, students who had finished only four years (rather than the full six
years) of the common school curriculum were made eligible to apply. As a face-saving measure,
the Legislation Bureau gave permission to officially call the new school a "middle school,"
despite its lower standards. 63 Yet, even with this reduced quality, the new TaichP (Taichung)
Middle School proved highly popular among the Taiwanese elite, with 306 students competing
for one of 100 spots when the school opened in April 1915.64
Moreover, the Taichi Middle School affair proved to be an important break with the past.
Through negotiations with Taiwanese elites and with Tokyo, Kumamoto and other GGT officials
came to accept, and to even defend, the need to provide higher education to the colonized people.
In turn, while Taiwanese elites continued to protest that Japanese residents in Taiwan had access
to better educational opportunities, they had largely come to prefer the modern education
provided by Japanese colonial schools over that of the traditional shobd.65 Also, as Goto-era
officials were replaced with new recruits from Japan, the perspective that the Taiwanese could
not be assimilated into the Japanese national community was slowly abandoned by the GGT.
Particularly instrumental in bringing about this policy shift was Akashi Motojiro, who became
63 Chen P., "Doka " no dosh6 imu, pp. 167-71; Komagome, Shokuninchi teikoku Nihon no bunka togo, pp. 144-48.
64 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 69.
65 A 1915 internal report, for example, noted that colonial authorities were able to accommodate only ten percent of
those desiring admission into the common schools. Chen P., "Doka " no doshe imu, p. 105.
273
Governor-General in 1918. Formally the head of the police in Korea (from 1907-1914), Akashi
had become concerned with the rise of nationalist movements, not only in China, but throughout
the colonized world. He was convinced that if Taiwan was to forever be a part of Japan, it was
necessary to transform the Taiwanese into loyal Japanese subjects. An effective education
system that was also patronized by the local elite thus came to be regarded as the key to Japan's
success as an imperial power in the new era of national self-determination. 66
Under Akashi's leadership, educational opportunities for Taiwanese were thus expanded
both at the primary and secondary levels. While 13.14 percent of school-aged children were
enrolled in common schools in 1917, this figure reached 20.69 percent in 1919 (when Akashi
died in office), as seen in Table 1. Furthermore, in an effort to advance local ownership of the
colonial education system, the number of secondary schools that were open to Taiwanese
children was increased substantially by Akashi's Education Ordinance of January 1919. In
addition to the Taichfi Middle School (which enrolled only boys), a three-year middle school was
created for girls. Also established were two four-year normal schools (with a one-year
preparatory course), and three technical schools in commerce, agriculture and forestry, and
industry (all three years in length). The curriculum of the GGT Medical School was upgraded
into an eight-year program (from the previous five) consisting of four years of preparatory
education and four years of actual medical school training. Finally, two new institutions of
tertiary education were added to the mix: the six-year (including three years of preparatory work)
Agriculture College and Forestry College. All of these schools were open only to the Taiwanese,
except for the Medical School, where Japanese students were admitted into a separate course. 67
66 On Akashi's overall policy regarding Taiwan, see Komori Tokuji, Akashi Motojird (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968),
pp. 50-66. His education policy is discussed on pp. 131-34.
67 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 85-88.
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Table 1: Common and Shobo School Enrollment, 1898-1931
Common School Shob6
Total No. Total No. Total No. % of School- Total No. Total No. Total No. % of School-
of of of aged Children of of of aged Children



















































































































































































































































































































Source: Taiwan Ky6ikukai, Taiwan kydiku
1973[1939]), pp. 408-10, 9 84 -9 8 6 .
enkakushi [History of education in Taiwan] (Taipei: Kotei Shooku,
Note: Data is shown only up to 1931 -that is, prior to Japan's undeclared war against China-as this was the last
year the GGT maintained a relatively liberal policy regarding enrollment in shob5-style schools. When shob was
abolished entirely in 1940, the number of schools had dropped to 17, with a total student enrollment at 996. For
post-1931 shob6 data, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 246.
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Akashi's successor, Den Kenjir6, further advanced the accommodation of Taiwanese
elite interests on education. Having been appointed Governor-General shortly after the March 1,
1919 Movement in Korea (where a group of students led a large-scale demonstration in Seoul
demanding Korean independence), Den was particularly sensitive to the role played by
intellectuals in leading struggles against colonization. In his view, Akashi's policy may indeed
lead to the long-term assimilation of Taiwanese through their participation in the colonial
education system; however, the creation of new secondary and tertiary schools for the Taiwanese
did not address their disdain toward the prevailing segregated system, where schools for
Taiwanese children were clearly inferior to those attended by Japanese settler students. Den also
took notice of the fact that Taiwanese elites-both the old literati elites and the newer group
comprised of doctors, teachers, and other young intellectuals and professionals68-- did not
demand Taiwanese independence from Japan, but simply sought greater equality within the
Japanese empire. 69 The desegregation of the colonial education system was therefore seen by
Den as an opportunity to not only advance local ownership of the education institution, but also a
means of preventing the radicalization of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.
After two years of research and limited trials of co-education (between Taiwanese and
Japanese) at the primary level, a new and final Education Ordinance was implemented in 1922
that-at least on paper-accommodated many of the demands of Taiwanese elites. First,
68 The face of this new professional and intellectual elite stratum were physicians. Their rise as the intellectual elite
of Taiwan was due to Goto Shimpei's initial policy of allowing only the founding of a medical school as a source of
tertiary education. For an analysis of the role played by Taiwanese physicians in both protesting and promoting
Japanese imperialism, see Ming-cheng M. Lo, Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in
Colonial Taiwan (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 2002). For example, among the 52 members of the
Taiwan Cultural Association (which was the largest Taiwanese nationalist organization in the 1920s), 14 were
physicians. After the 15 landlords-who largely belonged to the traditional gentry elite stratum-physicians were
thus the most represented group within this organization.
69 For discussions of Taiwanese political movements, see K6 Se-kai, Nihon tochika no Taiwan: teiko to danatsu
[Taiwan under the Japanese rule: resistance and suppression] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972), pp. 168-
263; Harry J. Lamley, "Assimilation Efforts in Colonial Taiwan: The Fate of the 1914 Movement," Monumenta
Serica 29 (1970-1971): 496-519; Rwei-ren Wu, The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of
Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945, Diss., University of Chicago, 2003 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 2003).
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although separate schools were maintained for Taiwanese and Japanese children at the primary
level as before, Taiwanese children were now permitted to attend previously Japanese-only
elementary schools, as long as they displayed "national language" proficiency. Second, the
quality of the common school curriculum was improved and brought closer to that of a Japanese
elementary school. Academic subjects such as history and geography were added, while hours
devoted to vocational subjects were substantially lessened. On the other hand, under this logic of
conforming the standards of common schools to Japanese ones, the study of classical Chinese,
previously required, became an elective. Third, the ban on founding new private schools (which
was instituted by Akashi) was lifted. Fourth, and most importantly, all schools at the secondary
and tertiary levels became integrated, and now open (at least in principle) to both Taiwanese and
Japanese pupils. The quality of education provided in previously Taiwanese-only schools at
these levels (such as the Taich6i Middle School and the Agriculture and Forestry College) was
consequently raised to accommodate Japanese students.70
After 1922, the only major change to the institution of education was the founding of the
Taihoku (Taipei) Imperial University (ostensibly open to Japanese and Taiwanese alike) in 1925.
Even as school curricula were altered in the mid 1930s, with the placing of education on a
wartime footing, the structure of the school system remained unchanged. 71 In the final two
decades of Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese elites vociferously protested that discrimination
against their children in school admission (especially at the tertiary level) persisted, but the very
70 For a discussion of these reforms, see E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 91-106. The
text of the Taiwan Public School Regulation (which details the various changes following the promulgation of the
1922 Education Ordinance) is found in Taiwan Kybikukai, Taiwan kydiku enkakushi, pp. 358-79. For the new
common school curriculum under the 1922 Education Ordinance, see pp. 379-81.
71 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, pp. 107-32. For a discussion of the school curriculum
between 1922 and 1945, see pp. 139-44. For a discussion of GGT's language policy during the wartime years of
1937 to 1945, see Wan-yao Chou, The "Kominka " Movement: Taiwan under Wartime Japan, 193 7-1945, Diss.,
Yale University, 1991 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1992), pp. 55-109.
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72nature of this grievance affirms that the education system itself was widely accepted. Even as
the Taiwanese sought to define their sense of distinct national identity through various cultural
movements (such as by establishing poetry societies, importing Mandarin, and creating a written
script for the Taiwanese language), the Japanese language was largely accepted by both the old
gentry-scholars and the younger professional elite (such as doctors and teachers) as a medium of
professional and intellectual discourse.73 Yet, precisely because Taiwanese ownership of the
colonial education institution was contingent upon Taiwan's incorporation into the Japanese
imperial state, it would not outlast the island's retrocession to China in 1945. The same logic that
led Taiwanese elites to embrace Japanese language education resulted in their acceptance of
Mandarin's supremacy in Taiwan under Chinese rule.
2.JV. Epilogue: Mandarin-speaking Taiwan as a Legacy of Japanese Colonial Rule
On October 25, 1945, sovereignty over Taiwan was transferred from Japan to Chiang
Kai-shek's Guomindang regime. Viewing the inhabitants of the former Japanese colony as
"enslaved" (bei muhua) people, the new Taiwan provincial government, led by Chen Yi, lost no
7 Hsieh Nan-kuang, Taiwanjin wa kaku miru [The Taiwanese see it this way] (Taipei: Taiwan Minposha, 1930), pp.
52-74; Yanaihara Tadao, "Teikokushugika no Taiwan [Taiwan under colonial rule]," in Yanaihara Tadao zenshai
[Collected works of Yanaihara Tadao] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963[1929]), pp. 342-58.
73 Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, pp. 51-132; Ann
Heylen, "The Legacy of Literacy Practices in Colonial Taiwan: Japanese-Taiwanese-Chinese: Language
Interaction and Identity Formation," Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 26.6 (2005), pp. 499-
504; Komagome Takeshi, "Tainichi und6 ni okeru kyoiku y6kyi to Sotokufu no ky6iku seisaku: 1920-30 nendai
Taichl shfi Soton sh6 no jirei wo chashin ni [Educational demands within anti-Japanese movements and education
policy of the Government-General: with a focus on Caotun village in Taichung province in the 1920s to the 1930s],"
in Ri-ju shi-qi Taiwan shi guo-ji xue-shu yan-tao-hui lun-wenji [International Conference on Taiwan History under
Japanese Colonization], ed. Department of History, National Taiwan University (Taipei: National Taiwan
University, 1992): 415-40; Lamley, The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895-1915, pp. 398-473; Lo,
Doctors within Borders; E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Mental Captivity and Resistance Lessons from Taiwanese Anti-
colonialism," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 12.2 (1980): 2-13; Wu, The Formosan Ideology, pp. 265-383.
Even Lin Xiantang, who refused to learn Japanese, made sure his children were educated in Japanese by sending
them to Tokyo for their schooling. More generally, despite the fact that Taiwanese elites had the option of sending
their children to China for Western-style education after 1911, they still overwhelmingly preferred their children to
be educated at top Japanese schools. For example, the GGT police noted that there were approximately 2,400
Taiwanese study-abroad students in Japan in 1922 compared to 273 such students in China in 1923. See, Taiwan
Sotokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan shakai unda shi, pp. 24 and 174.
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time in putting forth a policy of cultural reconstruction (wenhua chongjian) and Sinicization
(Zhongguohua). Competence in Mandarin became a symbol of an individual's "Chineseness"
and loyalty to the new state. The use of Japanese in official business was forbidden, and
publication of periodicals in the former colonial language banned.7 4 This transition in official
language was sudden and absolute. But the Taiwanese, though certainly resentful of the
mistreatment they suffered at the hands of their new occupiers, accepted this change in "national
language" from kokugo (Japanese) to guoyu (Mandarin) in stride. Ironically, the relatively
positive reception of Mandarin-which was incomprehensible to a Taiwanese speaker-by the
island's inhabitants was a legacy of Japanese colonial education. As a result of GGT's language
policy, educated Taiwanese were bilinguals, who spoke Taiwanese (or one of several native
languages) as their mother tongue and Japanese in the public sphere.76 Taiwanese elites thus
simply traded one "foreign" language for another, and one that at least shared some similarities
with their native languages.
Furthermore, the school system left behind by the Japanese (and remained largely
unchanged by the Chen Yi administration) was not only impressive in its size and quality, but
was also most suited to the type of forceful language policy pursued by the Guomindang regime
(and the Japanese before them).77 Between 1937 and 1945, the number of primary schools
increased rapidly as part of Japan's wartime mobilization campaign, with over 70 percent of
74 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 189-90; Steven E. Phillips, Between
Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003), pp. 67-70.
75 For a discussion of the various reactions by Taiwanese elites to retrocession, see Phillips, Between Assimilation
and Independence, pp. 115-39.
76 Chen P., "Ddka " no dsh5 imu, pp. 217-27.
77 A description of the Guomindang's language policy in Taiwan is found in Robert L. Cheng, "Language
Unification in Taiwan: Present and Future," in The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present, ed. Murray A. Rubenstein
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994[1979]), pp. 367-70; Hwa-wei Lee, Educational Development in Taiwan under the
Nationalist Government, 1945-1962, Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1964 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1965), pp. 64-72.
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school-aged children enrolled by the war's end. 8 Given the tight regulation against private
schools, almost all of these children attended schools that were directly controlled by the state. It
was therefore relatively easy for Guomindang officials to impose an all-Mandarin curriculum
following retrocession. The only difficulty was in filling teaching positions formally occupied by
Japanese educators (8,793 out of a total of 17,249 at the primary level) with Mandarin-speaking
ones. Yet, even this problem was soon resolved with mass migration of mainland Chinese to
Taiwan following Guomindang's defeat by the Communists in 1949.79 With a less effective pre-
existing educational system to work with, it is doubtful that the Guomindang regime could have
even contemplated imposing an all-Mandarin language policy, let alone succeed in this large-
scale social engineering scheme.8 0 Indeed, Guomindang's policy of making Mandarin the
common language of China had been formulated as early as 1929, but it was in Taiwan (among
the non-Mandarin speaking areas under its control) that this policy was enforced for the first time
in 1946."
The legacy of Japanese education policy in Taiwan is often discussed in terms of its
linguistic impact. Although reliable estimates for Japanese literacy rate among the Taiwanese
population do not exist,82 it is fair to say that a large portion (if not the majority) of the younger
generation was fluent in Japanese by 1945. In 1920, a little over 25 percent of school-aged
78 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 148.
7 Lee, Educational Development in Taiwan under the Nationalist Government, pp. 63-64.
80 Richard W. Wilson, Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1970).
81 Cheng, "Language Unification in Taiwan," pp. 370-7 1. For a discussion of Guomindang's education policy prior
to Taiwan's retrocession, see Lee, Educational Development in Taiwan under the Nationalist Government, pp. 50-
55.
82 The GGT declared in 1940 that it had reached its goal of 50 percent Japanese literacy rate, but this figure lacked
reliability, as it was simply the aggregate of the number of people who had attended common schools or language
training centers for adults. Fewings, "Japanese Colonial Language Education in Taiwan and Assimilation," pp. 125-
26.
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children were enrolled in primary school, and by 1939, this had increased to over 50 percent.83
Nonetheless, more consequential for Taiwan's postcolonial development was not the content of
Japanese colonial education (which was abolished in the aftermath of Japan's defeat), but its
institutional structure. The Japanese colonial education institution, in addition to attaining local
ownership, was hybridic: All private schools, including shobo, were carefully regulated by local
authorities, allowing the GGT to achieve coherence in the educational system unseen in other
colonial territories (such as the Philippines). With private competitors having been squeezed out
or tamed through hybridizing reforms, the public school system the Guomindang inherited was a
well-oiled "machine" that was easily retooled to impose the new guoyu ("national language")
throughout Taiwan. Japanese colonial officials thus ultimately succeed in transforming the
linguistic composition of the Taiwanese population. Ironically, however, their part was to
establish the institutional preconditions for Mandarin to become the national language of the
Taiwanese people.
3. Building an Education Institution in the Philippines
Providing free primary education to the Filipino masses was at once the most important
symbol of U.S. benevolence and the occupiers' primary tool for conquering and colonizing the
Filipino people. It not only served as effective campaign rhetoric for pro-annexation politicians
in 1899, but was also regarded as among the central components of the U.S. military's
pacification strategy in the archipelago during its 1899 to 1902 campaign. In the short run,
military and civilian officials, in Washington and Manila alike, hoped that the Army's strategy of
83 E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 148. Also, by this time average daily attendance, as
well as completion rate of the common school curriculum, was around 90 percent. E. P. Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial
Education in Taiwan, p. 62; Taiwan sheng xing zheng chang guan gong shu tong ji shi, ed., Taiwan sheng wu shiyi
nian lai tongji tiyao [A statistical summary of the province of Taiwan for the past fifty-one years] (Taipei, 1946),
pp. 1232-33.
281
immediately opening schools (run by military officers) in towns "liberated" from insurrecto
control would simultaneously "attract" Filipino elites and the American electorate to U.S.
annexation of the Philippines. In the long run, education would be the method through which
Filipinos would be reengineered into becoming English-speaking, democracy-loving, and
capitalism-promoting allies of America in the Pacific. With U.S. policymakers hesitant toward
the notion of permanently retaining the Philippine Islands as an integral component of the federal
union, it was imperative that Filipinos be thoroughly and rapidly Americanized through the
course of the occupation.
Hence, while the American effort to provide education was advertised as primarily
undertaken for the benefit of the Filipinos themselves, U.S. colonial officials-constrained by
Secretary of War Elihu Root's unequivocal instructions-refused to accommodate local
demands. When Filipino elites subverted U.S. efforts to establish a new education institution by
withholding their much needed support, the colonial regime hardened its stance and redoubled its
effort by centralizing the provision of education and transforming American school teachers into
administrators. Yet, rather then escalating the conflict over education, Filipino elites simply
folded and sent their own children to private schools. "Exit," not "voice" (or violence), was thus
chosen in light of strong U.S. commitment to education reform and the availability of alternative
schooling options for the wealthy. 84 The effect of this dynamic, however, was to further entrench
the dualistic structure of the education institution, as largely unregulated private schools thrived
(especially at the secondary level) outside of the formal public education system. Meanwhile, the
new public school system, which was created without any consideration for its feasibility or its
compatibility with the educational institution of the previous regime, suffered in quality.
84 Concepts of "exit" and "voice" were borrowed from the work of Albert Hirschman. See Albert 0. Hirschman,
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970).
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Despite all of its problems, however, the U.S. education institution nonetheless was to
remain fundamentally unchanged for the duration of the colonial period. Constrained from above
(i.e., Washington), but not from below (i.e., Filipino landed elites), U.S. colonial agents rigidly
persisted in their pre-determined course of rapidly expanding a secular and English public school
system. Even as policymaking initiative within the archipelago was rapidly transferred to
Filipino elites starting in 1913 (with the initiation of the "Filipinization" policy), education
remained firmly in American hands until the declaration of the Philippine Commonwealth in
1935.85 As David Prescott Barrows (Director of Education, 1903-1909), noted, "[T]he school
system of these islands is the most typically American institution which our government here
established."86 It also turned out to be among the most dysfunctional institutions of the U.S.
colonial regime.
3.1. The Unmovable Pillars ofAmerican Education Policy
As seen from War Secretary Elihu Root's Instructions to the Philippine Commission (the
body charged with governing the Philippines), the Republican administration's education policy
in the archipelago was comprised of three key pillars. First, "the [Commission] should regard as
8' The Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (popularly known as the Jones Act) in fact specified that the Secretary of
Public Instruction (who would concurrently serve as Vice-Governor) would be an American. Section 23 of the Act
states: "That there shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, a vice governor of the Philippine Islands, who shall have all of the powers of the Governor General in
the case of a vacancy or temporary removal, resignation, or disability of the Governor General, or in case of his
temporary absence; and the said vice governor shall be the head of the executive department, known as the
department of public instruction, which shall include the bureau of education and the bureau of health, and he may
be assigned such other executive duties as the Governor General may designate." U.S. Congress, United States
Statues at Large, vol. 39 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917), p. 553. It should also be noted that the United States
ensured the preservation of their educational system by mandating, through an act of Congress, that English would
continue to be the primary language of instruction even after the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth.
See "Philippine Independence Act," in U.S. Congress, United States Statues at Large, vol. 48 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1934), pp. 456-65. See, in particular, p. 457 for the Act's "mandatory provision" regarding education, where it
states, "Provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of an adequate system of public schools,
primarily conducted in the English language." This Act, which promised independence of the Philippine Islands in
1946, is popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act.
86 David Prescott Barrows, "Report of the General Superintendent of Education," in Bureau of Insular Affairs,
Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903, pt. 3 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), p. 64. Hereafter,
reports of the Philippine Commission will be cited as RPC.
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of first importance the extension of a system of primary education which shall be free to all, and
which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a
civilized community." Second, "it is especially important to the prosperity of the islands that a
common medium of communication may be established, and it is obviously desirable that this
medium should be the English language." Third, and finally, in education, as well as in all other
areas of government, "the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and
absolute."87 Colonial officials were to structure the educational system as they saw fit, but in no
way were these three tenets of American-style education to be compromised. These were the
most fundamental principals of education in the United States, as understood by the War
Secretary, and if the Philippines were to be recreated in the American image, it seemed essential
to Root that they be upheld in the archipelago.88
These three tenets of American education represented both genuinely (even if grossly
misguided) altruistic sentiments on the part of American officials, as well as the violent logic of
colonial domination. Starting with the notion of providing Filipinos with free and universal
primary education, the justification articulated by David Barrows, as the colonial regime's most
enthusiastic and eloquent defender of its education policy, was as follows:
[P]ublic instruction in the Philippines was organized with the conscious purpose of
transforming the condition and position of the gente baja [lower class]. Our aim is to
destroy caciquismo [bossism] and to replace the dependent class with a body of
independent peasantry, owning their own homes, able to read and write, and thereby gain
access to independent sources of information, able to perform simple calculations, keep
their own accounts and consequently to rise out of their condition of indebtedness, and
87 "Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission," in Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the
Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917), p. 489.
88 Michael Adas, "Improving on the Civilising Mission? Assumptions of United States Exceptionalism in the
Colonisation of the Philippines," Itinerario 22.4 (1998): 44-66; Manuel G. Lacuesta, "Foundations of an American
Educational System in the Philippines," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review 23.2-4 (1958): 115-40.
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inspired if possible with a new spirit of self-respect, a new consciousness of personal
dignity and civil rights.8 9
The policy was therefore to create a new Filipino citizenry, indoctrinated from a very
early age in the "benefit" of American-style democratic government and the "virtues" of
capitalist form of economic production. Old Hispanized elites, steeped in Iberian customs and
prejudices, would be replaced by Americanized youths, who would look to the United States for
ideological inspiration and political direction. Meanwhile, laborers would be made out of
peasants, who in turn would import American products, while providing U.S. consumers with
cheap primary goods. The aim of universal primary education was to emancipate the Filipino
from a life of poverty in which he toiled by colonizing his mind with American ideology.90
This process of Americanization would not be complete, however, unless Filipino
children were educated in English. As Barrows noted, English (due to the expansion of the
British Empire) had emerged as the "lingua franca of the Far East." Hence, "to the Filipino the
possession of English is the gateway into that busy and fervid life of commerce, of modern
science, of diplomacy and politics in which he aspires to shine." 91 Yet, English was more than
merely the common language of Asia. It was the language of the world's leading democratic
nation, and the language in which the most famous treatises on democracy and liberty had been
written. There was no better language than English for transmitting the ideologies undergirding
the American nation. "If we can give the Filipino husbandman a knowledge of the English
language, and the most elemental acquaintance with English writings," Barrows expounded, "we
89 David Prescott Barrows, "Education and Social Progress in the Philippines," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 30 (1907), p. 73.
90 Kenton J. Clymer, "Humanitarian Imperialism: David Prescott Barrows and the White Man's Burden in the
Philippines," The Pacific Historical Review 45.3 (1976): 495-517; Jane A. Margold, "Egalitarian Ideals and
Exclusionary Practices: U.S. Pedagogy in the Colonial Philippines," Journal of Historical Sociology 8.4 (1995):
375-94.
91 Barrows, "Report of the General Superintendent of Education," RPC, 1903, p. 701.
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will free him from that degraded dependence upon the man of influence of his own race..." 92
Thus, the idea was not only to teach Filipino children how to speak English as a foreign
language, but to make English the national language of the archipelago. Every subject would be
taught in English, from science to literature. Even the writings of Jose Rizal, the most important
figure of Filipino nationalism, would be translated into and taught in English.93
Practical and linguistic justifications for the use of English also abounded. Although
Spanish was the common language of the educated elite, the vast majority of Filipinos
understood only their local dialect, which fell within one of three main Filipino language groups:
Tagalog (and the relatively similar Bicol), Bisaya (which includes the related dialects spoken in
Cebu, Panay, and Samar), and Ilocano.94 Hence, there seemed to be no reason why English could
not be used instead of Spanish as the language of instruction. After all, it was much more
convenient for American officials to teach English, and expect native elites to communicate with
the colonizers in this language, than it was for them to learn Spanish. Also, insofar as the idea
was to transplant U.S.-style education to the archipelago, it was pertinent that American teachers
be brought to the Philippines as educators and administrators. It would have been difficult to
secure enough Spanish-speaking Americans for this purpose.
The alternative approach was to make Tagalog-the language spoken in Manila and its
surrounding provinces, and also the language of Rizal, Andr6s Bonifacio, Emilio Aguinaldo,
Apolinario Mabini, and other leaders of the Revolution-the national language. Tagalog,
however, was deemed too linguistically primitive to serve as the foundation of a modern nation.
It was unsuited, American officials argued, as a medium for conveying important scientific ideas
92 Ibid.
93 Andrew B. Gonzalez, Language and Nationalism: The Philippine Experience Thus Far (Quezon City, P.I.:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980), pp. 24-59.
94 Najeeb Mitry Saleeby, The Language of Education of the Philippine Islands (Manila: [s.n.], 1924), pp. 42-46.
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and democratic principles, and useless for commerce and diplomacy. Moreover, U.S. officials
noted that the selection of Tagalog, or any other dialect, had the danger of antagonizing the other
ethnic/language groups of the archipelago. While it was possible to undertake education through
different local languages, this would increase the cost of education, as textbooks would have to
be translated into many different dialects. It would also make supervision of schools by
American teachers difficult, as officials in the Bureau of Education would be unable to
understand what was being taught in the classrooms. Moreover, the prevailing wisdom was that
the provision of primary education in multiple languages would retard the modernization of the
Filipino nation by depriving it of a single and unifying national language.9"
The final pillar of U.S. education policy was secularization. The complete and absolute
separation of church and state was also arguably the most important tenet of public education, at
least in the view of Secretary Root. While Root regarded universal education as something the
United States should strive toward, and the use of English as the language of instruction as
highly desirable, he was uncompromising on the issue of secularization, both within the text of
the Instructions and in his letters and other writings. Religious freedom, in Root's view, was
among the most important founding principles of the American nation, as demand for religious
tolerance was what brought the first pilgrims to Plymouth Rock, as well as his own mother and
father to the shores of New York.96 Filipino parents were free to raise their children in whatever
religion they desired, and the government had no business advancing one religion over another in
95 Bernard Moses, "Report of the Secretary of Public Instruction," in RPC, 1902, pt. 1, pp. 880-81. These sentiments
were also expressed by leading Filipino collaborators, such as Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, who believed that the
Philippines would greatly benefit from close association with the United States. Educated in Europe, Pardo de
Tavera believed that the only way for the Philippines to achieve modernity was through English education. For an
examination of Pardo de Tavera's position on education, see Barbara S. Gaerlan, "The Pursuit of Modernity:
Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and the Educational Legacy of the Philippine Revolution," Amerasia Journal 24.2
(1998): 87-108.
96 See, for example, Elihu Root, "Sectarian Education," in Addresses on Government and Citizenship, ed. Robert
Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), pp. 137-40; Root to Taft, 9 May
1901, Reel 36, William Howard Taft, Papers: 1890-1930 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1969).
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schools funded by the state. Consequently, schools were no longer to be held on parish grounds,
but within structures newly constructed by the government. Filipino teachers, who had been
trained in Catholicism, were to be reeducated in accordance with American pedagogical
methods. In the meantime, local educators would receive strict supervision by American officials
and were compelled to abide by the new secular curriculum.
3.11. The Perils of a Dualistic Education Institution
What Secretary Root had in mind for the Philippines was therefore the complete opposite
of the education institution that prevailed in the archipelago prior to U.S. colonization. While
American officials sought to establish universal primary education, the previous Spanish system
had focused on educating a small segment of the elite. Root's insistence on secular education
ignored the reality that all schools under the Spanish regime were run by Catholic parishes.
Finally, despite the fact that Spanish was the language of the elite, English was to become the
only language of instruction under U.S. rule.97 It was therefore of little surprise that Filipino
elites regarded U.S. education policy unfavorably.
However, top colonial officials, along with their superiors in Washington, were largely
oblivious to (or chose to ignore) the unpopularity of their reform program, especially when it
came to the language issue. The Philippine Commission, which served as both the legislative and
executive branch of the Philippines (until 1907), declared in its 1900 report, "[The] natives are
reported as eager to learn English, and the use of Spanish or the native dialects is generally
deprecated." 98 Such self-serving sentiment on the part of American colonial officials was hardly
unique, and understandable. After all, it was true that some prominent Filipino elites stressed the
97 For a comprehensive history of Spanish-era education in the Philippines, see Evergisto Bazaco, History of
Education in the Philippines: Spanish Period, 1565-1898, 2nd ed. (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Press, 1953).
98 RPC, 1900, p. 107.
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desire for an all-English education, and it was also true that municipalities, as soon as they were
"liberated" by the U.S. military, expressed strong support for an American-style education.
However, the meaning of this support for English as the language of instruction should have
been placed within the context of a population besieged by 70,000 heavily armed U.S. soldiers-
something that the self-righteous colonizers did not think to do.
It was also of little coincidence that those Filipino elites who had the most to gain from
the U.S. occupation were the most vocal supporters of English education. Trinidad H. Pardo de
Tavera's advocacy of English is a case in point. Pardo de Tavera, a wealthy Spanish mestizo and
medical doctor, had initially joined Aguinaldo's revolutionary government as foreign minister.
Yet, from the very beginning, he was skeptical of the revolution, which was dominated by
provincial landed elites, rather than by urban intellectuals and reformers like himself. He was
perfectly content with the Philippines remaining a Spanish colony when the revolution first
began in 1896, and only came to support Aguinaldo when U.S. intervention assured Spanish
defeat. As it became clear that the United States intended to annex the Philippine Islands, he was
quick to offer his services to American colonial officials. A founding member of the Federal
Party (which operated as a counter-revolutionary organization), his loyalty to the United States
was rewarded with his appointment to the Philippine Commission in 1901; by collaborating with
the U.S. colonial administration, Pardo de Tavera thus finally obtained the political prominence
that had long eluded him under both the Spanish and Revolutionary regimes.99 When Philippine
Civil Governor William Howard Taft and other members of the Philippine Commission reported
native elite support for English education, they were largely referring to men like Pardo de
99 For a discussion of collaborative arrangements between U.S. colonial officials and "Federalistas" (such as Pardo
de Tavera), see Michael Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908
(Quezon City, P1: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 49-72; Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making:
The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 51-138.
For Pardo de Tavera's views on education, see Gaerlan, "The Pursuit of Modernity."
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Tavera. High-ranking civilian officials in the colonial regime simply had little access to, and
therefore no knowledge of, the opinions of Filipinos who resided outside of Manila. 100
Compared to the civilian members of the Insular Government, U.S. military officials,
through their campaigns across the archipelago, were better acquainted with "popular" opinion in
the provinces. For this reason, it was the military's insistence that English education was widely
supported by Filipinos, that reassured the Philippine Commission of the advisability of this
policy.'01 However, as Frank White, Assistant to the General Superintendent of Education,
confessed in his 1903 report, "[I]t became evident that a measure of the apparent interest in
school affairs on the part of local native leaders was feigned, or, at least, not altogether
genuine."io2 The first American schools in the archipelago were not established by professional
(civilian) educators, but by officers of the U.S. Army as part of their counter-insurgency
campaign of "attraction." Consequently, "the people had been given to understand that if they
would avoid the disfavor and suspicion of the authorities they must lend their unqualified support
to these schools. A 'principal' who was rash enough to express indifference to this American
'00 For examples of these testimonies, see Jacob Schurman, et al., Report of the Philippine Commission to the
President, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900). As Hayden writes, "There were, of course, many Filipino
dissentients from the views of the group which agreed to the establishment of English as the sole language of the
public schools. They were not in a favorable position to influence policy, however, because many of them were
political irreconcilables who were persona non grata to the [colonial] government. ... This group objected not to the
teaching of English in the public schools, but to the exclusion of the native languages." Joseph Ralston Hayden, The
Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York: MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 592. Evidence of such
sentiment can be found in reports by division superintendents of the Bureau of Education-officials who were
actually stationed in the provinces and who came into direct contact with provincial elites. According to the division
superintendent of Pangasinan, for example, "Many adult Filipinos, who have some command of Spanish, are
anxious for their children to have the same advantage. If the high school does not provide for this some private
school is always ready to do so, and the children of an influential class are thus removed from the influence of the
public schools." See "Report of the Division Superintendents and Principals of the Insular Normal, Trade, and
Nautical Schools," RPC, 1903, p. 797.
1' U.S. Department of War, Education in the Philippine Islands (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1901), especially pp. 40-
42. Captain Albert Todd's recommendation that English education be introduced immediately was based on a
survey of military commanders across the archipelago.102 Frank R. White, "Report of the Assistant to the General Superintendent," in RPC, 1903, pt. 3, p. 706.
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educational enterprise was a candidate for official investigation." 03 The following example
given by White-a report by an unnamed lieutenant in the U.S. Army-is most revealing:
Sir: I have the honor to report that Sergeant , Company H, now in command of
detachment at Rosario, stated to me yesterday that some of the school children at Rosario
had told the school-teacher there that they did not want to learn English, but did want to
learn Spanish. Sergeant went to the presidente [mayor] of the town and told him
that such talk was treasonable; that the United States had come here to stay and the
people were to learn English; that he did not want to hear of any more of such defiant and
treasonable talk. He asked me to report the matter to regimental headquarters.1 04
In short, as White concluded in his report, "There were few Filipinos at the time who did not
wish to assume a semblance of loyalty to the purposes of the government as expressed by its
military representatives."10 5
The use of either Spanish or the vernacular as the language of instruction was more likely
to have been preferred by a majority of Filipino elites, at least during the early colonial period.106
Indeed, the education policy of the short-lived Philippine Republic (1899-1901), devised by
Felipe Buencamino, mandated that knowledge of Spanish was required for admission to
secondary schools. The use of Spanish as the language of instruction was also implied in
Mabini's draft Constitution of the Philippine Republic, even as Mabini (who was among
Aguinaldo's closest associates) desired Tagalog to be taught in schools as the future national
language of the Philippines. Spanish was ultimately chosen by the revolutionaries as the national
language in order to prevent inter-ethnic conflict over language policy, but the notion that
primary education should be conducted in the vernacular gained widespread support over
103 White, "Report of the Assistant to the General Superintendent," p. 706.
04 Ibid.
1s Ibid. For a vivid illustration of this dynamic, see Peter James Tarr, The Education of the Thomasites: American
School Teachers in Philippine Colonial Society, 1901-1913, Diss., Cornell University, Ithaca, 2006 (Ann Arbor:
UMI, 2006), pp. 284-324.
'06 This is not to suggest that Filipinos had no desire to learn English as a second (foreign) language. Given U.S.
domination of the archipelago, English was highly beneficial for those aspiring to find employment in the civil
service, as well as in business.
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time.' 07 On February 27, 1908, the newly created Philippine Assembly voted to make the dialect
of a particular region the language of instruction--only for this measure to be struck down by the
American-controlled Philippine Commission. 08
The designation of English as the language of instruction was not the only aspect of
American education policy that proved unpopular among local Filipino elites. In fact, generating
even greater, and clearly visible, opposition among Filipinos was the separation of church and
state in the classroom. As discussed above, Root was adamant that public schools should not
favor any one religion over another. Yet, Civil Governor Taft (who served as Root's loyal
executioner in the archipelago) was well aware that Filipinos were deeply attached to the
Catholic faith and that Filipino parents believed Catholicism should be an integral part of the
school curriculum.109 The "compromise" solution adopted by the Philippine Commission was
modeled after measures briefly attempted in the Minnesota towns of Faribault and Stillwater (by
Archbishop John Ireland) in the 1890s. Under this plan, it was mandated that no teacher "shall
teach or criticize the doctrines of any church, religious sect or denomination, or shall attempt to
influence the pupils for or against any church or religious sect in any public school established...
107 Gonzalez, Language and Nationalism, pp. 17-21; Cesar Adib Majul, "Education During the Reform Movement
and the Philippine Revolution," The Diliman Review 14.5 (1967): 185-257. As early as 1903, a paper presented at
the annual division superintendent's meeting noted, "The teaching of Tagalog or other native dialect would please
the parents in many parts of the Philippines. ... It is both necessary and politic to teach some little Tagalog or
whatever may be the dialect of the territory in the barrio school if the people desire it. ... If the native dialect is
taught, it will seem their school rather than altogether an American school. But there is really a necessity for the
dialect. They should be able to read and write it for barrio business purposes." See "Report of the Division
Superintendents and Principals of the Insular Normal, Trade, and Nautical Schools," p. 869.
08 Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913 (Quezon City, P.I.: New Day
Publishers, 1968), p. 75. Indeed, soon after Filipinos obtained self-rule in 1935, the Institute of National Language
recommended that Tagalog be made the national language. This policy was adopted by Quezon (himself a Tagalog
speaker) with little opposition in the national legislature. Thereafter, English would remain an official language of
government, but Tagalog was to become the national language of the Filipino people. Hayden, The Philippines, pp.
583-85 and 623-29.
0 See, for example, Taft to Mrs. Bellany Storer, 22 June 1900, Reel 463, Taft, Papers, where Taft writes, "I
understand that the public school system in which no religion is taught at all is not regarded by Catholics as a proper
system; but you and [your husband] Bellamy know that no other is possible with us and the Church must so
understand it."
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." It was lawful though for "the priest or minister of any church established in the pueblo ... to
teach religion for one-half an hour three times a week in the school buildings to those public
school pupils whose parents or guardians desire it ... ."10
However, from the perspective of Filipino elites (as well as non-elites), this was hardly a
compromise, as is apparent from reports by American teachers and administrators stationed in
the provinces. "Church influences were strong against the public schools in Sorsogon and but a
little better in Albay," one official reported. He further added, "Not only did church schools
flourish, but an active and aggressive campaign was carried on against public schools.""' The
division superintendent of Ambros Camarines concurred that the "reason for the lack of the
moral support of the people at large [for public schools] is that the children are not instructed in
the religious teachings and catechism of the church in the public schools, and this in their eyes is
a fatal defect in our system, which otherwise is well liked by those Filipinos who have become
familiar with it."" 2 Even in the province of Batangas, where antagonism toward the Spanish
friars was strong, the division superintendent reported, "[Filipinos] are thoroughly satisfied with
[the public schools], but for one exception-that is, they desire religious instruction." 13
Similarly, in the province of Rizal, school authorities stated, "There is strong sentiment in this
province among the parents that children should not be allowed to attend the public school until
they had learned the catechism of the church. As a general rule, all children who do not know the
catechism do not attend."" 4 Indeed, despite U.S. policy preferring secular schools, there were
110 See Act 74, Section 16 in U.S. Department of War, Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the United States
Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1901), p. 126.
"Report of the Division Superintendents and Principals of the Insular Normal, Trade, and Nautical Schools," p.
726.
1 2 Ibid., p. 731.
"' Ibid., p. 733.
"
4 Ibid., p. 802.
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325 church-sponsored schools in addition to 1,004 private schools (which also provided
instruction in Catholic teachings) in 1903, compared to 1,663 public (and secular) schools.' 1 5
Provincial teachers and school administrators came to understand that if the public school
system was to become truly popular among the Filipinos, religious instruction needed to become
a more central component of education. "Practically speaking, all the children who attend the
schools in the provincial towns are from Catholic homes, and their parents want the children
taught religion," the superintendent of Ilocos Sur and Abra noted. "It is useless to expect that
parents are going to petition the division superintendent for permission to have their children
taught 'doctrina,' etc. They will take their children out of the public schools and send them to
private schools before they will do this." A solution to this problem, this official suggested, was
to change the school law so as to "allow the native teachers to teach religion in the public schools
a half hour each day ... "116 Nonetheless, such suggestions from those most familiar with local
conditions were rejected by the Philippine Commission, which was bound by the educational
priorities of Washington. With or without the cooperation of local municipal elites and church
officials, the Insular Government was determined to institute a public and secular school system
that would teach Filipino children entirely in English.
As originally envisioned, the new educational system in the Philippines was to
structurally mimic the one found in the United States-that is, local officials would play a
predominant role in the financing and regulation of schools. However, it quickly became
apparent that local school boards and municipal governments could not be relied upon to enforce
American education policy. In many localities, presidentes (municipal mayors) sabotaged the
"15 Census Office of the Philippine Islands, Census of the Philippine Islands: 1918, vol. 4, pt. II (Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1920-192 1), p. 7. This information can also be found in the 1903 Census, vol. 3, but the 1918 Census has
the advantage of displaying both the 1903 and 1918 data.
116 "Report of the Division Superintendents and Principals of the Insular Normal, Trade, and Nautical Schools," p.
757.
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work of American teachers by failing to appropriate funds for the salary of Filipino public school
teachers and for the construction of school buildings. Choosing not to openly oppose American
colonial officials, Filipino municipal officials simply procrastinated. Also, by feigning laziness,
they declined to use their authority to motivate parents to send their children to public schools." 7
Frustration among American school administrators was palpable: "We need a law which will
give the division superintendent power to do something," the division superintendent of Bulacan
lamented. "As it is, his hands are absolutely tied by the municipal officers. He can not require the
pupils to go to school; the salaries of his native teachers can be held six months if the
municipality so desires; he can not have any repairs made on the schoolhouses if the officials do
not care to do so."" 8
Yet, despite such complaints by division superintendents, these officials possessed far
greater power over local school matters than any comparable official within the United States,
and purposely so. Superintendents had the power to appoint native teachers as well as determine
their salary. They selected half of the members of the local school board, and were responsible
for supervision and inspection of schools." 9 If anything, their freedom to act was constrained not
by lack of authority within the locality, but by directives of their superiors in the Bureau of
Education. Just as a schoolteacher had little say over the design of the curriculum, division
superintendents were also instructed to faithfully follow the educational guidelines laid down by
the Director of Education. Division superintendents were far too willing to abandon the core
tenets of U.S. education policy; therefore, allowing on-the-ground experimentation had the
"7 Tarr, The Education of the Thomasites, p. 681. Such uncooperative behavior by Filipino elites was usually
interpreted as a sign of laziness, underscoring how effective these elites were in sabotaging U.S. institution-building
efforts without endangering their own political standing. In fact, resistance by inaction is a common strategy used by
politically weak or compromised individuals. See James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
118 "Report of the Division Superintendents and Principals of the Insular Normal, Trade, and Nautical Schools," p.
743.
119 Tarr, The Education of the Thomasites, p. 193-94.
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danger of undercutting the overall strategy of providing secular and English education to Filipino
children. The Bureau of Education thus became a highly centralized organization that left little
room for local initiative. Nonetheless, centralization of education administration was the surest
method through which the colonial government could overcome the problem of enforcement,
given the unpopularity of its education policies among local elites.120
A centralized administrative structure is effective, however, only so far as there is a
sufficient number of officials on the ground to enforce the directives from the center. In the case
of U.S. education in the Philippines, necessary manpower was provided through the hiring of
hundreds of American teachers to serve in the Philippines as teachers and administrators. These
individuals, known as "Thomasites" (after a transport ship Thomas, which brought the first group
of American teachers to the Philippines), numbered 928 men and women at their height, and
were scattered throughout the archipelago to enforce America's "civilizing mission." 2 1
Oftentimes, a Thomasite was the only American to reside within a provincial town, and hence,
he or she wielded considerable power and influence within the local community. In this way, and
perhaps ironically, American teachers came to serve the same role Catholic friars had fulfilled
under the Spanish regime. Their pedagogical duties went beyond the classroom, as they were
instructed to enforce "moral behavior" within the local community. Furthermore, similar to how
the Spanish friars manipulated electoral outcomes to ensure victory of candidates supportive of
the Church and the Spanish colonial regime, the support or non-support of American teachers
made or destroyed the political careers of Filipino politicians under the U.S. administration. 2 2
120 The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands (Manila: Bureau
of Printing, 1925), pp. 517-60.
12 Tarr, The Education of the Thomasites, p. 197.
122 For example, Harry Bandholtz, who at the time was a division commander of the Constabulary, complained that
a schoolteacher in Tayabas by the name of R. H. Wardall was actively campaigning for a candidate other than whom
Bandholtz preferred for the position of provincial governor. As this episode demonstrates, colonial officials did not
always agree on which Filipino elite should be supported by the Insular Government. Nonetheless, the fact remains
296
Passive Filipino resistance toward the new public education system was thus overcome
through the tenacity and rigidity of U.S. officials. Backed by an infusion of U.S. teachers and
resources, local agents of the Bureau of Education bypassed municipal governments and directly
enforced the school curriculum. However, brute force alone could not have overcome Filipino
resistance had this taken a more active form. Uncooperativeness on the part of Filipino elites
could be overcome with centralization of the education system, but had the elites engaged in
violent opposition over education policy, a redirection in the policy would have been
unavoidable. What is indeed surprising is the fact that Filipino elites displayed such passivity
regarding America's policy of fundamentally uprooting the existing education system when their
very identity as an elite was based on education. In the Philippines, the elite was known as the
ilustrado, precisely because what differentiated them from the commoner, in addition to wealth,
was the fact that they had received Catholic education either in the Philippines or in Spain.
Education had been a privilege under Spanish rule and was therefore the primary signifier of
elite status.m U.S. public education therefore not only offended the elites' religious sentiments,
but also threatened to democratize the source of their superior status.
Lack of robust resistance by ilustrados against U.S. educational reform had much to do
with the unchanging reality that Catholic private schools continued to offer the best education in
the Philippine Islands. This was especially the case at the tertiary education level, where the most
prestigious secondary and collegiate schools in the Philippines were private Catholic schools. It
that American teachers, as well as Constabulary officers, were very much involved in local politics. This episode is
told through a series of correspondences between Bandholtz, Wardall, Muerman, Balch, and Harbord between
December 3, 1905 and January 11, 1906. These correspondences can be found in Reel I of Harry Hill Bandholtz
Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Conversely, presidentes were also very
conscious of the importance of winning the support of American teachers, not only to retain their jobs, but also for
the purpose of attracting appropriations from the central government to their municipality. For a description of how
presidentes were extremely cautious in their dealings with American teachers, see Tarr, The Education of the
Thomasites, pp. 286-91.
123 Michael Cullinane, ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Quezon City, PI:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 26-32.
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was thus easy for wealthy parents to ensure that their children received high-quality Catholic
education, as they had under the old regime. In short, with the "exit" option so readily available
(and attractive), it made little sense for local powerholders to risk jeopardizing their privileged
position within the U.S. colonial governance structure by actively opposing the establishment of
secular and English colonial schools. 2 4 Moreover, with the U.S. focus on providing mass
education at the primary level, the dominance of private schools at the post-secondary level was
unchallenged, as seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Student Enrollment in Public and Private Schools, 1903-1961
Public School Enrollment Private School Enrollment
Elementary Secondary Collegiate Total Elementary Secondary Collegiate Total
1903 261,615 4,747 0 266,362 80,323 9,264 436 90,023
1918 636,301 37,281 2,701 676,283 98,972 10,235 3,556 112,763
1930-31 1,143,708 79,054 9,635* 1,222,762 48,268 37,460 16,685 102,413
1940-41 1,922,738 100,987 11,752 2,035,457 71,816 72,089 36,013 179,918
*This number combines 1930-31 enrollment data for American colleges and vocational schools with the 1929-31
enrollment data of the University of the Philippines. 1930-31 enrollment data for the University is unavailable.
Sources: 1929-30 University of the Philippines enrollment data from Encamacion Alzona, A History ofEducation in
the Philippines, 1565-1930 (Manila: University of Philippines Press, 1932), p. 286; 1903 enrollment data from U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Census of the Philippine Islands: 1903 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1905), p. 672; 1918
enrollment data from Philippines Census Office, Census of the Philippine Islands: 1918 (Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1920-1921), p. 532; 1930-31 and 1940-41 enrollment data from 0. D. Corpuz, "Education and Socio-
Economic Change in the Philippines," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review 32.2 (1967), pp. 225-26.
Consequently, while the elite's decision to opt out of the public school system allowed
colonial administrators to forge ahead with their predetermined education policy, it had the
unintended effect of further entrenching the dualistic character of the education institution: On
one hand were public schools for the masses (which provided free education only at the primary
124 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 566; Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims,
Execution, and Impact ofAmerican Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 83. For
a discussion of the development and expansion of private education in the Philippines, see Encarnacion Alzona, A
History ofEducation in the Philippines, 1565-1930 (Manila: University of Philippines Press, 1932), pp. 334-51;
Maria Guillen Acierto, American Influences in Shaping Philippine Secondary Education, Diss., Loyola University
of Chicago, 1980 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1980). For a critique of the quality of private education, see The Board of
Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System qf the Philippine Islands, pp. 505-16.
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and intermediate levels), and on the other were private schools (along with a few tuition-
charging public secondary schools) that were largely attended by the wealthy. Ironically,
America's very attempt to democratize the school system thus ensured that higher education and
elite status would remain closely intertwined. Not only did this institutional structure lead to the
crystallization of class cleavages under U.S. rule, but it also produced perverse incentives among
Filipino elites that further degraded the quality of public education. Most damaging of all, elites
sought to rapidly increase the number of public primary schools for reasons of political gain,
irrespective of the system's ability to support such expansion.
For example, one of the first acts of the Philippine Assembly (comprised entirely of
Filipino legislators) was to appropriate one million pesos (2 pesos = 1 U.S. dollar) for the
purpose of constructing primary schools in barrios in 1907. This appropriation was in addition to
the regular expenditure of the Bureau of Education, which was already greater than any other
bureau of the colonial government. This scheme, known as the Gabaldon Act, was extended in
1910 through the appropriation of another one million pesos, and the Philippine Assembly again
appropriated 335,000 pesos for municipal school buildings three years later. In 1918 (two years
after lawmaking power was transferred completely to Filipinos with the abolishment of the
Philippine Commission), the legislature appropriated approximately 30 million pesos, to be
distributed over five years, for the purpose of expanding primary education. Given that
Filipino legislators were predominantly landowners, such actions were in seeming contradiction
to their class interests, as well as to their individual economic concerns. Peasant children were
12 For data and discussion of the legislature's education appropriations, see Alzona, A History of Education in the
Philippines, pp. 205-08.
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valuable laborers, who helped their sharecropping parents maintain the productivity of
haciendas.12 6
Yet, this uncharacteristically "altruistic" action by the Filipino legislators can be
explained by the fact that appropriation for education became the primary method to bring
"pork"-that is, a slice of the national expenditure-back to their home district. After all, the
funds were not used to provide more (or better) education per se, but simply to "construct" more
school buildings. 27 To the detriment of the public education system, however, there simply were
not enough qualified teachers to staff these new public schools-all of them at the elementary
level-that were being built at the will of the Philippine Assembly. Consequently, as the number
of elementary schools increased exponentially, their quality deteriorated rapidly.' 2 8 However,
126 For example, the division superintendent of Ambos Camarines writes in his annual report, "[A Filipino elite] is
indifferent whether the children of his more ignorant neighbors attend [school], totally failing to perceive that before
a people can successfully undertake self-government the masses of the people must be readers and thinkers. He is
utterly opposed to allowing the little peons whose service he exacts to attend school at all, though they be children
ranging in age from 6 to 16 years. The Filipino who sends his child servants to school is not unknown but he is a
rarity." RPC, 1903, pt. 3, p. 731. Of course, such sentiments by a colonial agent must be taken with a grain of salt,
but this is largely in line with other actions commonly taken by the landed elite during the U.S. colonial period (such
as land-grabbing and usury) that forced a large number of small-scale landowners into indentured servitude. Indeed,
while 80.1 percent of farms in 1903 were individually owned, this figure had decreased to 49.2 percent by 1939.
During this same span, the number of share-croppers doubled, while the number of farms over two hectares (which
is about the maximum size a single family could cultivate on their own) increased from just under 25 percent to
nearly 50 percent. For these figures, see Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903 (vol. 4, pp. 268-76) and 1918 (vol. 3,
pp. 95-112), and Census of the Philippines, 1939 (vol. 2, p. 975). For more on the abusive behavior of the landed
elite toward the peasantry, see Leslie E. Bauzon, Philippine Agrarian Reform, 1880-1965 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1975); Brian Fegan, "The Social History of a Central Luzon Barrio," in Philippine Social
History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (Quezon City, P.I.:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982): 91-129; Marshall S. McLennan, "Land Tenancy in the Central Luzon
Plain," Philippine Studies 17 (1969): 651-82.
127 Here, "construct" is placed in quotations, for these funds were hardly distributed in a way that led to the building
of sturdy structures, but to put money in the pockets of those who promised to build. The Board of Educational
Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, pp. 525-26.
128 American colonial officials were indeed quite aware of this problem and sought to prioritize quality over
quantity, at least from 1910. However, little action was taken to reverse this trend by the colonial government, as the
Filipino desire to rapidly expand the school system in fact echoed Secretary Root's goal of achieving universal
primary education in the Philippines-a policy which was then strongly supported by succeeding War Secretaries in
both Republican and Democratic administrations. The exception (which ultimately proves the rule) was during the
1911-1912 school year, when, with Governor-General Forbes away on medical leave to the United States, Newton
Gilbert (Secretary of Public Instruction), along with Frank White (Director of Education), determined that the school
system had expanded too rapidly in the previous ten years. They were also concerned that not enough secondary
schools were available for those completing elementary education. They thus closed 769 barrio (primary) schools to
free up funds for additional secondary schools. Forbes, having returned to the Philippine Islands in early 1913,
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this was not a concern to the elites themselves, for their own children attended private schools.' 2 9
It did not matter to them that public schools were hardly providing what could be called an
"education," except at the secondary level (which was beyond the reach of children from
families of limited means), where a combination of local government support and the charging of
tuition ensured that a high standard was maintained.
American efforts to build a new education institution nonetheless "succeeded" in one key
respect: In place of the Spanish language, English became firmly established as the new
language of the Filipino elite. Despite its many problems (as discussed in the pages below),
American schools produced a cadre of English-speaking Filipinos each year, and individuals
with a command of English were more competitive in obtaining positions in the American-
dominated Insular Civil Service. Hence, while those aspiring to obtain government positions had
the option of taking the civil service exam in either English or Spanish, by 1911, 80 percent of
Filipino applicants (4,921 out of 6,148) chose to be examined in English. By 1925, the number of
Filipinos taking the exam in Spanish had dwindled to one percent, and in 1935, only 80 out of
immediately recognized that this action contradicted America's "civilizing" goal (as initially articulated by Root),
even if it made sense from a pedagogical perspective. Forbes lost no time in apologizing to newly elected President
Woodrow Wilson for his subordinates' behavior, and promised the President the immediate opening of one thousand
primary schools and an additional thousand in the next two years. What is intriguing about Forbes' decision to
overrule Gilbert and White was that he was generally supportive of the policy of shifting the Insular Government's
emphasis from primary to secondary education. Forbes even sought to cut back total expenditure for education so
that he could instead focus on public works, especially road-building. The reductions implemented by Gilbert and
White were too sudden and too deep, however. Forbes, as a survivor of the 1905 "purge" (discussed in Ch. 3),
understood this perfectly. See W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928),
pp. 460-61; Forbes to Wilson, 18 May 1913, Philippine Data: Executive, Vol. 5, Forbes Papers; Journal of W.
Cameron Forbes, 13 March 1908 and 5 April 1908 entries, Vol. 2, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge; May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, pp. I 10-11 and 115-16.
129 Revealingly, when the Director of Education recommended in 1937 that funds be used to improve the quality of
existing schools rather than increase enrollment, the legislature instead enacted a law making primary education
compulsory for children living within a certain distance from a primary school. Onofre D. Corpuz, "Education and
Socio-Economic Change in the Philippines," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review 32.2 (1967), pp.
228-29.
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44,213 applicants chose to take the Spanish exam.130 The colonial government also signaled their
intention to phase out the use of Spanish in the courts, incentivizing those aspiring to practice
law (which was regarded as the most prestigious career path) to obtain a solid foundation in
English.13 1 In short, Filipinos could not avoid participation in the English-dominant colonial
environment imposed upon by the United States.
As a result, even prestigious Catholic schools, which prided themselves in providing high
quality Spanish and Latin education, slowly introduced English into their curriculum to remain
competitive. By the 1920s, the University of Santo Tomas and the College of Ateneo de Manila
had made English their language of instruction. 3 2 Meanwhile, after a rocky start, the all-English
and government-sponsored University of the Philippines came to be regarded as a premier
institution for higher learning, thus providing a secular alternative to Santo Tomas. Entrance into
the University of the Philippines required a diploma from a public school or from one of the
government-accredited-that is, English-based-private schools.' 33 The dominance of Spanish
in Filipino elite politics and culture was unsustainable.134
130 Handbook on the Executive Departments of the Government of the Philippine Islands (Manila: Bureau of
Printing, 1912), p. 22; Lewis E. Gleeck, American Institutions in the Philippines, 1898-1941 (Manila: Historical
Conservation Society, 1976), p. 44. Gonzalez, Language and Nationalism, p. 29.
"i Initially, English was to replace Spanish as the language of the judiciary in January 1906, but this was postponed
several times, and Spanish continued to be used in the courts throughout the American period. Salamanca, The
Filipino Reaction to American Rule, pp. 66-67.
132 Jose Victor Z. Torres, In Transition: The University of Santo Tomas during the American Colonial Period, 1898-
1935 (Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 2007).
133 Alzona, A History of Education in the Philippines, pp. 273-333.
14 As Hayden wrote in the late 1930s, "For forty years Spanish has been gradually losing the advantage which it had
in 1900 as the only Western language widely spoken in the Islands. The circulation of the Spanish press tells the
story, in part. While it has held its own absolutely, the readers of its English and native language competitors have
increased many fold. For years a constantly decreasing number of young people have been learning Spanish. Among
the graduates of the University of the Philippines few command the language unless they have studied it as a college
subject. The alumni of Santo Tomas make a better showing in this respect, but even among them a knowledge of
Spanish is far from universal. As the Spanish-speaking generation passes from the scene fewer and fewer Filipinos
are going to read that language regularly, in the newspapers or anywhere else." Hayden then adds, "Since the above
paragraph was written, the census of 1939 has shown that the use of Spanish has already decreased far more rapidly
than the author would have believed possible. Only 417,375 persons were reported to possess the ability to speak
Spanish, as compared with 4,164,549 who could speak English." Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 634-35.
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With enough dedication and resources on the part of the occupying power, even a
dualistic institution initially lacking in local ownership was therefore able to make a permanent
mark on the colonial society. Nonetheless, this did not mean that the educational system was
functional. Ironically, the very factor that led the U.S. colonial regime to expend considerable
manpower and financial resources to ensure long-term survival of its institution of schooling-
namely, the importance of the "civilizing mission" as justification for continued U.S.
occupation-blinded policymakers in Washington (and by extension, high-ranking U.S. officials
in Manila) to the incongruence between their pedagogical agenda and preexisting conditions in
the archipelago. Without native organizational foundations, as well as strong elite support, the
U.S. education institution was ultimately unable achieve its goal of laying the groundwork for a
liberal and democratic Philippine state.
3.111. The Failure ofAmerican Education in the Philippines
The most systematic, and independent, evaluation of the U.S. colonial education system
was conducted in 1925 under the direction of Dr. Paul Monroe.135 His team tested approximately
32,000 Filipino students on their ability to read, speak, and write English, as well as proficiency
in other subjects, such as arithmetic, social studies, and the sciences. While these tests were
adjusted to reflect the Philippine public school curriculum, they were based on those undertaken
in the United States in order to measure the quality of Filipino schools against an "objective"
benchmark. It was also reasoned that since the aim of Philippine public schools was to provide
1s Paul Monroe, a faculty member from 1898 to 1938 at the Teachers College, Columbia University, was a pioneer
in the field of history of education and was internationally recognized as the preeminent scholar of education when
he was invited to the Philippines in 1925 to conduct an investigative survey. His most notable achievement was the
Cyclopedia of Education, a five-volume work comprised of essays from over a thousand individual contributors. For
a brief discussion of his contributions to the field of education history, see William W. Brickman and Francesco
Cordasco, "Paul Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education: With Notices of Educational Encyclopedias Past and Present,"
History of Education Quarterly 10.3 (1970): 324-37.
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American-style education to Filipino children, its quality should be measured against American
standards.136
The results of his investigation were highly discouraging for the colonial administration.
The study found that at the end of the fourth grade, a Filipino child read about as well as an
American pupil at the end of his or her second year. The gap between the reading levels of
Filipino and American school children increased in the advanced grades: The reading ability of a
Filipino child in his or her fourth (and final) year of high school education was that of a fifth-
grade American elementary school pupil. These findings were especially problematic, as English
was not simply taught as a foreign language, but was the language of instruction. Since Filipino
children did not learn how to read or write in their local dialects, the implication was that even
those who completed all primary and secondary public schooling were unlikely to be fully
literate. Low levels of English attainment by Filipino children also affected their comprehension
of other subjects. For example, Monroe's team found that a seventh-grade Filipino child's
understanding of scientific concepts was half of that of an American child at that same level.
Further highlighting the problem of English education was the finding that a Filipino child did as
well as an American child in arithmetic (where the ability to understand the English language
was less important) throughout the primary and secondary grades. 3 7
This disparity in English-language attainment was exacerbated by low daily attendance,
as well as high drop out rates among Filipino children. Monroe found that while more than 50
percent of school-aged children were in school (which was very high even when compared to
136 For an explanation of the Commission's methodology, see The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the
Educational System of the Philippine Islands, pp. 37-39. Given the inherent biases of the examiners and the
insensitivity of the examination and its method to the Philippine cultural context, the results of this survey must be
taken with some hesitation. Nonetheless, since the results of this survey are consistent with what the Philippine
government found in 1960, the findings were likely accurate in their overall depiction of the problem. For the
Philippine government's 1960 report, see Magsaysay Committee on General Education, Toward General Education
in the Philippines (Manila: University of the East, 1960).
137 The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, pp. 132-86.
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European countries), nearly half (approximately 570,000 out of 1.2 million) were in the first two
grades, and 82 percent in the first four. Only 12 percent were in grades five through seven.
Hence, a high number of Filipino children were dropping out from schools at a very early stage,
and an average Filipino child remained in school for no more than three years.1 38 This rendered
public education completely meaningless for the majority of Filipinos, as the Monroe
Commission also found that English was largely forgotten by those with less than four years of
education. 139 Monroe largely attributed this failure in colonial education to the low quality of
Filipino teachers. Indeed, the median education level of a first-grade elementary teacher was that
of a first-year student in high school; between grades two and four, it was that of a second-year
high school student; and the median education level for teachers of grades five to seven was that
of a high-school graduate. Less than five percent of elementary school instructors had completed
teacher training programs. Monroe therefore recommended that the pace of expansion be slowed
so that the quality of education could catch up with the existing number of schools.'4 0
Meanwhile, Monroe and his investigative team overlooked a much deeper flaw in the
Philippine public education system-that is, the use of English as the language of instruction.
Most ironically, Monroe's own study provided definitive evidence that an all-English education
was bound to fail in a country where the vernacular had little resemblance to the English
language. He found that more than 99 percent of Filipinos did not use English in their homes and
not more than 10 to 15 percent of the coming generation was likely to use it in their occupation.
Unsurprisingly, most Filipinos, who never ventured far beyond their place of birth, had little use
13 Ibid., pp. 199-204. In comparison, the number of school children in the United States was largely constant
through the first six grades, and 91 percent of American children went on to grade seven.
139 Ibid., pp. 139-40.
40 Ibid., pp. 401-09. For the Insular Government's reply to Monroe's report, see Eugene A. Gilmore, Reply of the
Secretary of Public Instruction (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925).
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of the "lingua franca of the Far East." 41 Since opportunities for students to become acquainted
with English outside of the classroom were scarce, the vast majority of time in school had to be
spent on oral pronunciation of words, rather than actually understanding the subject matter being
taught.14 2 Indeed, this error was abundantly clear to Najeeb Mitry Saleeby, a linguist and medical
doctor who served as superintendent of education in Moro province, and whose 1924 study of
Philippine education predated the Monroe report.
In his unpublished study, Saleeby accepted the premise that knowledge of English would
be advantageous for Filipinos, as it "fosters a higher intellectual development and a superior
culture," as well as being the "language of democracy and the language of commerce of the Far
East and the Middle East." Hence, the advisability of adopting English as the official language of
government was "common sense." English instruction in all public schools was entirely
reasonable, and the "[a]bility to read, speak and use the English language should be a condition
to all academic degrees and to public office." However, Saleeby argued that the adoption of
English "as the basis of education and as the sole medium of public instruction [was] a
completely different matter." The U.S. education policy, which sought the "obliteration of the
tribal difference of the Filipinos, the substitution of English for the vernacular dialects as the
home tongue, and making English the national, common language of the Archipelago," was
extreme in its ambition. It was pure hubris to attempt with less resources and manpower "what
ancient Persia, Rome, Alexander the Great and Napoleon failed to accomplish."' 4 3
It was certainly not the case that U.S. education policy was failing due to lack of effort or
commitment, as the colonial government was in fact allocating the lion's share of its budget to
schooling. In 1923, educational expenditure amounted to an astonishing 28.1 percent of the
14 The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, p. 135.
42 Ibid., p. 41.
143 Saleeby, The Language of Education of the Philippine Islands, p. 13.
306
insular (national) expenditure, and 23.4 percent of total government expenditure (including
insular, provincial, and municipal). In comparison, the next two biggest budgetary items, road
construction and public health, were 12.6 percent and 6.01 percent of the expenditure,
respectively. It was unreasonable to expect that the national government spend any more on
education, while motivating local governments to spend more than their current level (at 15.3
percent) was difficult. 4 4 After all, the apparent enthusiasm of local elites (who sent their own
children to private Catholic schools) to expend on public education had much more to do with
their desire to attract pork to their district than any interest on their part to help peasants achieve
political and economic independence, as discussed above.
Yet, by Saleeby's estimation, current expenses on education were far from sufficient to
achieve the goal of instilling English as the mother tongue of the Filipinos. By the 1920s, there
were less than 350 American teachers employed by the Bureau of Education, and the vast
majority of them were either in administrative positions or were teaching at the high school level.
Hence, most Filipinos learned English from fellow countrymen, who themselves had been poorly
trained in English to begin with. A vicious cycle of limited literacy in English was thus created.
According to Saleeby, two American teachers per school would be the minimum requirement to
achieve the objective of mass and full English literacy. With approximately 8,000 public schools
in the mid 1920s, 16,000 American teachers would have therefore been necessary. However, it
was simply impossible for the Insular Government to increase the number of American teachers
beyond existing levels, as American teachers commanded a salary far greater than Filipino ones.
In fact, the Bureau of Education was forced to decrease the number of American teachers over
4 The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, pp. 566-68 and
591.
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time in order to make funds available for the expansion of public education, as demanded by the
Philippine Assembly.14 5
American insistence on providing mass elementary education in English was therefore
the primary cause of Filipino illiteracy during the colonial period. With the Bureau of Education
focused on expanding primary education as rapidly as possible, very little of its budget was
allocated to fund public high schools. Consequently, most public high schools charged tuition,
making them beyond the reach of peasant children, who were already under pressure to quit
school at an early age to help support their family's finances. As the Monroe report revealed,
there were approximately 47,419 children in public high schools out of a high school age
population of 848,000 in 1924. Including the 66,825 children in approved private secondary
schools, only 7.9 percent of high-school age Filipinos received secondary education. 14 6 Most
ironically, this was only a slight improvement to the 7 percent of the school age population that
had received secondary education under the Spanish regime.14 7 Moreover, Monroe's study found
that the majority of children in high schools came from the upper classes, as shown in Table 3.
Among the occupations listed in this table, those most closely associated with the lower classes
were farm tenants, fishermen, and common laborers, which constituted 8.1 percent of provincial
high school children and 5.5 percent of Manila high school children.' 4 8
145 Saleeby, The Language ofEducation of the Philippine Islands, pp. 22-23. Later in his treatise, Saleeby argues
that even 30,000 American teachers would be insufficient to make English the common language of the Philippines.
He then postulates, "If a million industrious Americans should emigrate here and colonize the Islands, then, and
only then, could such a transformation of language become possible (28)."146 The Board of Educational Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, p. 315.147 Tarr, The Education of the Thomasites, p. 725.
148 Here, it is important to note that of the 52.2 percent of provincial high-school children with farm-owning parents
Monroe found that "a disproportionate number are really large landed proprietors." The Board of Educational
Survey, A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands, p. 324.
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Merchants and proprietors of business 16.7 17.1
Professional Service 3.7 9.2
Managers and officials 6.1 8.6
Clerical and Commercial Service 4.4 19.7
Farm Owners 52.2 9.0
Farm Tenants 3.3 0.6
Fishermen 3.1 1.2
Artisans and Skilled Laborers 7.7 27.3
Common Laborers 1.7 3.7
Unclassified 1.1 3.6
*Data from provincial high schools in Cebu, Occidental Negros, Pangasinan, and Sorsogon.
Source: The Board of Education Survey, A Survey of the Educational System
Bureau of Printing, 1925), p. 323.
of the Philippine Islands (Manila:
Combining the Monroe Commission's findings on high school student composition and
on the quality of schooling a Filipino received at the primary and intermediate educational levels,
the failure of the U.S. education institution becomes thus apparent. 149 Although public education
theoretically provided the necessary tools for civic engagement and economic advancement for
both the rich and the poor, in actuality, it was only the rich who utilized this opportunity. 5 0
Whatever the intentions of U.S. colonial officials, the implication of their education policy on the
development of the Philippine nation was hardly encouraging. Borrowing the words of Saleeby:
[To] insist on English as the sole basis of public instruction defeats the very purposes for
which the present system has been inaugurated and patronized. To give 10% of the
149 For a similar assessment, see Renato Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino," Philippine Social Sciences
and Humanities Review 23 (1958): 39-65; May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, pp. 123-24.
50 While American colonial education did indeed provide opportunities for upward mobility to thousands of people
from humble means, as was most famously displayed by the rise of Camilo Osias from a child of a small-scale
farmer to the position of Senate President, this was also true of Catholic education under the friars. Local parish
priests sponsored the entire education of their best students, regardless of socioeconomic background. The prime
example of this was Quezon, whose father was a primary school teacher. For a defense of American education (from
the perspective of providing social mobility to the poor), see Amparo S. Lardizabal, Pioneer American Teachers and
Philippine Education (Quezon City, PI: Phoenix Publishing House, 1991). An account of Osias' success can be
found in Roland Sintos Coloma, Empire and Education: Filipino Schooling under United States Rule, 1900-1910,
Diss., The Ohio State University, Columbus, 2004 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 2005), pp. 91-112. For a discussion of
Quezon's education and early political career, see Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics, pp. 176-94.
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school population an intensive English secondary and university education and to fail to
give the majority of the children of school age, and the lay people an adequate knowledge
of English or a satisfactory education, is both un-democratic and unjust. It at once creates
a dividing line between these two well defined camps of citizens, placing in bold relief a
high-browed English-speaking "ilustrados" class.' 5 1
Despite the best intentions of U.S. policymakers, such was indeed to be the legacy of American
institution-building efforts in the area of education-a legacy that was to obstruct the
development of the Philippines into a stable and democratic nation-state upon independence.
3.JV. Epilogue: Legacy of U.S. Colonial Education on Philippine National Development
Ten years after the publication of the Monroe Report, direct U.S. control over Philippine
education policy came to an end with the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. Yet,
the deficiencies highlighted by Monroe, and acknowledged by the Director of Education, had
hardly been addressed. In 1939, a little over 1.7 million individuals were reported to regularly
read newspapers and magazines. With a population of 16,000,303 this amounted to a mere 10.7
percent of the total population and 15.8 percent of those who were 10 years and older. 52
Moreover, the majority of these regular consumers of information did not read in English, thus
placing further doubt on the usefulness of English education. In 1936, there were approximately
226,000 daily newspapers in circulation, but only eight newspapers with a total circulation of
85,343 were in English, as opposed to nine Spanish newspapers with a circulation of 62,497.
"51 Saleeby, The Language of Education of the Philippine Islands, pp. 29-30.
52 Commission of the Census, Census of the Philippines: 1939, vol. 2, pt. I (Manila: Bureau of Printing: 1941), p.
288. The 1939 census reports the literacy of those 10 years and older to be at 48.8 percent, yet the standard used to
produce this figure seems to have been extremely low. This fact is recognized by the editors of the 1939 Census,
who write, "The comparison of the number of literate persons with the number of persons 10 years old and over
completing Grade I indicates that census enumerators were extremely liberal in their determination of whether a
person was able to read and write. There are 228,176 more male persons and 100,241 more female persons reported
as able to read and write than are reported as having completed Grade I or a higher grade. No doubt, there is a
considerable number of persons who have not completed Grade I but who are able to read and write. On the other
hand, there is a considerable number of persons who have completed Grade I, Grade II, Grade III, or even a higher
grade, but who are not actually able to read and write. The number of persons reported as able to read and write is
probably too high, particularly if a strict test was used to determine the persons actually able to read and write
(288)."
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Curiously, there were also two Tagalog newspapers with a circulation of 46,983 and five Chinese
newspapers with a circulation of 32,137 when neither of these languages was taught in public or
government-sanctioned private schools.153 One can only speculate what newspaper and magazine
readership would have been if the United States had directed government revenue to educating
Filipinos in the vernacular or in the Spanish language.
To the critics of English education, such sobering statistics clearly pointed to the need to
educate Filipinos in their vernacular. This was the only way that the vast majority of the people
could be made fully literate. If the vernacular was used as the medium of instruction, then better
teachers could be trained more quickly, and a greater number students could be admitted to
public schools without sacrificing the quality of education. Less time was needed for students to
process information in the vernacular compared to English, allowing those who could not afford
to stay in school for more than two to three years to obtain a functional understanding of some
language. Knowledge of the vernacular may not equip students for a life of international
commerce and diplomacy, but it would allow them to be informed of local news, participate in
civic functions at the municipal level, and engage in daily market transactions.1 54 Another
possibility could have been to retain Spanish as the language of instruction. Spanish was indeed
spoken by only a minority of the Filipino population (as U.S. policymakers liked to stress), but
teachers were among this educated minority. The use of Spanish, along with some relaxation of
the secularization policy, could also have prevented the emergence of a dualistic structure that
proved so harmful to the education institution's development.
However, such options were never contemplated, let alone adopted, by the U.S. colonial
regime, which was constrained by Washington's insistence that the "civilizing mission" required
153 Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 611-12.
1 Saleeby, The Language of Education of the Philippine Islands, pp. 33-41.
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the establishment of a secular and English educational system in the archipelago. It was not until
1960 that the dismal findings of a Philippine government-sponsored commission finally led to
the introduction of Tagalog as the medium of instruction in the first two grades, and its use for
select subjects (largely in the humanities) in the upper grades. 55 Yet, still unresolved was the
position of English in the Philippine national imagination. After forty-some years of American
education, English was now clearly the language of the elite, and was widely employed in
politics and commerce. Nonetheless, as the language of the former colonizer, English was a
controversial medium for the expression of Philippine nationalism and for the building of a
Philippine nation-state. The legacy of U.S. institution-building effort in education was therefore
not only to leave behind a dysfunctional system of schooling, but to also ensure that language
policy would become an issue of acute contestation and conflict in postcolonial Philippines.156
4. Conclusion
At the pinnacle of both Taiwanese and Philippine society was an elite stratum that viewed
education as their defining characteristic: the shenshi in the former and the ilustrado in the latter.
As such, education policy of the colonizers was of particular concern to the elite in both colonial
territories. Strong preferences on the part of the subject population do not necessarily translate
into policy outcomes within a foreign occupation, however. Whether foreign reform agents
1 Magsaysay Committee on General Education, Toward General Education in the Philippines, pp. 106-08. The
government-sponsored commission found that the majority of Filipino students terminated their education after three
or four years of schooling, and even those that advanced to higher grades were not retaining the content of subject
matters taught in the classrooms. Although a considerable portion of the school day was spent learning English,
Filipino children continued to lag behind American children by about two years in their reading ability. In light of
such findings, the commission recommended that English be introduced starting in the third grade, until it became
the medium of instruction at the high school level. Meanwhile, Pilipino (the new national language based on
Tagalog) was to be taught starting in the first grade, and used as the language of instruction in select subjects
(largely in the humanities).
116 See, for example, Renato Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino: The Filipinos in the Philippines";
Barbara S. Gaerlan, The Politics of Pedagogy of Language Use at the University of the Philippines, Diss., University
of California, Los Angeles, 1998 (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1998); Gonzalez, Language and Nationalism.
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accommodate a particular group's demands is a function of the group's centrality to the
maintenance of peace and security, as well as the intensity of its opposition.





Durable ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ Fragile
Philippines, 1935 Philippines, 1899
Ineffective
In Taiwan, although assistance by the scholar-gentry proved critical in defeating the
insurgency at the start of the occupation, their support was no longer needed once peace was
restored. Given that the formal structures of the Japanese colonial state reached deep down to the
village level, the GGT simply bypassed the scholar-gentry and directly forged collaborative
relations with township and village notables. The fortunes of the literati class again changed in
1911, when (in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution) the GGT sought their backing in the
campaign against republican and leftist ideologies. The receptiveness of the GGT to the scholar-
gentry's educational demands closely followed this fall and rise in their role in maintaining
colonial governance. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the weakness of the U.S. colonial state
outside of Manila led colonial officials to rely heavily on the ilustrado to ensure the loyalty of
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provincial and municipal elites to the United States. The lack of effective resistance by Filipino
elites was therefore not a reflection of their political weakness, but was more a function of their
strategic calculus that led them to choose passivity over active opposition in educational affairs.
The variable of effective local resistance, while significant, was not the only factor that
determined whether new institutions in the area of education acquired local ownership over time,
as summarized in Figure 1. In both Taiwan and the Philippines, the elites' acceptance of new
institutions also reflected their changing views on the distributional benefits of these institutions.
The education system in Taiwan went through a series of reforms starting in the 191 Os, as the
GGT accommodated the demands of the Taiwanese literati, but what made accommodation
possible in the first place was the rising popularity of Japanese schools among the local
population. By the second decade of Japanese rule, the original leaders of the literati class had
either died or left the political spotlight, leaving younger gentry members, as well as those who
had received education in Japan, in positions of influence within nationalist movements. This
new group of Taiwanese leaders accepted the supremacy of modem Japanese education over
those provided by traditional shob6-type schools; their primary request was that their children be
given equal opportunity for admission into the new public schools, especially at the secondary
and tertiary levels.
Meanwhile, America's public school system obtained Filipino elite ownership by the late
1900s without any attempt by U.S. officials to accommodate the educational demands of the
elite. The reason for this had little to do with a change in perception regarding the pedagogical
value of the new public schools, but rather was due to the fact that education was the largest item
on the colonial budget. When the Philippine Assembly was established in 1907, and Filipino
legislators acquired control over government expenditure, they immediately saw how funds set
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aside for education could be used for their political benefit. Simply put, appropriations for the
construction of new school buildings became the new pork. The public school system thus
rapidly expanded under the Assembly's initiative, even as this eroded the quality of education.
With their own children enrolled in prestigious private Catholic schools, Filipino legislators had
little to lose and plenty to gain from this unsustainable expansion.
The conclusion we should draw from this outcome, however, is not that Filipino elites
were malicious, but that local ownership alone does not ensure the effectiveness of institutions. It
was the right decision for U.S. administrators to give Filipinos control over expenditure; their
error was in creating a dualistic institutional order in the first place. What was perverse was not
the interests of the local elites, but the institutional structure of the education system. This
observation leaves us with both a warning and a solution. On one hand, it is a mistake to focus
solely on the issue of local ownership when establishing new institutions in an occupied territory
(or when providing development aid to a sovereign state). Indeed, if foreign powers "succeed" in
entrenching dualistic institutions within a target territory, more harm than good will be done. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter (on policing) and in the above analysis (of education),
dualistic institutions are more likely than not to produce suboptimal behavioral outcomes. The
key to institution-building success is the establishment of hybridic institutions. Insofar as such
institutions are more likely to be forged under conditions of agent discretion, the occupying
country must be prepared give ample autonomy to its reform agents.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in both colonial Taiwan and the Philippines, even
institutions that are initially rejected by the subject population may acquire local ownership over
time. Importantly, a fundamental shift in native elite interests is not needed for this outcome.
New institutions necessarily alter the way in which resources arc distributed and political power
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is gained or lost, thus changing how elites maximize their material interests. Hence, if the
objective is to entrench democratic behavior in a target territory, for example, there is no need to
transform native elites into liberal-democratic true believers; rather the key is to carefully adapt
new democratic institutions to the existing institutional order so that the desired behavioral
outcome is produced. Moreover, by fusing new and old institutions into a single whole, it
becomes difficult for the latter to be used to challenge the former. A hybridic institution can
always be altered by post-independence leaders, but its complete elimination is unlikely. Native
allies are always helpful in a foreign occupation, but local institutional support is what ensures
institution-building success.
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Chapter 6: Colonial Lessons for Contemporary State-building
1. Introduction
In recent years, strategic and normative concerns of the contemporary era have led great
powers to intervene frequently against oppressive regimes and/or failing regimes. Oftentimes
working through the United Nations, they have ruled over foreign peoples in an attempt to
reconstruct the occupied territory's governance institutions in their image. Misgovernment by
oppressive or incompetent regimes not only leads to famine, epidemics, and degradation of the
environment, but creates and sustains terrorist organizations. It has thus become increasingly
difficult to distinguish humanitarian from geostrategic foreign policy goals; the boundaries
between wars of "choice" and "necessity" are blurred. What is clear, however, is that great
powers are now more likely to become involved in civil wars of ethnically and religiously
divided countries than to fight each other for regional or global supremacy. The endpoint of a
likely conflict is no longer the annihilation of enemy forces, but the stabilization and
reconstruction of a war-torn territory.
The goal of this dissertation has been to examine two state-building occupations during
the late colonial period-the Japanese colonization of Taiwan and the U.S. colonization of the
Philippines-to draw lessons for today. These cases were selected due to their similarity in
background conditions coupled with contrasting outcomes. Like most territories currently under
foreign administration, Taiwan and the Philippines were both ethnically divided and traditional
societies, where the local populations fiercely resisted foreign intervention. Japanese and
American colonial officials (albeit for different strategic reasons) also aimed to transform their
colonial territories into modern bureaucratic states. However, while the Japanese succeeded in
implanting effective rational-legal institutions within Taiwan's traditional order, U.S. colonial
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officials in the Philippines left behind a dualistic governance structure, where new institutions
malfunctioned as they clashed with existing norms and social practices.
In this concluding chapter, I demonstrate the applicability of theoretical concepts and
causal arguments developed through the comparison of the Taiwanese and Philippine cases to
the contemporary era. I do this by examining a case that is both representative and unique among
United Nations (UN) and U.S.-led state-building campaigns of the past few decades: the ongoing
occupation of Afghanistan. Like most targets of recent reconstruction and development missions,
Afghanistan is an ethnically (or more precisely, tribally and sub-tribally) divided and war-torn
state, where a central government has never succeeded in monopolizing political authority and
coercive power. Yet, unlike other recent UN or U.S.-led occupations, there is no single foreign
administration leading the institution-building effort. Hence, it allows for the analysis of reform
efforts by different foreign entities (such as the U.S. Army, the European Union and its member
states, and the UN) all within the same strategic environment. Specifically, what follows is a
comparison of two police reform campaigns in Afghanistan: one at the national level led by
Germany (along with other countries sending aid and advisors to Afghanistan), and the other by
the U.S. Army in the unstable southern provinces bordering Pakistan. I argue that, as was the
case in the colonial occupations, the success of the Afghan state-building mission hinges on the
ability of foreign reform agents to integrate new and modern institutional elements within the
local institutional order through a pragmatic and experimental institution-building approach.
This analysis is followed by an explication of six general lessons for contemporary state-
building derived from the colonial cases. The first three of these lessons concern the centrality of
institutional hybridization in forging effective institutions under foreign occupation. The second
set of lessons (also three in total) summarizes insights gleaned from previous chapters on the
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issue of "local ownership." Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the tradeoff between
pragmatic and ideological goals in the building of institutions abroad. It is not always the case
that an institutional design that functions most effectively in a foreign environment is one that
Western states find normatively acceptable. Meanwhile, institutions designed to reflect the moral
standards of the West may prove utterly dysfunctional in the third world, thus doing more harm
than good. Ultimately, a foreign intervention is as much a normative problem as it is a strategic
one. Although this dissertation has focused exclusively on the issue of institutional effectiveness,
this should be the starting point, rather than sole focus, of policy and political debates on the
building of governance institutions through foreign occupation.
2. Building a Police Institution in Afghanistan
If the official U.S. military assessment of Afghanistan's security sector is to be believed,
the Afghan National Police (ANP) has achieved a (very) modest level of effectiveness nearly a
decade after its inception in 2002. Of the 203 operational units within the formal police
organization, 70 are now rated as "effective with advisors" and another 79 as "effective with
assistance." Although there is some ambiguity regarding the exact size of the force (due to high
desertion rate), the ANP is reported to consist of 125,589 men and women as of March 31, 2011,
thus meeting the target set by the U.S. military and its NATO allies. After a series of
reorganizations in the past decade, it is now comprised of three main formal police forces and
two auxiliary ones. Within the former category are the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan
Border Police, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, and the Afghanistan National Civil
Order Police (ANCOP). Of these three branches, the Uniform Police is the largest and is tasked
with the day-to-day maintenance of security in urban areas. The other three branches, as their
names suggest, are more specialized. The respective functions of the Afghan Border Police and
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the Counternarcotics Police are intuitive. As for ANCOP, it is a paramilitary force that, rather
than stationed in a single district, is deployed to localities in need of a surge in police power. The
two auxiliary police forces are the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which consists of
former militia groups reorganized by the national government to replace private security
companies, and the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which is an umbrella term denoting the various
village-level police units.'
Yet, even if the ANP is developing into an effective police organization (as optimistically
reported by the U.S. military), the success of Afghanistan's institution of policing (of which
ANP is a part) is far from assured. As seen in the colonial cases, a police institution includes
much more than the formal police force; in the long run, what matters most is not the operational
effectiveness of the organizational arm of the institution (i.e., the ANP), but the structure of the
institution as a whole. As I describe in the following pages, the police institution in Afghanistan
has achieved local ownership, but is thoroughly dualistic. This outcome resulted from a lack of
discretion on the part of foreign state-building agents (with the notable exception of U.S. Special
Forces involved in organizing village police units). It is not too late for foreign reformers to shift
course and develop a more hybridic police institution in Afghanistan that integrates traditional
Afghan practices of dispute resolution and village-level policing into the formal structures of the
state. For this to happen, however, the state-building mission in Afghanistan will first have to be
radically reorganized, and autonomous decision-making authority bestowed upon those charged
with implementing institutional reform.
'U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States
Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces," U.S. Department of Defense, April 2011, Web, 6
June 2011, pp. 30-34 and 61-64.
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2.1. The "Locally Owned" but Dualistic Police Institution in Afghanistan
With the decision to employ the "lead nation" donor system at a Group of Eight (G8)
summit in 2002, the international mission to establish Afghanistan's security sector assumed a
fragmented structure. Rather than create a single foreign administration (as was to be the case in
Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority) to coordinate the state-building effort, leading
countries within the "coalition of the willing" divided amongst themselves responsibility over the
various functional areas comprising security sector reform: Britain, counternarcotics; Italy, the
judiciary; Japan, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; United States, military; and
finally, Germany, police. 2 The German plan was to develop a core of capable and disciplined
officers, who would then shape the ANP into an effective police organization. To this end, the
Kabul Police Academy was reopened in August 2002, offering three-year courses for officers
and nine-month (originally one-year) courses for non-commissioned officers. In August 2005,
the reformed academy produced its first crop of 251 graduates from the three-year officer
program. By 2007, when authority over the German police training program was handed over to
the European Union, the police academy had trained approximately 4,500 commissioned and
non-commissioned officers. 3
It did not take long, however, for U.S. officials in Afghanistan to question the wisdom of
this approach. Even if the German model was indeed the best way to forge an effective police
organization in the long term, Afghanistan had an immediate need for the provision of security.
Furthermore, U.S. officials questioned the type of training being offered by the Germans, and in
2 International Crisis Group, "Reforming Afghanistan's Police," Crisis Group Asia Report N"138, International
Crisis Group, August 2007, Web, 28 June 2010, pp. 6-9.
3 Ibid., pp. 6-7; Christopher S. Chivvis, EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 2010), pp. 17-29; Markus Feilke, "German Experiences in Police Building in Afghanistan," Discussion
Paper 10-02, GRIPS Policy Research Center, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, January 2010, Web, 9
June 2011, pp. 7-8.
321
particular, its exclusive focus on the civil aspects of policing. Missing were courses pertaining to
counterinsurgency. Beginning in 2003, the United States thus began a parallel police training
program, which was initially placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (within the State Department), before being transferred
to the Department of Defense's Central Command. In 2005, the Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was established for the purpose of training both the Afghan
National Army and the ANP. The focus of the U.S. program has been to provide basic courses
(ranging from nine to fourteen weeks depending on the participant's literacy level) to patrolmen
at training centers in Kabul, as well as in key provincial centers. This regular training program
was further supplemented by a program called the Focused District Development, where the
entire police force within a single district received intensive training.4
Despite these efforts, the ANP remains corrupt and largely ineffective, at least without
foreign supervision and military support. As a ragtag organization comprised of ex-militiamen,
the ANP hardly hesitates to employ excessive force against civilian protestors, quelling riots with
live ammunition. For the most part, policemen simply do not do their assigned duties, ignoring
emergency calls and remaining within police stations rather than patrolling. Instead, their time is
spent extorting "taxes" and "fines" from the population, while taking bribes from insurgent and
criminal organizations. The ANP at times is also known to contribute directly to instability,
engaging in theft, kidnapping, rape, and murder.5 In one incident described by a doctor from the
city of Ghazni, a bus was robbed on Ghazni Highway in August 2008 by men assumed to be
4 Robert M. Perito, "Afghanistan's Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform," Special Report 227, United
States Institute of Peace, August 2009, Web, 27 May 2010, pp. 3-6; Andrew Wilder, "Cops or Robbers? The
Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police," Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007, Web, 6
June 2011, pp. 18-35.
5 The various abuses committed by members of the ANP are well documented. For a particularly illustrative
discussion, see "Reforming the Afghan National Police," Foreign Policy Research Institute and Royal United
Services Institute, November 2009, Web, 6 June 2011, pp. 2-17.
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insurgents. A little later, the "real Taliban" appeared on the highway and stopped the bus.
According to the doctor, "People told them about the previous group. The Taliban told them to
wait and they went and caught the first group." It was then discovered that the men presumed to
be insurgents were in fact "the entire police of that area." The Taliban subsequently returned the
stolen money and belongings to the people and took the police into Taliban "custody." 6
Such accounts of police corruption notwithstanding, it is likely that the quality of the
ANP, while still very low, has improved in recent years. With continued international funding
and personnel assistance, at least some ANP units (especially those within ANCOP) will likely
be fully operational in the coming years. Yet, the problem of policing in Afghanistan goes
beyond the narrow issue of ANP's organizational competency, which has so far received the
bulk of the attention within German and U.S. police reform programs. More fundamentally,
foreign state-building agents must address the failure of the policing institution as a whole,
which includes, in addition to the ANP, the Ministry of Interior (Mol); the various auxiliary
police organizations (such as the APPF and the ALP); the body of laws that the police is
responsible for upholding; and norms and beliefs concerning the proper relationship between the
police and society.
This need for broader institutional reform has indeed been recognized by foreign
analysts, and some steps (such as pay and rank reform within the Mol) have been undertaken in
this vein.7 Ongoing institutional reforms, however, have so far failed to produce the desired
effect, for they are not based on an accurate understanding of the institutional problem: the
Afghan police institution is characterized by a dualistic structure. Efforts to improve the police
institution's effectiveness will ultimately fail unless reformers recognize the problem inherent in
6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 For a discussion of these reforis, see Wilder, "Cops or Robbers?," pp. 37-42.
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superimposing a highly centralized police organization, coupled with state-reliant accountability
rules, onto a decentralized political system where a patchwork of tribal strongmen and warlords
govern through patronage and coercion.8 Unless this contradiction is reconciled, the former is
perpetually compelled to compete with, and be corrupted by, the latter.
Most notably, political power within Afghanistan is highly fragmented and personalized.
In the northern Uzbek- and Turkmen-majority provinces, for example, Abdul Rashid Dostum
ruled among Afghanistan's foremost warlords from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s over a
fairly wide area stretching from Badghis province in the west to Kunduz province in the east.
Yet, even at the height of Dostum's influence, he lacked the capacity to directly govern
territories outside of his stronghold in Jowzjan province. Rather, he ruled indirectly by fostering
patron-client relations with other warlords operating at the provincial level, such as Ahmed Khan
of Samangan, Kamal Khan of Saripul, and Hashim Habibi of Faryab. These provincial warlords
then maintained their own feudalistic sub-domains by distributing scarce resources and lending
military support to district-level warlords, who in turn ruled over village military leaders.9 Yet
even this decentralized political system of northern Afghanistan is more hierarchical compared to
the one characterizing the ethnically Pashtun southern provinces, where robust tribal and sub-
tribal loyalties prevent pan-regional warlords from emerging in the first place. In times of crisis,
several villages may band together to fight a common threat. However, given that individual
8 Here, the terms "strongmen" and "warlords" are used to describe two very different types of charismatic leaders.
The former are tied to specific tribal groups and likely belong to the nobility class; their legitimacy comes from their
position (often hereditary) within the tribe, as well as their ability to distribute scarce goods and resources to clients.
A warlord may or may not be tied to a tribe. What gives him authority is his military credentials and ability to
protect clients from external threat. For further discussion of these distinctions, see Antonio Giustozzi and Noor
Ullah, "'Tribes' and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005," Working Papers No. 7, Crisis States Research
Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2006, Web, 6 June 2011.
9 Antonio Giustozzi, Empires ofMud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press,
2009), pp. 103-31.
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identities are tightly bound to his or her village, there is little that keeps inter-village alliances
together once peace is restored. 0
Yet, regardless of the fragmented nature of Afghan politics, both the local governmental
system and the ANP is organized into a highly centralized structure with the Ministry of Interior
at its apex. In the first place, the Mol appoints governors at both the district and provincial level,
extending its reach (at least on paper) deep down into society. The are no formal mechanisms for
communities to select or remove their local governmental representatives under this system.
Moreover, district and provincial governments are not corporate entities in any legal sense, but
are instead designed as strictly administrative units whose only function is to enforce decisions
made in Kabul. They neither have the power to determine their own tax rates nor the authority to
decide how revenue is to be spent. Municipalities are the only sub-national governmental entities
with some legal autonomy over fiscal and personnel matters, but the Mol is still responsible for
approving municipal budgets and staffing decisions."
Like the local administrative structure, the ANP was also designed, and reformed over
the years, to strengthen the central government's authority over the provinces. Hence, while
provincial governors often served concurrently as police chiefs during the early post-Taliban
years (reflecting the reality that they largely came from the ranks of militia leaders), these
positions must now be held by separate individuals. The Interior Ministry's authority over ANP
appointments is also absolute all the way down to the district level, at least formally.' 2 Finally, as
described in a 2006 Mo! memorandum, "The police chain of commands flows from the Minister
of Interior, to the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs, to the Regional Commands, down to
0 Giustozzi and Ullah, 'Tribes' and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005."
" Anne Evans, et al., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2004), pp. 70-
107.
12 Wilder, "Cops or Robbers?," pp. 4-7.
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local police chiefs. The police chain of command is the final authority in all police operational
decisions. Governors ... will not direct police activities at the tactical or operational level."13
The formal structure of the Afghan security sector thus completely ignores the reality that
power, especially coercive power, is decentralized in Afghanistan. Consequently, it is of little
surprise that in many cases (especially when a territory is governed by a powerful warlord) the
Mol has been unable to exercise its authority over local governmental and ANP appointments.
According to an unnamed district governor:
Most heads of police departments used to be [militia] commanders and are mostly
illiterate. When the center has tried appointing more qualified heads of police they are not
accepted. These positions have been occupied by force. For example, the Head of Police
in this district received a transfer letter [from the Mol]. Another person was appointed
who had no jihadi background so he hasn't been able to take up his new position.14
Nonetheless, as this account by a district governor also displays, aside from those leading
the insurgency against the Afghan government and its foreign sponsors, local strongmen and
warlords have not challenged the legitimacy of the formal local governmental organization or the
ANP per se. Instead, they have made these organizations their own by hijacking them. Large
warlords declared themselves provincial governors and lesser warlords became district
governors. Private militia armies of the Taliban era are now ANP units.' 5 In the province of
Faryab, for instance, all but one of the district governors in 2002 belonged to Dostum's Junbesh
party. In Herat, all district governors and chiefs of police were personally loyal to Ismail Khan,
prior to his ouster as provincial governor in 2004 by marginalized tribal leaders and their
"3 International Crisis Group, "Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy," Asia Briefing N"85,
International Crisis Group, December 2008, Web, 28 June 2010, p. 7.
1 Evans, et al., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, p. 99.
"s Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder, "Strengthening Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform
or State-building?" Public Administration and Development 25.1 (2005): 39-48.
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militias.16 As one scholar astutely notes, "Political power is not exercised in a progressively
depersonalised, formalised, and rationalised way through agreed 'rules.' Rather, it continues to
be exercised in a personal and patronage-based manner, but within the overall framework of
bureaucratic rules."17
Local ownership of the provincial governmental organization and the ANP by warlords
such as Dostum and Ismail Khan has resulted in their transformation into instruments of personal
patronage. Yet, it is not just in the provinces that the police institution has been thus corrupted.
More alarmingly, tribal strongmen and warlords who assumed executive posts in the central
government, such as President Karzai, Mohammed Fahim, and Yunus Qanuni, have abused their
power to appoint individuals to positions of influence within local governments and the ANP in
order to expand their clientelistic networks. Initially, Fahim and Qanuni, who both belonged to
the Jamiat Islami party, had the upper hand in the politics of appointments, given the former's
control over the Ministry of Defense and the latter's position as Minister of Interior. Their
primary target was Dostum, whose network of warlords overlapped with their own sphere of
influence in the north. The abuse of authority by Qanuni, as he handed out appointments within
the ministry itself as well as in the provincial governments to unqualified loyalists, was in fact so
blatant that he was forced to resign in 2002 under foreign pressure. Yet, when Qanuni's allies
were removed from provincial governments and the ANP under the guise of Mol reform, they
were replaced by those personally loyal to President Karzai. The rise of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the
half-brother of President Karzai, as the powerbroker in Kandahar is a case in point. In this way,
Mol "reform" and the weakening of Jamiat's hold on the Interior Ministry did not lead to the
6 Evans, et al., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, pp. 97-100; Giustozzi, Empires of Mud, pp. 173-81, 264-65.
" Sarah Lister, "Understanding State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan," Working Paper No. 14,
Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, May 2007, Web, 12 June 2011,
p.6.
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strengthening of formal bureaucratic rules; it simply provided the opportunity for President
Karzai to build a feudalistic political system in the southern provinces in a manner similar to how
Dostum and the Jamiat leadership carved out their respective spheres of influence in the north.18
The transformation of Afghanistan's police institution into a vehicle for patronage is also
exemplified in the creation of Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP). The proponent of
this force was President Karzai, who argued that security in the southern Pashtun provinces
could be improved by recruiting men directly from the local tribes and organizing them into
auxiliary police units. In theory, recruits were carefully vetted by tribal elders to ensure that they
would be suited to serve the particular community to which they were assigned. The Mol was
responsible for a second round of background checks to ascertain their qualification-i.e., that
the recruits did not belong to militia groups or have criminal backgrounds. ANAP recruits then
received ten days of instruction in a provincial ANP training center (in contrast to a minimum of
nine weeks for ANP patrolmen) and were handed a uniform that looked no different from the one
worn by regular ANP units. However, when a pilot program was launched in Zabul province in
September 2006, none of the vetting rules were followed. Despite the provision that ANAP
recruits were to come from the local community, out of the 200 recruits in the second class of
ANAP trainees, only 16 were from Zabul; the largest group of recruits came from Karzai's home
province of Kandahar. Moreover, rather than being comprised of credible individuals selected by
village chiefs, ANAP units were constituted by those belonging to pro-government militias.
Predictably, this experiment was a disaster, as the ANAP took the lead in harassing the local
18 Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, March 2011, Web, 6 April 2011, pp. 16-19; Antonio Giustozzi, "'Good' State vs.
'Bad' Warlords? A Critique of State-building Strategies in Afghanistan," Working Paper No. 51, Crisis States
Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 2004, Web, 6 June 2011; idem.,
"Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan," in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy
Donais (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008): 215-31; Ahmed Rashid, "The Afghan Enforcer I Knew," New York Times 13 July
2011: A27. Ahmed Wali Karzai was assassinated by his long-time bodyguard on July 12, 2011.
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population. The ANAP was terminated in 2008, but rather than being disbanded and disarmed,
ANAP militiamen were simply integrated into regular ANP units.19
In sum, the combination of a dualistic structure and local ownership lies at the heart of
Afghanistan's dysfunctional police institution. On one hand, institutional dualism ensured a
disconnect between the de jure rules and de facto practices, rendering ineffective the various
attempts by foreign agents to improve the quality of the security sector through bureaucratic and
legal reforms. On the other, ownership of the new local government structure and the ANP by
tribal strongmen and warlords has allowed these organizations to take root, but at the cost of
their corruption into tools of patronage politics. It is too early, however, to dismiss security
sector reform in Afghanistan as a complete failure. As seen in the colonial cases of Taiwan and
the Philippines, institution-building under foreign occupations is hardly path dependent, given
the overwhelming resources and manpower that foreigners can inject (if they so desire) into the
reform effort. Yet, in order for foreign agents to play a constructive role in the building of an
Afghan police institution, the United States and its allies must first recognize that minor
adjustments to the current reform strategy are not enough. What is needed is nothing less than a
complete restructuring of the intervention so that foreign reformers have the flexibility needed to
create hybridic institutions out of foreign models and traditional Afghan norms and practices.
2.11. The Perils of Undertaking State-building without a Foreign Administration
Soon after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in November 2001, representatives of the G8 met
in Bonn to discuss Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. Two key decisions came out
of this conference. First, departing from the model adopted in both Kosovo and East Timor,
where a United Nations representative and his staff acted as an interim administration,
19 Mathieu Lef6vre, "Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives," Afghanistan
Analysts Network, May 2010, Web, 3 March 2011, pp. 5-8; Wilder, "Cops or Robbers?" pp. 13-17.
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sovereignty was immediately handed over to Afghan leaders. International support, meanwhile,
took the form of the "lead nation" approach (as discussed above). 20 The corollary of this "light
footprint" approach was that the international peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan was to
constitute a mere 5,000 troops, deployed in largely Kabul. In contrast, the more elaborate UN
mission in the small island of East Timor was undertaken with 9,000 troops, while the UN
deployed 40,000 men and women to the equally small former Yugoslav sub-province of Kosovo.
U.S. military presence in Afghanistan grew from a few thousand in late 2001 to 10,000 by early
2002, but their focus was in defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the south, rather than
buttressing government authority in the comparatively stable northern provinces.2 1
Second, the G8 member-states ratified the takeover of the central government in Kabul
by the Northern Alliance (dominated by Tajik and Uzbek warlords), even as they recognized,
under the Bonn Agreement, "the need to ensure broad representation in these interim
arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population ... "22 Of the various warlord factions
included within the Northern Alliance, the Jamiat party's (with its largely Tajik leadership)
preponderance in the new Interim Administration was especially striking, with the three most
important ministerial posts (other than that of Prime Minister) of Defense, Interior, and Foreign
Affairs going to Jamiat men. Marginalized within the new Interim Administration were not only
the tribal Pashtun leaders (with the notable exception of Hamid Karzai), but also Jamiat's main
rivals within the Northern Alliance, such as Dostum and Ismail Khan.2 3 The Bonn Agreement
addressed this contradiction between the desire for broad representation and the reality that the
20 Dale, "War in Afghanistan," p. 5; Feilke, "German Experiences in Police Building in Afghanistan," pp. 4-5.
21 Michael Bhatia, et al., "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,"
AREU Briefing Paper, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004, Web, 12 June 2011, pp. 9-12; "American
Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq," nytimes.com, New York Times, 22 June 2011, Web, 22 June 2011.
22 "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, December 2001, Web, 20 June 2011.
23 S. Frederick Starr, "Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-building," in Nation-building: Beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), pp. I 10-15.
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Interim Administration was overrun by a Tajik warlord clique by noting that "these interim
arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-
sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in
place beyond the specified period of time." However, given the "light footprint" approach of the
UN mission in Afghanistan, there was little that the international coalition could do to prevent
the Jamiat party from monopolizing key government bureaucracies in succeeding years.
Both of these policies-that is, the "light footprint" approach and the handover of the
government machinery to the Jamiat party-have since been criticized.24 Yet, given the size of
Afghanistan (slightly larger than Iraq and thirteen times larger than Bosnia), its rugged terrain,
and the proven ability of the Afghan people to resist foreign encroachment on their sovereignty
(as they did against the British in the mid nineteenth century and the Soviets in the 1980s, for
example), it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S.-led coalition to implement
a state-building program in Afghanistan without relying heavily on local partners. Meanwhile,
due to the fact that Afghan politics are highly segmented into various tribal and warlord factions,
if not the Jamiat party, some other tribal or warlord clique would have likely captured the central
government (or at least attempted to do so) at the expense of its rivals. As Antonio Giustozzi
writes, "The factionalisation of local ownership ... makes local power brokers more interested in
building fiefdoms which they might be able to directly control than in setting up impartial
institutions, hence pitting them against genuine reforms."25
The error, then, of the foreign sponsors of the Bonn Agreement was not in adopting a
"light footprint" approach, or in allowing "factionalization of local ownership" (by the Jamiat
party or by President Karzai's clique) to take root. Rather, it lies squarely in the Afghan state-
24 See, for example, the several essays in Francis Fukuyama, Nation-building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006) that are on Afghanistan.
25 Antonio Giustozzi, "Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan," pp. 215-16.
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building strategy originally embraced by the participants of the Bonn conference in 2001-that
is, in the words of Astri Suhrke, the attempt to establish "an effective, central state that operates
under the rule ofpositive law and in accordance with contemporary standards of transparency
and accountability." 26 This is a reform strategy that assumes the Afghan central government as
possessing the capacity to undertake top-down modernizing reforms-in the mold of post-WWII
Northeast Asian dictatorships-despite the fact that political power in Afghanistan is fragmented
into the hands of tribal leaders and warlords at the village and district levels. Moreover, while
informal norms of patron-client relations lie at the heart of all social interactions in Afghanistan,
it is an institution-building approach that assumes that people are motivated by formal
bureaucratic rules rather than by inter-personal ties and loyalties, and that abstract legal codes of
accountability will trump one's duties to his or her community.
Despite the obvious problem with applying this state-centric and formal-rules-oriented
strategy to Afghanistan, as exemplified in the above discussion of police reform failure, it is
ubiquitous in policy statements of donor countries and international organizations with offices in
Afghanistan. For example, in a key 2006 conference in London involving representatives from
Western donor countries and the Afghan government, reform proposals were outlined in three
substantive areas: (i) security; (ii) governance, rule of law, and human rights; (iii) and economic
and social development. 27 In the area of security, the participants called for the creation of "a
nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army" that is
"democratically accountable, organized, and trained and equipped" by the end of 2010. As for
public administrative reform, they affirmed that "a clear and transparent national appointments
mechanism will be established within 6 months, applied within 12 months and fully implemented
26 Astri Suhrke, "The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan," Chr. Michelsen
Institute, March 2006, Web, 6 June 2011, p. 1. Emphasis is mine.
27 "The Afghanistan Compact," International Security Assistance Force, NATO, February 2006, Web, 20 June 2011.
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within 24 months for all senior level appointments," and by the end of 2010, a "merit-based
appointments, vetting procedures and performance-based reviews will be undertaken for civil
service positions at all levels of government." Overall, while "Government" (that is, the central
government) is singled out as the body primarily responsible for these and other reforms
throughout the resulting agreement (called the Afghanistan Compact), no mention is made of
village-level councils that serve as the actual provider of day-to-day governance in Afghanistan.
This bias in favor of government (especially the central government) and the rule of
positive law also pervades more specialized policy proposals, which in turn serve as the blueprint
for technocratic reformers under the employment of the United Nations Development
Programme, The World Bank, or the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan. Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the issue of corruption, where a team of analysts from the British
government and various international organizations noted in a 2007 report that "non-functioning
[formal] institutions and severely limited capacity in the Government" are important enablers of
corruption in Afghanistan. Yet, rather than concluding from this observation that the solution to
rampant corruption may thus be found outside formal governmental institutions (especially in
Kabul), the document goes on to declare that "core Government agencies (finance and revenue,
law enforcement, prosecution, etc.) and line ministries (especially those with major service
delivery, infrastructure, regulatory, or contracting functions) inevitably will be the key elements
of the institutional framework for fighting corruption."2 8 Ignored is the fact that informal village-
level councils have traditionally served to maintain accountability within Afghan communities.29
28 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for Strategy and
Action," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, February 2007, Web, 20 June 2011. See also Seth G. Jones,
"Stabilization from the Bottom Up," Testimony presented before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, Rand
Corporation, February 2010, Web, 28 May 2011.
29 Thomas Barfield, et al., "The Clash of Two Goods: State and Non-state Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan," in
Customary Justice and the Rule ofLaw in War-torn Societies, ed. Deborah Isser (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2011):
159-92.
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The fact that donor countries and international organizations are misguided in their state-
building strategy is hardly surprising. From the colonial period to today, policymakers in
Western capitals have generally disregarded or disparaged the traditional institutional order of
target territories, viewing their own "advanced" institutions as the solution to whatever ails
foreign peoples. What is thus needed for a successful state-building effort is not another attempt
by policymakers in Geneva, Brussels, or Washington to devise a new and "better" reform agenda
for Afghanistan, but rather, the creation of an autonomous foreign administration in Kabul with
the authority to deviate from the preferred strategy of Western capitals. It is only then that
foreign institutional models will be effectively adapted to local conditions through a flexible and
experimental institution-building process. Importantly, it is not necessary for this autonomous
foreign administration to exercise sovereignty over Afghanistan, as did colonial regimes of the
past era. What it will need, however, is full control over the appropriation of development aid, in
order to assure autonomy from donor countries and organizations.
A prototype of how such a foreign administration would function is found in the southern
provinces of Afghanistan, where U.S. special operations forces have taken advantage of their
access to CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) funds to experiment with various
models of local policing (along with other institution-building projects) in partnership with
Afghan tribal leaders. Unlike regular development aid, which is typically tied to specific projects
sanctioned by an aid-giving organization (be it the UN or The World Bank), CERP funds may be
flexibly dispensed by U.S. military commanders (at the battalion level or above), as long as the
proposed project obtains a letter of endorsement from a local Afghan official, is below $500,000
in total expense, and falls under one of nineteen development categories ranging from security to
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water sanitation. 30 The high level of discretion associated with CERP funded projects, coupled
with the fact that U.S. military commanders are amateurs when it comes to assessing the viability
of development projects, have led to much waste and even corruption.3 However, trial and error
is very much a part of an experimental approach to building institutions. As seen in the U.S.
military's early blunders and more recent successes in establishing tribal police units, effective
institutions are ultimately founded on a graveyard of failed institutional models.
The first of several tribal policing initiatives by the U.S. military-i.e., the Afghanistan
National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)-has already been discussed. The reason for ANAP's failure
was twofold: First, its ranks were filled with ex-militiamen, who may have had experience firing
AK-47s and fighting rival insurgents, but had little background in policing. Yet, despite their
complete lack of qualification, they received only ten days of training. This situation was made
worse by the fact that ANAP recruits often came from outside of the communities to which they
were assigned, and with little vetting. Friction between the poorly trained ANAP units and the
local population was thus unavoidable. Second, because ANAP personnel received a similar
uniform as ANP patrolmen, along with a comparable salary and a government identification
card, it deterred people from joining the ANP (with its much longer training period and practice
of assigning recruits to faraway provinces). As such, the auxiliary police served only to
undermine the effectiveness of the ANP during its two years of existence and was quietly
discontinued in 2008.
ANAP's failure hardly discouraged U.S. military commanders, who had come to
appreciate (after years of operating in the southern Pashtun provinces) the central role of
30 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander's Emergency Response Program: Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2008).
" United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to
Afghanistan, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 112-21 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011), pp. 18-19.
32 Lefdvre, "Local Defence in Afghanistan," pp. 5-10; Wilder, "Cops or Robbers?" pp. 13-17.
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informal tribal organizations in providing governance at the local level. They nonetheless learned
important lessons from the ANAP debacle: In particular, if community policing schemes were to
succeed, then it was of paramount importance that the local community be involved in their
recruitment and supervision.3 3 With this in mind, a new program was drafted and launched in
early 2009, dubbed the Afghanistan Public Protection Program (AP3), in four districts within the
province of Wardak. Not only was Wardak a strategically important province (due to its
proximity to Kabul), but it also hosted a pilot project where traditional village councils, called
shuras (or jirgas in Pashto), were formally organized into standing committees under the
authority of the central government. However, when the program was actually put into place, the
shura-based recruitment process was circumvented, as tribal strongmen and local militia
commanders took the lead in enlisting AP3 "guardians." The original design of AP3 was further
undermined when Ghulam Muhammad Hotak, a former warlord from Jalrez district, was
appointed as AP3 commander. Thereafter, his former militiamen, who largely hailed from his
home district, came to dominate AP3 at the expense of the various other tribes and ethnic groups
of Wardak province. As such, regardless of Ghulam Muhammad's apparent success in restoring
order in Wardak, the AP3, now renamed and expanded as the Afghan Public Protection Force
(APPF), is no longer the community police force it was originally designed to be.34
Meanwhile, U.S. military commanders began experimenting with several other local
defense initiatives (LDIs) in mid 2009 that aimed to correct the most important defect of the
Wardak program: Its takeover by militia leaders. To this end, it was determined that local police
units should be organized strictly at the village level, so that the jurisdiction of a police unit
coincided with that of ajirga or shura. The problem with the AP3 program was that in
3 See, for example, Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan," Small Wars Journal,
December 2009, Web, 13 March 2011.
3 Lef6vre, "Local Defence in Afghanistan," pp. 8-14.
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attempting to organize units at the district level, it strengthened the hand of power brokers
(typically warlords), who operated across several village communities. Furthermore, to ensure
that village elders had a long-term interest in maintaining a local police force, valuable
infrastructure (such as wells) were built in villages by U.S. special operations forces under the
Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. This also had the added benefit of motivating
villagers to enlist as "defenders" without pay, which in turn prevented the village police from
becoming a source of corruption. In August 2010, the various experimental LDI programs were
formally recognized as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and placed under the jurisdiction of the
Interior Ministry.3 5
The original model for the LDI (and later the ALP) was a traditional system of village
policing found in the Loya Pakita region of southeast Afghanistan, known as arbakai. Hence,
whether these new village police organizations will succeed in the long run depends on the
duplicability and the sustainability of the arbakai model outside of southeast Afghanistan. An
arbakai is not a standing organization, but is formed on an ad hoc basis by the village jirga to
undertake one of three tasks: (i) to implement ajirga's ruling concerning some dispute within the
village community; (ii) to maintain general law and order; and (iii) to defend a community and
its geographic boundaries against external attack. An arbakai is comprised entirely of unpaid
volunteers selected by the elders among the village's able-bodied men; serving in an arbakai is
regarded as an act of honor. An arbakai thus differs from other traditional coercive organizations
(such as a lashkar) that are formed to undertake offensive campaigns against rival sub-tribes and
tribes. It also contrasts with a militia group in that an arbakai serves the will of an entire village
3 Dale, "War in Afghanistan," pp. 47-49; Lefdvre, "Local Defence in Afghanistan," pp. 14-21; U.S. Department of
Defense, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," pp. 61-62.
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or sub-tribal community rather than that of a single warlord leader.36 These characteristics make
an arbakai more immune against warlord penetration than other forms of informal police units.
At the same time, however, it may be difficult to form arbakai-like organizations in areas
without authoritative jirgas (or shuras) and a robust village leadership.
Despite this concern, early assessments of arbakai-like organizations established outside
of Loya Pakita are positive, and ALP units are reported to have contributed to the weakening of
insurgent activity in Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, and other southern Afghan provinces.37 In
Nagahan village in Kandahar province, for example, a core group of 25 recruits were organized
by the U.S. military into a permanent village police force with the help of the villagejirga. They
were then trained by U.S. Special Forces and, departing from the arbakai model, drew a salary.
This group of 25 full-time "defenders" were supported by an additional 50 part-time volunteers,
who received food and support from villagers in place of a salary. The elders of Nagahan have
reported that this newly organized police force was directly responsible for the improvement of
security conditions in the village, and the establishment of similar ALP units in surrounding
villages was recommended. 8 Such evidence of success, however, must be judged against the fact
that Nagahan (as well as other villages where LDI units have so far been organized) was
carefully selected by U.S. Special Forces to ensure that local circumstances were conducive to
the LDI's success. Most notably, Nagahan was characterized by strong village leadership and
36 Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muuioz, Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 2010); Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karkhail, "The Role of Non-state Actors in 'Community-based
Policing': An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-eastern Afghanistan," Contemporary Security
Policy 30.2 (2009): 318-42; Mohammad Osman Tariq, "The Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast
Afghanistan," Occasional Paper No. 7, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political
Science, December 2008, Web, 6 June 2011.
37 See, for example, Seth G. Jones, "Transitioning to Afghan-led Counterinsurgency," testimony presented before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rand Corporation, May 2011, Web, 6 June 2011.
38 Lef6vre, "Local Defence in Afghanistan," pp. 16-18.
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homogenous tribal affiliations-conditions that are lacking in many Afghan villages that have
experienced considerable inward and/or outward migration due to war and economic distress.39
In addition to the question of the arbakai model's exportability to areas with weaker and
less homogenous village leadership, two further objections have been raised concerning ALP's
long-term viability.40 The first is that by turning what were previously informal practices of self-
policing within "natural" (that is, village, sub-tribal, or tribal) communities into formal police
organizations linked to the state, the very characteristics that made them effective-such as their
legitimation by village councils and their pursuit of community goals-would be lost. Secondly,
given that traditional village police organizations are formed to serve some particular community
(at the village, or sub-tribal level), they may promote a narrow set of local interests over that of
the wider "national community." Both of these objections, which ultimately concern the issue of
hybridizing formal and informal elements of an institution into a coherent whole, are further
complicated by the fact that the administrative apparatus of the Afghan state is corrupted (as
discussed above) by the "factionalization of local ownership." 41
Indeed, the current institutional arrangement-that of placing the ALP under the
authority of the Interior Ministry-does little to address these concerns. Despite repeated reform
efforts by foreign agents, appointments within the Mo! and sub-national administrations continue
'9 Ibid.
44 Masood Karokhail and Susanne Schmeidl, "Integration of Traditional Structures into the State-building Process:
Lessons from the Tribal Liaison Office in Loya Pakita," in Publication Series on Promoting Democracy under
Conditions of Slate Fragility: Afghanistan (Berlin: Heinrich B61 Foundation, 2006): 59-81; Susanne Schmeidl and
Masood Karkhail, "The Role of Non-state Actors in 'Community-based Policing'."
4' These objections do not pertain just to Afghanistan but also to other countries where local (or community)
policing has come to be seen as a panacea of the problem of insecurity in societies with weak or failing states. See,
for example, Mike Brogden, "Commentary: Community Policing: A Panacea from the West," African Affairs
103.413 (2004): 635-59; Diane E. Davis, "Policing, Regime Change and Democracy: Reflections from the Case of
Mexico," Working Papers No. 22, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political
Science, November 2007, Web, 8 June 2011; Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi, "Anatomy of a Surrogate:
Historical Precedents and Implications for Contemporary Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism," Small Wars
andinsurgencies 20.1 (2009): 1-35; Ulrich Schneckener, "Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-state Actors and Security
Governance," in Private Actors and Security Governance, ed. Alen Bryden and Marina Caparini (Geneva: Centre
for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006): 23-40.
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to reflect clientelistic considerations first and foremost. As such, by explicitly linking the ALP to
the Mol, village police units may become corrupted; the danger is that ALP units (like the ANAP
in Zabul or the AP3 in Wardak) could be taken over by local strongmen and warlords. Moreover,
by placing the village police forces under the command of the district police chief, the link
between ALP units and the villagejirga or shura is weakened. In turn, even if usurpation of an
ALP unit by a militia leader is avoided, its delegitimization may not be, as the ALP is regarded
by villagers as nothing more than an extension of the central or provincial government. The
danger of placing the ALP under the jurisdiction of the Mol notwithstanding, the alternative is
not obvious. From the colonial period to today, various local policing initiatives have been tried,
some with more success (i.e., Taiwan) than others (i.e., the Philippines). 4 2 However, as every
case is unique in terms of its societal composition, the strength of the state, and the nature of the
foreign occupation, there are no ready-made models that could serve as guides to integrating the
ALP within the formal security apparatus of the Afghan state.
The success of the ALP program, and of the police institution more broadly, rests on the
replication of the very process that led to the creation of the ALP at a higher (i.e., provincial and
national) level of reform. What is therefore needed is not a detailed plan (sanctioned by the UN
or other international aid-giving organizations) on the integration of the ALP into the formal
security apparatus, but the ability of foreign reformers to freely experiment with various
institutional arrangements. For this reason, even as the U.S. military gradually withdraws from
combat operations in the southern provinces, its role in rebuilding Afghanistan should be
strengthened. In the absence of a formal occupational regime, the U.S. military is the only
foreign agent in Afghanistan with the discretionary power to undertake institutional reform with
42 Some recent examples of success are discussed in Bruce Baker, "Who Do People Turn to for Policing in Sierra
Leone?" Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23.3 (2005): 371-90; idem., "Reconstructing a Policing System
Out of the Ashes: Rwanda's Solution," Policing and Society 17.4 (2007): 344-66.
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the necessary flexibility and pragmatism. In the final analysis, while U.S. military commanders
themselves may lack legal expertise or fluency in developmental economics, they are best suited
to lead the next phase of Afghanistan's state-building campaign.
3. Six Lessons from Our Colonial Past for Contemporary State-building Missions
Differences between the recent U.S.-led state-building campaign in Afghanistan and the
early twentieth century colonial occupations are striking. While the Japanese in Taiwan and the
Americans in the Philippines established full-fledged colonial administrations to directly rule the
native population for several decades, sovereignty over Afghanistan was immediately handed
over to Afghan elites upon the toppling of the Taliban regime. Construction of modem
governance institutions in Taiwan and the Philippines was primarily funded through tax revenue
raised within the occupied territory and controlled entirely by the colonial administration; the
reconstruction and development effort in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is largely funded
externally by foreign governments, as well as by hundreds of international and nongovernmental
organizations, each with its separate agenda. The timeline that Japanese and American colonial
officials had to work with was indefinite: Taiwan was intended to become a permanent part of
the Japanese nation-state, and the U.S. occupation of the Philippines was initially to last as long
as it took for Filipinos to think and act like idealized Americans. Meanwhile, U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan is scheduled to end by 2014, even though aid-giving organizations
(along with U.S. military advisers and trainers) may remain long after this deadline.
Consequently, specific institutional designs that proved effective in colonial Taiwan or
the Philippines are inapplicable to the ongoing Afghan intervention, or to other territories that are
currently under foreign occupation. This does not mean, however, that the historic state-building
cases offer no lessons for today's policymakers. Like Afghanistan-as well as East Timor, Sierra
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Leone, and many other territories recently or currently under foreign occupation-both Taiwan
and the Philippines were populated by those who saw themselves as belonging to clans, rather
than nations or even ethnic groups; placed patron-client relations at the center of social, political,
and economic interactions; and frequently fought one another for control over scarce resources
and for settling long-lasting feuds. As such, while the structure of the occupation, as well as the
tools and strategies available to foreign agents, may be radically different between the early
twentieth-century cases and recent state-building missions, the basic institutional problem of
building modem (i.e., rational-legal) governance institutions in territories characterized by
43traditional forms of authority is the same.
In particular, two basic implications emerge out of the colonial Taiwan and Philippine
cases, which in turn help explain why the state-building mission in Afghanistan is failing. First,
effective institutions are forged out of a pragmatic and experimental process; pre-conceived
plans and reform strategies, no matter how carefully they may have been formulated, are likely
to fail. For this reason, the most important ingredient to state-building success is that foreign
reformers are afforded considerable discretion in building new institutions. Second, whether
local ownership improves or degenerates the effectiveness of an institution is closely tied to the
institution's internal structure. Although local ownership enhances a hybridic institution's
effectiveness, it leads to the corruption of a dualistic one. Finally, in addition to these two broad
implications, six specific lessons follow from the colonial case studies, which in turn serve as
guides (or warnings) to current and future state-builders.
4 For a discussion of the distinctions between a modem and traditional state (as well as between modem and
traditional forms of authority), see Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval
and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 6-10; Michael Mann, States, War,
and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1988), pp. 7-14; Charles Tilly,
Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), pp. 1-5; Max
Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946): 77-128.
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I. Military occupations are more likely to succeed than those led by civilians
Military officers are not well suited to designing and implementing development projects.
As seen in the Afghan case, they are prone to support financially unstable projects that do not
meet the needs of local communities. 44 Meanwhile, in the Taiwan case, the Japanese Imperial
Army was blamed for turning civilians into insurgents through their repressive rule, and it was
only after the military was removed from all civilian duties that security conditions began to
improve. Nonetheless, militaries are most suited to lead a state-building campaign, as they are
afforded considerable discretion in executing their assigned mission. Civil Administrator of
Taiwan Got6 Shimpei's (1898-1906) plan for structuring Taiwan's police institution (according
to the nineteenth-century Prussian model) survived even after it was rejected by the Minister of
Home Affairs (in Tokyo) because it had the backing of Governor-General Kodama Gentaro, who
was among the most influential generals in the Imperial Army. On the other hand, police chief
Harry Bandholtz's (1907-1913) plan to integrate the municipal police into the Philippine
Constabulary failed to receive the support of successive civilian Governor-Generals of the
Philippines, as they dared not deviate from the priorities of Washington. The problem with
Bandholtz's institution-building strategy was that it contradicted one of the U.S. state-building
mission's core tenets: the principle of local (municipal) autonomy.
Hence, it is not the superiority of military commanders as state-builders that make them
ideally suited to lead such campaigns; rather, their relative autonomy vis-i-vis the home
government provides them the discretion necessary to succeed. The case of Kodama Gentaro and
other Japanese generals serving as colonial administrators was extreme in that Imperial Japan
was a country with extremely weak civilian control over the military. Yet, even in the United
4 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. It should be noted,
however, that many projects implemented by USAID (an agency of the U.S. government responsible for
administering foreign aid) are also reported to be unsustainable.
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States, where civilian control is well established, generals are more likely than any civilian
counterpart to possess considerable discretionary authority in the operational field, as witnessed
in both the recent Afghan and the Iraq occupations. Nonetheless, because military officers are
not experts in designing development projects, military occupations are more likely to succeed
when there is close cooperation between military commanders and civilian experts. This was the
case in Taiwan, as seen from the partnership between Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shimpei, as
well as in the post-World War 1I Japanese and German occupations, led respectively by generals
Douglas MacArthur and Lucius Clay.
11. More time, manpower, and money do not guarantee state-building success
The failure of the United States to establish effective police and education institutions in
the Philippines was particularly notable in that these were among the top priorities of the colonial
administration. For example, the 1902 colonial budget was 17.4 million pesos (approximately 8.7
million dollars). Of which, the two leading items on the budget were education (at 3.6 million
pesos) and policing (at 2.5 million pesos). 4 5 Moreover, from 1901 (when the Constabulary was
created) to 1917 (when a Filipino was first appointed as Chief of the Philippines Constabulary),
70 percent of the commissioned officers were Americans.4 6 In turn, Filipino policemen received
particularly intense training and tutelage by the Americans. Indeed, the only bureaucratic
organization to be subjected to longer and greater U.S. supervision was the Education Bureau,
where an American served as Bureau Chief until 1935, and where most division superintendents
and school principals were Americans up until the very end of direct U.S. rule over the
4 Alfred W. McCoy, Policing A merica's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and Rise of the Surveillance
State (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), p. 54.
46 Emanuel Agrava Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems (Manila: Pobre's Press, 1933), p. 70.
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archipelago.4 7 As these examples painfully demonstrate, no amount of training or tutelage by
foreign advisors, as well as infusion of money, can overcome a bad institutional design.
The amount of time and resources foreign powers commit to a foreign occupation do
nonetheless impact the transformativeness of a state-building campaign. The Japanese colonial
state in Taiwan was able to exert its influence deep into Taiwanese society not only because of
the skillful use of hoko (a traditional Taiwanese system of village-level policing and collective
responsibility), but also because of the ubiquity of Japanese police officers throughout the island.
In 1910, for example (that is, 15 years after Japan's annexation of Taiwan), a police force of
5,980 men was dispersed throughout the island, such that there was one police officer for every
820 non-aboriginal Taiwanese residents, compared to a ratio of about one to a thousand in
metropolitan Japan. (The police to population ratio in aboriginal territories was 1:58.)48 Of this
force, 4,558 (or 76.2 percent) were Japanese. 49 Given that the police and local administration
were tightly integrated in colonial Taiwan, the high police to population ratio directly translated
to state strength. Had Japanese police presence been much smaller, it is likely that the Japanese
would have depended more heavily on prominent Taiwanese to act as intermediaries between the
colonial state and society. In turn, much more of the original decentralized political structure that
revolved around prominent landlord families would have been preserved, a la Philippines.
47 This was specified in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (popularly known as the Jones Act). See U.S.
Congress, United States Statues at Large, v. 39 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917), p. 553.
48 Ching-chih Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," Diss., Harvard University, 1973, pp.
257-59, 261.
49 Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan Sdtokufu keisatsu enkakushi [A history of the Taiwan Government-
General police], vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan Sotokufu Keimukyoku, 1933), p. 810.
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Ill. Institutions that are effective under a foreign occupation may fail with independence
The U.S. state-building effort in the Philippines is largely considered by scholars to have
been a failure. 0 Nonetheless, often missed in recent assessments of the Philippine occupation is
that the U.S. colonial regime was quite effective in governing the archipelago during its nearly
forty years of existence. The Philippine Constabulary played a particularly significant role in
suppressing the insurgency, collecting valuable intelligence on revolutionaries and other enemies
of the United States, and forging collaborative ties between the conservative landed elite and
American colonial officials. Despite the Constabulary's effectiveness as a police organization,
however, the larger institution of policing was itself dysfunctional due to its dualistic structure.
Provincial elites fielded their own private police force, and even municipal police units (which
were nominally under the authority of the Constabulary) largely functioned as the municipal
mayor's personal bodyguards. With coercive power thus dispersed throughout Philippine society,
the Constabulary's effectiveness ultimately depended on the large U.S. military presence to deter
any "misbehavior." In short, an institutional structure that may prove effective within the context
of a foreign occupation may contribute to instability under normal conditions. The performance
of an institution under foreign occupation is not indicative of its effectiveness in the occupation's
aftermath. A more reliable marker of an institution's post-occupation effectiveness is its internal
structure-i.e., its degree of hybridity.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the tendency in the study of state-
building is to measure the success or failure of a reform effort based on "performance
5 See, for example, Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the
Philippines and Puerto Rico during US. Colonialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Paul D. Hutchcroft,
Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); John T. Sidel,
Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Dan Slater,
Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and A uthoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
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indicators," such as GDP growth, number of battle deaths, and survey results on perception of
institutional performance. The problem with these indicators, however, is that they provide a
picture of an institution's effectiveness only up to the present, and say little about how an
institution may perform in the future. Indeed, if we were to measure the Philippine
Constabulary's performance in the 1930s, we would have concluded that the United States was
highly successful in building a police institution in the Philippines. Meanwhile, positive reports
by the U.S. military on the Afghan Local Police's recent performance have fueled hope that
security sector reform is now on the right track. Yet, even if such assessments depict an accurate
picture of present conditions, they tell us little about whether village-level police units will
continue to contribute to peace and security in the absence of a large U.S. military presence. In
order to determine more precisely the likely outcome of the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan
(and elsewhere), it is necessary to predict how new institutions may evolve in the occupation's
aftermath. A typology of institutional structures-which categorizes institutions based on their
degree of hybridization and local ownership-will therefore prove more accurate in assessing the
success of a reform effort, even if such qualitative measures are inherently subjective and
difficult to apply systematically across different cases.
IV. Local ownership may be substituted by a large foreign presence
Since the mid-I 990s, "local ownership" is commonly flagged as a necessary ingredient of
a successful state-building effort. Although the exact meaning of this term is the subject of much
debate, at minimum, it means that the local population (or more accurately, representatives of the
local population) regards the operation of a particular institution to be in its best interest.5 1
51 For a discussion of the meaning of "local ownership" and its history, see Timothy Donais, "Understanding Local
Ownership in Security Sector Reform," in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais
(Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008): 3-18; Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in
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However, as Simon Chesterman writes, the reality is that although local ownership is explicitly
or implicitly touted in almost any institution-building strategy produced by aid-giving
organizations, "ownership in the development field has frequently been of more rhetorical
significance than anything else."52 In fact, as demonstrated in preceding chapters, local
ownership is likely to pertain only when native elites can mount effective resistance against
foreign occupiers, and force them to design institutions that take into account local interests.
Actor interests and institutions, however, are co-constitutive. In other words, interests
shape the type of institution that is demanded by local actors, but once established, institutions
then shape actor interests, albeit gradually. Therefore, if foreign occupiers are willing to commit
the manpower, time, and resources necessary to enforce an institution initially lacking in local
ownership, then local ownership may eventually be induced through the very operation of the
institution. This was indeed observed in the case of education reform in both colonial Taiwan
and the Philippines. Hence, while a large foreign presence does not assure the establishment of
effective institutions, it does allow foreigners to side-step the problem of local ownership. This
becomes particularly significant when the population of a target territory is divided along two or
more competing ethnic or sectarian groups, such that institutions which advance the interests of
one group will inevitably hurt those of another. Under these conditions, the most effective type
of institution may be one that is not owned by any of the competing groups.53
UN Statebuilding Operations," Journal ofIntervention and Statebuilding 1.1 (2007): 3-26. According to a more
maximalist definition by Laurie Nation, local ownership means that "institutions and activities in a given country
must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors." See Laurie Nathan,
"The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice," in Local Ownership and Security
Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), p. 21.
52 Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice," p. 8.
53 For further discussion of this problem, see Eric Scheye, "Unknotting Local Ownership Redux: Bringing Non-
state/Local Justice Networks Back In," in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais
(Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008): 60-81; Alex Martin and Peter Wilson, "Security Sector Evolution: Which Locals?
Ownership of What?" in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais (Berlin: Lit Verlag,
2008): 82-103.
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V. Under a dualistic institutional structure, local ownership is more bad than good
While local ownership will help new rules and regulations obtain compliance within the
target territory, it does not ensure that an institution will induce its intended behavioral outcome
from the subject population. More consequential for an institution's effectiveness is its internal
structure. When Taiwan's hoko system was first reconstituted in 1897, for example, it obtained
the support of local Taiwanese elites, as the system helped to consolidate their authority at the
village and township levels. However, despite such support by the local elite, hok5 units largely
failed in their primary task of thwarting insurgent activity. It was only when the hok5 system was
carefully integrated into the formal colonial police structure in the ensuing years that they came
to serve as the backbone of the Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan.
Moreover, local ownership can lead to an institution's corruption when combined with a
dualistic institutional structure. The reason for this lies in the fact that local ownership makes an
institution's evolutionary trajectory highly stable (i.e., path dependent), thus ensuring the
reproduction of an institution's core elements, both good and bad. Consequently, local ownership
of an ineffective institution means that the various factors causing an institution's dysfunction-
such as the dualistic relationship between new and old institutional elements-are encased,
making it difficult for foreign (or domestic) reformers to fundamentally alter the institution's
design for the better. This was observed in the case of America's reform of the Philippine
education system. Given that Filipino elites perceived Catholic private schools as providing the
best schooling for their children, they attached very little educational value to the newly built
secular public schools. Filipino elites nonetheless came to support the rapid expansion of these
schools, for they served as a convenient tool for attracting government appropriations to their
home districts. In turn, the quality of public schools deteriorated, as the expansion of the school
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system outpaced the training of competent teachers. If Filipino elites had regarded the public
schools as an important source of their children's education, this strategy of abusing education
appropriations for electoral benefit would not have been viable.
V1. Choice of owners in local ownership should be a part of the institution-building strategy
Leading the Taiwanese resistance against Japanese occupation in 1895 were high-ranking
members of the gentry elite and heads of familial clans. They were typically large landlords, who
garnered the support of multiple villages within a single region, and could therefore field large
rebel forces against the Imperial Japanese Army. It was in the face of this popular resistance-
led by Taiwan's foremost elites-that the Japanese colonial administration decided to resurrect
the hoko system; the ultimate success of this system was due to the fact that it obtained
ownership by the elite. However, this "pro-Japanese" elite, who served as heads of hok6 units,
were not the prominent landlords and gentry members that led the initial resistance, but village-
level notables, whose influence did not extend far beyond their local communities. In this way,
by empowering village notables, the Japanese succeeded in weakening the influence of Taiwan's
traditional leaders, enabling them to concentrate political power in the hands of colonial
administrators. Effective resistance compelled the Japanese to design institutions with local
ownership, but by taking advantage of traditional divisions within Taiwanese society between
large landlords and less prominent village notables, the Japanese established a new system of
colonial governance that best served their exploitative goals.
The moral of the story is not that foreign occupiers should manipulate divisions within
the subject society to advance their own selfish goals; rather, foreign reformers should be
cognizant of the fact that their decisions regarding institutional design will inevitably affect the
balance of power within the target territory, empowering some elites over others. Indeed, the
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reason why large and well-connected warlords and tribal leaders are thriving in Afghanistan
today is because institution-building has focused almost exclusively on the national level. When
the occupational authority concentrates power in the central government, those elites with access
to national-level political office are most rewarded. It is precisely for this reason that the ALP
program (if it can avoid colonization by the Ministry of Interior) may hold the key to
Afghanistan's future. Since the ALP, at least under the original arbakai-model, is organized and
maintained by village councils (i.e., shuras and jirgas), it has the potential of empowering village
elders at the expense of district and provincial level warlords. If this leads to the permanent
weakening of warlords, it will do more to buttress the power and authority of the central
government than any of the centralizing reforms currently favored by donor governments and
aid-giving organizations.
4. Conclusion
Humanitarian and other normative concerns lie at the heart of contemporary state-
building missions. From Cambodia (where the United Nations assumed sovereignty over an
independent state for the first time) to Kosovo and East Timor, the desire to transform war-torn
societies into exemplary democracies has guided the actions of foreign reformers. However, as
demonstrated in the above discussion of Afghanistan, noble goals of fostering a freer and fairer
society instill rigidity into the institutional reform process; models based on the Western
bureaucratic (rational-legal) state are often ill-suited to societies where traditional forms of
authority reign supreme. As we saw in the colonial cases, institutions rigidly modeled on
Western precedent are less likely to be integrated into the preexisting institutional order of the
target territory, thus resulting in corruption and ineffectiveness. It is not wrong for state-building
missions to be undergirded by humanitarian impulses. Such impulses, however, must be
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mediated by pragmatic reformers with the discretion to selectively borrow from both foreign and
native institutional elements to construct a coherent and effective whole. A dysfunctional
institution, even if it embodies universal normative principles, does more harm than good.
Pragmatism, however, should not be allowed to completely trump normative concerns. It
is not always the case that the most effective institutions are ones that reflect the sense of justice
and fairness of the local population or that of the "international community." Consequently, the
provision of discretionary authority to the occupational administration-an inherently autocratic
entity-must be coupled with some means of ensuring agent accountability to the principal
governments and international organizations. Moreover, it is necessary to be aware of the fact
that all institutions have distributional implications; institutions with "local ownership" will still
produce winners and losers. Local ownership is therefore not a good in itself. It may even be the
case that a more just institutional design is one with very little support from the local elite
stratum. Yet, if occupiers are unwilling to invest considerable time, money, and manpower into
the state-building effort, only institutions that are strongly supported by native elites (no matter
how corrupt they may appear in the eyes of foreign reformers) will survive the occupation.
Ultimately, state-building cannot be debated strictly from an institutional perspective, for
it concerns some of our most cherished beliefs on good government, social justice, and economic
fairness. Good intentions, however, do not necessarily lead to good outcomes. In seeking the
right balance between strategic and normative concerns, and between pragmatism and idealism,
the first step is to understand how effective institutions are created under foreign occupation. It is
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